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A THEODICY; 



OR, 



VINDICATION OF THE DIVINE GLORY, 



AS MANIFESTED IN THE 



CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE MORAL WORLD. 



By ALBERT TAYLOR BLEDSOE, LL. D., 

PROFESSOR OF MATHEMATICS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, 



\ ' 

PUBLISHED BY CARLTON & PHILLIPS, 

200 MULBERRY-STREET. 

1 8 5 6. 



\85G 



Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1853, by 
CARLTON & PHILLIPS, 

in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern District of New- York. 



By Transfer 
MA^f 24 1928 



TO 



IfftotmjiT 1'atius |T. Cakll, H.$., 

OF THE UNIVERSITX OF VIRGINIA, 

THIS VOLUME IS INSCRIBED BY ONE WnO ENTEETAINS A HIGH ADMIKATION 

OF HIS INTELLECTUAL POWERS AND LEAENING, AS WELL AS OF niS 

OHAEAOTEE AS A CHRISTIAN GENTLEMAN. 



C It t £ 11 1 s 



IITEODUCTIOI. 

OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY ....: Page 9 

§ L— The failure of Flato, and other ancient philosophers, to construct a 

theodicy, not a ground of despair 11 

§ II. — The failure of Leibnitz not a ground of despair 15 

§ III. — The system of the moral universe not purposely involved in obscurity 

to teach us a lesson of humility 19 

§ IT. — The littleness of the human mind a ground of hope , 21 

§ V. — The construction of a theodicy not an attempt to solve mysteries, but to 

dissipate absurdities .• 21 

§ VI. — The spirit in which the following work has been prosecuted, and the 

relation of the author to other systems 2.3 

PART I. 

THE EXISTENCE OF MORAL EVIL, OR SIX, CONSISTENT WITH THE HOLI- 
NESS OF GOD 31 

Chapter I. — The scheme of necessity denies that max is responsible for the 

EXISTENCE OF SIN 33 

> § I. — The attempts of Calvin and Luther to reconcile the scheme of necessity 

Avith the responsibility of man 3-1 

§ II. — The manner in which Hobbes, Collins, and others, endeavour to reconcile 

necessity with free and accountable agency 41 

§ HI. — The sentiments of Descartes, Spinoza, and Malebranche, concerning the 

relation between liberty and necessity 45 

§ IV. — The views of Locke, Tucker, Hartley, Priestley, Helvetius, and Diderot, 

with respect to the relation between liberty and necessity 50 

§ V. — The manner in which Leibnitz endeavours to reconcile liberty and neces- 
sity 54 

§ VI.— The attempt of Edwards to establish free and accountable agency on the 
basis of necessity — The views of the younger Edwards, Day, Chalmers, Dick, 
D'Aubigne, Hill, Shaw, and M'Cosh, concerning the agreement of liberty 
and necessity 61 

§ VH. — The sentiments of Hume, Brown, Comte, and Mill, in relation to the 

antagonism between liberty and necessity 72 

§ VIH. — The views of Kant and Sir William Hamilton in relation to the 

antagonism between liberty and necessity 78 



6 CONTENTS. 

§ IX. — The notion of Lord Karnes and Sir James Mackintosh on the same 
subject Page 81 

§ X. — The conclusion of Moehler, Tholuck, and others, that all speculation on 

such a subject must be vain and fruitless S3 

§ XL — The true conclusion from the foregoing review of opinions and argu- 
ments 81 

Chapter II. — The scheme of necessity makes God the author of sin 8G 

§ I. — The attempts of Calvin and other reformers to show that their system of 

necessity does not make God the author of sin 87 

§ II. — The attempt of Leibnitz to show that the scheme of necessity docs not 

make God the author of sin 93 

§ III. — The maxims adopted and employed by Edwards to show that the 

scheme of necessity does not make God the author of sin 98 

§ TV. — The attempts of Dr. Emmons and Dr. Chalmers to reconcile the scheme 

of necessity with the purity of God 110 

CnATTER HI. — The scheme of necessity denies the reality of moral distinc- 
tions , 113 

§ I. — The views of Spinoza, in relation to the reality of moral distinctions 113 

§ II. — The attempt of Edwards to reconcile the scheme of necessity with the 

reality of moral distinctions Ill 

§ ILT. — Of the proposition that " The essence of the virtue and vice of dispo- 
sitions of the heart and acts of the will lies not in their cause, but in their 
nature" 12G 

§ IT. — The scheme of necessity seems to be inconsistent with the reality of 
moral distinctions, not because we confound natural and moral necessit}-, 
but because it is really inconsistent therewith 129 

Chapter IV. — The moral world not constituted according to the scheme of 

necessity 132 

§ I. — The scheme of necessity is based on a false psychology 132 

§ LI. — The scheme of necessity is directed against a false issue 142 

§ 111. — The scheme of necessity is supported by false logic 119 

§ IV. — The scheme of necessity is fortified by false conceptions 151 

§ V. — The scheme of necessity is recommended by false analogies 1G0 

§ VI. — The scheme of necessity is rendered plausible by a false phraseology 1G2 

§ VLI. — The scheme of necessity originates iu a false method, and terminates 
in a false religion 1G-A 

Chapter V. — The relation between the human will and the divine agency 1G6 

§ I. — General view of the relation between the divine and the human power.... 1GG 
§ LT. — The Pelagian platform, or view of the relation between the divine and 

the human power 171 

§111. — The Augnstinian platform, or view of the relation between the divine 

agency and the human 17G 

§ IV. — The views of those who, in later times, have symbolized with Augustine... 178 
§ V. — The danger of mistaking distorted for exalted views of the divine 

sovereignty 18 I 



CONTENTS. 7 

Chap-j eh VI.— The existence of moral evil, or sin, reconciled with the holiness 

of God Page 182 



§ I. — The hypothesis of the soul's preexistence 182 

§ II. — The hypothesis of the Manicheaus 183 

§ III. — The hypothesis of optimism , 185 

§ IV. — The argument of the atheist — The reply of Leibnitz and other theists — 

The insufficiency of this reply 189 

§ V.— The sophism of the atheist exploded, and a perfect agreement shown to 

subsist between the existence of sin and the holiness of God 192 

§ VI. — The true and only foundation of optimism 199 

§ VII. — The glory of God seen in the creation of a world which he foresaw 

would fall under the dominion of sin 203 

§ 'YTIL — The little, captious spirit of Voltaire, and other atheizing minute 
philosophers 209 

Chapter VII. — Objections Considered 211 

§ I. — It«ruay be objected that the foregoing scheme is " new theology " 211 

§ II. — It may be imagined that the views herein set forth limit the omnipotence 

of God 213 

§ III. — The foregoing scheme, it may be said, presents a gloomy view of the 

universe 216 

§ IV. — It may be alleged, that in refusing to subject the volitions of men to the 
power and control of God, we undermine the sentiments of humility and 

submission 218 

§ V.— The foregoing treatise may be deemed inconsistent with gratitude to God 222 
§ VI. — It may be contended, that it is unfair to urge the preceding difficulties 
against the scheme of necessity ; inasmuch as the same, or as great, diffi- 
culties' attach to the system of those by whom they are urged 223 



PART II. 

THE EXISTENCE OF NATURAL EVIL, OR SUFFERING, CONSISTENT WITH 

THE GOODNESS OF GOD 231 

Chapter I. — God deshies and seeks the salvation of all men 233 

§ I. — The reason why theologians have concluded that God designs the salva- 
tion of only a part of mankind 235 

§ II. — The attempt of Howe to reconcile the eternal ruin of a portion of man- 
kind A\ith the sincerity of God in his endeavours to save them 237 

§ IH. — The views of Luther and Calvin respecting the sincerity of God in his 

endeavours to save those who will finally perish 242 

Chapter H. — Natural evtl, or suffering, and especially thu sufferlng of in- 
fants, reconciled wtth the goodness of God 245 

§ I. — All suffering not a punishment for sin 245 

§ II. — The imputation of sin not consistent with the goodness of God 250 

§ HI. — The imputation of sin not consistent with human, much less with the 

divine goodness 259 

§ IV. — The true ends, or final causes, of natural evil' 2Gi 

§ V. — The importance of harmonizing reason and revelation 272 



8 CONTENTS. 

Chapter III. — The sufferings of Christ reconciled with the goodness of God 276 

§ I. — The sufferings of Christ not unnecessary Page 276 

§ II. — The sufferings of Christ a bright manifestation of the goodness of God.... 279 
§ III. — The objections of Dr. Channing, and other Unitarians, against the doc- 
trine of the atonement 286 

Chatter IV. — The eternal punishment of the wicked reconciled with the 

goodness of God 294 

§ I. — The false grounds upon which the doctrine of the eternity of future punish- 
ment has been placed 295 

§ II. — The unsound principles from which, if true, the fallacy of the eternity 

of future punishment may be clearly inferred 297 

§ III. — The eternity of future punishment an expression of the divine goodness 301 

Chapter V. — The dispensation of the dtvine favours reconciled with the 

goodness of God 312 

§ I. — The unequal distribution of favours, which obtains in the economy of - 

natural providence, consistent with the goodness of God 312 

§ II. — The Scripture doctrine of election consistent Avith the impartiality of 

the divine goodness 317 

§ III. — The Calvinistic scheme of election inconsistent with the impartiality 

and glory of the divine goodness 323 

§ IV. — The true ground and reason of election to eternal life shows it to be 

consistent with the infinite goodness of God 330 



CONCLUSION. 

A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES AND ADVANTAGES OF THE FORE- 
GOING SYSTEM 335 

I. — Summary of the first part of the foregoing system 337 

§ I. — The scheme of necessity denies that man is the responsible author of sin. 338 

§ II. — The scheme of necessity makes God the author of sin 340 

§ III. — The scheme of necessity denies the reality of moral distinctions 341 

§ IV. — The moral world not constituted according to the scheme of necessity... 343 

§ V. — The relation between the human agency and the divine 344 

§ VI. — The existence of moral evil consistent with the infinite purity of God.... 345 

II. — Summary of the second part of the foregoing system 355 

§ I. — God desires the salvation of all men 355 

§ II. — The sufferings of the innocent, and especially of infants, consistent with 

the goodness of God 357 

§ III. — The sufferings of Christ consistent with the divine goodness 359 

§ IV. — The eternity of future punishment consistent with the goodness of God. 360 
§ V. — The true doctrine of election and predestination consistent with the 

goodness of God 361 

§ VI. — The question submitted 364 



INTRODUCTION. 



OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY 



lufrohtriiaiL 



OF THE POSSIBILITY OP A THEODICY. 

How, under the government of an infinitely perfect Being, evil 
could have proceeded from a creature of his own, has ever been 
regarded as the great difficulty pertaining to the intellectual 
system of the universe. It has never ceased to puzzle and per- 
plex the human mind. Indeed, so great and so obstinate has it 
seemed, that it is usually supposed to He beyond the reach of the 
human faculties. Wq shall, however, examine the grounds of 
this opinion, before we exchange the bright illusions of hope, 
if such indeed they be, for the gloomy forebodings of despair. 

SECTION I 

The failure of Plato and other ancient philosophers to construct a Theodicy, 
not a ground of despair. 

The supposed want of success attending the labours of the 
past, is, no doubt, the principal reason which has induced so 
many to abandon the problem of evil in despair, and even to 
accuse of presumption every speculation designed to shed light 
upon so great a mystery. But this reason, however specious 
and imposing at first view, will lose much of its apparent force 
upon a closer examination. 

In every age the same reasoning has been employed to repress 
the efforts of the human mind to overcome the difficulties by 
which it has been surrounded ; yet, in spite of such discourage- 
ments, the most stupendous difficulties have gradually yielded 
to the progressive developments and revelations of time. It 
was the opinion of Socrates, for example, that the problem of 



12 INTRODUCTION. 

the natural world was unavoidably concealed from mortals, and 
that it was a sort of presumptuous impiety, displeasing to the 
gods, for men to pry into it. If Newton himself had lived in 
that age, it is probable that he would have entertained the same 
opinion. It is certain that the problem in question would then 
have been as far beyond the reach of his powers, as beyond 
those of the most ordinary individual. The ignorance of the 
earth's dimensions, the manifold errors respecting the laws of 
motion, and the defective state of the mathematical sciences, 
which then prevailed, would have rendered utterly impotent 
the efforts of a thousand Newtons to grapple with such a prob- 
lem. The time was neither ripe for the solution of that problem, 
nor for the appearance of a Newton. It was only after science 
had, during a period of two thousand years, multiplied her re- 
sources and gathered up her energies, that she was prepared for 
a flight to the summit of the world, whence she might behold 
and reveal the wonderful art wherewith it hath been constructed 
by the Almighty Architect. Because Socrates could not con- 
ceive of any possible means of solving the great problem of the 
material world, it did not follow, as the event has shown, that 
it was forever beyond the reach and dominion of man. We 
should not then listen too implicitly to the teachers of despair, 
nor too rashly set limits to the triumphs of the human power. 
If we may believe " the master of wisdom," they are not the 
true friends of science, nor of the world's progress. " By far 
the greatest obstacle," says Bacon, " to the advancement of the 
sciences, is to be found in men's despair and idea of imjpossi- 
MMty." 

Even in the minds of those who cultivate a particular branch 
of knowledge, there is often an internal secret despair of finding 
the truth, which so far paralyzes their efforts as to prevent them 
from seeking it with that deep earnestness, without which it is 
seldom found. The history of optics furnishes a most impressive 
illustration of the justness of this remark. Previous to the time 
of Newton, no one seemed to entertain a real hope that this 
branch of knowledge would ever assume the form and clearness 
of scientific truth. The laws and properties of so ethereal a sub- 
stance as light, appeared to elude the grasp of the human intel- 
lect ; and hence, no one evinced the boldness to grapple directly 
with them. The whole region of optics was involved in mists, 



OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY. 13 

and those who gave their attention to this department of knowl- 
edge, abandoned themselves, for the most part, to vague gen- 
eralities and loose conj ectures. In the conflict of manifold opin- 
ions, and the great variety of hypotheses which seemed to pro- 
mise nothing but endless disputes, the highest idea of the science 
of optics that prevailed, was that of something in relation to 
light which might be plausibly advanced and confidently main- 
tained. It was .reserved for Newton to produce a revolution in 
the mode of treating this branch of knowledge, as well as that 
of physical astronomy. Not despairing of the truth, he sternly 
put away " innumerable fancies flitting on all sides around him," 
and by searching observation and experiment, brought his mind 
directly into contact with things themselves, and held it steadily 
to them, until the clear light of truth dawned. The consequence 
was, that the dreams of philosophy, falsely so called, gave place 
to the clear realities of nature. It was to the unconquerable 
hope, no less than to the profound humility of Newton, that the 
world is indebted for his most splendid discoveries, as well as 
for that perfect model of the true spirit of philosophy, which 
combined the infinite caution of a Butler with the unbounded 
boldness of a Leibnitz. The lowliest humility, free from the 
least shadow of despair, united with the loftiest hope, without 
the least mixture of presumption, both proceeding from an in- 
vincible love of truth, are the elements which constituted the 
secret of that patient and all-enduring thought which conducted 
the mind of Newton from the obscurities and dreams envelop- 
ing the world below into the bright and shining region of eter- 
nal truths above. In our humble opinion, Newton has done\ 
more for the great cause of knowledge, by the mighty impulse I 
of hope he has given to the powers of the human mind, than i 
by all the sublime discoveries he has made. For, as MaclaurinJ 
says : " The variety of opinions and perpetual disputes among 
philosophers has induced not a few of late, as well as in former 
times, to think that it was vain labour to endeavour to acquire 
certainty in natural knowledge, and to ascribe this to some un- 
avoidable defect in the principles of the science. But it has 
appeared sufficiently, from the discoveries of those who have 
consulted nature, and not their own imaginations, and particu- 
larly from what we learn from Sir Isaac Newton, that the fault 
lias lain in philosophers themselves, and not inphilosojjhy." 



14 INTRODUCTION. 

We are persuaded the day will come, when it will be seen 
that the despair of scepticism has been misplaced, not only with 
regard to natural knowledge, but also in relation to the great 
problems of the intellectual and moral world. It is true, that 
Plato failed to solve these jxroblems ; but his failure may be 
easily accounted for, without in the least degree shaking the 
foundations of our hope. The learned Ritter has said, that 
Plato felt the necessity imposed upon him, by his system, to 
reconcile the existence of evil with the perfections of God ; but 
yet, as often as he approached this dark subject, his views be- 
came vague, fluctuating, and unsatisfactory. How little insight 
he had into it on any scientific or clearly defined principle, is 
obvious from the fact, that he took shelter from its difficulties 
in the wild hypothesis of the preexistence of souls. But the 
impotency of Plato's attempts to solve these difficulties, may be 
explained without the least disparagement to his genius, or 
without leading us to hope for light only from the world's pos- 
session of better minds. 

In the first place, such was the state of mental science when 
Plato lived, that it would have been impossible for any one to 
reconcile the existence of evil with the perfections of God. It 
has been truly said, that " An attention to the internal opera- 
tions of the human mind, with a view to analyze its principles, 
is one of the distinctions of modern times. Among the ancients 
scarcely anything of the sort was known." — Robert Hall. Yet 
without a correct analysis of the powers of the human mind, 
and of the relations they sustain to each other, as well as to ex- 
ternal objects and influences, it is impossible to shed one ray of 
light on the relation subsisting between the existence of moral 
evil and the divine glory. The theory of motion is " the key 
to nature." It was with this key that Newton, the great high- 
priest of nature, entered into her profounclest recesses, and laid 
open her most sublime secrets to the admiration of mankind. 
In like manner, the true theory of action is the key to the intel- 
lectual world, by which its difficulties are to be laid open and 
its enigmas solved. ISTot possessing this key, it was as impossi- 
ble for Plato, or for any other philosopher, to penetrate the 
mystery of sin's existence, as it would have been, without a 
knowledge of the laws of motion, to comprehend the stupendous 
problem of the material universe. 



OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY. 15 

Secondly, the ancient philosophers laboured nnder the in- 
superable disadvantage, that the sublime disclosures of revela- 
tion had not been made known to the world. Hence the ma- 
terials were wanting out of which to construct a Theodicy, or 
vindication of the perfections of God. For if we could see only 
so much of this world's drama as is made known by the light 
of nature, it would not be possible to reconcile it with the char- 
acter of its great Author. ~No one was more sensible of this 
defect of knowledge than Plato himself; and its continuance 
was, in his view, inconsistent with the goodness of the divine 
Being. Hence his well-known prediction, that a teacher would 
be sent from God to clear up the darkness of man's present 
destiny, and to withdraw the veil from its future glory. The 
facts of revelation cannot, of course, be logically assumed as 
verities, in an argument with the atheist ; but still, as we shall 
hereafter see, they may, in connexion with other truths, be made 
to serve a most important and legitimate function in exploding 
his sophisms and objections. 

SECTION" II. 
The failure of Leibnitz not a ground of despair. 

It is alleged, that since Leibnitz exhausted the resources of 
his vast erudition, and exerted the powers of his mighty intel- 
lect without success, to solve the problem in question, it is in 
vain for any one else to attempt its solution. Leibnitz, himself, 
was too much of a philosopher to approve of such a judgment 
in relation to any human being. He could never have wished, 
or expected to see " the empire of man, which is founded in the 
sciences," permanently confined to the boundaries of a single 
mind, however exalted its powers, or comprehensive its attain- 
ments. He finely rebuked the false humility and the disguised 
arrogance of Descartes, in affirming that the sovereignty of God 
and the freedom of man could never be reconciled. " If Des- 
cartes," says he, " had confessed such an inability for himself 
alone, this might have savoured of humility ; but it is other- 
wise, when, because he could not find the means of solving this 
difficulty, he declares it an impossibility for all ages and for all 
minds." We have, at least, the authority and example of 
Leibnitz, in favour of the propriety of cultivating this depart- 



16 INTRODUCTION. 

ment of knowledge, with a view to shed light on the great 
problem of the intellectual world. 

His failure, if rightly considered, is not a ground for despond- 
ency. He approached the problem in question in a wrong 
spirit. The pride of conquering difficulties is the unfortunate 
disposition with which he undertook to solve it. His well-known 
boast, that with him all difficult things are easy, and all easy 
things difficult, is a proof that his spirit was not perfectly 
adapted to carry him forward in a contest with the dark enigmas 
of the universe. Indeed, if we consider what Leibnitz has actu- 
ally done, we shall perceive, that notwithstanding his wonder- 
ful powers, he has rendered many easy things difficult, as well 
as many difficult things easy. The best way to conquer diffi- 
culties is, if we may judge from his example, not to attack them 
directly, and with the pride of a conqueror, but simply to seek 
after the truth. If we make a conquest of all the truth, this 
will make a conquest of all the difficulties within our reach. 
It is wonderful with what ease a difficulty, which may have re- 
sisted the direct siege of centuries, will sometimes fall before a 
single inquirer after truth, who had not dreamed of aiming at 
its solution, until this seemed, as if by accident, to offer itself to 
his mind. If we pursue difficulties, they will be apt to fly from 
us and elude our grasp ; whereas, if we give up our minds to an 
honest and earnest search after truth, they will come in with 
their own solutions. 

The truth is, that the difficulty in question has been increased 
rather than diminished by the speculations of Leibnitz. This 
has resulted from a premature anc 1 xtreme devotion to /stem — 
a source of miscarriage and failure common to Leibnitz, and to 
most others who have devoted their attention to the origin of 
evil. On the one hand, exaggerated views concerning the 
divine agency, or equally extravagant notions on the other, re- 
specting the agency of man, have frequently converted a seem- 
ing into a real contradiction. In general, the work of God has 
been conceived in such a relation to the powers of man, as to 
make the latter entirely disappear ; or else the power of man 
has been represented as occupying so exalted and independent 
a position, as to exclude the Almighty from his rightful dominion 
over the moral world. Thus, the Supreme Being has generally 
been shut out from the affairs and government of the world by 



OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY. 17 

one side, and his energy rendered so all-pervading by the other, 
as really to make him the anthor of evil. In this way, the dif- 
ficulties concerning the origin and existence of evil have been 
greatly augmented by the very speculations designed to solve 
them. For if God takes little or no concern in the affairs and 
destiny of the moral world, this clearly seems to render him re- 
sponsible for the evil which he might easily have prevented ; 
and, on the other hand, if he pervades the moral world with his 
power in such a manner as to bring all things to pass, this as 
clearly seems to implicate him in the turpitude of sin. 

After having converted the seeming discrepancy between the 
divine power and human agency into a real contradiction, it is 
too late to endeavour to reconcile them. Yet such has been 
the case with most of the giant intellects that have laboured to 
reconcile the sovereignty of God and the moral agency of man. 
It will hereafter be clearly seen, we trust, that it is not possible 
for any one, holding the scheme of a Calvin, or a Leibnitz, or a 
Descartes, or an Edwards, to show an agreement between the 
power of God and the freedom of man ; since according to these 
systems there is an eternal opposition and conflict between 
them. It is no ground of despair, then, that the mighty minds 
of the past have failed to solve the problem in question, if the 
cause of their failure may be traced to the errors of their own 
systems, and not to the inherent difficulties of the subject. 

Those who have endeavoured to solve the problem in ques- 
tion have, for the most part, been necessitated to fail in conse- 
quence of having adopted a wrong method. Instead of begin- 
ning with observation, and carefully dissecting the world which 
God has made, so as to rise, by a clear analysis of things, to 
the general principles on which they have been actually framed 
and put together, they have set out from the lofty region of 
universal abstractions, and proceeded to reconstruct the world 
for themselves. Instead of beginning with the actual, as best 
befits the feebleness of the human intellect, and working their 
way up into the great system of things, they have taken their 
position at once in the high and boundless realm of the ideal, 
and thence endeavoured to deduce the nature of the laws and 
phenomena of the real world. This is the course pursued by 
Plato, Leibnitz, Hobbes, Descartes, Edwards, and, indeed, most 
of those great thinkers who have endeavoured to shed light on 



18 INTRODUCTION. 

the problem in question. Hence each has necessarily become 
" a sublime architect of words," whose grand and imposing sys- 
tem of shadows and abstractions has but a slight foundation in 
the real constitution and laws of the spiritual world. Their 
writings furnish the most striking illustration of the profound 
aphorism of Bacon, that " the usual method of discovery and 
proof, by first establishing the most general propositions, then 
applying and proving the intermediate axioms according to 
these, is the parent of error and the calamity of every science." 
He who would frame a real model of the world in the under- 
standing, such as it is found to be, not such as man's reason has 
distorted, must pursue the opposite course. Surely it cannot be 
deemed unreasonable, that this course should be most diligently 
applied to the study of the intellectual world ; especially as it 
has wrought such wonders in the province of natural knowl- 
edge, and that too, after so many ages had, according to the 
former method, laboured upon it comparatively in vain. Be- 
cause the human mind has not been able to bridge over the 
impassable gulf between the ideal and the concrete, so as to 
effect a passage from the former to the latter, it certainly does 
not follow, that it should forever despair of so far penetrating 
the apparent obscurity and confusion of real things, as to see 
that nothing which God has created is inconsistent with the 
eternal, immutable glory of the ideal : or, in other words, be- 
cause the real world and the ideal cannot be shown to be 
connected by a logical dependency, it does not follow, that the 
actual creation and providence of God, that all his works and 
ways cannot be made to appear consistent with the idea of an 
absolutely perfect being and of the eternal laws according to 
which his power acts: that is to say, because the high a priori 
method, which so magisterially proceeds to pronounce what 
must be, has failed to solve the problem of the moral world, it 
does not follow, that the inductive method, or that which cau- 
tiously begins with an examination of what is, may not finally 
rise to the sublime contemplation of what ought to be j and, in 
the light of God's own creation, behold the magnificent model 
of the actual universe perfectly conformed to the transcendent 
and unutterable glory of the ideal. 



OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY. 19 



SECTION" in. 

The system of the moral universe not purposely involved in ooscurity to 
teach us a lesson of humility. 

But the assertion is frequently made, that the moral govern- 
ment of the world is purposely left in obscurity and apparent 
confusion, in order to teach man a lesson of humility and sub- 
mission, by showing him how weak and narrow is the human 
mind. We have not, however, been able to find any sufficient 
reason or foundation for such an opinion. As every atom in 
the universe presents mysteries which baffle the most subtle 
research and the most profound investigation of the human 
intellect, we cannot see how any reflecting mind can possibly 
find an additional lesson of humility in the fact, that the system 
of the universe itself is involved in clouds and darkness. Would 
it not be strange, indeed, if the mind, whose grasp is not suf- 
ficient for the mysteries of a single atom, should be really hum- 
bled by the conviction that it is too weak and Limited to fathom 
the wonders of the universe? Does the insignificance of an 
egg-shell appear from the fact that it cannot contain the ocean ? 

The truth is, that the more clearly the majesty and glory of 
the divine perfections are displayed in the constitution and 
government of the world, the more clearly shall we see the 
greatness of God and the littleness of man. No true knowledge 
can ever impress the human mind with a conceit of its own 
greatness. The farther its light expands, the greater must be- 
come the visible sphere of the surrounding darkness ; and its 
highest attainment in real knowledge must inevitably terminate 
in a profound sense of the vast, unlimited extent of its own ig- 
norance. Hence, we need entertain no fear, that man's humil- 
ity will ever be endangered by too great attainments in science. 
Presumption is, indeed, the natural offspring of ignorance, and 
not of knowledge. Socrates, as we have already seen, endeav- 
oured to inculcate a lesson of humility, by reminding his con- 
temporaries how far the theory of the material heavens was be- 
yond the reach of their faculties. And to enforce this lesson, 
he assured them that it was displeasing to the gods for men to 
attempt to pry into the wonderful art wherewith they had con- 
structed the universe. In like manner, the poet, at a much 



20 INTRODUCTION. 

later period, puts the following sentiment into the mouth of an 
angel :■ — 

" To ask or search, I blame thee not ; for heaven 
Is as the book of God before thee set, 
Wherein to read his wondrous works, and learn 
His seasons, hours, or days, or months, or years : 
This to attain, whether heaven move or earth, 
Imports not if thou reckon right ; the rest 
From man or angel the great Architect 
Did vnsely to conceal, and not divulge 
His secrets, to be scann'd by them who ought 
Rather admire ; or, if they list to try 
Conjecture, he his fabric of the heavens 
Hath left to their disputes, perhaps to move 
His laughter at their quaint opinions wide 
Hereafter." 

All this may be very well, no doubt, for him by whom it was 
uttered, and for those who may have received it as an everlast- 
ing oracle of truth. But the true lesson of humility was taught 
by Newton, when he solved the problem of the world, and re- 
vealed the wonderful art displayed therein by the Supreme 
Architect. Never before, in the history of the human race, 
was so impressive a conviction made of the almost absolute 
nothingness of man, when measured on the inconceivably mag- 
nificent scale of the universe. No one, it is well known, felt 
this conviction more deeply than Newton himself. "I have 
been but as a child," said he, " playing on the sea-shore ; now 
finding some pebble rather more polished, and now some shell 
rather more agreeably variegated than another, while the im- 
mense ocean of truth extended itself unexplored before me." 

It is, indeed, strangely to forget our littleness, as well as the 
limits which this necessarily sets to the progress of the under- 
standing, to imagine that the Almighty has to conceal anything 
with a view to remind us of the weakness of our powers. In- 
deed, everything around us, and everything within us, brings 
home the conviction of the littleness of man. There is not a 
page of the history of human thought on which this lesson is 
not deeply engraved. Still we do not despair. We find a 
ground of hope in the very littleness as well as in the great- 
ness of the human powers. 



OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY. 21 



SECTION" IV. 
The littleness of the human mind a ground of hope. 

We would yield to no one in a profound veneration for the 
great intellects of the past. But let us not be dazzled and 
blinded by the splendour of their achievements. Let us 
look at it closely, and see how wonderful it is — this thing called 
the human mind. The more I think of it, the more it fills me 
with amazement. I scarcely know which amazes me the more, 
its littleness or its grandeur. Now I see it, with all its high 
powers and glorious faculties, labouring under the ambiguity 
of a word, apparently in hopeless eclipse for centuries. Shall I 
therefore despise it ? Before I have time to do so, the power 
and the light which is thus shut out from the world by so piti- 
ful a cause, is revealed in all its glory. I see this same intelli- 
gence forcing its way through a thousand hostile appearances, 
resisting innumerable obstacles pressing on all sides around it, 
overcoming deep illusions, and inveterate opinions, almost as 
firmly seated as the very laws of nature themselves. I see it 
rising above all these, and planting itself in the radiant seat of 
truth. It embraces the plan, it surveys the work of the Su- 
preme Architect of all things. It follows the infinite reason, 
and recognises the almighty power, in their sublimest manifes- 
tations. I rejoice in the glory of its triumphs, and am ready 
to pronounce its empire boundless. But, alas ! I see it again 
baffled and confounded by the wonders and mysteries of a 
single atom ! 

I see this same thing, or rather its mightiest representatives, 
with a Newton or a Leibnitz at their head, in full pursuit of a 
shadow, and wasting their wonderful energies in beating the air. 
They have measured the world, and stretched their line upon 
the chambers of the great deep. They have weighed the sun, 
moon, and stars, and marked out their orbits. They have de- 
termined the laws according to which all worlds and all atoms 
move — according to which the very spheres sing together. And 
yet, when they came to measure " the force of a moving body," 
they toil for a century at the task, and finally rest in the amazing 
conclusion, that " the very same thing may have two measures 
widely different from each other !" Alas ! that the same mind, 



22 INTRODUCTION. 

that the same god-like intelligence, which has measured worlds 
and systems, should thus have wasted its stupendous energies 
in striving to measure a metaphor ! 

"When I think of its grandeur and its triumphs, I bow with 
reverence before its power, and am ready to despair of ever 
seeing it go farther than it has already gone ; but when I think 
of its littleness and its failures, I take courage again, and de- 
termine to toil on as a living atom among living atoms. The 
glory of its triumphs does not discourage me, because I also see 
its littleness ; nor can its littleness extinguish in me the light 
of hope, because I also see the glory of its triumphs. And 
surely this is right ; for the intellect of man, so conspicuously 
combining the attributes of the angel and of the worm, is not 
to be despised without infinite danger, nor followed without in- 
finite caution. 

Such, indeed, is the weakness and fallibility of the human 
mind, even in its brightest forms, that we cannot for a moment 
imagine, that the inherent difficulties of the dark enigma of the 
world are insuperable, because they have not been clearly and 
fully solved by a Leibnitz or an Edwards. On the contrary, 
we are perfectly persuaded that in the end the wonder will be, 
not that such a question should have been attempted after so 
many illustrious failures, but that any such failure should have 
been made. This will appear the more probable, if we con- 
sider the precise nature of the problem to be solved, and not 
lose ourselves in dark and unintelligible notions. It is not to 
do some great thing — it is simply to refute the sophism of the 
atheist. If God were both willing and able to prevent sin, 
which is the only supposition consistent with the idea of God, 
says the atheist, he would certainly have prevented it, and sin 
would never have made its appearance in the world. But sin 
has made its appearance in the world ; and hence, God must 
have been either unable or unwilling to prevent it. ]STow, if 
we take either term of this alternative, we must adopt a con- 
clusion which is at war with the idea of a God. 

Such is the argument of the atheist ; and sad indeed must 
be the condition of the Christian world if it be forever unable 
to meet and refute such a sophism. Yet, it is the error involved 
in this sophism which obscures our intellectual vision, and causes 
so perplexing a darkness to spread itself over the moral order 



OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY. 23 

and beauty of the world. Hence, in grappling with the sup- 
posed great difficulty in question, we do not undertake to re- 
move a veil from the universe — we simply undertake to remove 
a sophism from our own minds. Though we have so spoken in 
accommodation with the views of others, the problem of the 
moral world is not, in reality, high and difficult in itself, like 
the great problem of the material universe. We repeat, it is 
simply to refute and explode the sophism of the atheist. Let 
this be blown away, and the darkness which seems to overhang 
the moral government of the world will disappear like the 
mists of the morning. 

If such be the nature of the problem in question, and such 
it will be found to be, it is certainly a mistake to suppose 
that "it must be entangled with perplexities while we see 
but in part."* It is only while we see amiss, and not while 
we see in part, that this problem must wear the appearance 
of a dark enigma. It is clear, that our knowledge is, and 
ever must be, exceedingly limited on all sides; and if we 
must understand the whole of the case, if we must comprehend 
the entire extent of the divine government for the universe and 
for eternity, before we can remove the difficulty in question, we 
must necessarily despair of success. But we cannot see any 
sufficient ground to support this oft-repeated assertion. Because 
the field of our vision is so exceedingly limited, we do not see 
why it should be forever traversed by apparent inconsistencies 
and contradictions. In relation to the material universe, our 
space is but a point, and our time but a moment ; and yet, as 
that inconceivably grand system is now understood by us, there 
is nothing in it which seems to conflict with the dictates of rea- 
son, or with the infinite perfections of God. On the contrary, 
the revelations of modern science have given an emphasis and a 
sublimity to the language of inspiration, that " the heavens de- 
clare the glory of the Lord," which had, for ages, been con- 
cealed from the loftiest conception of the astronomer. 

Nor did it require a knowledge of the whole material universe 
to remove the difficulties, or to blast the objections which 
atheists had, in all preceding ages, raised against the perfections 
of its divine Author. Such objections, as is well known, were 
raised before astronomy, as a science, had an existence. Lucre- 

* Johnson's Works, vol. iv, p. 286. 



24 INTRODUCTION. 

tius, for example, though he deemed the sun, moon, and stars, 
no larger than they appear to the eye, and supposed them to 
revolve around the earth, undertook to point out and declaim 
against the miserable defects which he saw, or fancied he saw, 
in the system of the material world. That is to say, he under- 
took to criticise and find fault with the great volume of nature, 
before he had even learned its alphabet. The objections of 
Lucretius, which appeared so formidable in his day, as well as 
many others that have since been raised on equally plausible 
grounds, have passed away before the progress of science, and 
now seem like the silly prattle of children, or the insane babble 
of madmen. But although such difficulties have been swept 
away, and our field of vision cleared of all that is painful and 
perplexing, nay, brightened with all that is grand and beautiful, 
we seem to be farther than ever from comprehending the whole 
of the case' — from grasping the amazing extent and glory of the 
material globe. And why may not this ultimately be the case 
also in relation to the moral universe ? Why should every at- 
tempt to clear up its difficulties, and blow away the objections 
of atheism to its order and beauty, be supposed to originate in 
presumption and to terminate in impiety? Are we so much 
the less interested in knowing the ways of God in regard to the 
constitution and government of the moral world than of the 
material, that he should purposely conceal the former from us, 
while he has permitted the latter to be laid open so as to 
ravish our minds ? We can believe no such thing ; and we are 
not willing to admit that there is any part of the creation of 
God in which omniscience alone can cope with the atheist. 



SECTION V. 

The construction of a Theodicy, not an attempt to solve mysteries, dut to 
dissipate absurdities. 

As we have merely undertaken to refute the atheist, and vin- 
dicate the glory of the divine perfections, so it would be a 
grievous mistake to suppose, that we are about to pry into the 
holy mysteries of religion. No sound mind is ever perplexed 
by the contemplation of mysteries. Indeed, they are a source 
of positive satisfaction and delight. If nothing were dark, — 
if all around us, and above us, were clearly seen, — the truth 



OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY. 25 

itself would soon appear stale and mean. Everything truly 
great must transcend the powers of the human mind ; and hence, 
if nothing were mysterious, there would be nothing worthy of 
our veneration and worship. It is mystery, indeed, which lends 
such unspeakable grandeur and variety to the scenery of the 
moral world. Without it, all would be clear, it is true, but 
nothing grand. There would be lights, but no shadows. And 
around the very lights themselves, there would be nothing 
soothing and sublime, in which the soul might rest and the im- 
agination revel. 

Hence it is no part of our object to pry into mystery, but to 
get rid of absurdity. And in our humble opinion, this would 
long since have been done, and the difficulty in question solved, 
had not the friends of truth incautiously given the most power- 
ful protection to the sophism and absurdity of the atheist, by 
throwing around it the sacred garb of mystery. 



SECTION VI. 

The spirit in which the following worlc has oeen prosecuted, and the relation 
of the author to other systems. 

In conclusion, we offer a few remarks in relation to the man- 
ner and spirit in which the following work has been undertaken 
and prosecuted. In the first place, the writer may truly say, 
that he did not enter on the apparently dark problem of the 
moral world with the least hope that he should be able to 
throw any light upon it, nor with any other set purpose and de- 
sign. He simply revolved the subject in mind, because he was 
by nature prone to such meditations. So far from having aimed 
at things usually esteemed so high and difficult with a feeling 
of presumptuous confidence, he has, indeed, suffered most from 
that spirit of despondency, that despair of scepticism, against 
which, in the foregoing pages, he has appeared so anxious to 
caution others. It has been patient reflection, and the reading 
of excellent authors, together with an earnest desire to know the 
truth, which has delivered him from the power of that spirit, 
and conducted him to what now so clearly seems " the bright 
and shining light of truth." 

It was, in fact, while engaged in meditation on the powers 
and susceptibilities of the human mind, as well as on the rela- 



26 INTRODUCTION". 

tions they sustain to each and to other things, and not in any 
direct attempt to elucidate the origin of evil, that the first clear 
light appeared to dawn on this great difficulty : and in no other 
way, he humbly conceives, can the true philosophy of the 
spiritual world ever be comprehended. For, as the laws of 
matter had first to be studied and traced out in relation to 
bodies on the earth, before they could be extended to the 
heavens, and made to explain its wonderful mechanism; so 
must the laws and phenomena of the human mind be correctly 
analyzed and clearly defined, in order to obtain an insight into 
the intellectual system of the universe. And just in pro- 
portion as the clouds and darkness hanging over the phe- 
nomena of our own minds are made to disappear, will the intel- 
lectual system of the world which God " has set in our hearts," 
become more distinct and beautiful in its proportions. For it 
is the mass of real contradictions and obscurities, existing in the 
little world within, which distorts to our view the great world 
without, and causes the work and ways of God to appear so full 
of disorders. Hence, in proportion as these real contradictions 
and obscurities are removed, will the mind become a truer 
microcosm, or more faithful mirror, in which the image of the 
universe will unfold itself, free from the apparent disorders and 
confusion which seem to render it unworthy of its great Author 
and Ruler. 

Secondly, the relation which the writer sustains to other sys- 
tems, has been, it appears to himself, most favourable to a suc- 
cessful prosecution of the following speculations. Whether at 
the outset of his inquiries, he was the more of an Arminian or 
of a Calvinist, he is unable to say ; but if his crude and imper- 
fectly developed sentiments had then been made known, it is 
probable he would have been ranked with the Arminians. Be 
this as it may, it is certain that he was never so much of an 
Arminian, or of anything else, as to imagine that Calvinism 
admitted of nothing great and good. On the contrary, he has 
ever believed that the Calvinists were at least equal to any 
other body of men in piety, which is certainly the highest and 
noblest of all qualities. And besides, it was a constant delight 
to him to read the great master-pieces of reasoning which Cal- 
vinism had furnished for the instruction and admiration of 
mankind. By this means he came to believe that the scheme 



OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY. 27 

of the Arminians could not be maintained, and his faith in it 
was gradually undermined. 

But although he thus submitted his mind to the dominion of 
Calvinism, as advocated by Edwards, and earnestly espoused it 
with some exceptions ; he never felt that profound, internal 
satisfaction of the truth of the system, after which his rational 
nature continually longed, and which it struggled to realize. 
He certainly expected to find this satisfaction in Calvinism, if 
anywhere. Long, therefore, did he pass over every portion of 
Calvinism, in order to discover, if possible, how its foundations 
might be rendered more clear and convincing, and all its parts har- 
monized among themselves as well as with the great undeniable 
facts of man's nature and destiny. While engaged in these 
inquiries, he has been more than once led to see what appeared 
to be a flaw in Calvinism itself ; but without at first perceiving 
all its consequences. By reflection on these 'apparent defects ; 
nay, by protracted and earnest meditation on them, his sus- 
picions have been confirmed and his opinions changed. If 
what now so clearly appears to be the truth is so or not, it is 
certain that it has not been embraced out of a spirit of oppo- 
sition to Calvinism, or to any other system of religious faith 
whatever. Its light, whether real or imaginary, has dawned 
upon his mind while seeking after truth amid the foundations 
of Calvinism itself ; and this light has been augmented more 
by reading the works of Calvinists themselves, than those of 
their opponents. 

These things are here set down, not because the writer thinks 
they should have any weight or influence to bias the judgment 
of the reader, but because he wishes it to be understood that 
he entertains the most profound veneration for the great and 
good men whose works seem to stand in the way of the follow- 
ing design to vindicate the glory of God, and which, therefore, 
he will not scruple to assail in so far as this may be necessary 
to his purpose. It is, indeed, a matter of deep and inexpressible 
regret, that in our conflicts with the powers of darkness, we 
should, however undesignedly, be weakened and opposed by 
Christian divines and philosophers. But so it seems to be, and 
we dare not cease to resist them. And if, in the following 
attempt to vindicate the glory of God, it shall become neces- 
sary to call in question the infallibility of the great founders of 



28 INTEODUCTION. 

human systems, this, it is to be hoped, will not be deemed an 
unpardonable offence. 

Thus has the writer endeavoured to work his way through 
the mingled lights and obscurity of human systems into a bright 
and beautiful vision of the great harmonious system of the world 
itself. It is certainly either a sublime truth, or else a glorious 
illusion, which thus enables him to rise above the apparent 
disorders and perturbations of the world, as constituted and 
governed by the Almighty, and behold the real order and 
harmony therein established. The ideal creations of the poet 
and the philosopher sink into perfect insignificance beside 
the actual creation of God. Where clouds and darkness 
once appeared the most impenetrable, there scenes of inde- 
scribable magnificence and beauty are now beheld with inex- 
pressible delight ; the stupendous cloud of evil no longer hangs 
overhead, but rolls beneath us, while the eternal Eeason from 
above permeates its gloom, and irradiates its depths. "We now 
behold the reason, and absolutely rejoice in the contemplation, 
of that which once seemed like a dark blot on the world's 
design. 

In using this language, we do not wish to be understood 
as laying claim to the discovery of any great truth, or any new 
principle. Yet we do trust, that we have attained to a clear 
and precise statement of old truths. And these truths, thus 
clearly defined, we trust that we have seized with a firm grasp, 
and carried as lights through the dark places of theology, 
so as to expel thence the errors and delusions by which its 
glory has been obscured. Moreover, if we have not succeeded, 
nor even attempted to succeed, in solving any mysteries, prop- 
erly so called, yet may we have removed certain apparent 
contradictions, which have been usually deemed insuperable to 
the human mind. 

But even if the reader should be satisfied beforehand, that no 
additional light will herein be thrown on the problem of the 
moral world, yet would we remind him, that it does not neces- 
sarily follow that the ensuing discourse is wholly unworthy of 
his attention : for the materials, though old, may be presented 
in new combinations, and much may be omitted which has 
disfigured and obscured the beauty of most other systems. 
Although no new fountains of light may be opened, yet may 



OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A THEODICY. 29 

the vision of the soul be so purged of certain films of error as 
to enable it to reflect the glory of the spiritual universe, just as 
a single dew-drop is seen to mirror forth the magnificent cope of 
heaven with all its multitude of stars. 

We have sought the truth, and how far we have found it, no 
one should proceed to determine without having first read and 
examined. We have sought it, not in Calvinism alone, nor in 
Arminianism alone, nor in any other creed or system of man's 
devising. In every direction have we diligently sought it, 
as our feeble abilities would permit ; and yet, we hope, it will 
be found that the body of truth which we now have to offer is 
not a mere hasty patchwork of superficial eclecticism, but a 
living and organic whole. By this test we could wish to be 
tried ; for, as Bacon hath well said, " It is the harmony of any 
philosophy in itself that giveth it light and credence." And in 
the application of this test, we could also wish, that the reader 
would so far forget his sectarian predilections, if he have any, 
as to permit his mind to be inspired by the immortal words of 
Milton, which we shall here adopt as a fitting conclusion of these 
our present remarks : — 

"Truth, indeed, came once into the world with her divine 
Master, and was a perfect shape most glorious to look on ; but 
when he ascended, and his apostles after him were laid asleep, 
then straight arose a wicked race of deceivers, who, as that 
story goes of the Egyptian Typhon, with his conspirators, how 
they dealt with the good Osiris, took the virgin, Truth, hewed 
her lovely form into a thousand pieces, and scattered them to 
the four winds. From that time ever since the sad friends of 
Truth, such as durst appear, imitating the careful search that 
Isis made for the mangled body of Osiris, went up and down 
gathering up limb by limb still as they could find them. We 
have not yet found them all, nor ever shall do, till her Master's 
second coming; he shall bring together every joint and mem- 
ber, and shall mould them into an immortal feature of loveli- 
ness and perfection. Suffer not these licensing prohibitions to 
stand at every place of opportunity, forbidding and disturbing 
them that continue seeking, that continue to do our obsequies 
to the torn body of our martyred saint. We boast our light ; 
but if we look not wisely on the sun itself, it smites us into dark- 
ness. Who can discern those planets that are oft combust, and 



30 INTRODUCTION. 

those stars of brightest magnitude, that rise and set with the 
sun, until the opposite motion of their orbs bring them to such 
a place In the firmament, where they may be seen morning or 
evening ? The light which we have gained was given us, not 
to be ever staring on, but by it to discover onward things more 
remote from our knowledge. It is not the unfrocking of a priest, 
the unmitring of a bishop, and the removing him from off the 
Presbyterian shoulders, that will make us a happy nation ; no, 
if other things as great in the Church, and in the rule of life, 
both economical and political, be not looked into and reformed, 
we have looked so long upon the blaze that Zuinglius and Calvin 
have beaconed up to us, that we are stark blind. There be who 
perpetually complain of schisms and sects, and make it such a 
calamity that any man dissents from their maxims. It is their 
own pride and ignorance which causes the disturbing, who 
neither will hear with meekness, nor can convince, yet all must 
be suppressed which is not found in their Syntagma. They are 
the troublers, they are the dividers of unity, who neglect and 
permit not others to unite those dissevered pieces which are 
yet wanting to the body of truth. To be still searching what 
we know not, by what we know, still closing up truth to truth 
as we find it, (for all her body is homogeneal and proportional,) 
this is the golden rule in theology as well as in arithmetic, 
and makes up the best harmony in a Church ; not the forced 
and outward union of cold, and neutral, and inwardly-divided 
minds." 



PART I 



THE EXISTENCE OF MORAL EVIL, OR SIN, CONSISTENT 
WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 



What Time this World's great Workmaister did cast, 
To make all things such as we now behold, 

It seems that he before his eyes had plast 
A goodly patterne, to whose perfect mould 

He fashion'd them as comely as he could, 

That now so fair and seemly they appear, 

As naught may be amended anywhere. 

That wondrous patterne, wheresoever it be, 
Whether in earth laid up in secret store, 

Or else in heav'n, that no man may it see 
With sinful eyes, for feare it to deflore, 

Is perfect Beautie. 

Spenser. 



A THEODICY 



PART I 



CHAPTER I. 



THE SCHEME 0E NECESSITY DENIES THAT MAN IS RESPONSIBLE EOR THE 
EXISTENCE OF SIN. 

Ye, who live, 
Do so each cause refer to Heaven above, 
E'en as its motion, of necessity, 
Drew with it all that moves. If this were so, 
Free choice in you were none ; nor justice would 
There should be joy for virtue, woe for ill. — Dante. 

The doctrine of necessity has been, in all ages of the world, the 
great stronghold of atheism. It is the mighty instrument with 
which the unbeliever seeks to strip man of all accountability, 
and to destroy our faith and confidence in God, by tracing up 
the existence of all moral evil to his agency. "The opinion of 
necessity," says Bishop Butler, " seems to be the very basis in 
which infidelity grounds itself." It will not be denied that this 
opinion seems, at first view, to be inconsistent with the free 
agency and accountability of man, and that it appears to im- 
pair our idea of God by staining it with impurity. Hence it 
has been used, by the profligate and profane, to excuse men for 
their crimes. It is against this use of the doctrine that we in- 
tend to direct the force of our argument. 

But here the question arises : Can we refute the argument 
against the accountability of man, without attacking the doc- 
trine on which it is founded ? If we can meet this argument 
at all, it must be either by showing that no such consequence 
flows from the scheme of necessity, or by showing that the 
scheme itself is false. We cannot meet the sceptic, who seeks 

3 



34 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

to excuse his sins, and to cast dishonour on God, and expose 
his sophistry, unless we can show that his premises are unsound, 
or that his conclusions are false. We must do the one or the 
other of these two things ; or, whatever we may think of his 
moral sensibility, we must acknowledge the superiority of his 
reason and logic. After long and patient meditation on the 
subject, we have been forced to the conclusion, that the only 
way to repel the argument of the sceptic, and cause the intrin- 
sic lustre of man's free-agency to appear, is to unravel and 
refute the doctrine of necessity. 

If we could preserve the scheme of necessity, and at the same 
time avoid the consequences in question, we may fairly con- 
clude that the means of doing so have been found by some of 
the illustrious advocates of that scheme. How, then, do they 
vindicate their own system 1 How do they repel the frightful 
consequences which infidelity deduces from it? This is the 
first question to be considered ; and the discussion of it will 
occupy the remainder of the present chapter. 

SECTION I. 

The attempts of Calvin and Luther to reconcile the scheme of necessity loith 
the responsibility of man. 

Nothing can be more unjust than to bring, as has often been 
done, the unqualified charge of fatalism against the great Pro- 
testant reformers. The manner in which this odious epithet is 
frequently used, applying it without discrimination to the bright- 
est ornaments and to the darkest specimens of humanity, is cal- 
culated to engender far more heat than light. Indeed, under this 
very ambiguous term, three distinct schemes of doctrine, widely 
different from each other, are set forth ; schemes which every can- 
did inquirer after truth should be careful to distinguish. The first 
is that scheme of fatalism which rests on the fundamental idea 
that there is nothing in the universe besides matter and local mo- 
tion. This doctrine, of course, denies the spirituality of the 
Divine Being, as well as of all created souls, and strikes a fatal 
blow at the immutability of moral distinctions. It is unneces- 
sary to say, that in such a sense of the word, neither Calvin nor 
Luther can be justly accused of fatalism ; as it is well known 
that both of them maintained the spirituality of God, as well as 
the reality of moral distinctions prior to all human laws. 



Chapter!] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 35 

The second scheme of fatalism rises above the first in point 
of dignity and purity of character. It proceeds on the idea 
that all things in heaven and earth are bound together by " an 
implexed series and concatenation of causes:" it admits the 
existence of God, it is true, but yet it regards him as merely the 
greatest and brightest link in the adamantine universal chain 
of necessity. According to this scheme, as well as to the former, 
the very idea of moral liberty is inconceivable and impossible. 
This portentous scheme was perfectly understood and expressly 
repudiated by Calvin. In reference to this doctrine, which was 
maintained by the ancient Stoics, he says : " That dogma is 
falsely and maliciously charged upon us. For we do not, with 
the Stoics, imagine a necessity arising from a perpetual con- 
catenation and intricate series of causes contained in nature ; 
but we make God the Arbiter and Governor of all things, who, in 
his own wisdom, has, from all eternity, decreed what he would 
do, and now by his own power executes what he decreed." 

Here we behold the nature of the third scheme, which has 
been included under the term fatalism. It recognises God as 
the great central and all-controlling power of the universe. It 
does not deny the possibility of liberty ; for it recognises its 
actual existence in the Divine Being. " If the divine will," says 
Calvin, "has any cause, then there must be something ante- 
cedent, on which it depends ; which it is impious to suppose." 
According to Calvin, it is the uncaused divine will which makes 
the " necessity of all things." He frequently sets forth the 
doctrine, that, from all eternity, God decreed whatever should 
come to pass, not excepting, but expressly including, the de- 
liberations and " volitions of men," and by his own power now 
executes his decree. As we do not wish to use opprobrious 
names, we shall characterize these three several schemes of doc- 
trine by the appellations given to them by their advocates. The 
first we shall call, " materialistic fatalism ;" the second, " Stoical 
fatalism ;" and the third we shall designate by the term, " ne- 
cessity" 

Widely as these schemes may differ in other respects, they 
have one feature in common : they all seem to bear with equal 
stringency on the human will, and deprive it of that freedom 
which is now conceded to be indispensable to render men ac- 
countable for their actions. If our volitions be produced by a 



36 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

series of causes, according to the Stoical notion, of fate, or by 
the omnipotence of God, they would seem to be equally neces- 
sitated and devoid of freedom. Hence, in attacking one of 
these schemes at this point, we really attack them all. We 
shall first consider the question, then, How does Calvin attempt 
to reconcile his doctrine with the accountability of man ? How 
does he show, for example, that the first man was guilty and 
justly punishable for a transgression in which he succumbed 
to the divine omnipotence ? 

If a man is really laid under a necessity of sinning, it would 
certainly seem impossible to conceive that he is responsible for 
his sins. Nay, it would not only seem impossible to conceive 
this, but it would also appear very easy to understand, that 
he could not be responsible for them. In order to remove this 
difficulty, and repel the attack of his opponents, Calvin makes 
a distinction between " co-action and necessity." " JSTow, when 
I assert," says he, " that the will, being deprived of its liberty, 
is necessarily drawn or led into evil, I should wonder if any 
one considered it as a harsh expression, since it has nothing in 
it absurd, nor is it unsanctioned by the custom of good men. 
It offends those who know not how to distinguish between 
necessity and compulsion."* Let us see, then, what is this 
distinction between necessity and compulsion, or co-action, 
(as Calvin sometimes calls it,) which is to take off all appear- 
ance of harshness from his views. We are not to imagine 
that this is a distinction without a difference ; for, in truth, 
there is no distinction in philosophy which may be more easily 
made, or more clearly apprehended. It is this : Suppose a 
man wills a particular thing, or external action, and it is pre- 
vented from happening by any outward restraint ; or suppose 
he is unwilling to do a thing, and he is constrained to do it 
against his will ; he is said to labour under compulsion or co- 
action. Of course he is not accountable for the failure of the 
consequence of his will in the one case, nor for the consequence 
of the force imposed on his body in the other. This kind of 
necessity is called co-action by Calvin and Luther ; it is usually 
denominated " natural necessity " by Edwards and his followers ; 
though it is also frequently termed compulsion, or co-action, by 
them. 

Institutes, b. ii, c. iii. 



Chapter I.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 37 

This natural necessity, or co-action, it is admitted on all hands, 
destroys accountability for external conduct, wherever it ob- 
tains. Indeed, if a man is compelled to do a thing against his 
will, this is not, properly speaking, his act at all ; nor is it an 
omission of his, if he wills to do a thing, and is necessarily pre- 
vented from doing it by external restraint. But it should be 
observed that natural necessity, or co-action, reaches no deeper 
than the external conduct; and can excuse for nothing else. 
As it does not influence the will itself, so it cannot excuse for 
acts of the will. Indeed, it presupposes the existence of a 
volition, or act of the will, whose natural consequences it coun- 
teracts and overcomes. Hence, if the question were — Is a man 
accountable for his external actions, that is, for the motions of 
his body, we might speak of natural necessity, or co-action, 
with propriety ; bat not so when the question relates to internal 
acts of the will. All reference to natural necessity, or co-action, 
in relation to such a question, is wholly irrelevant. No one 
doubts, and no one denies, that the motions of the body are 
controlled by the volitions of the mind, or by some external 
force. The advocates for the inherent activity and freedom of 
the mind, do not place them in the external sphere of matter, 
in the passive and necessitated movements of body : they seek 
not the living among the dead. 

But to do justice to these illustrious men, they did not attempt, 
as many of their followers have done, to pass off this freedom 
from external co-action for the freedom of the will. Indeed, 
neither of them contended for the freedom of the will at all, 
nor deemed such freedom requisite to render men accountable 
for their actions. This is an element which has been wrought 
into their system by the subsequent progress of human knowl- 
edge. Luther, it is well known, so far from maintaining the 
freedom of the mind, wrote a work on the "Bondage of the 
Human Will," in reply to Erasmus. " I admit," says he, " that 
man's will is free in a certain sense ; not because it is now in 
the same state it was in paradise, but because it was made free 
originally, and may, through Godls grace, become so again?* 
And Calvin, in his Institutes, has written a chapter to show 
that "man, in his present state, is despoiled of freedom of 
will, and subjected to a miserable slavery." He " was endowed 

e Scott's Luther and Eef., vol. i, pp. 70, 71. 



38 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I, 

with free will," says Calvin, " by which, if he had chosen, he 
might have obtained eternal life."* Thus, according to both 
Lnther and Calvin, man was by the fall despoiled of the free- 
dom of the will. 

Though they allow a freedom from co-action, they repudiate 
the idea of calling this a freedom of the will. " Lombard at 
length pronounces," says Calvin, "that we are not therefore 
possessed of free-will, because we have an equal power to do 
or to think either good or evil, but only because we are free 
from constraint And this liberty is not diminished, although 
we are corrupt, and slaves of sin, and capable of doing nothing 
but sin. Then man will be said to possess free-will in this 
sense, not that he has an equally free election of good and 
evil, but because he does evil voluntarily, and not by con- 
straint. That indeed, is true ; but what end could it answer 
to deck out a thing so diminutive with a title so superb ?"f 
Truly, if Lombard merely meant by the freedom of the will, 
for which he contended, a freedom from external restraint, 
or co-action, Calvin might well contemptuously exclaim, 
"Egregious liberty!";): It was reserved for a later period in 
the history of the Church to deck out this diminutive thing 
with the superb title of the freedom of the will, and to pass it 
off for the highest and most glorious liberty of which the 
human mind can form any conception. Iiobbes, it will be 
hereafter seen, was the first who, either designedly or unde- 
signedly, palmed off this imposture upon the world. 

It is a remarkable fact, in the history of the human mind, 
that the most powerful and imposing arguments used by the 
early reformers to disprove the freedom of the will have been 
as confidently employed by their most celebrated followers to 
establish that very freedom on a solid basis. It is well known, 
for example, that Edwards, and many other great men, have 
employed the doctrine of the foreknowledge of God to prove 
philosophical necessity, without which they conclude there can 
be no rational foundation for the freedom of the will. Yet, in 
former times, this very doctrine was regarded as the most for- 
midable instrument with which to overthrow and demolish that 
very freedom. Thus Luther calls the foreknowledge of God a 
thunderbolt to dash the doctrine of free-will into atoms. And 

° Institutes, b. i, c. xv. f II>id., b. ii, c. ii. t Ibid. 



Chapter!] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 39 

who can forbear to agree with Luther so far as to say, that if 
the foreknowledge of God proves anything in opposition to the 
freedom of the will, it proves that it is under the most absolute 
and uncontrollable necessity ? It clearly seems, that if it proves 
anything in favour of necessity, it proves everything for which 
the most absolute necessitarian can contend. Accordingly, a 
distinguished Calvinistic divine has said, that if our volitions be 
foreseen, we can no more avoid them " than we can pluck the 
sun out of the heavens."* 

But though the reformers were thus, in some respects, more 
true to their fundamental principle than their followers have 
been, we are not to suppose that they are free from all incon- 
sistencies and self-contradiction. Thus, if " foreknowledge is 
a thunderbolt" to dash the doctrine of free-will into atoms, it 
destroyed free-will in man before the fall as well as after. 
Hence the thunderbolt of Luther falls upon his own doctrine, 
that man possessed free-will in his primitive state, with as much 
force as it can upon the doctrine of his opponents. He is evi- 
dently caught in the toils he so confidently prepared for his 
adversary. And how many of the followers of the great re- 
former adopt his doctrine, and wield his thunderbolts, without 
perceiving how destructively they recoil on themselves ! Though 
they ascribe free-will to man as one of the elements of his pris- 
tine glory, yet they employ against it in his present condition 
arguments which, if good for anything, would despoil, not only 
man, but the whole universe of created intelligences — nay, the 
great Uncreated Intelligence himself — of every vestige and 
shadow of such a power. 

It is a wonderful inconsistency in Luther, that he should so 
often and so dogmatically assert that the doctrine of free-will 
falls prostrate before the prescience of God, and at the same 
time maintain the freedom of the divine will. If foreknowledge 
is incompatible with the existence of free-will, it is clear that 
the will of God is not free ; since it is on all sides conceded that 
all his volitions are perfectly foreseen by him. Yet in the 
face of this conclusion, which so clearly and so irresistibly follows 
from Luther's position, he asserts the freedom of the divine will, 
as if he were perfectly unconscious of the self-contradiction in 
which he is involved. " It now then follows," says he, " that 

° Dick's Theology. 



40 MOEAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I, 

free-will is plainly a divine term, and can be applicable to none 
but the Divine Maj esty only."* . . . , He even says, If free- 
will " be ascribed nnto men, it is not more properly ascribed, 
than the divinity of God himself wonld be ascribed nnto them ; 
which wonld be the greatest of all sacrilege. Wherefore, 
it becomes theologians to refrain from the nse of this term 
altogether, whenever they wish to speak of hnman ability, and 
to leave it to be applied to God only."f And we may add, 
if they wonld apply it to God, it becomes them to refrain from 
all such arguments as wonld show even snch an application 
of it to be absurd. 

In like manner, Calvin admits that the human sonl possessed 
a free-will in its primitive state, bnt has been despoiled of it 
by the fall, and is now in bondage to a " miserable slavery." 
Bnt if the necessity which arises from the power of sin over the 
will be inconsistent with its freedom, how are we to reconcile 
the freedom of the first man with the power exercised by the 
Almighty over the wills of all created beings ? So trne it is, 
that the most systematic thinker, who begins by denying the 
truth, will be sure to end by contradicting himself. 

In one respect, as we have seen, Calvin differs from his fol- 
lowers at the present day ; the denial of free-will he regards as 
perfectly reconcilable with the idea of accountability. Al- 
though onr volitions are absolutely necessary to ns, although 
they may be produced in us by the most uncontrollable power 
in the universe, yet are we accountable for them, because they 
are our volitions. The bare fact that we will such and such a 
thing, without regard to how we come by the volition, is suf- 
ficient to render us accountable for it. We must be free from 
an external co-action, he admits, to render us accountable for 
our external actions ; but not from an internal necessity, to ren- 
der us accountable for our internal volitions. But this does not 
seem to be a satisfactory reply to the difficulty in question. We 
ask, How a man can be accountable for his acts, for his voli- 
tions, if they are caused in him by an infinite power ? and we 
are told, Because they are his acts. This eternal repetition of 
the fact in which all sides are agreed, can throw no light on 
the point about which we dispute. We still ask, How can a 
man be responsible for an act, or volition, which is necessitated 

° Bondage of the Will, sec. xxvi. | Ibid. 



Chapter L] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 41 

to arise in his mind by Omnipotence ? If any one should reply, 
with Dr. Dick, that we do not know how he can be account- 
able for such an act, yet we should never deny a thing because 
we cannot see how it is ; this would not be a satisfactory 
answer. For, though it is certainly the last weakness of the 
human mind to deny a thing, because we cannot see how it is ; 
yet there is a great difference between not being able to see 
how a thing is, and being clearly able to see that it cannot he 
anyhow at all, — "between being unable to see how two things 
agree together, and being able to see that two ideas are utterly 
repugnant to each other. Hence we mean to ask, that if a 
man's act be necessitated in him by an infinite, omnipotent 
power, over which he had, and could have, no possible control, 
can we not see that he cannot be accountable for it ? We have 
no difficulty whatever in believing a mystery ; but when we 
are required to embrace what so plainly seems to be an ab- 
surdity, we confess that our reason is either weak enough, or 
strong enough, to pause and reluctate. 



SECTION II. 

The manner in which Hobbes, Collins, and others, endeavour to reconcile 
necessity with free and accountable agency. 

The celebrated philosopher of Malmsbury viewed all things as 
boimd together in the relation of cause and effect ; and he was, 
beyond doubt, one of the most acute thinkers that ever advo- 
cated the doctrine of necessity. From some of the sentiments 
expressed towards the conclusion of " The Leviathan," which 
have, not without reason, subjected him to the charge of atheism, 
we may doubt his entire sincerity when he pretends to advo- 
cate the doctrine of necessity out of a zeal for the Divine Sove- 
reignty and the dogma of Predestination. If he hoped by this 
avowal of Ins design to propitiate any class of theologians, he 
must have been greatly disappointed ; for his speculations were 
universally condemned by the Christian world as atheistical in 
their tendency. This charge has been fixed upon him, in spite 
of his solemn protestations against its injustice, and his earnest 
endeavours to reconcile his scheme of necessity with the free- 
agency and accountability of man. 

" I conceive," says Hobbes, " that nothing taketh beginning 



42 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I, 

from itself, but from the action of some other immediate agent 
without itself. And that therefore, when first a man hath an 
appetite or will to something, to which immediately before he 
had no appetite nor will, the cause of his will is not the will 
itself, but something else not in his own disposing ; so that it is 
out of controversy, that of voluntary actions the will is the neces- 
sary cause, and by this which is said, the will is also caused 
by other things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that volun- 
tary actions have all of them necessary causes, and therefore 
are necessitated." This is clear and explicit. There is no con- 
troversy, he truly says, that voluntary actions, that is, external 
actions proceeding from the will, are necessitated by the will. 
And as according to his postulate, the will or volition is also 
caused by other things of which it has no disposal, so they are 
also necessitated. In other words, external voluntary actions 
are necessarily caused by volitions, and volitions are necessarily 
caused by something else other than the will ; and consequently 
the chain is complete between the cause of volition and its 
effects. How, then, is man a free-agent? and how is he 
accountable for his actions? Hobbes has not left these 
questions unanswered; and it is a mistake to suppose, as 
is too often done, that his argument in favour of necessity 
evinces a design to sap the foundations of human respon- 
sibility. 

He answers these questions precisely as they were answered 
by Luther and Calvin more than a hundred years before his 
time. In order to solve this great difficulty, and establish an 
agreement between necessity and liberty, he insists on the dis- 
tinction between co-action and necessity. Sir James Mackin- 
tosh says, that " in his treatise de Servo Arhit/rio against Eras- 
mus, Luther states the distinction between co-action and neces- 
sity as familiar a hundred and fifty years before it was proposed 
by Hobbes, or condemned in the Jansenists."* According to his 
definition of liberty, it is merely a freedom from co-action, or ex- 
ternal compulsion. " I conceive liberty," says he, " to be rightly 

o Progress of Ethical Philosophy, note 0. Indeed, this distinction appears 
quite as clearly in the writings of Augustine, as it does in those of Luther, or 
Calvin, or Hobbes. He repeatedly places our liberty and ability in this, that we 
can " keep the commandments if ive ivill" which is obviously a mere freedom 
from external co-action. See Part ii, ch. iv, sec. 2. 



Chapter L] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 43 

defined in this manner : Liberty is the absence of all the impedi- 
ments to action that are not contained in the natnre and intrinsical 
qualities of the agent : as for example, the water is said to de- 
scend freely, or to have liberty to descend by the chamiel of 
the river, 'because there is no impediment that way ; but not 
across, because the banks are impediments ; and though the 
water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants liberty to 
ascend, but the faculty or power, because the impediment is 
in the nature of the water and intrinsical." According to this 
definition, though a man's volitions were thrown out, not by 
himself, but by some irresistible power working within his 
mind, say the power of the Almighty, yet he would be free, 
provided there were no impediments to prevent the external 
effects of his volitions. This is the liberty which water, im- 
pelled by the power of gravity, possesses in descending the 
channel of a river. It is the liberty of the winds and waves of 
the sea, which, by a sort of metaphor, is supposed to reign over 
the dominions of a mechanical and materialistic fate. It is the 
most idle of all idle things to speak of such a liberty, or rather, 
to use the word in such a sense, when the controversy relates to 
the freedom of the mind itself, What has such a thing to do 
with the origin of human volitions, or the nature of moral 
agency? Is there no difference between the motion of the 
body and the action of mind % Or is there nothing in the uni- 
verse of God but mere body and local motion ? If there is not, 
then, indeed, we neither have nor can conceive any higher 
liberty than that which the philosopher is pleased to allow us 
to possess ; but if there be mind, then there may be things in 
heaven and earth which are not dreamed of in his philosophy. 

The definition which Collins, the disciple of Hobbes, has 
given of liberty, is the same as that of his master. " I contend," 
says he, " for liberty, as it signifies a power in man to do as he 
wills or pleases." The doing here refers to the external action, 
which, properly speaking, is not an act at all, but merely a 
change of state in the body. The body merely suffers a change 
of place and position, in obedience to the act of the will ; it 
does not act, nor can it act, because it is passive in its nature. 
To do as one wills, in this sense, is a freedom of the body from 
co-action ; it is not a freedom of the will from internal neces- 
sity. Collins says this is " a valuable liberty," and he says 



44 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I, 

truly; for if one were thrown into prison, lie conld not go 
wherever he might please, or do as he might will. But the 
imprisonment of the body does not prevent a man from being 
a free-agent. He also tells us truly, that " many philosophers 
and theologians, both ancient and modern, have given defini- 
tions of liberty that are consistent with fate and necessity." 
But then, their definitions, like his own, had no reference to 
the acts of the mind, but to the motions of the body ; and it is 
a grand irrelevancy, we repeat, to speak of such a thing, when 
the question relates, not to the freedom of the body, but the 
freedom of the mind. Calvin truly says, that to call this exter- 
nal freedom from co-action or natural necessity a freedom of 
the will, is to decorate a most diminutive thing with a superb 
title ; but the philosopher of Malmsbury, and his ingenious dis- 
ciple, seem disposed to confer the high-sounding title and 
empty name on us, in order to reconcile us to the servitude and 
chains in which they have been pleased to bind us. 

This idea of liberty, common to Hobbes and Collins, which 
Mackintosh says was familiar to Luther and Calvin at least a 
hundred and thirty years before, is in reality of much earlier 
origin. It was maintained by the ancient Stoics, by whom it is 
as clearly set forth as by Hobbes himself. The well-known 
illustration of the Stoic Chrysippus, so often mentioned by Leib- 
nitz and others, is a j)roof of the correctness of this remark : 
" Suppose I push against a heavy body," says he : " if it be 
square, it will not move ; if it be cylindrical, it will. What the 
difference of form is to the stone, the difference of disposition 
is to the mind." Thus his notion of freedom was derived from 
matter, and supposed to consist in the absence of friction ! The 
idea of liberty thus deduced from that which is purely and per- 
fectly passive, from an absolutely necessitated state of body, 
was easily reconciled by him with his doctrine of fate. 

Is it not strange that Mr. Hazlitt, after adopting this defini- 
tion of liberty, should have supposed that he allowed a real 
freedom to the will ? "I prefer exceedingly," says he, " to the 
modern instances of a couple of billiard-balls, or a pair of scales, 
the illustration of Chrysippus." We cannot very well see, how 
the instance of a cylinder is so great an improvement on that 
of a billiard-ball ; especially as a sphere, and not a cylinder, is 
free to move in all directions. 



Chapter 1.1 WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 45 

The truth is, we must quit the region of dead, inert, passive 
matter, if we would form an idea of the true meaning of the 
term liberty, as applied to the activity of living agents. Mr. 
Hazlitt evidently loses himself amid the ambiguities of language, 
when he says, that " I so far agree with Hobbes and differ from 
Locke, in thinking that liberty, in the most extended and ab- 
stracted sense, is applicable to material as well as voluntary 
agents" Still this very acute writer makes a few feeble and 
ineffectual efforts to raise our notion of the liberty of moral 
agents above that given by the illustration of Chrysippus in 
Cicero. " My notion of a free agent, I confess," says he, " is 
not that represented by Mr. Hobbes, namely, one that when all 
things necessary to produce the effect are present, can never- 
theless not produce it ; but I believe a free-agent of whatever 
kind is one which, where all things necessary to produce the 
effect are present, can produce it ; its own operation not being 
hindered by anything else. The body is said to be free when 
it has the power to obey the direction of the will ; so the will 
may be said to be free when it has the power to obey the dic- 
tates of the understanding."* Thus the liberty of the will is 
made to consist not in the denial that its volitions are produced, 
but in the absence of impediments which might hinder its 
operations from taking effect. This idea of liberty, it is evi- 
dent, is perfectly consistent with the materialistic fatalism of 
Hobbes, which is so much admired by Mr. Hazlitt. 

SECTION III. 

The sentiments of Descartes, Spinoza, and Malebranche, concerning the rela- 
tion between liberty and necessity. 

~No one was ever more deeply implicated in the scheme of 
necessity than Descartes. "Mere philosophy," says he, "is 
enough to make us know that there cannot enter the least 
thought into the mind of man, but God must will and have 
willed from all eternity that it should enter there." His argu- 
ment in proof of this position is short and intelligible. " God," 
says he, " could not be absolutely perfect if there could happen 
anything in this world which did not spring entirely from him." 
Hence it follows, that it is inconsistent with the absolute per- 

e Literary Kemains, p. 65. 



46 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

fections of God to suppose that a being created by him could 
put forth a volition which does not spring entirely from him, 
and not even in part from the creature. 

Yet Descartes is a warm believer in the doctrine of free- 
will. On the ground of reason, he believes in an absolute pre- 
destination of all things ; and yet he concludes from exjDerience 
that man is free. If we ask how these things can hang to- 
gether, he replies, that we cannot tell ; that a solution of this 
difficulty lies beyond the reach of the human faculties. Now, 
it is evident, that reason cannot " make us know " one thing, 
and experience teach another, quite contrary to it ; for no two 
truths can ever contradict each other. Those who adopt this 
mode of viewing the subject, generally remind us of the feeble- 
ness of human reason, and of the necessary limits to all human 
speculation. Though, as disciples of Butler, we are deeply im- 
pressed with these truths, yet, as disciples of Bacon, we do not 
intend to despair until we can discover some good and sufficient 
reason for so doing. It seems to us, that the reply of Leibnitz 
to Descartes, already alluded to, is not without reason. "It 
might have been an evidence of humility in Descartes," says 
he, " if he had confessed his own inability to solve the difficulty 
in question ; but not satisfied with confessing for himself, he 
does so for all intelligences and for all times." 

But, after all, Descartes has really endeavoured to solve the 
problem which he declared insoluble ; that is, to reconcile the 
infinite perfections of God with the free-agency of man. He 
struggles to break loose from this dark mystery ; but, like the 
charmed bird, he struggles and flutters in vain, and finally 
yields to its magical influence. In his solution, this great 
luminary of science, like others before him, seems to suffer a 
sad eclipse. " Before God sent us into the world," says he, " he 
knew exactly what all the inclinations of our wills would be ; 
it is he that has implanted them in us / it is he also that lias 
disposed all things, so that such or such objects should present 
themselves to us at such or such times, by means of which he 
has known that our free-will would determine us to such or 
such actions, and he has willed that it should he so ; hit he has 
not willed to constrain us thereto" This is found in a letter to 
the Princess Elizabeth, for whose benefit he endeavoured to 
reconcile the liberty of man with the perfections of God. It 



Chapter!] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 47 

brings us back to the old distinction between necessity and 
co-action. God brings onr volitions to pass ; he wills them ; they 
"spring entirely from him;" but we are nevertheless free, 
because he constrains not our external actions, or compels us to 
do anything contrary to our wills ! We cannot suppose, how- 
ever, that this solution of the problem made a very clear or 
deep impression on the mind of Descartes himself, or he would 
not, on other occasions, have pronounced every attempt at the 
solution of it vain and hopeless. 

In his attempt to reconcile the free-agency of man with the 
divine perfections, Descartes deceives himself by a false analogy. 
Thus he supposes that a monarch "who has forbidden duelling, 
and who, certainly knowing that two gentlemen will fight, if 
they should meet, employs infallible means to bring them to- 
gether. They meet, they fight each other : their disobedience 
of the laws is an effect of their free-will ; they are punishable." 
" What a king can do in such a case," he adds, " God who has 
an infinite power and prescience, infallibly does in relation to 
all the actions of men." But the king, in the supposed case, 
does not act on the minds of the duellists ; their disposition to 
disobey the laws does not proceed from him ; whereas, accord- 
ing to the theory of Descartes, nothing enters into the mind 
of man which does not spring entirely from God. If we sup- 
pose a king, who has direct access to the mind of his subject, 
like God, and who employs his power to excite therein a mur- 
derous intent or any other particular disposition to disobey the 
law, we shall have a more apposite representation of the divine 
agency according to the theory of Descartes. Has anything 
ever been ascribed to the agency of Satan himself which could 
more clearly render him an accomplice in the sins of men ? 

From the bosom of Cartesianism two systems arose, one in 
principle, but widely different in their developments and ulti- 
mate results. We allude to the celebrated schemes of Spinoza 
and Malebranche. Both set out with the same exaggerated 
view of the sublime truth that God is all in all ; and each gave 
a diverse development to this fundamental position, to this cen- 
tral idea, according as the logical faculty predominated over 
the moral, or the moral faculty over the logical. Father Male- 
branche, by a happy inconsistency, preserved the great moral 
interests of the world against the invasion of a remorseless logic. 



48 MOEAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

Spinoza, on the contrary, conld follow out his first principle 
almost to its last consequence, even to the entire extinction of 
the moral light of the universe, and the enthronement of blind 
power, with as little concern, with as profound composure, as 
if he were merely discussing a theorem in the mathematics. 

" All things," says he, " determined to such and such actions, 
are determined by God ; and, if God determines not a thing to 
act, it cannot determine itself."* From this proposition he 
drew the inference, that things which are produced by God. 
could not have existed in any other manner, nor in any other 
order, f Thus, by the divine power, all things in heaven and 
earth are bound together in the iron circle of necessity. It 
required no great logical foresight to perceive that this doctrine 
shut all real liberty out of the created universe ; but it did 
require no little moral firmness, or very great moral insensi- 
bility, to declare such a consequence with the unflinching auda- 
city which marks its enunciation by Spinoza. He repeatedly 
declares, in various modes of expression, that " the soul is a 
spiritual automaton," and possesses no such liberty as is usually 
ascribed to it. All is necessary, and the very notion of a free- 
will is a vulgar prejudice. "All I have to say," he coolly 
remarks, "to those who believe that they can speak or keep 
silence — in one word, can act — by virtue of a free decision of 
the soul, is, that they dream with their eyes open.";); Though 
he thus boldly denies all free-will, according to the common 
notion of mankind ; yet, no less than Hobbes and Collins, he 
allows that the soul possesses " a sort of liberty." " It is free," 
says he, in the act of affirming that " two and two are equal to 
four ;" thus finding the freedom of the soul which he is pleased 
to allow the world to possess in the most perfect type of neces- 
sity it is possible to conceive. 

But Spinoza does not employ this idea of liberty, nor an) r 
other, to show that man is a responsible being. This is not at 
all strange ; the wonder is, that after having demonstrated that 
" the prejudice of men concerning good and evil, merit and 
demerit, praise and blame, order and confusion, beauty and 
deformity," are nothing but dreams, he should have felt bound 
to defend the position, that we may be justly punished for our 

° Ethique, premiere partic, prop. xxvi. f Ibid., prop, xxxiv. 

I Ethique, Des Passions, prop, ii and Scholium. 



Chapter L] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 49 

offences by the Supreme Ruler of the world, His defence of 
this doctrine we shall lay before the reader without a word of 
comment. " "Will you say," he replies to Oldenburg, " that God 
cannot be angry with the wicked, or that all men are worthy 
of beatitude ? Li regard to the first point, I perfectly agree 
that God cannot be angry at anything which happens according 
to his decree, but I deny that it results that all men ought to 
be happy ; for men can be excusable, and at the same time be 
deprived of beatification, and made to suffer a thousand ways. 
A horse is excusable for being a horse, and not a man ; but that 
prevents not that he ought to be a horse, and not a man. He 
who is rendered mad by the bite of a dog, is surely excusable, 
and yet we ought to constrain him. In like manner, the man 
who cannot govern his passions, nor restrain them by the fear 
of the laws, though excusable on account of the infirmity of his 
nature, can nevertheless not enjoy peace, nor the knowledge 
and the love of God ; and it is necessary that he should 
perish."* 

It was as difficult for Father Malebranche to restrain his 
indignation at the system of Spinoza, as it was for him to ex- 
pose its fallacy, after having admitted its great fundamental 
principle. This is well illustrated by the facts stated by M. Sais- 
set : " When Mairan," says he," still young, and having a strong 
passion for the study of the ' Ethique,' requested Malebranche 
to guide him in that perilous route ; we know with what urgency, 
bordering on importirnity, he pressed the illustrious father 
to show him the weak point of Spinozism, the precise place 
where the rigour of the reasoning failed, the paralogism con- 
tained in the demonstration. Malebranche eluded the question, 
and could not assign the paralogism, after which Mairan so ear- 
nestly sought : ■ It is not that the paralogism is in such or* 
such places of the Ethigae, it is everywhere.' "f In this impa- 
tient judgment, Father Malebranche uttered more truth than 
he could very well perceive ; the paralogism is truly everywhere, 
because this whole edifice of words, " this frightful chimera," 
is really assumed in the arbitrary definition of the term sub- 
stance. We might say with equal truth, that the fallacy of 
Malebranche's scheme is also everywhere ; for although it stops 

° (Euvres de Spinoza, tome ii, 350. 

t Introduction to the " (Euvres de Spinoza," by M. Saisset. 
4 



50 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

short of the consequences so sternly deduced by Spinoza, it sets 
out from the same distorted view of the sovereignty and domin- 
ion of God, from which those consequences necessarily flow. 

Spinoza, who had but few followers during his lifetime, has 
been almost idolized by the most celebrated savans of modern 
Germany. Whether this will ultimately add to the glory of 
Spinoza, or detract from that of his admirers, we shall leave the 
reader and posterity to determine. In the mean time, we shall 
content ourselves with a statement of the fact, in the language 
of M. Saisset : " Everything," says he, " appears extraordinary 
in Spinoza ; his person, his style, his philosophy ; but that which 
is more strange still, is the destiny of that philosophy among 
men. Badly known, despised by the most illustrious of his con- 
temporaries, Spinoza died in obscurity, and remained buried 
during a century. All at once his name reappeared with an 
extraordinary eclat ; his works were read with passion ; a new 
world was discovered in them, with a horizon unknown to our 
fathers ; and the god of Spinoza, which the seventeenth century 
had broken as an idol, ]hrecame the god of Lessing, of Goethe, 
of JSTovalis." 

"The solitary thinker whom Malebranche called a wretch, 
Schleiermacher reveres and invokes as equal to a saint. That 
6 systematic atheist,' on whom Bayle lavished outrage, has been 
for modern Germany the most religious of men. ' God-intoxi- 
cated,' as Novalis said, i he has seen the world through a thick 
cloud, and man has been to his troubled eyes only a fugitive 
mode of Being in itself.' In that system, in fine, so shocking 
and so monstrous, that ' hideous chimera,' Jacobi sees the last 
word of philosophy, Schelling the presentiment of the true 
philosophy." 

SECTION IV. 

Tlie views of Locke, Tuclcer, Hartley, Priestley, Hehethis, and Diderot, icitli 
respect to the relation between liberty and necessity. 

Locke, it is well known, adopted the notions of free-agency 
given by Hobbes. " In this," says he, " consists freedom, viz., 
in our being able to act or not to act, according as we shall 
choose or will."" And this notion of liberty, consisting in a 

° Book ii, chapters 21, 27. 



Chapter!] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 51 

freedom from external co-action, has received an impetus and 
currency from the influence of Locke which it would not other- 
wise have obtained. Neither Calvin nor Luther, as we have 
seen, pretended to hold it up as the freedom of the will. This 
was reserved for Hobbes and his immortal follower, John 
Locke, who has, in his turn, been copied by a host of illustrious 
disciples who would have recoiled from the more articulate and 
consistent development of this doctrine by the philosopher of 
Malmsbury. It is only because Locke has enveloped it in a 
cloud of inconsistencies that it has been able to secure the ven- 
eration of the great and good. 

It is remarkable, that although Locke adopted the definition 
of free-will given by Hobbes, and which the latter so easily 
reconciled with the omnipotence and omniscience of God ; yet 
he expressly declares that he had found it impossible to recon- 
cile those attributes in the Divine Being with the free-agency 
of man. Surely no such difficulty could have existed, if his 
definition of free-agency, or free-will, be correct ; for although 
omnipotence itself might produce our volitions, we might still 
be free to act, to move in accordance with our volitions. But 
the truth is, there was something more in Locke's thoughts and 
feelings, in the inmost working of his nature, with respect to 
moral liberty, than there was in his definition. The inconsist- 
ency and fluctuation of his views on this all-important subject 
are fully reflected in his chapter on power. 

Both in Great Britain and France, the most illustrious suc- 
cessors of Locke soon delivered themselves from his incon- 
sistencies and self-contradictions. Hartley was not in all re- 
spects a follower of Locke, it is true, though he admitted his 
definition of free-agency. " It appears to me," says Hartley, 
" that all the most complex ideas arise from sensation, and that 
reflection is not a distinct source, as Mr. Locke makes it." By 
this mutilation of the philosophy of Locke, it was reduced back 
to that dead level of materialism in which Hobbes had left it, 
and from which the former had scarcely endeavoured to raise 
it. Hence arose the rigid scheme of necessity, for which 
Hartley is so zealous an advocate. In reading his treatise on 
the " Mechanism of the Human Mind," we are irresistibly com- 
pelled {o feel the conviction that the only circumstance which 
prevents the movements of the soul from being subjected to 



52 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

mathematical calculation, and made a branch of dynamics, is 
the want of a measure of the force of motives. If this want 
were supplied, then the philosophy of the mind might be, ac- 
cording to his view of its nature and operations, converted into 
a portion of mechanics. Yet this excellent man did not im- 
agine for a moment that he upheld a scheme which is at war 
with the great moral interests of the world. He supposes it is 
no matter how we come by our volitions, provided our bodies 
be left free to obey the impulses of the will ; this is amply suf- 
ficient to render us accountable for our actions, and to vindicate 
the moral government of God. Thus did he fall asleep with a 
specious, but most superficial dream of liberty, which has no 
more to do with the real question concerning the moral agency 
of man than if it related to the winds of heaven or to the waves 
of the sea. Accordingly this is the view of liberty which he 
repeatedly holds up as all-sufficient to secure the great moral 
interest of the human race. 

His great disciple, Dr. Priestley, pursues precisely the same 
course. " If a man," says he, " be wholly a material being, and 
the power of thinking the result of a certain organization of the 
brain, does it not follow that all his functions must be regulated 
by the laws of mechanism, and that of consequence his actions 
proceed from an irresistible necessity?" And again, he ob- 
serves, " the doctrine of necessity is the immediate result of the 
materiality of man, for mechanism is the undoubted consequence 
of materialism."* Priestley, however, allows us to possess free- 
will as defined by Hobbes, Locke, and Hartley. 

Helvetius himself could easily admit such a liberty into his 
unmitigated scheme of necessity, but he did not commit the 
blunder of Locke and Hartley, in supposing that it bore on the 
great question concerning the freedom of the mind. "It is 
true," he says, " we can form a tolerably distinct idea of the 
word liberty, understood in its common sense. A man is free 
who is neither loaded with irons nor confined in prison, nor in- 
timidated like the slave with the dread of chastisement : in this 
sense the liberty of man consists in the free exercise of his 
power ; I say, of his power, because it would be ridiculous to 
mistake for a want of liberty the incapacity we are under to 
pierce the clouds like the eagle, to live under the water like the 

Disquisitions and Introduction, p. 5. 



Chapter!] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 53 

whale, or to become king, emperor, or pope. We have so far 
a sufficiently clear idea of the word. But this is no longer the 
case when we come to apply liberty to the will. What must 
this liberty then mean ? We can only understand by it a free 
power of willing or not willing a thing : but tins power would 
imply that there may be a will without motives, and conse- 
quently an effect without a cause. A philosophical treatise on 
the liberty of the will would be a treatise of effects without a 
cause."* 

In like manner, Diderot had the sagacity to perceive that 
the idea of liberty, as defined by Locke, did not at all come 
into conflict with his portentous scheme of irreligion, which had 
grounded itself on the doctrine of necessity. Having pro- 
nounced the term liberty, as applied to the will, to be a word 
without meaning, he proceeds to justify the infliction of punish- 
ment on the same grounds on which it is vindicated by Hobbes 
and Spinoza. " But if there is no liberty," says he, " there is 
no action that merits either praise or blame, neither vice nor 
virtue, nothing that ought to be either rewarded or punished. 
What then is the distinction among men ? The doing of good 
and the doing of evil ! The doer of ill is one who must be 
destroyed, not punished. The doer of good is lucky, not virtu- 
ous. But though neither the doer of good nor of ill be free, man 
is, nevertheless, a being to be modified ; it is for this reason the 
doer of ill should be destroyed upon the scaffold. From thence 
the good effects of education, of pleasure, of grief, of grandeur, 
of poverty, &c. ; from thence a philosophy full of pity, strongly 
attached to the good, nor more angry with the wicked than 

with the whirlwind which fills one's eyes with dust." 

" Adopt these principles if you think them good, or show me 
that they are bad. If you adopt them, they will reconcile you 
too with others and with yourself: you will neither be pleased 
nor angry with yourself for being what you are. Keproach 
others for nothing, and repent of nothing, this is the first step 
to wisdom. Besides this all is prejudice and false philosophy." 

Though these consequences irresistibly flow from the doctrine 
of necessity, yet the injury resulting from them would be far 
less if they were maintained only by such men as Helvetius 
and Diderot. It is when such errors receive the sanction of 

° Helvetius on the Mind, p. 44. 



54 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT LPart I, 

Christian philosophers, like Hartley and Leibnitz, and are rec- 
ommended to the hnman mind by a j)ious zeal for the glory of 
God, that they are apt to obtain a frightful currency and be- 
come far more desolating in their effects. "The doctrine of 
necessity," says Hartley, " has a tendency to abate all resent- 
ment against men : since all they do against us is by the ap- 
pointment of God, it is rebellion against him to be offended 
with them? 

SECTION V. 
The manner in which Leibnitz endeavours to reconcile liberty and necessity. 

Leibnitz censures the language of Descartes, in which he 
ascribes all the thoughts and volitions of men to God, and com- 
plains that he thereby shuts out free-agency from the world. 
It becomes a very curious question, then, how Leibnitz himself, 
who was so deeply implicated in the scheme of necessity, has 
been able to save the great interests of morality. He does not, 
for a moment, call in question " the great demonstration from 
cause and effect " in favour of necessity. It is well known that 
he has more than once compared the human mind to a balance, 
in which reasons and inclinations take the place of weights ; he 
supposes it to be just as impossible for the mind to depart from 
the direction given to it by " the determining cause," as it is for 
a balance to turn in opposition to the influence of the greatest 
weight. 

Nor is he pleased with Descartes's appeal to consciousness to 
prove the doctrine of liberty. In reply to this appeal, he says : 
"The chain of causes connected one with another reaches very 
far. Wherefore the reason alleged by Descartes, in order to 
prove the independence of our free actions, by a pretended 
vigorous internal feeling, has no force.* We cannot, strictly 
speaking, feel our independence ; and we do not always per- 
ceive the causes, frequently imperceptible, on which our reso- 
lution depends. It is as if a needle touched with the loadstone 
were sensible of and pleased with its turning toward the north. 

° Mr. Stewart says : " Dr. Hartley was, I believe, one of the first (if not the 
first) who denied that our consciousness is in favour of our free-agency." — 
Stewart's Works, vol. v, Appendix. This is evidently a mistake. In the above 
passage, Leibnitz, with even more point than Hartley, denies that our conscious- 
ness is in favour of free-agency. 



Chapter I] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 55 

For it would believe that it turned itself, independently of any 
other cause, not perceiving the insensible motions of the mag- 
netic matter."* Thus, he seems to represent the doctrine of 
liberty as a mere dream and delusion of the mind, and the iron 
scheme of necessity as a stern reality. Is it in the power of 
Leibnitz, then, any more than it was in that of Descartes, to 
reconcile such a scheme with the free-agency and accountability 
of man ? Let us hear him and determine. 

Leibnitz repudiates the notion of liberty given by Hobbes 
and Locke. In his "Nouveaux Essais sur L'Entendement 
Humain," a work in which he combats many of the doctrines of 
Locke, the insignificance of his idea of the freedom of the will 
is most clearly and triumphantly exposed. Philalethe, or the 
representative of Locke, says : " Liberty is the power that a 
man has to do or not to do an action according to his will." 
Theophile, or the representative of Leibnitz, replies : " If men 
understood only that by liberty, when they ask whether the 
will is free, their question would be truly absurd." And agair : 
" The question ought not to be asked," says Philalethe, " if the 
will is free : that is to speak in a very improper manner : but 
if man is free. This granted, I say that, when any one can, by 
the direction or choice of his mind, prefer the existence of one 
action to the non-existence of that action and to the contrary, 
that is to say, when he can make it exist or not exist, according 
to his iciU, then he is free. And we can scarcely see how it 
could be possible to conceive a being more free than one who is 
capable of doing what he wills" Theophile rejoins: "When 
we n reason concerning the liberty of the will, we do not demand 
if the man can do what he wills, but if he has a sufficient inde- 
pendence in the will itself; we do not ask if he has free limbs 
or elbow-room, but if the mind is free, and in what that free- 
dom consists."! 

° Essais de Theodicee, p. 99. 

f " Hobbes defines a free-agent," says Stewart, " to be 'he that can do if he 
will, and forbear if he will/ The same definition has been adopted by Leibnitz, 
by Collins, by Gravezende, by Edwards, by Bonnet, and by all later necessitari- 
ans." The truth is, as we have seen, that instead of adopting, Leibnitz has very 
clearly refuted, the definition of Hobbes. Mr. Harris, in his work entitled " The 
Primeval Man," has also fallen into the error of ascribing this definition of liberty 
to Leibnitz. Surely, these very learned authors must have forgotten, that Leib- 
nitz wrote a reply to Hobbes, in which he expressly combats his views of liberty. 



5Q MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

Having thus exploded the delusive notion of liberty which 
Locke had borrowed from Hobbes, Leibnitz proceeds to take 
what seems to be higher ground. He expressly declares, that 
in older to constitute man an accountable agent, he must be 
free, not only from constraint, but also from necessity. In the 
adoption of this language, Leibnitz seems to speak with the ad- 
vocates of free-agency ; but does he think with them ? The 
sound is pleasant to the ear ; but what sense is it intended to 
convey to the mind? Leibnitz shall be his own interpreter. 
" All events have their necessary causes," says Hobbes. " Bad," 
replies Leibnitz : " they have their determining causes, by which 
we can assign a reason for them ; but they have not necessary 
causes." Now does this signify that an event, that a volition, 
is not absolutely and indissolubly connected with its " determin- 
ing cause?" Is this the grand idea from which the light of 
liberty is to beam on a darkened and enslaved world ? By no 
means. We must indulge no fond hopes or idle dreams of the 
kind. Yolition is free from necessity, adds Leibnitz ; because 
" the contrary could happen without implying a contradiction." 
This is the signification which he attaches to his own language ; 
and it is the only meaning of which it is susceptible in accord- 
ance with his system. Thus, Leibnitz saw and clearly exposed 
the futility of speaking about a freedom from co-action or re- 
straint, when the question is, not whether the body is untram- 
melled, but whether the mind itself is free in the act of willing. 
But he did not see, it seems, that it is equally irrelevant to 
speak of a freedom from a mathematical necessity in such a 
connexion ; although this, as plainly as the other sense of the 
word, has no conceivable bearing on the point in dispute. If a 
volition were produced by the omnipotence of God, irresistibly 
acting on the human mind, still it would not be necessary, in 
the sense of Leibnitz, since it might and would have been dif- 
ferent if God had so willed it ; the contrary volition implying 
no contradiction. Is it not evident, that to suppose the mind 
may thus be bound to act, and yet be free because the contrary 
act implies no contradiction, is merely to dream of liberty, anc 
to mistake a shadow for a substance ? 

As the opposite of a volition implies no contradiction, says 
Leibnitz, so it is free from an absolute necessity; that is to 
say, it might have been different, nay, it must have been dif- 



Chapter!] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 51 

ferent, from what it is, provided its determining canse had 
been different. The same thing may be said of the motions of 
matter. We may say that they are also free, because the oppo- 
site motions imply no contradiction ; and we only have to vary 
the force in order to vary the motion. Hence, freedom in this 
sense of the word is perfectly consistent with the absolute and 
uncontrolled dominion of causes over the will ; for what can 
be more completely necessitated than the motions of the body ? 

The demand of his own nature, which so strongly impelled 
Leibnitz to seek and cling to the freedom of the mind, as the 
basis of moral and accountable agency, could not rest satisfied 
with so unsubstantial a shadow. After all, he has felt con- 
strained to have recourse to the hypothesis of a preestablished 
harmony in order to restore, if possible, the liberty which his 
scheme of necessity had banished from the universe. It is no 
part of our intention to examine this obsolete fiction ; we merely 
wish to show how essential Leibnitz regarded it to a solution 
of the difficulty under consideration. " I come now," says he, 
" to show how the action of the will depends on causes ; that 
there is nothing so agreeable to human nature as this depend- 
ence of our actions, and that otherwise we should fall into an 
absurd and insupportable fatality ; that is to say, into the Mo- 
hammedan fate, which is the worst of all, because it does away 
with foresight and good counsel. However, it is well to explain 
how this dependency of our voluntary actions does not prevent 
that there may be at the bottom of things a marvellous spon- 
taneity in us, which in a certain sense renders the mind, in its 
resolutions, independent of the physical influence of all other 
creatures. This spontaneity, but little 'known hitherto, which 
raises our empire over our actions as much as it is possible, is 
a consequence of the system of ^reestablished harmony" Thus, 
in order to satisfy himself that our actions are really free and 
independent of the physical influence of other creatures, he has 
recourse to a fiction in which few persons ever concurred with 
him, and which is now universally regarded as one of the vaga- 
ries and dreams of philosophy. If we are to be saved from an 
insupportable fate only by such means, our condition must 
indeed be one of forlorn hopelessness. 

Before we take leave of Leibnitz, there is one view of the 
difficulty in question which we wish to notice, not because it is 



58 MOEAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I, 

peculiar to him, but because it is very clearly stated and con- 
fidently relied on by him. It is common to most of the advo- 
cates of necessity, and it is exceedingly imposing in its appear- 
ance and effect. " Men of all times," says he, " have been 
troubled by a sophism, which the ancients called the ' raison 
jpa/resseusej because it induces them to do nothing, or at least 
to concern themselves about nothing, and to follow only the 
present inclination to pleasure. For, say they, if the future is 
necessary, that which is to happen will happen whatever I may 
do. But the future, say they, is necessary, either because the 
Divinity foresees all things, and even preestablishes them in 
governing the universe ; or because all things necessarily come 
to pass by a concatenation of causes."* Leibnitz illustrated the 
fallacy of this reasoning in the following manner : " By the 
same reason (if it is valid) I could say — If it is written in the 
archives of fate, that poison will kill me at present, or do me 
harm, this will happen, though I should not take it ; and if that 
is not written, it will not happen, though I should take it ; and, 
consequently, I can follow my inclination to take whatever is 
agreeable with impunity, however pernicious it may be ; which 
involves a manifest absurdity. . . . This obj ection staggers them 
a little, but they always come back to their reasoning, turned 
in different points of view, until we cause them to comprehend 
in what the defect of their sophism consists. It is this, that it 
is false that the event will happen whatever we may do ; it will 
happen, because we do that which leads to it ; and if the event 
is written, the cause which will make it happen is also written. 
Thus the connexion {liaison) of effects and their causes, so far 
from establishing the doctrine of a necessity prejudicial to prac- 
tice, serves to destroy it."f The same reply is found more than 
once in the course of the same great work ; and it is employed 
by all necessitarians in defence of their system. But it is not 
a satisfactory answer. It overlooks the real difficulty in the 
case, and seeks to remove an imaginary one. The question is. 
not whether a necessary connexion between our volitions and 
their effects is a discouragement to practice, but whether a neces- 
sary connexion between our volitions and their causes is so. 
It is very true, that no man would be accountable for his exter- 
nal actions or their consequences, if there were no fixed relation 

° Essais dc Thcodicce, pp. 5, 6. | Id., p. 8. 



Chapter L] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 59 

between these and his volitions. If, when a man willed one 
thing, another should happen to follow which he did not will, 
of course he would not be responsible for it. And if there were 
no certain or fixed connexion between his external actions and 
their consequences, either as they affected himself or others, he 
certainly would not be responsible for those consequences. This 
connexion between causes and effects, this connexion between 
volitions and their consequences, is indispensable to our account- 
ability for such consequences. But for such a connexion, noth- 
ing could be more idle and ridiculous than to endeavour to do any- 
thing; for we might will one thing, and another would take place. 
But must the same necessary connexion exist between the 
causes of our volitions and the volitions themselves, before we 
can be accountable for these volitions, for these effects ? This 
is the question. Leibnitz has lost sight of it, and deceived him- 
self by a false application of his doctrine. The doctrine of 
necessity, when applied to volitions and their effects, is indis- 
pensable to build up man's accountability for his external 
conduct and its consequences. But the same doctrine, when 
applied to establish a fixed and unalterable relation between 
the causes of volition and volition itself, really demolishes all 
responsibility for volition, and consequently for its external 
results. Leibnitz undertook to show that a necessary connexion 
between volition and its causes does not destroy man's account- 
ability for his volitions ; and he has shown, what no one ever 
doubted, that a necessary connexion between volition and its 
effects does not destroy accountability for those effects ! Strange 
as this confusion of things is, it is made by the most celebrated 
advocates of the doctrine of necessity ; which shows, we think, 
that the doctrine hardly admits of a solid defence. Thus Ed- 
wards, for example, insists that the doctrine of necessity is so 
far from rendering our endeavours vain and useless, that it is 
an indispensable condition or prerequisite to their success. In 
illustration of this point, he says : "Let us suppose a real and 
sure connexion between a man having his eyes open in the clear 
daylight, with good organs of sight, and seeing ; so that seeing 
is connected with opening his eyes, and not seeing with his not 
opening his eyes ; and also the like connexion between such a 
man attempting to open his eyes and his actually doing it : the 
supposed established connexion between these antecedents and 



60 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I, 

consequents, let the connexion be never so sure and necessary, 
certainly does not prove that it is in vain for a man in such 
circumstances to attempt to open his eyes, in order to seeing ; 
his aiming at that event, and the use of the means, being the 
effect of his will, does not break the connexion, or hinder the 
success." 

" So that the objection we are upon does not lie against the 
doctrine of the necessity of events by a certainty of connexion 
and consequence : on the contrary, it is truly forcible against 
the Arminian doctrine of contingence and self-determination, 
which is inconsistent with such a connexion. If there be no 
connexion between those events wherein virtue and vice con- 
sist, and anything antecedent ; then there is no connexion 
between these events and any means or endeavours used in 
order to them : and if so, then those means must be in vain. 
The less there is of connexion between foregoing things and fol- 
lowing ones, so much the less there is between means and end, 
endeavours and success ; and in the same proportion are means 
and endeavours ineffectual and in vain." 

In like manner, Dr. Chalmers, in his defence of the doctrine 
of necessity, has in all his illustrations confounded the con- 
nexion between a volition and its antecedent, with the relation 
between a volition and its consequent. To select one such 
illustration from many, it would be idle, says he, for a man to 
labour and toil after wealth, if there were no fixed connexion 
between such exertion and the accumulation of riches. 

We reply to all such illustrations, — It is true, there must be 
a fixed connexion between our endeavours or voluntary exer- 
tions and their consequences, in order to render such endeavours 
or exertions of any avail, or to render us accountable for such 
consequences. But it should be forever borne in mind, that 
the question is not whether a fixed connexion obtains between 
our volitions and their sequents, but whether a necessary con- 
nexion exists between our volitions and their antecedents. The 
question is, not whether the will be a power which is often fol- 
lowed by necessitated effects ; but whether there be a power 
behind the will by which its volitions are necessitated. And 
this being the question, what does it signify to tell us, that the 
will is a producing power ? We deny that volitions and their 
antecedents are necessarily connected ; and our opponents re- 



Chapter I.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 61 

fute us by showing that volitions and their sequents are thus 
connected ! We deny that A and B are necessarily connected ; 
and this position is overthrown and demolished by showing that 
B and C are thus connected ! Is it not truly wonderful that 
such men as a Leibnitz, an Edwards, and a Chalmers, should, 
in their zeal to maintain a favourite dogma, commit so great an 
oversight, and so grievously deceive themselves ? 

SECTION" VI 

The attempt of Edwards to establish free and accountable agency on the basis 
of necessity — The mews of the younger Edwards, Day, Chalmers, Dick, 
D ''Aubigne, Hill, Shaw, and M ' Cosh, concerning the agreement of liberty 
and necessity. 

The great metaphysician of New-England insists, that his 
scheme, and his scheme alone, is consistent with the free- 
agency and accountability of man. But how does he show this ? 
Does he endeavour to shake the stern argument by which all 
things seem bound together in the relation of cause and effect ? 
Does he even intimate a doubt with respect to the perfect co- 
herency and validity of this argument ? Does he once enter a 
protest against the doctrine of the Stoics, or of the materialistic 
fatalists, according to which all things in heaven and earth are 
involved in an "implex series of causes?" He does not. On 
the contrary, he has stated and enforced the great argument 
from cause and effect, in the strongest possible terms. He 
contends that volition is caused, not by the will nor the mind, 
but by the strongest motive. This is the cause of volition, and 
it is impossible for the effect to be loose from its cause. It is 
an inherent contradiction, a glaring absurdity, to say that mo- 
tive is the cause of volition, and yet admit that volition may, 
or may not, follow motive. This is to say, indeed, that motive 
is the cause, and yet that it is not the cause, of volition ; which 
is a contradiction in terms.* So far from saying anything, 
then, to extricate the volitions of men from the adamantine 
circle of necessity, he has exerted his prodigious energies to 
fasten them therein. 

Hence the question arises, Has he left any room for the in- 
troduction of that freedom of the mind, which it is the great 
object of his inquiry to establish upon its true foundations? 

° Inquiry, part ii, sec. viii. 



62 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT IPart I, 

The liberty for which he contends, is, after all his labours, pre- 
cisely that advocated by Hobbes and Collins, and no other. 
It is a freedom from co-action, and not from necessity. But he 
is entitled to speak for himself, and we shall permit him so to 
do : " The plain and obvions meaning of the ^jot^. freedom and 
liberty," says he, " in common speech, is the power, opportunity, 
or advantage, that any one has, to do cos he pleases. Or, in other 
words, his being free from hinderance or impediment in the 
way of doing or conducting in any respect as he wills. And 
the contrary to liberty, whatever name we call it by, is a per- 
son being hindered, or unable to conduct as he will, or being 
necessitated to do otherwise." Here, it will be seen, that liberty, 
according to this notion of it, has no relation to the manner in 
which the will arises, or comes into existence ; if one's external 
conduct can only follow his will, he is free. 

" There are two things," says he, " contrary to what is called 
liberty in common speech. One is constraint, otherwise called 
force, compulsion, and co-action • which is a person being ne- 
cessitated to do a thing contrary to his will. The other is re- 
straint ; which is, his being hindered, and not having power to 
do according to his will. But that which has no will cannot 
be the subject of these things." This definition, it is plain, pre- 
supposes the existence of a volition ; and liberty consists in the 
absence of co-action. It has no relation to the question as to 
how we come by our volitions, whether they are put forth by 
the mind itself without being necessitated, or whether they are 
necessarily produced in us. It leaves this great fundamental 
question untouched. 

On this subject his language is perfectly explicit. There is 
nothing in Karnes, nor Collins, nor Crombie, nor Hobbes, nor 
any other writer, more perfectly unequivocal. " But one thing 
more," says he, " I would observe concerning what is vulgarly 
called liberty, namely, that power and opportunity for one to 
do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice, is all that 
is meant by it, without taking* into the meaning of the word 
anything of the cause of that choice, or at all considering 
how the person came to have such a volition, or internal habit 
and bias; whether it was determined by some internal ante- 
cedent volition, or whether it happened without a cause ; 
whether it were necessarily connected with something foregoing, 



Chapter!] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 63 

or not connected. Let the person come by his choice any how, 
yet, if lie is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his 
pursuing and executing his will, the man is perfectly free ac- 
cording to the primary and common notion of freedom P ISTow 
this is all the definition of liberty with which his "Inquiry" 
furnishes us ; and this, he says, is " sufficient to show what is 
meant by liberty, according to the common notion of mankind, 
and in the usual and primary acceptation of the word." 

It is easy to see, that there is no difficulty in reconciling 
liberty, in such a sense, with the most absolute scheme of ne- 
cessity or fatalism the world has ever seen. Let a man come 
by his volition ant how ; let it be produced in him by the di- 
rect and almighty power of Gocl himself; yet, "he is perfectly 
free," provided there is no external co-action to prevent his 
volition from producing its natural effects ! 

President Day is not pleased with the definition contained in 
the " Inquiry ;" and in this particular we think he has dis- 
covered a superior sagacity to Edwards. But his extreme 
anxiety to save the credit of his author has betrayed him, it 
seems to us, into an apology which will not bear a close ex- 
amination. "On the subject of liberty or freedom," says he, 
" which occupies a portion of the fifth section of Edwards's 
first book, he has been less particular than was to be expected, 
considering that this is the great object of inquiry in his work. 
His explanation of what he regards as the proper meaning of 
the term is applicable to the liberty of outward action, to what 
is called by philosophers external liberty." " This is very well 
as far as it goes. But the professed object of his book, accord- 
ing to the title-page, is an inquiry concerning the freedom of 
the will, not the freedom of the external conduct. We natu- 
rally look for his meaning of this internal liberty. What he 
has said, in this section, respecting freedom of the will, has 
rather the appearance of evading such a definition of it as 
might be considered his own."* ]STow, is it possible that Presi- 
dent Edwards has instituted an inquiry into the freedom of the 
will, and written a great book in defence of it, and yet has 
evaded giving his own definition of it? If so, then he may 
have demolished the views of others on this subject, but he has 
certainly not established his own in their stead ; and hence, for 
Q Day's Examination of Edwards on the Will, sec. v, pp. 80, 81. 



64 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [.Parti, 

aught we know, lie really did not believe in the freedom of the 
will at all ; and, for all his work shows, there may be no such 
freedom. For how is it possible for any man to establish his 
views of the freedom of the will, if he is not at sufficient pains 
to explain his meaning of the terms, and forbears even to give 
his own definition of them ? 

But the truth is, the author of the "Inquiry" has placed it 
beyond all controversy, that he has been guilty of no such 
omission or evasion. He has left no room to doubt that the def- 
inition of liberty, which he says is in conformity " with the 
common notion of mankind," is his own. He always uses this 
definition when he undertakes to repel objections against his 
scheme of necessity. " It is evident," he says, " that such a 
providential disposing and determining of men's moral actions, 
though it infers a moral necessity of those actions, yet it does 
not in the least infringe the real liberty of mankind, the only 
liberty that common sense teaches to be necessary to moral agency, 
which, as has been demonstrated, is not inconsistent with such 
necessity."* He defines liberty in the very words of Collins 
and Hobbes, to mean the power or opportunity any one has 
" to do as. he pleases ;" or, in other words, to do " as he wills ."f 
This definition, he says, is according to the primary and com- 
mon notion of mankind ; and now he declares, that " this is the 
only liberty common sense teaches is necessary to moral agency." 
It is very strange that any one should have read the great work 
of President Edwards without perceiving that this is the sense 
in which he always uses the term when he undertakes to repel 
the attacks of his adversaries. To select only one instance out 
of many, he says, " If the Stoics held such a fate as is repug- 
nant to any liberty, consisting in our doing as we please, I ut- 
terly deny such a fate. If they held any such fate as is not 
consistent with the common and universal notions that mankind 
have of liberty, activity, moral agency, virtue, and vice, I dis- 
claim any such thing, and think I have demonstrated the scheme 
I maintain is no such scheme.":); Thus he always has recourse 
to this definition of liberty, consisting in the power or oppor- 
tunity any one lias " to do as he pleases," or, in other words, 
" as he wills," whenever he attempts to reconcile his doctrine 
with the moral agency and accountability of man, or to vindi- 

Inquiry, part iv, sec. 9. f Ibid. J Ibid., sec. 7. 



Chapter I.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 65 

cate it against the attacks of his opponents. We must suppose 
then, that Edwards has given his own definition of liberty in 
the Inquiry, or we must conclude that he defended his system 
by the use of an idea of liberty which he did not believe to be 
correct ; that when he alleged that he " had demonstrated" his 
doctrine to be consistent with free-agency, he only meant with 
a false and atheistical notion of free-agency. 

We are not surprised that President Day does not like this 
definition of liberty ; but we are somewhat surprised, we con- 
fess, that such an idea of liberty should be so unhesitatingly 
adopted from Edwards, and so confidently set forth as the 
highest conceivable notion thereof, by Dr. Chalmers. He does 
not seem to entertain the shadow of a doubt, either that the 
definition of liberty contained in the Inquiry is that of Ed- 
wards himself, or that which is fully founded in truth. He 
freely concedes, that " we can do as we please," and supposes 
that the reader may be startled to hear that this is " cordially 
admitted by the necessitarians themselves !" 

But this concession he easily reconciles with the tenet of neces- 
sity. " To say that you can do as you please," says he, " is just to 
affirm one of those sequences which take place in the phenom- 
ena of mind — a sequence whereof a volition is the antecedent, 
and the performance of that volition is the consequent. It is 
a sequence which no advocate of the philosophical necessity is 
ever heard to deny. Let the volition ever be formed, and if it 
point to some execution which lies within the limits we have 
just adverted to, the execution of it will follow."* Thus, his 
notion of liberty makes it consist in the absence of external im- 
pediments, which might break the connexion of a volition and 
its consequent, and not in the freedom of the will itself from 
the absolute dominion of causes. Such an idea of free-will, it 
must be confessed, is very well adopted by one who intends to 
maintain " a rigid and absolute predestination" of all events. 

The manner in which Edwards attempts to reconcile the free- 
agency and accountability of man with the great argument 
from the law of causation, or with his doctrine of necessity, is, 
as we have seen, precisely the same as that adopted by Hobbes. 
There is not a shade of difference between them. It is, indeed, 
easy to demonstrate that liberty, according to this definition of 

° Institutes of Theology, vol. ii, part iii, chap. i. 



66 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I, 

it, is not inconsistent with necessity; and it is jnst as easy to 
demonstrate, that it is not inconsistent with any scheme of fate 
that has ever been heard of among men. The will may be ab- 
solutely necessitated in all its acts, and yet the body may be 
free from external co-action or natural necessity ! 

But though there is this close agreement between Hobbes 
and Edwards, there are some points of divergency between 
Edwards and Calvin. The former comes forward as the advo- 
cate of free-will, the latter expressly denies that we have a free- 
will. Calvin admits that we may be free from co-action or 
compulsion; but to call this freedom of the will, is, he con- 
siders, to decorate a most "diminutive thing with a superb 
title." And though this is all the freedom Edwards allows us 
to possess, yet he does not hesitate to declare that his doctrine 
is perfectly consistent with " the highest degree of liberty that 
ever could be thought of, or that ever could possibly enter into 
the heart of man to conceive." 

The only liberty we possess, according to all the authors re- 
ferred to, is a freedom of the body and not of the mind. 
Though the younger Edwards is a strenuous advocate of his 
father's doctrine, he has sometimes, without intending to do so, 
let fall a heavy blow upon it. He finds, for instance, the fol- 
lowing language in the writings of Dr. West, " he might have 
omitted doing the thing if he would," and he is perplexed to 
ascertain its meaning. " To say that if a man had chosen not 
to go to a debauch, (for that is the case put by Dr. West,) he 
would, indeed, have chosen not to go to it, is too great trifling 
to be ascribed to Dr. West." " Yet to say," he continues, " that 
the man could have avoided the external action of going, etc., 
if he would, would be equally trifling ; for the question before 
us is concerning the liberty of the will or mind, and not the 
body." The italics are his own. It seems, then, that in the 
opinion of the younger Edwards it is very great trifling to speak 
of the power to do an external action in the present controversy, 
because it relates to the will or mind, and not to the body. We 
believe this remark to be perfectly just, and although it was 
aimed at the antagonist of President Edwards, it falls with 
crushing weight on the doctrine of President Edwards him- 
self. Is it not wonderful that so just a reflection did not 
occur to the younger Edwards, in relation to the definition 



Chapter LI WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 67 

of liberty contained in the great work he had undertaken to 
defend ? 

We have now seen how some of the early reformers, and 
some of the great thinkers in after-times, have endeavoured to 
reconcile the scheme of necessity with the free-agency and 
accountability of man. Before quitting this subject, however, 
we wish to adduce a remarkable passage from one of the most 
correct reasoners, as well as one of the most impressive writers 
that in modern times have advocated the doctrines of Calvinism. 
" Here we come to a question," says he, " which has engaged 
the attention, and exercised the ingenuity, and perplexed the 
wits of men in every age. If God has foreordained whatever 
comes to pass, the whole series of events is necessary, and 
human liberty is taken away. Men are passive instruments in 
the hands of their Maker ; they can do nothing but what they 
are secretly and irresistibly impelled to do ; they are not, there- 
fore, responsible for their actions ; and God is the author of 
sin." After sweeping away some attempts to solve this diffi- 
culty, he adds : " It is a more intelligible method to explain 
the subject by the doctrine which makes liberty consist in the 
power of acting according to the prevailing inclination, or the 
motive which appears strongest to the mind. Those actions 
are free which are the effects of volition. In whatever manner 
the state of mind which gave rise to volition has been produced 
the liberty of the agent is neither greater nor less. It is his loill 
alone which is to be considered, and not the means by which it 
has been determined. If God foreordained certain actions, and 
placed men in such circumstances that the actions would cer- 
tainly take place agreeably to the laws of the mind, men are 
nevertheless moral agents, because they act voluntarily and are 
responsible for the actions which consent has made their own. 
liberty does not consist in the power of acting or not acting, 
but in acting from, choice. The choice is determined by some- 
thing in the mind itself, or by something external influencing 
the mind; but whatever is the cause, the choice makes the 
action free, and the agent accountable. If this definition of 
liberty be admitted, you, will perceive that it is possible to 
reconcile the freedom of the will with absolute decrees ; but we 
have not got rid of every diffiadty." Now this definition of 
liberty, it is obvious, is precisely the same as that given by 



68 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I, 

President Edwards, and nothing could be more perfectly 
adapted to effect a reconciliation between the freedom of the 
will and the doctrine of absolute decrees. How perfectly it 
shapes the freedom of man to fit the doctrine of predestination ! 
It is a fine piece of workmanship, it is true ; but as the learned 
and candid author remarks, we must not imagine that we have 
" got rid of every difficulty." For, " by this theory" he con- 
tinues, " human actions ajypear to be as necessary as the motions 
of matter according to the laws of gravitation and attraction • 
and man seems to be a machine, conscious of his movements, 
and consenting to them, but impelled by something different 
from himself P' k Such is the candid confession of this devoted 
Calvinist. 

We have now seen the nature of that freedom of the will 
which the immortal Edwards has exerted all his powers to 
recommend to the Christian world ! " Egregious liberty I'" 
exclaimed Calvin. " It merely allows us elbow-room," says 
Leibnitz. " It seems, after all, to leave us mere machines," 
says Dick. " It is trifling to speak of such a thing," says the 
younger Edwards, in relation to the will. " Why, surely, this 
cannot be what the great President Edwards meant by the 
freedom of the will," says Dr. Day. He certainly must have 
evaded his own idea on that point. Is it not evident, that the 
house of the necessitarian is divided against itself? 

Necessitarians not only refute each other, but in most cases 
each one contradicts himself. Thus the younger Edwards says, 
it is absurd to speak of a power to act according to our choice, 
when the question relates, not to the freedom of the body, but 
to the freedom of the mind itself. He happens to see the 
absurdity of this mode of speaking when he finds it in his adver- 
sary, Dr. West ; and yet it is precisely his own definition of 
freedom. " But if by liberty," says he, " be meant a power 
of willing and choosing, an exemption from co-action and 
natural necessity, and power, opportunity, and advantage, to 
execute our own choice / in this sense we hold liberty."t Thus 
he returns to the absurd idea of free-will as consisting in " elbow- 
room," which merely allows our choice or volition to pass into 
effect. Dr. Dick is guilty of the same inconsistency. Though 

° Lectures on Theology, by the late Rev. John Dick, D. D. 
f Dissertation, p. 41. 



Chapter L] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 69 

he admits, as we have seen, that this definition of liberty does 
not get rid of every difficulty, but seems to leave us mere 
"machines;" yet he has recourse to it, in order to reconcile 
the Calvinistic view of divine grace with the free-agency of 
man. "The great objection," says he, "against the invinci- 
bility of divine grace, is, that it is subversive of the liberty of 
the will."* But, he replies, " True liberty consists in doing 
what we do with knowledge and from choice? 

Yet as if unconscious that their greatest champions were 
thus routed and overthrown by each other, we see hundreds of 
minor necessitarians still fighting on with the same weapc as, 
perfectly unmindful of the disorder and confusion which reigns 
around them in their own ranks. Thus, for example, D'Au- 
bigne* says, " It were easy to demonstrate that the doctrine of 
the reformers did not take away from man the liberty of a 
moral agent, and reduce him to a passive machine." ISTow, 
how does the historian so easily demonstrate that the doctrine 
of necessity, as held by the reformers, does not deny the liberty 
of a moral agent ? Why, by simply producing the old effete 
notion of the liberty of the will, as consisting in freedom from 
co-action ; as if it had never been, and never could be, called 
in question. "Every action performed without external re- 
straint," says he, " and. in pursuance of the determination of 
the soul itself, is a free action."f This demonstration, it is 
needless to repeat, would save any scheme of fatalism from 
reproach, as well as the doctrine of the reformers. 

The scheme of the Calvinists is defended in the same man- 
ner in Hill's Divinity : " The liberty of a moral agent," says 
he, " consists in the power of acting according to his choice ; 
and those actions are free, which are performed without any 
external compulsion or restraint, in consequence of the deter- 
mination of his own mind." " According to the Calvinists," 
says Mr. Shaw, in his Exposition of the Confession of Faith, 
" the liberty of a moral agent consists in the power of acting 
according to his choice ; and those actions are free which are 
performed without any external compulsion or restraint, in con- 
sequence of the determination of his own mind." J Such, if we 
may believe these learned Calvinists, is the idea of the freedom 

° Dick's Lectures, vol. ii, p. 157. f History of the Reformation, b. v. 

| Hill's Divinity, ch. ix, sec. iii. 



70 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

of the will which belongs to their system. If this be so, then 
it must be conceded that the Calvinistic definition of the free- 
dom of the will is perfectly consistent with the most absolute 
scheme of fatality which ever entered into the heart of man to 
conceive. 

The views of M'Cosh respecting the freedom of the will, seem, 
at first sight, widely different from those of other Calvinists and 
necessitarians. The freedom and independence of the will is 
certainly pushed as far by him as it is carried by Cousin, Cole- 
ridge, Clarke, or any of its advocates in modem times. " True 
necessitarians," says he, " should learn in what way to hold and 
defend their doctrine. Let them disencumber themselves of all 
that doubtful argument, derived from man being supposed to 
be swayed by the most powerful motive."* Again: a The 
truth is," says he, "it is not motive, properly speaking, that 
determines the working of the will ; but it is the will that 
imparts the strength to the motive. As Coleridge says, ' It is 
the man that makes the motive, and not the motive the man.' "f 
According to this Calvinistic divine, the will is not determined 
by the strongest motive ; on the contrary, it is self-active and 
self-determined. " Mind is a self-acting substance," says he ; 
" and hence its activity and independence." In open defiance 
of all Calvinistic and necessitarian philosophy, he even adopts 
the self-determining power of the will. "Nor have neces- 
sitarians," says he, " even of the highest order, been sufficiently 
careful to guard the language employed by them. Afraid of 
making admissions to their opponents, we believe that none of 
them have fully developed the phenomena of human sponta- 
neity. Even Edwards ridicules the idea of the faculty or power 
of will, or the soul in the use of that power determining its own 
volitions. Now, we hold it to be an incontrovertible fact, and 
one of great importance, that the true determining cause of 
every given volition is not any mere anterior incitement, but 
the very soul itself, by its inherent power of will.";); Surely, 
the author of such a passage cannot be accused of being afraid 
to make concessions to his opponents. But this is not all. If 
possible, he rises still higher in his views of the lofty, not to 
say god-like, independence of the human will. "We rejoice," 

The Divine Government, Physical and Moral, b. iii, ch. i, sec. iii. 
f Id., b. iii, ch. i, sec. ii. | Ibid. 



Chapter!] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 71 

says he, " to recognise such a being in man. We trust that we 
are cherishing no presumptuous feeling, when we believe him 
to be free, as his Maker is free. "We believe him, morally 
speaking, to be as independent of external control as his Cre- 
ator must ever be — as that Creator was when, in a past eternity, 
there was no external existence to control Mm."* 

Yet, strange as it may seem, Mr. M'Cosh trembles at the idea 
of "removing the creature from under the control of God;" 
and hence, he insists as strenuously as any other necessitarian, 
that the mind, and all its volitions, are subjected to the domin- 
ion of causes. " We are led by an intuition of our nature," 
says he, " to a belief in the invariable connexion between cause 
and effect ; and we see numerous proofs of this law of cause 
and effect reigning in the human mind as it does in the exter- 
nal world, and reigning in the will as it does in every other 
department of the mind."f Again : " It is by an intuition of 
our nature that we believe this thought or feeling could not 
have been produced without a cause ; and that this same cause 
will again and forever produce the same effects. And this 
intuitive principle leads us to expect the reign of causation, not 
only among the thoughts and feelings generally, but among the 
wishes and volitions of the soul."J 

Eow here is the question, How can the soul be self-active, 
self-determined, and yet all its thoughts, and feelings, and voli- 
tions, have producing causes ? How can it be free and inde- 
pendent in its acts, and yet under the dominion of efficient 
causes ? How can the law of causation reign in all the states 
of the mind, as it reigns over all the movements of matter, and 
yet leave it as free as was the Creator when nothing beside him- 
self existed % In other words, How is such a scheme of necessity 
to be reconciled with such a scheme of liberty 1 The author 
replies, We are not bound to answer such a question § — nor are we. 
As we understand it, the very idea of liberty, as above set forth 
by the author, is a direct negative of his doctrine of necessity. 

But although he has taken so much pains to dissent from his 
necessitarian brethren, and to advocate the Arminian notion 
of free-will, Mr. M'Cosh, nevertheless, falls back upon the old 
Calvinistic definition of liberty, as consisting in a freedom from 

* The Divine Government, Physical and Moral, To. iii, ch. i, sec. ii. 
t Ibid. % Ibid. § Ibid. 



72 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

external co-action, in order to find a basis for human respon- 
sibility. It may seem strange, that after all his labour in laying 
the foundation, he should not build upon it ; but it is strictly 
true. " If any man asserts," says he, " that in order to respon- 
sibility, the will must be free — that is, free from physical 
restraint ; free to act as he pleases — we at once and heartily 
agree with him ; and we maintain that in this sense the will is 
free, as free as it is possible for any man to conceive it to be." 
And again : "If actions do not proceed from the will, but from 
something else, from mere physical or external restraint, then 
the agent is not responsible for them. But if the deeds proceed 
from the will, then it at once attaches a responsibility to them. 
Place before the mind a murder committed by a party through 
pure physical compulsion brought to bear on the arm that 
inflicts the blow, and the conscience says, here no guilt is 
attachable. But let the same murder be done with the thorough 
consent of the will, the conscience stops not to inquire whether 
this consent has been caused or no."* Thus, after all his dissent 
from Edwards, he returns precisely to Edwards's definition of 
the freedom of the will as the ground of human responsibility ; 
after all his strictures upon " necessitarians of the first order," 
he falls back upon precisely that notion of free-will which was 
so long ago condemned by Calvin, and exploded by Leibnitz, 
and which relates, as we have so often seen, not to acts of the 
will at all, but only to the external movements of the body. 



SECTION VII. 

The sentiments of Hume, Brown, Comte, and Mill, in relation to the antag- 
onism between liberty and necessity. 

Mr. Hume has disposed of the question concerning liberty 
and necessity, by the application of his celebrated theory of 
cause and effect. According to this theory, the idea of power, 
of efficacy, is a mere chimera, which has no corresponding 
reality in nature, and should be ranked among the exploded 
prejudices of the human mind. " One event follows another," 
says he ; " but we never can observe any tie between them. 
They seem conjoined, but never connected '."f 

9 The Divine Government, Physical and Moral, b. iii, ch. i, sec. ii. 
t Hume's Works, Liberty and Necessity. 



Chapter L] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 73 

We shall not stop to examine this hypothesis, which has 
been so often refuted. "We shall merely remark in passing, 
that it owes its existence to a false method of philosophizing. 
Its anthor set out with the doctrine of Locke, that all our ideas 
are derived from sensation and reflection ; and because he could 
not trace the idea of power to either of these sources, he denied 
its existence. Hence we may apply to him, with peculiar force, 
the judicious and valuable criticism which M. Cousin has 
bestowed upon the method of Locke. Though Mr. Hume 
undertakes, as his title-page declares, to introduce the inductive 
method into the science of human nature, he departed from 
that method at the very first step. Instead of beginning, as he 
should have done, by ascertaining the ideas actually in our 
minds, and noting their characteristics, and proceeding to trace 
them up to their sources, he pursued the diametrically opposite 
course. He first determined and fixed the origin of all our 
ideas ; and every idea which was not seen to arise from this 
preestablished origin, he declared to be a mere chimera. He 
thus caused nature to bend to hypotheses ; instead of anat- 
omizing and studying the world of mind according to the 
inductive method, he pursued the high a priori road, and recon- 
structed it to suit his preestablished origin of human knowledge. 
This was not to study and interpret the work of God "in the 
profound humiliation of the human soul ;"* but to re-write the 
volume of nature, and omit those parts which did not accord 
with the views and wishes of the philosopher. In the pithy 
language of Sir William Hamilton, he " did not anatomize, but 
truncate." 

If this doctrine be true, it is idle to talk about free-agency, 
for there is no such thing as agency in the world. It is true, 
there is a thing which we call volition, or an act of the mind ; 
but this does not produce the external change by which it is 
followed. The two events co-exist, but there is no connecting 
tie between them. " They are conjoined, but not connected." 
In short, according to this scheme, all things are equally free, 
and all equally necessary. In other words, there is neither 
freedom nor necessity in the usual acceptation of the terms ; 
and the whole controversy concerning them, which has agitated 
the learned for so many ages, dwindles down into a mere empty 

° Bacon. 



74 MOEAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

and noisy logomachy. Indeed, this is the conclusion to which 
Mr. Hume himself comes ; expressly maintaining that the con- 
troversy in question has been a dispute about words. We are 
not to suppose from this, however, that he forbears to give a 
definition of liberty. His idea of free-agency is precisely that 
of Hobbes, and so many others before him. " By liberty," says 
he, " we can only mean a power of acting or not acting accord- 
ing to the determination of the will : that is, if we choose to 
remain at rest, we may ; if we choose to move, we also may."* 
Such he declares is all that can possibly be meant by the term 
liberty ; and hence it follows that any other idea of it is a mere 
dream. The coolness of this assumption is admirable ; but it is 
fully equalled by the conclusion which follows. If we will ob- 
serve these two circumstances, says he, and thereby render our 
definition intelligible, Mr. Hume is perfectly persuaded " that 
all mankind will be found of one opinion with regard to it." 
If Mr. Hume had closely looked into the great productions of 
his own school, he would have seen the utter improbability, that 
necessitarians themselves would ever concur in such a notion of 
liberty. f 

If Mr. Hume's scheme were correct, it would seem that 
nothing could be stable or fixed ; mind would be destitute of 
energy to move within its own sphere, or to bind matter in its 
orbit. All things would seem to be in a loose, disconnected, 
and fluctuating state. But this is not the view which he had of 
the matter. Though he denied that there is any connecting link 

° Of Liberty and Necessity. 

f Although Mr. Hume gives precisely the same definition of liberty as that ad- 
vanced by Hobbes, Locke, and Edwards, he had the sagacity to perceive that this 
related not to the freedom of the will, but only of the body. Hence he says, " In 
short, if motives are not under our power or direction, which is confessedly the 
fact, we can at bottom have no liberty." We are not at all surprised, therefore, 
at the reception which Hume gave to the great work of President Edwards, as 
set forth in the following statement of Dr. Chalmers, concerning the appendix to 
the " Inquiry." " The history of this appendix," says he, " is curious. It has 
cnly been subjoined to the later editions of his work, and did not accompany the 
first impression of it. Several copies of this impression found their way into this 
country, and created a prodigious sensation among the members of a school then 
in all its glory. I mean the metaphysical school of our northern metropolis, 
whereof Hume, and Smith, and Lord Karnes, and several others among the more 
conspicuous infidels and semi-infidels of that day, were the most distinguished 
members. They triumphed in the book of Edwards, as that which set a conclu- 
sive seal on their principles," &c. — Institutes of Theology, vol. ii, ch. ii. 



Chapter!] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 75 

among events, yet he insisted that the connexion subsisting 
among them is fixed and unalterable. " Let any one define a 
cause," says he, " without comprehending, as part of the defini- 
tion, a necessary connexion with its effect; and let him show 
distinctly the origin of the idea expressed by the definition, and 
I shall readily give up the whole controversy."* This is the 
j)hilosopher who has so often told us, that events are " conjoined, 
not connected." 

The motives of volition given, for example, and the volition 
invariably and inevitably follows. How then, may we ask, can 
a man be accountable for his volitions, over which he has no 
power, and in which he exerts no power? This question has 
not escaped the attention of Mr. Hume. Let us see his answer. 
He admits that liberty " is essential to morality."f For " as 
actions are objects of our moral sentiment so far only as they 
are indications of the internal character, passions, and affections, 
it is impossible that they can give rise either to praise or blame, 
when they proceed, not from these principles, but are derived 
altogether from external violence." It is true, as we have seen, 
that if our external actions, the motions of the body, proceed 
not from our volitions, but from external violence, we are not 
responsible for them. This is conceded on all sides, and has 
nothing to do with the question. But suppose our external ac- 
tions are inevitably connected with our volitions, and our voli- 
tions as inevitably connected with their causes, how can we be 
responsible for either the one or the other? This is the ques- 
tion winch Mr. Hume has evaded and not fairly met. 

Mr.. Hume's notion about cause and effect has been greatly 
extended by its distinguished advocate, Dr. Thomas Brown; 
whose acuteness, eloquence, and elevation of character, have 
given it a circulation which it could never have received from 
the influence of its author. Almost as often as divines have 
occasion to use this notion, they call it the doctrine of Dr. Brown, 
and omit to notice its true atheistical paternity and origin. 

The defenders of this doctrine are directly opposed, in regard 
to a fundamental point, to all other necessitarians. Though 
they deny the existence of all power and efficacy, they still hold 
that human volitions are necessary; while other necessitarians 
ground their doctrine on the fact, that volitions are produced by 

° Of Liberty and Necessity. y Ibid. 



76 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT LPart I, 

the most powerful, the most efficacious motives. They are not 
only at war with other necessitarians, they are also at war with 
themselves. Let ns see if this may not be clearly shown. 

According to the scheme in question, the mind does not act 
upon the body, nor the body upon the mind ; for there is no 
power, and consequently no action of power, in the universe. 
Now, it is known that it was the doctrine of Leibnitz, that two 
substances so wholly unlike as mind and matter could not act 
upon each other ; and hence he concluded that the phenomena 
of the internal and external worlds were merely " conjoined, not 
connected" The soul and body run together' — to use his own 
illustration — like two independent watches, without either ex- 
erting any influence upon the movements of the other. Thus 
arose his celebrated, but now obsolete fiction, of a preestablished 
harmony. Now, if the doctrine of Plume and Brown be true, 
this sort of harmony subsists, not only in relation to mind and 
body, but in relation to all things in existence. Mind never 
acts upon body, nor mind upon mind. Hence, this doctrine 
is but a generalization of the preestablished harmony of Leib- 
nitz, with the exception that Mr. Hume did not contend that 
this wonderful harmony was established by the Divine Being. 
Is it not wonderful that so acute a metaphysician as Dr. Brown 
should not have perceived the inseparable affinity between his 
doctrine and that of Leibnitz ? Is it not wonderful that, instead 
of perceiving this affinity, he should have poured ridicule and 
contempt upon the doctrine of which his own was but a gener- 
alization? Mr. Mill, another able and strenuous advocate of 
Mr. Hume's theory of causation, has likewise ranked the pre- 
established harmony of Leibnitz, as well as the system of occa- 
sional causes peculiar to Malebranche, among the fallacies of 
the human mind. Thus they are at war with themselves, as 
well as with their great coadjutors in the cause of necessity. 

M. Comte, preeminently distinguished in every branch of 
science, has taken the same one-sided view of nature as that 
which is exhibited in the theory under consideration ; but he 
does not permit himself to be encumbered by the inconsistencies 
observable in his great predecessors. On the contrary, he 
boldly carries out his doctrine to its legitimate consequences, 
denying the existence of a God, the free-agency of man, and 
the reality of moral distinctions. 



Chapter L] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 11 

Mr. Mill also refuses to avail himself of the notion of liberty 
entertained by Hobbes and Hume, in order to lay a foundation 
for human responsibility. He sees that it really cannot be 
made to answer such a purpose. He also sees, that the doc- 
trine of necessity, as usually maintained, is liable to the obj ec- 
tions urged against it, that "it tends to degrade the moral 
nature of man, and to paralyze our desire of excellence."* In 
making this concession to the advocates of liberty, he speaks 
from his own " personal experience." The only way to escape 
these pernicious consequences, he says, is to keep constantly 
before the mind a clear and unclouded view of the true theory 
of causation, which will prevent us from supposing, as most 
necessitarians do, that there is a real connecting link or influ- 
ence between motives and volitions, or any other events. So 
strong is the prejudice (as he calls it) in favour of such connec- 
tion, that even those who adopt Mr. Hume's theory, are not 
habitually influenced by it, but frequently relapse into the old 
error which conflicts with the free-agency and accountability 
of man, and hence an advantage which their opponents have 
had over them. 

These remarks are undoubtedly just. There is not a single 
writer, from Mr. Hume himself, down to the present day, who 
has been able either to speak or to reason in conformity with 
his theory, however warmly he may have embraced it. Mr. 
Mill himself has not been more fortunate in this respect than 
many of his distinguished predecessors. It is an exceedingly 
difficult thing, by the force of speculation, to silence the voice 
of nature within us. If it were necessary we might easily 
show, that if we abstract "the common prejudice," in regard 
to causation, it will be as impossible to read Mr. Mill's work on 
logic, as to read Mr. Hume's writings themselves, without per- 
ceiving that many of its passages have been stripped of all 
logical coherency of thought. The defect which he so clearly 
sees in the writings of other advocates of necessity, not except- 
ing those who embrace his own paradox in relation to cause 
and effect, we can easily perceive in his own. 

The doctrine of causation, under consideration, annihilates one 
of the clearest and most fundamental distinctions ever made in 
philosophy ; the distinction between action smd passion, between 

° Mill's Logic, pp. 522, 523. 



18 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I, 

mind and matter. Matter is passive, mind is active. The very 
first law of motion laid down in the Principia, a work so mnch 
admired by M. Comte and Mr. Mill, is based on the idea that 
matter is wholly inert, and destitute of power either to move 
itself, or to check itself when moved by anything ab extra. 
This will not be denied. But is mind equally passive ? Is 
there nothing in existence which rises above this passivity of 
the material world? If there is not, and such is the evident 
conclusion of the doctrine in question, then all things flow on 
in one boundless ocean of passivity, while there is no First 
Mover, no Self-active Agent in the universe. Indeed, Mr. 
Mill has expressly declared, that the distinction between agent 
and patient is illusory.* If this be true, we are persuaded that 
M. Comte has been more successful in delivering the world 
from the being of a God, than Mr. Mill has been in relieving 
it from the difficulties attending the scheme of necessity. 



SECTION VIII 

The views of Kant and Sir William Hamilton in relation to the antagonism 
between liberty and necessity. 

" To clear up this seeming antagonism between the mecha- 
nism of nature and freedom in one and the self-same given 
action, we must refer," says Kant, " to what was advanced in 
the critique of pure reason, or what, at least, is a corollary from 
it, viz., that the necessity of nature which may not consort with 
the freedom of the subj ect, attaches simply to a thing standing 
under the relations of time, i. e., to the modifications of the 
acting subject as phenomena, and that, therefore, so far (i. e., as 
phenomena) the determinators of each act lie in the foregoing 
elapsed time, and are quite beyond his power, (part of which 
are the actions man has already performed, and the phenomenal 
character he has given himself in his own eyes,) yet, e contra, 
the self-same subject, being self-conscious of itself as a thing in 
itself, considers its existence as somewhat detached from the 
conditions of time, and itself, so far forth, as only determinable 
by laws given it by its own reason. "f 

Kant has said, that this " intricate problem, at whose solution 
centuries have laboured," is not to be solved by "a jargon of 

° Mill's Logic, book ii, chap, v, sec. 4. | Metaphysics of Ethics. 



Chapter L] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. ?9 

words." If so, may we not doubt whether he has taken the 
best method to solve it ? His solution shows one thing at least, 
viz., that he was not satisfied with any of the solutions of his 
predecessors, for his is wholly unlike them. Kant saw that the 
question of liberty and necessity related to the will itself, and 
not to the consequences of the will's volitions. Hence he was 
compelled to reject those weak evasions of the difficulty of 
reconciling them, and to grapple directly with the difficulty 
itself. Let us see if this was not too much for him. Let us 
see if he has been able to maintain the doctrine of necessity, 
holding it as a "demonstrated truth," and at the same time 
give the idea of liberty a tenable position in his system. 

If we would clear up the seeming antagonism between the 
mechanism of nature and freedom in regard to the same voli- 
tion, says he, we must remember, that the volition itself, as 
standing under the conditions of time, is to be considered as 
subject to the law of mechanism: yet the mind which puts 
forth the volition, being conscious that it is a thing somewhat 
detached from the conditions of time, is free from the law of 
mechanism, and determinable by the laws of its own reason. 
That is to say, the volitions of mind falling under the law of 
cause and effect, like all other events which appear in time, 
are necessary ; while the mind itself, which exists not exactly in 
time, is free. We shall state only two objections to this view. 
In the first place, it seems to distinguish the mind from its act, 
not modally, i. e., as a thing from its mode, but numerically, 
i.e., as one thing from another thing. But who can do this? 
Who regards an act of the mind, a volition, as anything but 
the mind itself as existing in a state of willing ? In the second 
place, it requires us to conceive, that the act of the mind is 
necessitated, while the mind itself is free in the act thus necessi- 
tated. But who can do this ? On the contrary, who can fail 
to see in this precisely the same seeming antagonism which 
Kant undertook to remove ? To tell us, that volition is necessi- 
tated because it exists in time, but the mind is free because it 
does not exist in time, is, one would think, a very odd way to 
dispel the darkness which hangs over the grand problem of life. 
It is to solve one difficulty merely by adding other difficulties 
to it. Hence, the world will never be much wiser, we are 
inclined to suspect, with respect to the seeming antagonism 



80 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

between liberty and necessity, in consequence of the specula- 
tions of tlie philosopher of Konigsberg, especially since his 
great admirer, Mr. Coleridge, forgot to fulfil his promise to 
write the history of a man who existed in " neither time nor 
space, but a-one side." 

Though Kant made the attempt in his Metaphysics of Ethics 
to overcome the speculative difficulty in question, it is evident 
that he is not satisfied with his own solution of it, since he has 
repeatedly declared, that the practical reason furnishes the only 
ground on which it can be surmounted. " This view of Kant," 
says Knapp, " implying that freedom, while it is a postulate of 
our practical reason, (i. e., necessary to be assumed in order to 
moral action,) is yet inconsistent with our theoretical reason, 
(i. e., incapable of demonstration, and contrary to the conclu- 
sions to which the reflecting mind arrives^) is now very gener- 
ally rejected."* 

In regard to this point, there seems to be a perfect coin- 
cidence between the philosophy of Kant and that of Sir William 
Hamilton. "In thought," says the latter, "we never escape 
determination and necessity."f If the scheme of necessity 
never fails to force itself upon our thought, how are we then 
to get rid of it, so as to lay a foundation for morality and 
accountability ? This question, the author declares, is too much 
for the speculative reason of man ; and being utterly baffled in 
that direction, we can only appeal to the fact of consciousness, 
in order to establish the doctrine of liberty. " The philosophy 
which I profess," says he, " annihilates the theoretical problem — 
How is the scheme of liberty, or the scheme of necessity, to be 
rendered comprehensible ? — by showing that both schemes are 
equally inconceivable ; but it establishes liberty practically as 
a fact, by showing that it is either itself an immediate datum, 
or is involved in an immediate datum of consciousness.";); We 
shall hereafter see, why the scheme of necessity always riveted 
the chain of conviction on the thought of Sir William Hamilton, 
and compelled him to have recourse to an appeal to conscious- 
ness in order to escape its delusive power. 

c Knapp's Theology, p. 520. f Reid's Works, note, p. Gil. \ Id., p. 599, note. 



Chapter!.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 81 

SECTION" IX. 
The notion of Lord Karnes and Sir James Mackintosh on the same subject. 

Lord Karnes boldl j cut the knot which philosophy had failed 
to unravel for him. Supposing the doctrine of necessity to be 
settled on a clear and firm basis, he resolved our feelings of 
liberty into "a deceitful sense" which he imagined the Al- 
mighty had conferred on man for wise and good purposes. He 
concluded that if men could see the truth, in regard to the 
scheme of necessity, without any illusion or mistake, they would 
relax their exertions in all directions, and passively submit to 
the all-controlling influences by which they are surrounded. 
But God, he supposed, out of compassion for us, concealed the 
truth from our eyes, in order that we might be induced to take 
care of ourselves, by the pleasant dream that we really have 
the power to do so. 

"We shall not stop to pull this scheme to pieces. We shall 
only remark, that it is a pity the philosopher undertook to 
counteract the benevolent design of the Deity, and to expose 
the cheat and delusion by which he intended to govern the 
world for its benefit. But the author himself, it is but just to 
acid, had the good sense and candour to renounce his own scheme ; 
and hence we need dwell no longer upon it. It remains at the 
present day only as a striking example of the frightful contor- 
tions of the human mind, in its herculean efforts to escape from 
the dark labyrinth of fate into the clear and open light of 
nature. 

Sir James Mackintosh, though familiar with the speculations 
of preceding philosophers, was satisfied with none of their solu- 
tions of the great problem under consideration, and conse- 
quently he has invented one of his own. This solution is 
founded on his theory of the moral sentiments, which is peculiar 
to himself. This theory is employed to show how it is, that 
although we may come by our volitions according to the scheme 
of necessity, yet we do not perceive the causes by which they 
are necessarily produced, and consequently imagine that we 
are free. Thus, the " feeling of liberty," as he calls it, is 
resolved into an illusory judgment, and the scheme of necessity 
is exhibited in all its adamantine strength, "It seems impossi 



82 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

ble," says lie, " for reason to consider occurrences otherwise than 
as bound together by the connexion of cause and effect ; and 
in this circumstance consists the strength of the necessitarian 
system."* 

We shall offer only one remark on this extraordinary hypoth- 
esis. If the theory of Sir James were true, it could only show, 
that although our volitions are necessarily caused, we do not 
perceive the causes by which they are produced. But this fact 
has never been denied : it has always been conceded, that we 
ascertain the existence of efficient causes, excepting the acts of 
our minds, only by means of the effects they produce. Both 
Leibnitz and Edwards long ago availed themselves of this 
undisputed fact, in order to account for the belief which men 
entertain in regard to their internal freedom. "Thus," says 
Edwards, " I find myself possessed of my volitions before I can 
see the effectual power and efficacy of any cause to produce 
them, for the power and efficacy of the cause are not seen hut by 
the effect, and this, for aught I Jcnow, may make some imagine 
that volition has no cause" We shall see hereafter that this is 
a very false account of the genesis of the common belief, that 
we possess an internal freedom from necessity ; but it is founded 
on the truth which no one pretends to deny, that external effi- 
cient causes can only be seen by their effects, and not by any 
direct perception of the mind. It was altogether a work of 
supererogation, then, for Sir James Mackintosh to bring forth 
his theory of moral sentiments to establish the possibility of a 
thing which preceding philosophers had admitted to be a fact. 
It requires no elaborate theory to convince us that a thing 
might exist without our perceiving it, when it is conceded on 
all sides, that even if it did exist, we have no power by which 
to perceive it. With this single remark, we shall dismiss a 
scheme which resolves our conviction of internal liberty into a 
mere illusion, and which, however pure may have been the 
intentions of the author, really saps the foundation of moral 
obligation, and destroys the nature of virtue. 

Progress of Ethical Philosophy, p. 275. 



Chapter!] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 83 



SECTION X. 

The conclusion of Mcehler, Tholuck, and others, that all speculation on such 
a sudject must oe vain and fruitless. 

Considering the vast wilderness of speculation which exists on 
the subject under consideration, it is not at all surprising that 
many should turn away from every speculative view of it with 
disgust, and endeavour to dissuade others from such pursuits. 
Accordingly Mcehler has declared, that " so often as, without 
regard to revelation, the relation of the human spirit to God hath 
been more deeply investigated, men have found themselves forced 

to the adoption of pantheism, and, with it, the most 

arrogant deification of man"* And Tholuck spreads out the 
reasoning from effect to cause, by which all things are referred 
to God, and God himself only made the greatest and brightest 
link in the chain ; and assuming this to be an unanswerable ar- 
gument, he holds it up as a dissuasive from all such speculations. 
He believes that reason necessarily conducts the mind to fatalism. 

We cannot concur with these celebrated writers, and we 
would deduce a far different conclusion from the speculations 
of necessitarians. This sort of scepticism or despair is more 
common in Germany than it is in this country ; for there, spec- 
ulation pursuing no certain or determinate method, has shown 
itself in all its wild and desolating excesses. But it is sophistry, 
and not reason, that leads the human mind astray; and we 
believe that reason, in all cases, is competent to detect and 
expose the impositions of sophistry. We do not believe that 
one guide which the Almighty has given us, can, by the legiti- 
mate exercise of it, lead us to a different result from that of 
another guide. We are persuaded that if reason seems to force 
us into any system which is contradicted by the testimony of 
our moral nature, or by the truths of revelation, this is unsound 
speculation : it is founded either on false premises, or else 
springs from false conclusions, which reason itself may correct, 
either by pointing out the fallacy of the premises, or the logical 
incoherency of the argument. We do not then intend to 
abandon speculation, but to plant it, if we can, on a better 
foundation, and build it up according to a better method. 

° Moehler's Symbolism, p. 117. 



8-i MOEAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

SECTION XL 

The true conclusion from the foregoing review of opinions and arguments. 

All the mighty logicians we have yet named have yielded to 
"the demonstration" in favour of necessity, but we do not 
know that one of them has ever directed the energies of his 
mind to pry into its validity. They have all pursued the 
method so emphatically condemned by Bacon, and the result 
has verified his prediction. " The usual method," says he, " of 
discovery and proof by first establishing the most general pro- 
positions, then applying and proving the intermediate axioms 
according to these, is the parent of error and the calamity of 
every science."* They have set out with the universal law of 
causality or the principle of the sufficient reason, and thence 
have proceeded to ascertain and determine the actual nature 
and processes of things. We may despair of ever being able to 
determine a single fact, or a single process of nature, by rea- 
soning from truisms; we must begin in the opposite direction 
and learn "to dissect nature," if we would behold her secrets 
and comprehend her mysteries. 

By pursuing this method it will be seen, and clearly seen, 
that "the great demonstration" which has led so many philo- 
sophers in chains, is, after all, a sophism. "We have witnessed 
their attempts to reconcile the great fact of man's free-agency 
with this boasted demonstration of necessity. But how inter- 
minable is the confusion among them ? If a few of them concur 
in one solution, this is condemned by others, and not unfre- 
quently by the very authors of the solution itself. We entertain 
too great a respect for their abilities not to believe, that if there 
had been any means of reconciling these things together, they 
would long since have discovered them, and come to an agree- 
ment among themselves, as well as made the truth known to 
the satisfaction of mankind. But as it is, their speculations are 
destitute of harmony — are filled with discordant elements. In- 
stead of the clear and steady light of truth, illuminating the 
great problem of existence, we are bewildered by the glare of 
a thousand paradoxes ; instead of the sweet voice of harmony, 
reaching and calling forth a response from the depths of the 

Novum Organ uin, book i, apli. 69. 



Chapter I.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 85 

human soul, the ear is stunned and confounded with a frightful 
roar of confused sounds. ' 

We shall not attempt to hold the scheme of necessity, and 
reconcile it with the fact of man's free-agency. We shall not 
undertake a task, in the prosecution of which a Descartes, a 
Leibnitz, a Locke, and an Edwards, not to mention a hundred 
others, have laboured in vain. But we do not intend to aban- 
don speculation. On the contrary, we intend to show, so 
clearly and so unequivocally that every eye may see it, that 
the great boasted demonstration in favour of necessity is a pro- 
digious sophism. We intend to do this; because until the 
mental vision be purged of the film of this dark error, it can 
never clearly behold the intrinsic majesty and glory of God's 
creation, nor the divine beauty of the plan according to which 
it is governed. 



86 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 



CHAPTEK II. 

THE SCHEME OF NECESSITY MAKES GOD THE AUTHOR OF SIN. 

I told ye then he should prevail, and speed 
On his bad errand ; man should be seduced, 
And flatter'd out of all, believing lies 
Against his Maker ; no decree of mine 
Concurring to necessitate his fall, 
Or touch'cl with slightest moment of impulse 
His free-will, to her own inclining left 
In even scale. — Milton. 

The scheme of necessity, as we have already said, presents two 
phases in relation to the existence of moral evil ; one relating 
to the agency of man, and the other to the agency of God. In 
the preceding chapter, we examined the attempts of the most 
learned and skilful advocates of this scheme to reconcile it with 
the free-agency and accountability of man. ¥e have seen 
how ineffectual have been all their endeavours to show that 
their doctrine does not destroy the responsibility of man for 
his sins. 

It is the design of the present chapter to consider the doctrine 
of necessity under its other aspect, and to demonstrate that it 
makes God the author of sin. If this can be shown, it may 
justly lead us to suspect that the scheme contains within its 
bosom some dark fallacy, which should be dragged from its 
hiding-place into the open light of day, and exposed to the 
abhorrence and detestation of mankind. 

In discussing this branch of our subject, we shall pursue the 
course adopted in relation to the first; for if the doctrine of 
necessity does not make God the author of sin, we may con- 
clude that this has been shown by some one of its most profound 
and enlightened advocates. If the attempts of a Calvin, and an 
Edwards, and a Leibnitz, to maintain such a doctrine, and yet 
vindicate the purity of God may be shown to be signal failures, 
we may well doubt whether there is a real agreement between 
these tenets as maintained by them. Nay, if in order to vin- 
dicate their system from so great a reproach, they have been 



Chapter II.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 87 

compelled to adopt positions which are clearly inconsistent with 
the divine holiness, and thus to increase rather than to diminish 
the reproach ; surely their system itself should be more than 
suspected of error. We shall proceed, then, with this view, to 
examine their speculations in regard to the agency of God in 
its connexion with the origin and existence of moral evil. 

SECTION I. 

The attempts of Calvin and other reformers to show that the system of neces- 
sity does not make God the author of sin. 

Most of the advocates of divine providence have endeavoured 
to soften their views, so as to bring them into a conformity 
with the common sentiments of mankind, by supposing that 
God merely permits, without producing the sinful volitions of 
men. But Calvin rejects this distinction with the most positive 
disdain. " A question of still greater difficulty arises," says he 7 
"from other passages, where God is said to incline or draw 
Satan himself and all the reprobate. For the carnal under- 
standing scarcely comprehends how he, acting by their means, 
and even in operations common to himself and them, is free 
from any fault, and yet righteously condemns those whose 
ministry he uses. Hence was invented the distinction between 
doing and permitting ; because to many persons this has ap- 
peared an inexplicable difficulty, that Satan and all the impious 
are subject to the power and government of God, so that he 
directs their malice to whatever end he pleases, and uses their 
crimes for the execution of his judgments. The modesty of 
those who are alarmed by absurdity, might perhaps be excusa- 
ble, if they did not attempt to vindicate the divine justice from 
all accusation by a pretence utterly destitute of any foundation 
in truth."* Here the distinction between God's permitting and 
doing in relation to the sins of men, is declared by Calvin to 
be utterly without foundation in truth, and purely chimerical. 
So, in various other places, he treats this distinction as " too 
weak to be supported." " The will of God," says he, " is the 
supreme and first cause of things ;" and he quotes Augustine 
with approbation to the effect, that "He does not remain an 
idle spectator, determining to permit anything; there is an 

Q Institutes, book i, chap, xviii. 



88 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I, 

intervention of an actual volition, if I may be allowed the 
expression, which otherwise could never be considered a cause."* 
According to Calvin, then, nothing ever happens in the uni- 
verse, not even the sinful volitions of men, which is not caused 
by God, even by " the intervention of an actual volition" of the 
supreme will. 

It is evident that Calvin scorns to have any recourse to a 
permissive will in God, in order to soften down the stupendous 
difficulties under which his system seems to labour. On the 
contrary, he sometimes betrays a little impatience with those 
who had endeavoured to mitigate the more rugged features of 
what he conceived to be the truth. " The fathers," says he, 
"are sometimes too scrupulous on this subject, and afraid of 
a simple confession of the truth."f He entertains no such 
fears. He is even bold and rigid enough in his consistency to 
say, "that God often actuates the reprobate by the interposi- 
tion of Satan, but in such a manner that Satan himself acts his 
part by the divine impulse.";): And again, he declares that by 
means of Satan, "God excites the will and strengthens the 
efforts" of the reprobate. § Indeed, his great work, whenever 
it touches upon this awful subject, renders it perfectly clear 
that Calvin despises all weak evasions in the advocacy of his 
stern doctrine. 

It has been truly said, that Calvin never thinks of " deducing 
the fall of man from the abuse of human freedom." So far is 
he from this, indeed, that he seems to lose his patience with 
those who trace the origin of moral evil to such a source." 
" They say it is nowhere declared in express terms," says Calvin, 
" that God decreed Adam should perish by his defection ; as 
though the same God, whom the Scriptures represent as doing 
whatever he pleases, created the noblest of his creatures with- 
out any determinate end. They maintain, that he was possess- 
ed of free choice, that he might be the author of his own fate, 
but that God decreed nothing more than to treat him according 
to his desert. If so weak a scheme as this be received, what 
will become of God's omnipotence, by which he governs all 
things according to his secret counsel, independently of every 
person or thing besides."] The fall of man, says Calvin, was 

Institutes, book i, chap. xvi. | Id., book ii, chap. iv. J Id., book i, chap, 

xviii. § Id., book iii, chap, xxiii. || Id., book iii, chap, xxiii, sec. 4, 7. 



Chapter II.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 89 

decreed from all eternity, and it was brought to pass "by the 
omnipotence of God. To suppose that Adam was the author 
of his own fate and fall, is to deny the omnipotence of God, and 
to rob him of his sovereignty. 

Now, if to say that God created man, and then left his sin 
to proceed wholly from himself, be to rob God of his omnipo- 
tence, and to affirm that he made man for no determinate end, 
the same consequences would follow from the position that God 
created Satan, and then left his sin and rebellion to proceed 
wholly from himself. But, strange as it may seem, the very 
thing which Calvin so vehemently denies in regard to man, 
he asserts in relation to Satan ; and he even feels called upon 
to make this assertion in order to vindicate the divine purity 
against the calumny of being implicated in the sin of Satan ! 
" But since the devil was created by God," says he, " we must 
remark, that this wickedness which we attribute to his nature 
is not from creation, but from corruption. For whatever evil 
quality he has, he has acquired by his defection and fall. And 
of this Scripture apprizes us ; but, believing him to have come 
from God, just as he now is, we shall ascribe to God himself 
that which is in direct opposition to him. For this reason, 
Christ declares, that Satan, ' when he speaketh a lie, speaketh 
of his own;' and adds the reason, 'because he abode not in 
the truth.' When he says that he abode not in the truth, he 
certainly implied that he had once been in it ; and when he 
calls him the father of a lie, he precludes his imputing to God 
the depravity of his nature, which originated wholly from him- 
self, Though these things are delivered in a brief and rather 
obscure manner, yet they are abundantly sufficient to vindicate 
the majesty of God from every calumny." 45 ' Thus, in order to 
show that God is not the author of sin, Calvin assumes the very 
positions in regard to the rebellion of Satan which his opponents 
have always felt constrained to adopt in regard to the transgres- 
sion of man. What then, on Calvin's own principles, becomes 
of the omnipotence of God ? Does this extend merely to man 
and not to Satan ? Is it not evident that Calvin's scheme in 
regard to the sin of the first man, is here most emphatically 
condemned out of his own mouth ? Does he not here endorse 
the very consequence which his adversaries have been accus- 

° Institutes, book i, chap, xiv, sec. 1 6. 



90 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

tomed to deduce from his scheme of predestination, namely, 
that it makes God the author of sin ? 

This scheme of doctrine, it must be confessed, is not without 
its difficulties. It clothes man, as he came from the hand of 
his Maker, with the glorious attributes of freedom ; but to what 
end ? Is this attribute employed to account for the introduc- 
tion of sin into the world ? Is it employed to show that man, 
and not God, is the author of moral evil ? It is sad to reflect 
that it is not. The fall of man is referred to the direct " omnip- 
otence of God." The feeble creature yields to the decree and 
power of the Almighty, who, because he does so, kindles into 
the most fearful wrath and dooms him and all his posterity to 
temporal, spiritual, and eternal death. Such is the doctrine 
which is advanced, in order to secure the omnipotence of God, 
and to exalt his sovereignty. But is it not a great leading 
feature of deism itself, that it exalts the power of God at the 
expense of his infinite moral perfections ? So we have under- 
stood the matter; and hence, it seems to us, that Christian 
divines should be more guarded in handling the attribute of 
omnipotence. " The rigid theologians," says Leibnitz, " have 
held the greatness of God in higher estimation than his good- 
ness, the latitudinarians have done the contrary ; true ortho- 
doxy has these two perfections equally at heart. The error 
which abases the greatness of God should be called anthropo- 
morphism, and despotism that which divests him of his good- 
ness."* 

If Calvin's doctrine be true, God is not the author of sin, 
inasmuch as he made man pure and upright ; but yet, by the 
same power which created him, has he plunged him into sin 
and misery. Now, if the creation of man with a sinful nature 
be inconsistent with the infinite purity of God, will it not be 
difficult to reconcile with that purity the production of sin in 
man, after his creation, by an act of the divine omnipotence ? 

If we ask, How can God be just in causing man to sin, and 
then punishing him for it ? Calvin replies, That all his dealings 
with us " are guided by equity."f We know, indeed, that all 
his ways are guided by the most absolute and perfect justice ; 
and this is the very circumstance which creates the difficulty. 
The more clearly we perceive, and the more vividly we realize, 

° Theodice, p. 365. f Institutes, book i, chap. xiv. 



Chapter n.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 91 

the perfection of the divine equity, the more heavily does the 
difficulty press upon our minds. This assurance brings us no 
relief; we still demand, if God be just, as in truth he is, how 
can he deal with us after such a manner ? The answer we ob- 
tain is, that God is just. And if this does not satisfy us, we are 
reminded that "it is impossible ever wholly to prevent the 
petulance and murmurs of impiety."* "We seek for light, and, 
instead of light, we are turned off with reproaches for the want 
of piety. ¥e have not that faith, we humbly confess, which 
" from its exaltation looks down on these mists with contempt ;"f 
but we have a reason, it may be " a carnal understanding," 
which longs to be enlarged and enlightened by faith. Hence, 
it cannot but murmur when, instead of being enlarged and en- 
lightened by faith, it is utterly overwhelmed and confounded 
by it. And these murmurings of reason, which we can no more 
prevent than we could stop the heavings of the mighty ocean 
from its depths, are met and sought to be quelled with the re- 
buke, " Who art thou, O man, that repliest against God ?" We 
reply not against God, but against man's interpretation of God's 
word ; and who art thou, O man, that puttest thyself in the 
place of God ? " Men," saith Bacon, " are ever ready to usurp 
the style, ' JVon ego, sed Dominus f and not only so, but to 
bind it with the thunder and denunciation of curses and anathe- 
mas, to the terror of those who have not sufficiently learned out 
of Solomon, that the ' causeless curse shall not come.' " 

Li relation to the subject under consideration, the amiable 
and philosophic mind of Melancthon seems to have been more 
consistent, at one time, than that of most of the reformers. 
" He laid down," says D'Aubigne, " a sort of fatalism, which 
might lead his readers to think of God as the author of evil, and 
which consequently has no foundation in Scripture : ' since 
whatever happens,' said he, 'happens by necessity, agreeably 
to divine foreknowledge, it is plain our will hath no liberty 
whatever.' " It is certainly a very mild expression to say, that 
the doctrine of Melancthon might lead his readers to think of 
God as the author of evil. This is a consequence which the 
logical mind of Melancthon did not fail to draw from his own 
scheme of necessity. In his commentary on the Epistle to the 
Romans, in the edition of 1525, he asserted " that God wrought 

° Institutes, book iii, ck. xxiii. "fid., book i, ck. xviii. 



92 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

all things, evil as well as good ; that he was the author of Da- 
vid's adultery, and the treason of Judas, as well as of Paul's 
conversion." 

This doctrine was maintained by Melancthon on practical as 
well as on speculative grounds. It is useful, says he, in its 
tendency to subdue human arrogance ; it represses the wisdom 
and cunning of human reason. We have generally observed, 
that whenever a learned divine denounces the arrogancy of 
reason, and insists on an humble submission to his own doc- 
trines, that he has some absurdity which he wishes us to em- 
brace ; he feels a sort of internal consciousness that human 
reason is arrayed against him, and hence he abuses and vilifies 
it. But reason is not to be kept in due subordination by any 
such means. If sovereigns would maintain a legitimate author- 
ity over their subjects, they should bind them with wise and 
wholesome laws, and not with arbitrary and despotic enact- 
ments, which are so well calculated to engender hatred and re- 
bellion. In like manner, the best possible way to tame the 
refractory reason of man, and hold it in subjection, is to bind it 
with the silken cords of divine truth, and not fetter it with the 
harsh and galling absurdities of man's invention. Melancthon 
himself furnished a striking illustration of the justness of this 
remark ; for although, like other reformers, he taught the 
doctrine of a divine fatality of all events, in order to hum- 
ble the pride of the human intellect, his own reason afterward 
rebelled against it. He not only recanted the monstrous 
doctrine which made God the author of sin, but he openly 
combatted it. 

In the writings of Bez'a and Zwingle there are passages, in 
relation to the origin of evil, more offensive, if possible, than 
any we have adduced from Calvin and Melancthon. The mode 
in which the reformers defended their common doctrine was, 
with some few exceptions, the same in substance. They have 
said nothing which can serve to dispel, or even materially les- 
sen, the stupendous cloud of difficulties which their scheme 
spreads over the moral government of God. 

Considering the condition of the Church, the state of human 
knowledge, and, in short, all the circumstances of the times in 
which the reformers lived and acted, it is not very surprising 
that they should have fallen into such errors. The corruptions 



Chapter II.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 93 

of human nature, manifesting themselves in the Romish Church, 
had so extravagantly exalted the powers of man, and especially 
of the priesthood, and so greatly depressed or obscured the sov- 
ereignty of G-od, that the reformers, in fighting against these 
abuses, were naturally forced into the opposite extreme. It is 
not at all wonderful, we say, that a reaction, which shook the 
very foundations of the earth, should have carried the authors 
of it beyond the bounds of moderation and truth. They would 
have been more than human if they had not fallen into some 
such errors as these which we have ascribed to them. But the 
great misfortune is, that these errors should have been stereo- 
typed and fixed in the symbolical books of the Protestant 
Churches, and made to descend from the reformers to their 
children's children, as though they were of the very essence of 
the faith once delivered to the saints. This is the misfortune, 
the lamentable evil, which has furnished the Romish Church 
with its most powerful weapons of attack ;* which has fortified 
the strongholds of atheism and infidelity ; and which has, be- 
yond all question, fearfully retarded the great and glorious 
cause of true religion. 

If we would examine the most elaborate efforts to defend 
these doctrines, or rather the great central dogma of necessity 
from which they all radiate, we must descend to later times ; 
we must turn our attention to the immortal writings of a Leib- 
nitz and an Edwards. 



SECTION II. 

The attempt of Leibnitz to show that the scheme of necessity does not make 
God the author of sin. 

This philosopher employed all the resources of a sublime 
genius, and all the stores of a vast erudition, in order to main- 
tain the scheme of necessity, and at the same time vindicate 
the purity of the Divine Being. That subtle and adroit sceptic, 
M. Bayle, had drawn out all the consequences of the doctrine 
of necessity in opposition to the free-agency of man, and to the 
holiness of God. Leibnitz wrote his great " Essais de Theodicee," 
for the purpose of refuting these conclusions of Bayle, as well 
as those of all other sceptics, and of reconciling his system with 

° See Moehler's Symbolism. 



94 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT LPart I, 

the divine attributes. In the preface to his work he says, " We 
show that evil has another source than the will of God; and 
that we have reason to say of moral evil, that God only permits 
it, and that he does not will it. But what is more important, 
we show that God can not only permit sin, but even concur 
therein, and contribute to it, without prejudice to his holiness; 
although, absolutely speaking, he might have prevented it." 
Such is the task which Leibnitz has undertaken to perform ; let 
us see how he has accomplished it. 

" The ancients," says he, " attributed the cause of evil to mat- 
ter ; but where shall we, who derive all things from God, find 
the source of evil ?"* He has more than once answered this 
question, by saying that the source of evil is to be found in the 
ideas of the divine mind. " Chrysippus," says he, " has reason 
to allege that vice comes from the original constitution of some 
spirits. It is objected to him that God has formed them ; and 
he can only reply, that the imperfection of matter does not per- 
mit him to do better. This reply is good for nothing ; for matter 
itself is indifferent to all forms, and besides God has made it. 
Evil comes rather from forms themselves, but abstract ; that is to 
say, from ideas that God has not produced by an act of his will, 
no more than he has produced number and figures ; and no 
more, in one word, than all those possible essences which we 
regard as eternal and necessary ; for they find themselves in 
the ideal region of possibles ; that is to say, in the divine under- 
standing. God is then not the author of those essences, in so 
far as they are only possibilities ; but there is nothing actual, 
but what he discerned and called into existence ; and he has 
permitted evil, because it is enveloped in the best plan which 
is found in the region of possibles ; that plan the supreme wis- 
dom could not fail to choose. It is this notion which at once 
satisfies the wisdom, the power, and the goodness of God, and 
yet leaves room for the entrance of evil."f 

In reading the lofty speculations of Leibnitz, we have been 
often led to wonder how one, whose genius was so great, could 
have permitted himself to rest in conceptions which appear so 
vague and indistinct. In the above passage we have both light 
and obscurity ; and we find it difficult to determine which pre- 
dominates over *he other. We are clearly told that God is not 

» Theodicee, p. 85. fid., p. 264. 



Chapter II] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 95 

the author of evil, because this proceeds from abstract forms 
which were from all eternity enveloped in his understanding, 
and not from any operation of his will. But how does evil 
proceed from abstract forms ; from the ideal region of the pos- 
sible ? Leibnitz does not mean that evil proceeds from abstract 
ideas, before they are embodied in the creation of real moral 
agents. Why then did God create beings which he knew from 
all eternity would commit sin ? and why, having created them, 
did he contribute to their sins by a divine concourse ? This is 
coming down from the ideal region of the possible, into the 
world of real difficulties. 

According to the philosophy of Leibnitz, God created every 
intelligent being in the universe with a perfect knowledge of 
its whole destiny ; and there is, moreover, a concourse of the 
divine will with all their volitions. Now, here we are in the 
very midst of the concrete world, and here is a difficulty which 
cannot be avoided by a flight into the ideal region of the pos- 
sible. How can there be a concourse of the divine will with 
the human will in one and the same sinful volition, without 
a stain upon the immaculate purity of God? How can the 
Father of Lights, by an operation of his will, contribute to our 
sinful volitions, without prejudice to his holiness? This is the 
problem which Leibnitz has promised to solve ; and we shall, 
with all patience, listen to his solution. 

The solution of this problem, says he, is effected by means 
of the " privative nature of evil." We shall state this part of 
his system in his own words : " As to the physical concourse," 
says he, "it is here that it is necessary to consider that truth 
which has made so much noise in the schools, since St. Augus- 
tine has shown its importance, that evil is a privation, whereas 
the action of God produces only the positive. This reply passes 
for a defective one, and even for something chimerical in the 
minds of many men ; but here is an example sufficiently anal- 
ogous, which may undeceive them." 

" The celebrated Kepler, and after him M. Descartes, have 
spoken of the natural inertia of bodies, and that we can con- 
sider it as a perfect image, and even as a pattern of the original 
limitation of creatures, in order to make us see that privation is 
the formal cause of the imperfections and inconveniences which 
are found in substance as well as in actions. Suppose that the 



96 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I, 

current of a river carries along with it many vessels which 
have different cargoes, some of wood, and others of stone ; some 
more, and some less. It will happen that the vessels which 
are more heavily laden will move more slowly than the others, 
provided there is nothing to aid their progress . . . Let ns com- 
pare the force which the current exercises over the vessels and 
what it communicates to them, with the action of God, who 
produces and preserves whatever is positive in the creature, 
and imparts to them perfection, being, and force ; let us com- 
pare, I say, the inertia of matter with the natural imperfection 
of creatures, and the slowness of the more heavily laden vessel 
with the defect which is found in the qualities and in the actions 
of the creature, and we shall perceive that there is nothing so 
just as this comparison. The current is the cause of the move- 
ment of the vessel, but not of its retardation ; God is the cause 
of the perfection in the nature and the actions of the creature, 
but the limitation of the receptivity of the creature is the cause 
of the defect in its actions. Thus the Platonists, St. Augustine, 
and the schoolmen, have reason to say that God is the material 
cause of evil, which consists in what is positive, and not the 
formal cause of it, which consists in privation, as we can say 
that the current is the material cause of the retardation, without 
being its formal cause ; that is to say, is the cause of the swift- 
ness of the vessel, without being the cause of the bounds of that 
swiftness. God is as little the cause of sin, as the current of the 
river is the cause of the retardation of the vessel."* Or as Leib- 
nitz elsewhere says, God is the author of all that is positive in 
our volitions, and the pravity of them arises from the necessary 
imperfection of the creature. 

"We have many objections to this mode of explaining the 
origin of moral evil, some few of which we shall proceed to 
state. 1. It is a hopeless attempt to illustrate the processes of 
the mind by the analogies of matter. All such illustrations are 
better adapted to darken and confound the subject, than to 
throw light upon it. If we would know anything about the 
nature of- moral evil, or its origin, we must study the subject 
in the light of consciousness, and in the light of consciousness 
alone. Dugald Stewart has conferred on Descartes the proud 
distinction of having been the first philosopher to teach the 

c Tlieodicee, pp. 89, 90. 



Chapter II.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 97 

true method according to which the science of mind should be 
studied. "He laid it down as 'a first principle," says Stewart, 
" that nothing comprehensible by the imagination can be at 
all subservient to the knowledge of mind ; and that the sensible 
images involved in all our common forms of speaking concern- 
ing its operations, are to be guarded against with the most 
anxious care, as tending to confound in our apprehensions, two 
classes of phenomena, which it is of the last importance to dis- 
tinguish accurately from each other."* 2. The privative nature 
of evil, as it is called, is purely a figment of the brain ; it is an 
invention of the schoolmen, which has no corresponding reality 
in nature. "When Adam put forth his hand to pluck the for- 
bidden fruit, and ate it, he committed a sinful act. But why 
was it sinful ? Because he knew it was wrong ; because his act 
was a voluntary and known transgression of the command of 
God. Now, if God had caused all that was positive in this 
sinful act, that is, if he had caused Adam to will to put forth 
his hand and eat the fruit, it is plain that he would have been 
the cause of his transgression. Nothing can be more chimerical, 
it seems to us, than this distinction between being the author 
of the substance of an act, and the author of its pravity. If 
Adam had obeyed, that is, if he had refused to eat the forbid- 
den fruit, such an act would not have been more positive than 
the actual series of volitions by which he transgressed. 3. If 
what we call sin, arises from the necessary imperfection of the 
creature, as the slowness of a vessel in descending a stream 
arises from its cargo, how can he be to blame for it ; or, in 
other words, how can it be moral evil at all ? And, 4. Leibnitz 
has certainly committed a very great oversight in this attempt 
to account for the origin of evil. He explains it, by saying 
that it arises from the necessary imperfection of the creature 
which limits its receptivity ; but does he mean that God cannot 
communicate holiness to the creature ? Does he mean that God 
endeavours to communicate holiness, and fails in consequence 
of the necessary imperfection of the creature? If so, what 
becomes of the doctrine which he everywhere advances, that 
God can very easily cause virtue or holiness to exist if he should 
choose to do so ? If God can very easily cause this to exist, as 
Leibnitz contends he can, notwithstanding the necessary imper- 

* Progress of Ethical Philosophy, p. 114. 

7 



98 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [.Part I, 

fection of the creature, why has he not done so ? Is it not 
evident, that the philosophy of Leibnitz merely plays over the 
surface of this great difficulty, and decks it out with the orna- 
ments of fancy, instead of reaching down to the bottom of it, 
and casting the illuminations of his genius into its depths ? 



SECTION III. 

The maxims adopted and employed ~by Edwards to show that the scheme of 
necessity does not make God the author of sin. 

"This remarkable man," says Sir James Mackintosh, "the 
metaphysician of America, was formed among the Calvinists 
of New-England, when their stern doctrine retained its vigor- 
ous authority. His power of subtle argument, perhaps un- 
matched, certainly unsurpassed among men, was joined, as in 
some of the ancient mystics, with a character which raised his 
piety to fervour." It is in his great work on the will, as well 
as in some of his miscellaneous observations, that Edwards has 
put forth the powers of his mind, in order to show that the 
scheme of necessity does not obscure the lustre of the divine per- 
fections. "With the exception of the Essais de Theodicee of 
Leibnitz, it is perhaps the greatest effort the human mind has 
ever made to get rid of the seeming antagonism between the 
scheme of necessity and the holiness of God. 

According to the system of Edwards, as well as that of his 
opponents, sin would not have been committed unless it were 
permitted by God. But in the scheme of Edwards, the agency 
of God bears a more intimate relation to the origin and exist- 
ence of sin than is implied by a bare permission of it, " God," 
says he, disposes "the state of events in such a manner, for 
wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that sin, if it 
be permitted or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly 
follow."* And this occurrence of sin, in consequence of his 
disposing and ordering events, enters into his design. For 
Edwards truly says, that " If God disposes all events, so that 
the infallible existence of the events is decided by his providence, 
then, doubtless, he thus orders and decides things knowingly 
and on design. God does not do what he does, nor order what 
he orders, accidentally and unawares, either without or beside 

° Inquiry, p. 216. 



Chapter II.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 99 

his intention." Thus, we are told, that God so arranges and 
disposes the events of his providence as to bring sin to pass, and 
that he does so designedly. This broad proposition is laid 
down, not merely with reference to sin in general, but to cer- 
tain great sins in particular. " So that," says Edwards, " what 
these murderers of Christ did, is spoken of as what God brought 
to pass or ordered, and that by which he fulfilled his own word." 
According to Edwards, then, the events of God's providence 
are arranged with a view to bring all the sinful deeds of 
men "certainly and infallibly" to pass, as well as their holy 
acts. 

Now, here the question arises, Is this doctrine consistent 
with the character of God? Is it not repugnant to his in- 
finite holiness? We affirm that it is; Edwards declares that 
it is not. Let us see, then, if his position does not involve 
him in insuperable difficulties, and in irreconcilable contra- 
dictions. 

Edwards supposes that some one may object : " All that these 
things amount to is, that God may do evil that good may 
come ; which is justly esteemed immoral and sinful in men, 
and therefore may be justly esteemed inconsistent with the per- 
fections of God." This is a fair and honest statement of the 
objection; now let us hear the reply. "I answer," says 
Edwards, " that for God to dispose and permit evil in the man- 
ner that has been spoken of, is not to do evil that good may 
come ; for it is not to do evil at all." It is not to do evil at all, 
says he, for the Supreme Ruler of the world to arrange events 
around one of his creatures in such a manner that they will 
certainly and infallibly induce him to commit sin. "Why is not 
this to do evil ? At first view, it certainly looks very much like 
doing evil ; and it is not at once distinguishable from the temp- 
tations ascribed to Satanic agency. Why 1 is it not to do 
evil, then, when it is done by the Almighty? * It is "not to do 
evil, says Edwards, because when Go<j/femgs sinVcertai»ly and 
infallibly to pass, he does so "for wise arid holy purposes." 
This is his answer : " In order to a thing's being morally evil, 
there must be one of these two things belonging to it: either it 
must be a thing unfit and unsuitable in its own nature, or it 
must have a bad tendency, or it must be done tor'' an evil end. 
But neither of these things can be attributed to God's ordering 



100 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part L, 

and permitting such events as the immoral acts of creatures for 
good ends."* Let us examine this logic. 

We are gravely told, that God designedly brings the sinful 
acts of men to pass by the use of most certain and infallible 
means ; but this is not to do evil, "because he has a good end in 
view. His intention is right ; he brings sin to pass for " wise 
and holy purposes." Let us come a little closer to this doctrine, 
and see what it is. It will not be denied, that if any being 
should bring sin to pass without any end at all, except to secure 
its existence, this would be a sinful agency. If any being 
should, knowingly and designedly, bring sin to pass in another, 
without any " wise and holy purposes," all mankind will agree 
in pronouncing the deed to be morally wrong. But precisely 
the same deed is not wrong in God, says Edwards, because in 
his case it proceeds from " a wise and holy purpose," and he has 
" a good end in view." That is to say, the means, in themselves 
considered, are morally wrong ; but being employed for a wise 
and holy purpose, for the attainment of a good end, they are 
sanctified ! This is precisely the doctrine, that the end sancti- 
fies the means. Is it not wonderful, that any system should be 
so dark and despotic in its power as to induce the mind of an 
Edwards, ordinarily so amazing for its acuteness and so exalted 
in its piety, to vindicate the character of God upon such 
grounds ? 

The defence of Edwards is neither more nor less than a play 
on the term evil. When it is said, that "we may do evil that 
good may come ;" the meaning of the maxim is, that the means 
in such a case and under such circumstances ceases to be evil. 
The maxim teaches that " we may do evil," that it is lawful to 
do evil, with a view to the grand and glorious end to be attained 
by it. Or, in other words, that it is right to do what would 
otherwise be morally evil, in order to accomplish a good end. 
If Edwards had considered the other form of the same odious 
maxim, namely, that " the end sanctifies the means," he would 
have found it impossible to evade the force of its application to 
his doctrine. He could not have escaped from the difficulty 
of his position by a play upon the word evil. He would have 
seen that he had undertaken to justify the conduct of the Father 
of Lights, by supposing it to be governed by the most corrupt 

° Inquiry, part iv, sec. ix. 



Chapter II] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 101 

maxim of the most corrupt system of casuistry the world has 
ever seen. 

"What God does, says Edwards, is not evil at all ; because his 
purpose is holy, because his object is good, his intention is 
right. In like manner, the maxim says, that when the end is 
good and holy, " it sanctifies the means." The means may be 
impure in themselves considered, but they are rendered pure 
by the cause in which they are employed. This doctrine has 
been immortalized by Pascal, in his " Provincial Letters ;" and 
we cannot better dismiss the subject than with an extract from 
the "Provincial Letters." "I showed you," says the Jesuitical 
father, "how servants might, with a safe conscience, manage 
certain troublesome messages ; did you not observe that it is 
simply taking off their intention from the sin itself, and fixing 
it on the advantage to be gained."* On this principle, stealing, 
and lying, and murder, may all be vindicated. " Caramuel, 
our illustrious defender," says the Jesuit, " in his Fundamental 

Theology," enters into the examination of many new 

questions resulting from this principle, (of directing the inten- 
tion,) as, for example, whether the Jesuits may kill the Jansen- 
ists ? " Alas, father !" exclaimed Pascal, " this is a most sur- 
prising point in theology! I hold the Jansenists already no 
better than dead men by the doctrine of Father Launy." " Aha, 
sir, you are caught ; for Caramuel deduces the very opposite 
conclusion from the same principles." " How so ?" said Pascal. 
" Observe his words, n. 1146 and 1147, p. 547 and 548. The 
Jansenists call the Jesuits Pelagians ; may they be hilled for 
so doing? No — for this plain reason, that the Jansenists are 
no more able to obscure the glory of our society, than an owl 
can hide the sun; in fact, they promote it, though certainly 
against their intention — occidi non jpossunt, quia nocere non 
potueruntP " Alas, father," says Pascal, " and does the exist- 
ence of the Jansenists depend solely upon their capacity of 
injuring your reputation ? If that be the case, I am afraid they 
are not in a very good predicament ; for if the slightest proba- 
bility should arise of their doing you any hurt, they may be 
despatched at once. -You can perform the deed logically and 
in form ; for it is only to direct your intention right, and you 
insure a quiet conscience. "What a blessedness for those who 

° Letter vii. 



102 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

can endure injuries to know this charming doctrine ! But, on 
the other hand, how miserable is the condition of the offending 
party ! Really, father, it would be better to have to do with 
people totally devoid of all religion, than with those Tvho have 
received instructions so far only as to this point, relative to 
directing the intention. I am afraid the intention of the mur- 
derer is no consolation to the wounded person. He can have 
no perception of this secret direction — poor man ! he is conscious 
only of the blow he receives; and I am not certain whether 
he would not be less indignant to be cruelly massacred by peo- 
ple in a violent transport of rage, than to be devoutly killed 
for conscience' sake." Now, we submit it to the candid reader, 
whether the reasoning here ascribed to the Jesuit by Pascal, is 
not exactly parallel with that on which Edwards justifies the 
procedure of the Almighty ? If God may choose sin and bring 
it to pass, without contracting the least impurity, because his 
intention is directed a/right, to a wise and good end, may we 
not be permitted to imitate his example ? And again, if God 
thus employs the creature as an instrument to accomplish his 
wise and holy purposes, why should he pour out the vials of his 
wrath upon him for having yielded to the dispensations of his 
almighty power ? In order to save his doctrine from reproach, 
Edwards has invented a distinction, which next demands our 
attention. " There is no inconsistence," says he, " in supposing 
that God may hate a thing as it is in itself, and considered 
simply as evil, and yet that it may be his will it should come 
to pass, considering all consequences. I believe there is no 
person of good understanding who will venture to say, he is 
certain that it is impossible it should be best, taking in the 
whole compass and extent of existence, and all consequences in 
the endless series of events, that there should be such a thing 
as moral evil in the world. And if so, it will certainly follow, 
that an infinitely wise Being, who always chooses what is best, 
must choose that there should be such a thing. And if so, 
then such a choice is not evil, but a wise and holy choice. 
And if so, then that Providence which is agreeable to such a 
choice, is a wise and holy Providence. Men do will sin as sin, 
and so are the authors and actors of it ; they love it as sin, and 
for evil ends and purposes. God does not will sin as sin, or for 
the sake of anything evil ; though it be his pleasure so to order 



Chapter n.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 103 

tilings that, lie permitting, sin will come to pass, for the sake 
of the great good that by his disposal shall be the consequence. 
His willing to order things so that evil should come to pass for 
the sake of the contrary good, is no argument that he does not 
hate evil as evil ; and if so, then it is no reason why he may 
not reasonably forbid evil as evil, and punish it as such."* 
Here we are plainly told, that although God hates sin as sin, 
yet, all things considered, he prefers that it should come to pass, 
and even helps it into existence. But man loves and commits 
evil as such, and is therefore justly punishable for it. 

There are several serious objections to this extraordinary dis- 
tinction. It is not true that men love and commit sin as sin. 
Sin is committed, not for its own sake, but for the pleasure 
which attends it. If sin did not gratify the appetites, or the 
passions, or the desires of men, it would not be committed at all ; 
there would be no temptation to it, and it would be seen as it is 
in its own loathsome nature. Indeed, to speak with philosoph- 
ical accuracy, sin is never a direct object of our affections or 
choice ; we simply desire certain things, as Adam did the for- 
bidden fruit, and we seek our gratification in them contrary to 
the will of God. This constitutes our sin. The direct obj ect of 
our choice is, not disobedience, not sin, but the forbidden thing, 
the prohibited gratification. We do not love and choose the 
disobedience, but the thing which leads us to disobey. This is 
so very plain and simple a matter, that we cannot but wonder 
that honest men should have lost sight of it in a mist of 
words, and built up their theories in the dark. 

Secondly, the above position, into which Edwards has been 
forced by the exigencies of his doctrine concerning evil, is 
directly at war with the great fundamental principle on which 
his whole system rests, namely, that the will is always deter- 
mined by the greatest apparent good. For how is it possible 
that men should commit sin as sin, and for its own sake, if they 
never do anything except what is the most agreeable to them % 
How is it possible that they pursue moral evil merely as moral, 
evil, and yet pursue it as the greatest apparent good? If it 
should be said that men love sin merely as sin, and therefore it 
pleases them to choose it for its own sake, this reply would be 
without foundation. For, as we have already seen, there is no 

° Inquiry, part iv, sec. ix. 



104 MOEAL EVIL CONSISTENT LPart I, 

such principle in human nature as the love of sin as such, or for 
its own sake ; and consequently sin can never delight or please 
the human mind as it is in itself. And, besides, it is self-con- 
tradictory ; for the question is, How can a man commit sin for 
its own sake on account of the pleasure it affords him 1 It 
would be an attempt to explain an hypothesis which denies the 
veiy fact to be explained by it. 

In the third place, if the philosophy of Edwards be true, no 
good reason can be assigned why men should restrain themselves 
from the commission of sin : for, all things considered, God pre- 
fers the sin which actually exists, and infallibly brings it to 
pass. He prefers it on account of the great good he intends to 
educe from it. Why then should we not also prefer its exist- 
ence ? God is sovereign ; he will permit no more sin than he 
can and will render subservient to the highest good of the uni- 
verse ; and so much as is for the highest good he will bring into 
existence. Why, then, should we give ourselves any concern 
about the matter ? Why should we fear that there may be too 
much sin in the world, or why should we blame other men for 
their crimes and offences ? 

The inference which we have just mentioned as necessarily 
flowing from the doctrine of Edwards, has actually been drawn 
by some of the most illustrious advocates of that doctrine. Thus 
says Hartley, as we have already seen, " since all men do against 
us is by the appointment of God, it is rebellion against him to 
be offended with them." This is so clearly the logical inference 
from the doctrine in question, that it is truly wonderful how any 
one can possibly fail to perceive it. 

We are told by Leibnitz and Edwards, that we should not 
presume to act on the principle of permitting sin in others, or 
of bringing it to pass, on account of the good that we may educe 
from it ; because such an affair is too high for us. Eut, surely, 
we need have no weak fears on this ground ; for although it 
may be too high for us, they do not pretend that it is too high 
for God. He will allow no more sin to make its appearance in 
the world, say they, than he will cause to redound to the good 
of the universe. He prefers it for that reason, and why should 
we not respond, amen! to his preference? Why should we 
give ourselves any concern about sin ? May we not follow our 
own inclinations, leaving sin to take its course, and rest quietly 



Chapter IL] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 105 

in Providence ? To this question it mil be replied, as Calvin 
and Edwards repeatedly reply, that the revealed, and not the 
secret, will of God is the rule of our duty. We do not obj ect 
to this doctrine ; we acknowledge its perfect propriety and cor- 
rectness : but it is no reply to the consequence we have deduced 
from the philosophy of Edwards. It only shows that his philos- 
ophy leads to a conclusion which is in direct opposition to reve- 
lation. So far from objecting that any should turn from the 
philosophy of Edwards to revelation, in order to find reasons 
why evil should not be committed by us, we sincerely regret 
that such a departure from a false philosophy, and return to a 
true religion, is not more permanent and universal. 

The doctrine of Edwards on this subject destroys the harmony 
of the divine attributes. It represents God as having two wills ; 
or, to speak more correctly, it represents him as having pub- 
lished a holy law for the government of his creatures, which he 
does not, in all cases, wish them to obey. On the contrary, he 
prefers that some of them should violate his holy law ; and not 
only so, but he adopts certain and infallible means to lead them 
to violate and trample it under foot. It is admitted by Ed- 
wards, that in this sense God really possesses two wills ; but he 
still denies that this shows any inconsistency in the nature of God. 

Edwards says, that the will of God does not oppose sin in the 
same sense in which it prefers sin, and that, therefore, there is no 
inconsistency in the case. But let us not deceive ourselves by 
words. Is it true, that sin is opposed by what is called the 
revealed will of God, by his command ; and yet that it is, all 
things considered, chosen by his secret and working will? He 
commands one thing, and yet works to bring another to pass ! 
He prohibits all sin, under the awful penalty of eternal death, 
and yet secretly arranges and plans things in such a manner 
as to secure the commission of it ! 

We have already seen one of these defences. God "hates 
sin as it is in itself ;" and hence he prohibits it by his command. 
"Yet it may be his will it should come to pass, considering all 
its consequences ;" and hence his secret will is bent on bringing 
it into existence. There is no inconsistency here, says Ed- 
wards, because the divine will relates to two different objects; 
namely, to " sin considered simply as sin," and to " sin con- 
sidered in all its consequences." We do not care whether 



106 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT EPart I, 

the two propositions contradict each other or not ; it is abun- 
dantly evident, as we have seen, that it makes God choose that 
which he hates, even sin itself, as the means of good. It makes 
the end sanctify the means, even in the eye of the holy God. 
This doctrine we utterly reject and infinitely abhor. We had 
rather have " our sight, hearing, and motive power, and what 
not besides, disputed, and even torn away from us, than suffer 
ourselves to be disputed into a belief," that the holy God can 
choose moral evil as a means of good. We had rather believe 
all the fables in the Talmud and the Koran, than that the ever- 
blessed God should, by his providence and his power, plunge 
his feeble creatures into sin, and then punish them with ever- 
lasting torments for their transgression. We know of nothing 
in the Pantheism of Spinoza, or in the atheism of Hobbes, more 
revolting than this hideous dogma. 

The great metaphysician of New-England has made a still 
further attempt to vindicate the dogma in question. "The 
Arminians," says he, "ridicule the distinction between the 
secret and revealed will of God, or, more properly expressed, 
the distinction between the decree and law of God ; because 
we say he may decree one thing and command another. And 
so, they argue, we hold a contrariety in God, as if one will of 
his contradicted another. However, if they will call this a 
contradiction of wills, ~we know that there is such a thing ; so 
that it is the greatest absurdity to dispute about it. We and 
they know it was God's secret will, that Abraham should not 
sacrifice his son Isaac ; but yet his command was, that he should 
do it."* Such is the instance produced by this acute divine, 
to show that the secret will of God may prefer the very thing 
which is condemned by his revealed will or law ; and on the 
strength of it, he is bold to say, " We know it, so that it is the 
greatest absurdity to dispute about it" 

We have often seen this passage of Scripture produced by 
infidels, to show that the Old Testament contains unworthy 
representations of God. If Edwards had undertaken to refute 
the infidel ground in relation to this passage, he might have 
done so with very great ease : but then he would at the same 
time have refuted himself. The Scriptural account of God's 
commanding Abraham to offer up his son Isaac, was long ago 

° Edwards's Works, vol. vii, p. 406. 



Chapter II.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 107 

employed by the famous infidel Hobbes to show that there are 
two wills in God. This argument of Hobbes has been refuted 
by Leibnitz. " Hobbes contends," says Leibnitz, "that God wills 
not always what he commands, as when he commands Abra- 
ham to sacrifice his son :" and he replies, that " God, in com- 
manding Abraham to sacrifice his son, willed the obedience, and 
not the action, which he prevented after having the obedience ; 
for that was not an action which merited in itself to be willed : 
but such is not the case with those actions which he positively 
wills, and which are indeed worthy of being the objects of his 
will ; such as piety, charity, and every virtuous action which 
God commands, and such as the avoidance of sin, more repug- 
nant to the divine perfections than any other thing. It is incom- 
parably better, therefore, to explain the will of God, as we 
have done it in this work."* It is evident that Leibnitz did 
not relish the idea of two wills in God ; and perhaps few pious 
minds would do so, if it were presented to them by an atheist. 
But there was too close an affinity between the philosophy of 
Leibnitz and that of Hobbes, to permit the former to furnish 
the most satisfactory refutation of the argument of the latter. 

This command to Abraham does not show that there ever 
was any such contrariety between the revealed and the decretal 
wills of God, as is contended for by Hobbes and Edwards. 
God intended, as we are told, to prove the faith of Abraham, 
in order that it might shine forth and become a bright example 
to all succeeding ages. For this purpose he commanded him 
to take his only son, whom he loved, and go into the land of 
Moriah, and there offer him up as a burnt-offering upon one 
of the mountains. Abraham obeyed without a murmur. After 
several days travelling and preparation, Abraham has reached 
the appointed place, and is ready for the sacrifice. His son 
Isaac is bound, and laid upon the altar; the father stretches 
forth his hand to take the knife and slay him. But a voice is 
heard, saying, " Lay not thine hand on the lad ; neither do thou 
anything unto him." ISTow, the conduct of Abraham on this 
memorable occasion, is one of the most remarkable exhibitions 
of confidence in the wisdom and goodness of God, which the 
history of the world has furnished. It deserves to be held up 
to the admiration of mankind, and to be celebrated in all ages 

° Theodicee, p. 327. 



108 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I, 

of the world. We sincerely pity the man, who is so taken up 
with superficial appearances, or who is so destitute of sympathy 
with the moral greatness and beauty of soul manifested in this 
simple narrative, that he can approach it in a little, captious, 
sneering spirit, rather than in an attitude of profound admira- 
tion. But our business, at present, is not so much with the 
laughing sceptic as with the grave divine. 

What evidence, then, does this story furnish that the secret 
will of God had anything to do with the simple but sublime 
transaction which it records? God commanded Abraham to 
repair to the land of Moriah with his son Isaac ; but are we 
informed that his secret will was opposed to the patriarch's 
going thither, or that it opposed any obstacle to his obedience ? 
Are we told that God so arranged the events of his providence 
as to render the disobedience of Abraham, in any one partic- 
ular, certain, and infallible ? We cannot find the shadow of any 
such information in the sacred story. And is there the least 
intimation, that when Abraham was commanded to stay the 
uplifted knife, the secret will of God was in favour of its being 
plunged into the bosom of his son? Clearly there is not. 
Where, then, is the discrepancy between the revealed and the 
secret wills of God in this case, which we are required to see ? 
Where is this discrepancy so plainly manifested, that we abso- 
lutely know its existence, so that it is the height of absurdity 
to dispute against it ? 

If there is any contrariety at all in this case, it is between 
the revealed will of God in commanding Abraham to oifer up 
his son, and his subsequently revealed will to desist from the 
sacrifice. It does not present even a seeming inconsistency 
between his secret will and his command, but between two 
portions of his revealed w T ill. This seeming inconsistency 
between the command of God and his countermand, in relation 
to the same external action, has been fully removed by Leibnitz ; 
and if it had not been, it is just as incumbent on the abettors 
of Edwards's scheme to explain it, as it is upon his opponents. 
If God had commanded Abraham to do a thing, and yet exerted 
his secret will to make him violate the injunction, this would 
have been a case in point : but there is no such case to be found 
in the word of God. 

It may not be improper, in this connexion, to quote the fol- 



Chapter H.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 109 

lowing judicious admonition of Howe : "Take heed," says he, 
" that we do not oppose the secret and revealed will of God to 
one another, or allow ourselves so much as to imagine an oppo- 
sition or contrariety between them. And that ground being 
once firmly laid and stuck to, as it is impossible that there can 
be a will against a will in God, or that he can be divided from 
himself, or against himself, or that he should reveal anything 
to us as his will that is not his will, (it being a thing inconsist- 
ent with his nature, and impossible to him to lie,) that being, I 
say, firmly laid, (as nothing can be firmer or surer than that,) 
then measure all your conceptions of the secret will of God by 
his revealed will, about which you may be sure. But never 
measure your conceptions of his revealed by his secret will ; 
that is, by what you may imagine concerning that. For you can 
but imagine while it is secret, and so far as it is unrevealed."* 

" It properly belongs," says Edwards, " to the supreme abso- 
lute Governor of the universe, to order all important events 
within his dominions by wisdom ; but the events in the moral 
world are of the most important kind, such as the moral actions 
of intelligent creatures, and the consequences. These events will 
be ordered by something. They will either be disposed by 
wisdom, or they will be disposed by chance ; that is, they will 
be disposed by blind and unclesigning causes, if that were pos- 
sible, and could be called a disposal. Is it not better that 
the good and evil which happen in God's world should be 
ordered, regulated, bounded, and determined by the good 
pleasure of an infinitely wise being, than to leave these things to 
fall out by chance, and to be determined by those causes which 
have no understanding and aim ? .... It is in its own nature fit, 
that wisdom, and not chance, should order these things."f 

In our opinion, if there be no other alternative, it is better 
that sin should be left to chance, than ascribed to the high and 
holy One. But why must sin be ordered and determined by 
the supreme Ruler of the world, or else be left to chance ? 
Has the great metaphysician forgotten, that there may be such 
things as men and angels in the universe ; or does he mean, 
with Spinoza, to blot out all created agents, and all subordinate 
agency, from existence ? If not, then certainly God may refuse 
to be the author of sin, without leaving it to blind chance, 

* Howe's Works, p. 1142. f On the Will, part iv, sec. ix. 



110 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

which is incapable of such a thing. He may leave it, as we 
conceive he has done, to the determination of finite created 
intelligences. If sin is to come into the world, as come it evi- 
dently does, it is infinitely better, we say, that it should be left 
to proceed from the creature, and not be made to emanate from 
God himself, the fountain of light, and the great object of all 
adoration. It is infinitely better that the high and holy One 
should do nothing either by his wisdom or by his decree, by 
his providence or his power, to help this hideous thing to raise 
its head amid the inconceivable splendours of his dominion. 

Such speculations as those of Edwards and Leibnitz, in our 
opinion, only reflect dishonour and disgrace upon the cause 
they are intended to subserve. It is better, ten thousand times 
better, simply to plant ourselves upon the moral nature of man, 
and the irreversible dictates of common sense, and annihilate 
the speculations of the atheist, than to endeavour to parry them 
off by such invented quibbles and sophisms. They give point, 
and pungency, and power to the shafts of the sceptic. If we 
meet him on the common ground of necessity, he will snap all 
such quibbles like threads of tow, and overwhelm us with the 
floods of irony and scorn. For, in the memorable words of 
Sir William Hamilton, " It can easily be proved by those who 
are able and not afraid to reason, that the doctrine of necessity 
is subversive of religion, natural and revealed." To perceive 
this, it requires neither a Bayle, nor a Hobbes, nor a Hume ; it 
only requires a man who is neither unable nor afraid to reason. 



SECTION IV. 

The attempts of Dr. Emmons and Dr. Chalmers to reconcile the scheme of 
necessity loith the pu/rity of God. 

As we have dwelt so long on the speculations of President 
Edwards concerning the objections in question, we need add 
but a few remarks in relation to the views of the above-men- 
tioned authors on the same subject. The sentiments of Dr. 
Emmons on the relation between the divine agency and the sin- 
ful actions of men, are even more clearly defined and boldly 
expressed than those of President Edwards. The disciple is 
more open and decided than the master. "Since mind can- 
not act," says he, " any more than matter can move, without a 



Chapter IL] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. Ill 

divine agency, it is absurd to suppose that men can be left to 
the freedom of their own will, to act, or not to act, independ- 
ently of a divine influence. There must be, therefore, the 
exercise of a divine agency in every human action, without 
which it is impossible to conceive that God should govern moral 
agents, and make mankind act in perfect conformity to his 
designs."* " He is now exercising his powerful and irresistible 
agency upon the heart of every one of the human race, and 
producing either holy or unholy exercises in it."f " It is often 
thought and said, that nothing more was necessary on God's 
part, in order to fit Pharaoh for destruction, than barely to 
leave him to himself. But God knew that no external means 
and motives would be sufficient of themselves to form his moral 
character. He determined therefore to operate on his heart 
itself, and cause him to put forth certain evil exercises in view 
of certain external motives. When Moses called upon him to 
let the people go, God stood by him, and moved him to refuse. 
When the people departed from his kingdom, God stood by 
him and moved him to pursue after them with increased malice 
and revenge. And what God did on such particular occasions, 
he did at all times.":}: It is useless to multiply extracts to the 
same effect. Could language be more explicit, or more revolt- 
ing to the moral sentiments of mankind ? 

If God is alike the author of all our volitions, sinful as well 
as holy, one wonders by what sort of legerdemain the authors 
of the doctrine have contrived to ascribe all the glory and all 
the j>raise of our holy actions to God, and at the same time all 
the shame and condemnation of our evil actions to ourselves. 
In relation to the holy actions of men, all the praise is due to 
God, say they, because they were produced by his power. 
Why is not the moral turpitude of their evil actions, then, also 
ascribed to God, inasmuch as he is said to produce them by his 
irresistible and almighty agency ? We are accountable for our 
evil acts, say Dr. Emmons and Calvin, because they are volun- 
tary. Are not our moral acts, our virtuous acts, also voluntary ? 
Certainly they are ; this is not denied ; and yet we are not 
allowed to impute the moral quality of the acts to the agent in 
such cases. This whole school of metaphysicians, indeed, from 
Calvin down to Emmons, can make God the author of our evil 

* Emmons's Works, vol. iv, p. 372. f Ibid., p. 388. J Ibid., p. 327. 



112 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT LPart I, 

acts, by an exertion of his omnipotence, and yet assert that 
because they are voluntary we are justly blameworthy and 
punishable for them; but though our virtuous acts are also 
voluntary, they still insist the praiseworthiness of them is to be 
ascribed exclusively to Him by whom they were produced. 
The plain truth is, that as the scheme originated in a particular 
set purpose and design, so it is one-sided in its views, arbitrary 
in its distinctions, and full of self-contradictions. 

The simple fact seems to be, that if any effect be produced 
in our minds by the power of God, it is a passive impression, 
and is very absurdly called a voluntary state of the will. And 
even if such an impression could be a voluntary state, or a voli- 
tion, properly so called, we should not be responsible for it, 
because it is produced by the omnipotence of God, This, we 
doubt not, is in perfect accordance with the universal con- 
sciousness and voice of mankind, and cannot be resisted by the 
sophistical evasions of particular men, how great soever may be 
their genius, or exalted their piety. 

We shall, in conclusion, add one more great name to the list 
of those who, from their zeal for the glory of the divine omnipo- 
tence, have really and clearly made God the author of sin. 
The denial of his scheme of "a rigid and absolute predes- 
tination," as he calls it, Dr. Chalmers deems equivalent to the 
assertion, that "things grow up from the dark womb of non- 
entity, which omnipotence did not summon into being, and 
which omniscience could not foretell." And again, "At this 
rate, events would come forth uncaused from the womb of non- 
entity, to which omnipotence did not give birth, and which 
omniscience could not foresee. "* Now all this is spoken, be it 
remembered, in relation to the volitions or acts of men. But 
if there are no such events, except such as omnipotence gives 
birth to, or summons into being, how clear and how irresistible 
is the conclusion that God is the author of the sinful acts of the 
creature ? It were better, we say, ten thousand times better, 
that sin, that monstrous birth of night and darkness, should 
grow up out of the womb of nonentity, if such were the only 
alternative, than that it should proceed from the bosom of God. 

Institutes of Theology, vol. ii, chap. iii. 



Chapter III.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 113 



CHAPTEE HI. 

THE SCHEME OF NECESSITY DENIES THE EEAEITY OF MORAL DISTINC CIONS. 

Our voluntary service He requires, 

Not our necessitated ; such with him 

Finds no acceptance, nor can find ; for how 

Can hearts, not free, be tried whether they serve 

Willing or no, who will but what they must 

By destiny, and can no other choose ? — Milton. 

In the preceding chapters we have taken it for granted that 
there is such a thing as moral good and evil, and endeavoured 
to show, that if the scheme of necessity be true, man is absolved 
from guilt, and God is the author of sin. But, in point of fact, 
if the scheme of necessity be true, there is no such thing as 
moral good or evil in this lower world ; all distinction between 
virtue and vice, moral good and evil, is a mere dream, and we 
really Live in a non-moral world. This has been shown by 
many of the advocates of necessity. 

SECTION I. 
The mews of Spinoza in relation to the reality of moral distinctions. 

It is shown by Spinoza, that all moral distinctions vanish 
before the iron scheme of necessity. They are swept away as the 
dreams of vulgar prejudice by the force of Spinoza's logic ; yet 
little praise is due, we think, on that account, to the superiority 
of his acumen. The wonder is, not that Spinoza should have 
drawn such an inference, but that any one should fail to draw 
it. For if our volitions are necessitated by causes over which 
we have no control, it seems to follow, as clear as noonday, 
that they cannot be the objects of praise or blame — cannot be 
our virtue or vice. So far is it indeed from requiring any 
logical acuteness to perceive such an inference, that it demands, 
as we shall see, the very greatest ingenuity to keep from per- 
ceiving it. Hence, in our humble opinion, the praise which has 
been lavished on the logic of Spinoza is not deserved. 

His superior consistency only shows one of two things — 



114 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part 1, 

either that lie possessed a stronger reasoning faculty than his 
great master, Descartes, or a weaker moral sense. In our 
opinion, it shows the latter. If his moral sentiments had been 
vigorous and active, they would have induced him, no doubt, 
either to invent sophistical evasions of such an inference, or to 
reject the doctrine from which it flows. If a Descartes, a 
Leibnitz, or an Edwards, for example, had seen the conse- 
quences of the scheme of necessity as clearly as they were seen 
by Spinoza, his moral nature would have recoiled from it with 
such force as to dash the premises to atoms. If any praise, 
then, be due to Spinoza for such triumphs of the reasoning 
power, it should be given, not to the superiority of his logic, 
but to the apathy of his moral sentiments. For our part, 
greatly as we admire sound reasoning and consistency in specu- 
lation, we had rather be guilty of ten thousand acts of logical 
inconsistency, such as those of Edwards, or Leibnitz, or Des- 
cartes, than to be capable of resting in the conclusion to which 
the logic of Spinoza conducted him — that every moral distinc 
tion is a vulgar prejudice, and that the existence of moral good 
ness is a dream.* 

SECTION II. 

The attempt of Edwards to reconcile the scheme of necessity with the reality 
of moral distinctions. 

It would not be difficult to see, perhaps, that a necessary 
holiness, or a necessary sin, is a contradiction in terms, if we 
would only allow reason to speak for itself, instead of extorting 
testimony from it by subjecting it to the torture of a false logic. 
For what proposition can more clearly carry its own evidence 
along with it, than that whatever is necessary to us, that what- 
ever we cannot possibly avoid, is neither our virtue nor our 
fault ? What can be more unquestionable, than that we can 
be neither to praise nor to blame, neither justly rewardable nor 
punishable for anything over whose existence we have no power 

* Emphatically as this conclusion is stated by Spinoza, and harshly as it is 
thrust by him against the moral sense of the reader, he could not himself find 
a perfect rest therein. Nothing can impart this to the reflective and inquiring 
mind but truth. Hence, even Spinoza finds himself constrained to speak of the 
duty of love to God, and so forth ; all of which, according to his own conclusion, 
is irrelative nonsense. 



Chapter in.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 115 

or control ? Yet this question, apparently so plain and simple 
in itself, has been enveloped in clouds of metaphysical subtilty, 
and obscured by huge masses of scholastic jargon. If, on this 
subject, we have wandered in the dim twilight of uncertain 
speculation, instead of walking in the clear open day, this has 
been, it seems to us, because we have neglected the wise admoni- 
tion of Barrow, that logic, however admirable in its place, was 
not designed as an instrument "to put out the sight of our 
eyes." 

It shall be our first object, then, to pull down and destroy 
"the invented quibbles and sophisms" which have so long 
darkened and confounded the light of reason and conscience in 
relation to the nature of moral good and evil, to dispel the 
clouds which have been so industriously thrown around this 
subject, in order that the bright and shining light of nature 
may, free and unobstructed, find its way into our minds and 
hearts. 

¥e say, then, that there never can be virtue or vice in the 
breast of a moral agent, prior to his own actings and doings. 
On the contrary, it is insisted by Edwards, that true virtue or 
holiness was planted in the bosom of the first man by the act 
of creation. "In a moral agent," says he, "subject to moral 
obligations, it is the same thing to be perfectly innocent, as to 
be perfectly righteous. It must be the same, because there 
can no more be any medium between sin and righteousness, or 
between being right and being wrong, in a moral sense, than 
there can be a medium between straight and crooked in a 
natural."" This is applied to the first man as he came from 
the hand of the Creator, and is designed to show that he was 
created with true holiness or virtue in his heart. According: to 
this doctrine, man was made upright, not merely in the sense 
that he was free from the least bias to evil, or that he possessed 
all the powers requisite to moral agency, but in the sense that 
true virtue or moral goodness was planted in his nature by the 
act of creation. If this be so, the doctrine of a necessary holi- 
ness must be admitted ; for surely nothing can be more neces- 
sary to us, nothing can take place in which we have less to do, 
than the act by which we are created. 

This then is the question which we intend to examine : 

° Original Sin, part ii, chap, i, sec. i. 



110 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT LPart I, 

whether that which is concreated with a moral agent, can be 
his virtue or his vice ? Whether, in other words, the dispo- 
sitions or qualities which Adam derived from the hand of God, 
partook of the nature of true virtue or otherwise? Edwards 
assumes the affirmative. To establish his position, he relies 
upon two arguments, which we shall proceed to examine. 

The first argument is designed to show, that unless true vir- 
tue, or moral goodness, had been planted in the nature of man 
by the finger of Gocl, it could never have found its way into 
the world. To give this argument in his own words, he says : 
" It is agreeable to the sense of men in all nations and ages, not 
only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is virtuous, but that 
the good choice itself, from whence that effect proceeds, is so ; 
yea, also, the antecedent good disposition, temper, or affection 
of mind, from whence proceeds that good choice, is virtuous. 
This is the general notion — not that principles derive their 
goodness from actions, but that actions derive their goodness 
from the principles whence they proceed ; so that the act of 
choosing what is good is no further virtuous, than it proceeds 
from a good principle, or virtuous disposition of mind ; which 
supposes that a virtuous disposition of mind may be before a 
virtuous act of choice ; and that, therefore, it is not necessary 
there should first be thought, reflection, and choice, before there 
can be any virtuous disposition. If the choice be first, before 
the existence of a good disposition of heart, what is the charac- 
ter of that choice ? There can, according to our natural notions, 
be no virtue in a choice which proceeds from no virtuous prin- 
ciple, but from mere self-love, ambition, or some animal appe- 
tites ; therefore, a virtuous temper of mind may be before a 
good act of choice, as a tree may be before its fruit, and the 
fountain before the stream which proceeds from it."* Thus, he 
argues, if there must be choice before a good disposition, or 
virtue, according to our doctrine, then virtue could not arise 
at all, or find its w r ay into the world. For all men concede, says 
he, that every virtuous choice, or act, must proceed from a vir- 
tuous disposition ; and if this must also proceed from a virtuous 
act, it is plain there could be no such thing as virtue or moral 
goodness at all. The scheme which teaches that the act must 
precede the principle, and the principle the act, reduces the 

° Original Sin, part ii, ch. i, sec. i. 



Chapter III.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. ltl 

very existence of virtue to a plain impossibility. He shows 
virtue to be possible, and escapes the difficulty, by referring it 
to the creative energy of the Divine Being, by which the prin- 
ciple of virtue, he contends, was planted in the mind of the 
first man. 

This argument is plausible ; but it will not bear a close exam- 
ination. It might be made to give way, in various directions, 
before an analysis of the principle on which it is constructed ; 
but we intend to demolish it by easier and more striking argu- 
ments. If we had nothing better to oppose to it, we might 
indeed neutralize its effect by a counter-argument of Edwards 
himself, which we find in his celebrated work on the will. 
He there says, that the virtuousness of every virtuous act or 
choice depends upon its own nature, and not upon its origin 
or cause. If we must refer every virtuous act, says he, to 
something in us that is virtuous as its antecedent, we must like- 
wise refer that antecedent to some other virtuous origin or cause ; 
and so on ad infinitum. Thus we should be compelled to trace 
virtue back from step to step, until we had quite driven it out 
of the world, and excluded it from the universality of things/ 1 ' 

Now this argument seems just as plausible as that which we 
have produced from the same author, in his work on Original 
Sin. Let us lay them together, and contemplate the joint 
result. According to one, the character of every virtuous act 
depends upon the virtuousness of the principle or disposition 
whence it proceeds ; according to the other, it depends upon its 
own nature, and not at all upon anything in its origin, or cause, 
or antecedent. According to one, we must trace every virtuous 
act to a virtuous principle, and the virtuous principle itself to 
the necessitating act of God ; according to the other, we must 
look no higher to determine the character of an act than its 
own nature ; and if we proceed to its origin or cause to deter- 
mine its character, we shall find no stopping-place. We shall 
not trace it up to God, as before, but we shall banish all virtue 
quite out of the world, and exclude it from the universality of 
things. According to one argument, there can be no virtue 
in the world, unless it be caused to exist, in the first place, by 
the necessitating, creative act of the Almighty ; and according 
to the other, the virtuousness of every virtuous act depends upon 

° Inquiry, part iv, sec. i. 



118 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

its own nature, and is wholly independent of the question 
respecting its origin or cause. The solution of these incon- 
sistencies and contradictions, we shall leave to the followers 
and admirers of President Edwards.* 

But we have something better, we trust, to oppose to Presi- 
dent Edwards than his own arguments. If his logic be good 
for anything, it will prove that God is the author of sin as well 
as of virtue. For it is as much the common notion of mankind 
that every sinful act must proceed from a sinful disposition or 
principle, as it is that every virtuous act must proceed from a 
virtuous disposition or principle ; and hence, according to the 
logic of Edwards, a sinful disposition or principle must have pre- 
ceded the first sinful act ; that an antecedent sinful disposition 
or principle could not have been introduced by the act of the 
creature, and consequently it must have been planted in the 
bosom of the first man by the act of the Creator. This argu- 
ment, we say, just as clearly shows that sin is impossible, or 
that it must have been concreated with man, as it shows the 
same thing in relation to virtue. If we maintain his argument, 
then, we must either deny the possibility of moral evil or make 
God the author of it. 

After having laid down principles from which the impossi- 
bility of moral evil may be demonstrated, it was too late for 
Edwards to undertake to account for the origin of sin. Accord- 
ing to his philosophy, it can have no existence ; and hence we 
are not to look into that philosophy for any very clear account 
of how it took its rise in the world. Indeed, this point is hur- 
ried over by Edwards in a most hasty and superficial manner, 

° They are accustomed to boast, that no man ever excelled Edwards in the 
reductio ad absurdum. But we believe no one has produced a more striking illus- 
tration of his ability in the use of this weapon, than that which we have just 
adduced. For if we contend, that every act is to be judged according to its own 
nature, whether it be good or evil, he will demonstrate, that we render virtue 
impossible, and exclude it entirely from the world. On the other hand, if we 
shift our position, and contend that no act is to be judged according to its own 
nature, but according to the goodness or badness of its origin or cause, he will 
also reduce this position, diametrically opposite though it be to the former, to 
precisely the same absurdity ; namely, that it excludes all virtue out of the world, 
and banishes it from the universality of things ! Surely, this reductio ad ab- 
surdum is a most formidable weapon in his hands ; since he wields it with such 
destructive fury against the most opposite principles, and seems himself scarcely 
less exposed than others to its force. 



Chapter IIL] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 119 

in which he seems conscious of no little embarrassment. In his 
great work on the will he devotes one page and a half to this 
subject; and the greater part of this small space is filled up 
with the retort upon the Arminians, that their scheme is en- 
cumbered with as great difficulties as his own ! He lets the 
truth drop in one place, however, that " the abiding principle 
and habit of sin' 7 was " first introduced by an evil act of the 
creature."* Is it possible ? How could there be an evil act 
which did not proceed from an antecedent evil principle or dis- 
position ? What becomes of the great common notion of man- 
kind, on which his demonstration is erected ? But we must allow 
the author to contradict himself, since he has now come around 
to the truth, that an evil act of the creature may and must have 
preceded the existence of moral evil in the world. If an intel- 
ligent creature, however, as it came from the hand of God, can 
introduce a " principle of sin by a sinful act," why should it be 
thought impossible for such a creature to introduce a principle 
of virtue by a virtuous act ? 

The truth is, that a virtuous act does not require an antecedent 
virtuous disposition or principle to account for its existence ; nor 
does a vicious act require an antecedent vicious principle to ac- 
count for its existence. In relation to the rise of good and evil 
in the world, the philosophy of Edwards is radically defective ; 
and no one can discuss that subject on the principles of his phi- 
losophy without finding himself involved in contradictions and 
absurdities. If his psychology had not been false, he might 
have seen a clear and steady light where he has only beheld 
difficulties and confusion. As we have already seen, and as we 
shall still more fully see, Edwards confounds the power by which 
we act with the susceptibility through which we feel: the will 
with the emotive part of our nature. Every one knows that we 
may feel without acting ; and yet feeling and acting, suffering 
and doing, are expressly and repeatedly identified in his writ- 
ings. Having merged the will in sensibility, he regarded vir- 
tue and vice as phenomena of the latter, and as evolved from 
its bosom by the operation of necessitating causes. Hence his 
views in relation to the nature of moral good and evil, as well 
as in relation to their origin, became unavoidably dark and 
confused. 

° Inquiry, part iv, sec. x. 



120 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

If we only bear in mind the distinction between the will and 
the sensibility, we may easily see how either holiness or sin 
might have taken its rise in the bosom of the first man, without 
supposing that either a holy or a sinful principle was planted 
there by the hand of the Creator. If we will only carry the 
light of this distinction along with us, it will be no more diffi- 
cult to account for the rise of the first sin in the bosom of a 
spotless creature of God, than to account for any other volition 
of the human mind. The first- man, by means of his intelli- 
gence, could contemplate the perfection of his Creator, and, 
doing so, he could not but feel an emotion of admiration and 
delight But this feeling was not his virtue. It was the natural 
and the necessary result of the organization which God had 
given him. He was also so constituted, that certain earthly 
objects were agreeable to him, and excited his natural appetites 
and desires. These appetites and desires were not sinful, nor 
was the sensibility from whose bosom they were evolved : they 
were the spontaneous workings of the nature which God had 
bestowed upon him. But his will was free. He could turn 
his mind to God, or he could turn it to earth. He did the latter, 
and there was no harm in this. But he listened to the voice 
of the tempter ; he fixed his mind on the forbidden fruit ; he 
saw it was pleasant to the eye ; he imagined it was good for 
food, and greatly to be desired to make one wise. Neither 
the possession of the intellect by which he perceived the beauty 
of the fruit, nor of the sensibility in which it excited so many 
pleasurable emotions, was the sin of Adam. They were given 
to him by the Author of every good and perfect gift. His will 
was free. It was not necessitated to act by his desires. But 
yet, in direct opposition to the known will of God, he put forth 
an act of his own free mind, his own unnecessitated will, and 
plucked the forbidden fruit to gratify his desires. This was his 
sin — this voluntary transgression of the known will of God. On 
the other hand, if he had resisted the temptation, and instead 
of voluntarily gratifying his appetite and desire, had preserved 
his allegiance to Gocl by acting in conformity with his will, 
this would have been his virtue. He would have acted in con- 
formity with the rule of duty, and thereby gratified a feeling 
of love to God, instead of the lower feelings of his nature. 

Thus, by observing the distinction between the will and the 



Chapter III.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 121 

sensitive part of our nature, we may easily see how either holi- 
ness or sin might have arisen in the bosom of the first man, 
though he had neither a holy nor a sinful principle planted in 
his nature by the hand of the Creator. We may easily see 
that he had all the powers requisite to moral agency, and that 
he was really capable of either a holy or a sinful act, without 
any antecedent principle of holiness or sin in his nature. 

We have now said enough, we think, to show the fallacy of 
Edwards's first great argument in favour of a necessary holiness. 
We have seen, that we need not suppose the existence of a 
virtuous principle in the first man, in order to account for his 
first virtuous act, or to render virtue possible. We might point 
out many other errors and inconsistencies in which that argu- 
ment is involved; but to avoid, as far as possible, becoming 
prolix and tiresome, we shall proceed to consider his second 
argument in favour of a necessary or concreated holiness. 

His second argument is this : " Human nature must have 
been created with some dispositions — a disposition to relish 
some things as good and amiable, and to be averse to others as 
odious and disagreeable ; otherwise it must be without any 
such thing as inclination or will; perfectly indifferent, without 
preference, without choice, or aversion, towards anything as 
agreeable or disagreeable. But if it had any concreated dis- 
positions at all, they must be either right or wrong, either 
agreeable or disagreeable to the nature of things. If man had 
at first the highest relish of things excellent and beautiful, a 
disposition to have the quickest and highest delight in those 
things which were most worthy of it, then his dispositions were 
morally right and amiable, and never can be excellent in a 
higher sense. But if he had a disposition to love most those 
things that were inferior and less worthy, then his dispositions 
were vicious. And it is evident there can be no medium 
between these." 

It is thus that Edwards seeks and finds virtue in the emotion, 
and not in the voluntary element of man's nature. The natural 
concreated disposition of Adam, he supposes, was morally right 
in the highest sense of the word, because he was so made as to 
relish and delight in the glorious perfections of the divine 
nature. Our first answer to this is, that it is contradicted by 
the reason and moral judgment of mankind in general, and, in 



122 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

particular, by the reason and moral judgment of Edwards 
himself. 

It is agreeable to the voice of human reason, that nothing 
can be our virtue, in the true sense of the word, which was 
planted in us by the act of creation, and in regard to the pro- 
duction of w T hich w T e possessed no knowledge, exercised no 
agency, and gave no consent. And if we listen to the language 
of Edwards, when the peculiarities of his system are out of the 
question, we shall find that this moral judgment was as agree- 
able to him as it is to the rest of mankind. For example: 
human nature is created with a disposition to be grateful for 
favours ; and this disposition, according to Edwards, must either 
be agreeable or disagreeable to the nature of things, that is, it 
must be either morally right or wrong in the highest sense of 
the word. There can be no medium between these two — it 
must partake of the nature of virtue or of vice. Now, which 
of the terms of this alternative does Edwards adopt ? Does he 
pronounce this natural disposition our virtue or our vice ? We 
do not know what Edwards would have said, if this question had 
been propounded to him in connexion with the argument now 
under consideration ; but we do know what he has said of it in 
other portions of his works. This natural concreated disposi- 
tion is, says he, neither our virtue nor our vice ! " That in- 
gratitude, or the want of natural affection," says he, " shows a 
high degree of depravity, does not prove that all gratitude and 
natural affection possesses the nature of true virtue or saving 
grace. "* " We see, in innumerable instances, that mere nature 
is sufficient to excite gratitude in men, or to affect their hearts 
with thankfulness to others for favours received."f " Gratitude 
being thus a natural principle, ingratitude is so much the more 
vile and heinous ; because it shows a dreadful prevalence of 
wickedness, which even overbears and suppresses the better 
principles of human nature. It is mentioned as a high degree 
of wickedness in many of the heathen, that they were without 
natural affection. Eom. ii, 31. But that the want of gratitude, 
or natural affection, is evidence of a great degree of vice, is 
no argument that all gratitude and natural affection has the 
nature of virtue or saving grace." 

Here, as well as in various other places, Edwards speaks of 

Religious Affections, part iii, sec. ii. t Ioid - 



Chapter III] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 123 

gratitude and other natural affections as the better principles 
of our nature ; to be destitute of which he considers a horrible 
deformity. But, however amiable and lovely, he denies to these 
natural affections, or dispositions, the character of virtue ; be- 
cause they are merely natural or concreated dispositions. They 
are innocent ; that is, they are neither our virtue nor our vice, 
but a medium between moral good and evil. Nothing can be 
more reasonable than this, and nothing more inconsistent with 
the logic of the author. Such is the testimony of Edwards him- 
self, when he escapes from the shadows of a dark system, and 
the trammels of a false logic, and permits his own individual 
mind, in the clear open light of nature, to work in full unison 
with the universal mind of man. 

According to the author's own definition of " true virtue," it 
" is the beauty of those qualities and acts of the mind that are 
of a moral nature, i. e., such as are attended with desert of 
praise or blame." Surely, Adam could have deserved no praise 
for the qualities bestowed on him by the act of creation ; and 
hence, according to the author's own definition, they could not 
have been his virtue. In regard to the " new creation " of the 
soul, Edwards contends that all the praise is due to God, and no 
part of it to man ; because the whole work is performed by 
divine grace, without human cooperation. Now, we admit that 
if the whole work of regeneration is performed by God, then 
man is not to be praised for it ; that is to say, it is not his virtue. 
Here again the author sets forth the true principle ; but how 
does it agree with his logic in relation to the first man I "Was 
nothris creation wholly and exclusively the work of God ? If so, 
then all the praise is due to God, and no part of it to man. But, 
according to the author's own definition, when there is no praise- 
worthiness there is no virtue ; and hence, as Adam deserved no 
praise on account of what he received at his creation, so such 
endowments partook not of the nature of true virtue. 

But we have a still more fundamental objection to the argu- 
ment in question. It proceeds on the supposition that true vir- 
tue consists in -mere feeling. This view of the nature of virtue 
is admirably adapted to make it agree and harmonize with the 
scheme of necessity ; but it is not a sound view. If an object 
is calculated to excite a certain feeling or emotion in the mind, 
that feeling or emotion will necessarily arise in view of such 



124 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT . (.Part I, 

object. If the glorious perfections of the divine nature, for ex- 
ample, had been presented to the mind of Adam, no doubt he 
would have been necessarily compelled to "love, relish, and 
delight in them." But this feeling of love and delight, thus 
necessarily evolved out of the bosom of his natural disposition, 
however exquisite and enrapturing, would not have been his 
virtue or holiness. It would have been the spontaneous and 
irresistible development of the nature which God had given him 
We may admire it as the most beautiful unfolding of that na- 
ture, but we cannot applaud hVas the virtue or moral goodness 
of Adam. We look upon it merely as the excellency and glory 
of the divine work of creation. We could regard the glory of 
the heavens, or the beauty of the earth, with a sentiment of 
moral approbation, as easily as we could ascribe the character 
of moral goodness to the noble qualities with which the Al- 
mighty had been pleased to adorn the nature of the first man. 

The beautiful feeling or emotion of love is merely the blossom 
which precedes the formation of true virtue in the heart. This 
consists, not in holy feelings, as they are called, but in holy 
exercises of the will. It is only when the will, in its workings, 
coalesces with a sense of right and a feeling of love to God, 
that the blossom gives place to the fruit of virtue. A virtuous 
act is not a spontaneous and irresistible emotion of the sensi- 
bility ; it is a voluntary exercise and going forth of the will in 
obedience to God. 

It is a strange error which makes virtue consist in "the 
spontaneous affections, emotions, and desires that arise in the 
mind in view of its appropriate objects." If these necessarily 
arise in us, " and do not wait for the bidding of the will,"* how 
can they possibly be our virtue? how can they form the objects 
of moral approbation in us ? Yet is it confidently asserted, 
that the denial of such a doctrine " stands in direct and palpa- 
ble opposition to the authority of God's word."f The word of 
God, we admit, says that holiness consists in love ; but does it 
assert that it consists in the feeling of love merely ? or in any 
feeling which spontaneously and irresistibly arises in the mind % 
If the Scripture had been written expressly to refute such a 
moral heresy, it could not have been more pointed or explicit. 

Holiness consists in love. But what is the meaning of the 

o 
° Dr. Woods. t Ibid. 



Chapter HI.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 125 

term love, as set forth in Scripture ? "We answer, " This is the 
love of God," that we " keep his commandments." " Let ns 
not love in word, neither in tongue, but in deed and in truth." 
" Whosoever heareth these sayings of mine and doeth them, I 
will liken him unto a wise man who built his house upon a rock." 
" He that hath my commandments, and Jceepeth them, he it is 
that loveth me." Here, as well as in innumerable other places, 
are we tolcl that true love is not a mere evanescent feeling of 
the heart, but an inwrought and abiding habit of the will. It 
is not a suffering, it is a doing. > The most lively emotions, the 
most ecstatic feelings, if they lead not the will to action, can 
avail us nothing ; for the tree will be judged, not by its 
blossoms, but by its fruits. 

If we see our brother in distress, we cannot but sympathize 
with him, unless our hearts have been hardened by crime. 
The feeling of compassion will spontaneously arise in our 
minds, in view of his distress ; but let us not too hastily imag- 
ine therefore that we are virtuous, or even humane. We may 
possess a tender feeling of compassion, and yet the feeling may 
have no corresponding act. The opening fountain of compas- 
sion may be shut up, or turned aside from its natural course, by 
a wrong habit of the will; and hence, with all our weeping 
tenderness of feeling, we may be destitute of any true humanity. 
We may be merely as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal. 
" Whoso hath this world's goods, and seeth his brother have 
need, and shutteth up his bowels of compassion from him, how 
dwelleth the love of God in him ?" It is this loving in work, 
and not in feeling merely, which the word of God requires of 
us ; and when, at the last day, all nations, and kindreds, and 
tongues, shall stand before the throne of heaven, we shall be 
judged, not according to the feelings we have experienced, but 
according to the deeds done in the body. Hence, the doctrine 
which makes true virtue or moral goodness consist in the 
spontaneous and irresistible feelings of the heart, " stands in 
direct and palpable opposition to the authority of God's word." 

Feeling is one thing; obedience is another. This counter- 
feit virtue or moral goodness, which begins and terminates in 
feeling, is far more common than true virtue or holiness. Who 
can reflect, for instance, on the infinite goodness of God, with- 
out an emotion or feeling of love ? That man must indeed be 



126 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

uncommonly hard-hearted and sullen, who can walk out on a 
fine day and behold the wonderful exhibitions of divine good- 
ness on all sides around him, without being warmed into a feel- 
ing of admiration and love. When all nature is music to the 
ear and beauty to the eye, it requires nothing more than a 
freedom from the darker stains and clouds of guilt within, to 
lead a sympathizing heart to the sunshine of external nature, as 
it seems to rejoice in the smile of Infinite Beneficence. The 
heart may swell with rapture as it looks abroad on a happy 
universe, replenished with so many evidences of the divine 
goodness ; nay, the story of a Saviour's love, set forth in elo- 
quent and touching language, may draw tears from our eyes, 
and the soul may rise in gratitude to the Author of such bound- 
less compassion ; and yet, after all, we may be mere sentiment- 
alists in religion, whose wills and whose lives are in direct oppo- 
sition to all laws, both human and divine. Infidelity itself, in 
such moments of deep but transitory feeling, may exclaim with 
an emotion known but to few Christian minds, "Socrates died 
like a philosopher, but Jesus Christ like a God," and its iron 
nature still retain " the unconquerable will." 

We may now safely conclude, we think, that the mists raised 
by the philosophy and logic of Edwards have not been able to 
obscure the lustre of the simple truth, that true virtue or holi- 
ness cannot be produced in us by external necessitating causes. 
Whatsoever is thus produced in us, we say, cannot be our 
virtue, nor can we deserve any praise for its existence. This 
seems to be a clear dictate of the reason of man ; and it would 
so seem, we have no doubt, to all men, but for certain devices 
which to some have obscured the light of nature. The princi- 
pal of these devices we shall now proceed to examine. 

SECTION III. 

Of the proposition that " The essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions 
of the heart and acts of the will, lies not hi their cause, out in their 
nature. ,"° 

For the sake of greater distinctness, we shall confine our 
attention to a single branch of this complex proposition ; namely, 
that the essence of virtuous acts of the will lies not in their 

Inquiry of President Edwards, part iv, sec. 1. 



Chapter III.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 127 

cause, but their nature. Our reasoning in relation to this point, 
may be easily applied to the other branches of the propo- 
sition. 

We admit, then, that the essence of a virtuous act lies in its 
nature. If this means that the nature of a virtuous act lies in 
its nature, or its essence lies in its essence, it is certainly true ; 
and even if the author attached different ideas to the terms 
essence and nature, we do not care to search out his meaning ; 
as we may very safely admit his proposition, whatever may be 
its signification. We are told by the editor, that the whole 
proposition is very important on account of " the negative part," 
namely, that "the essence of virtue and vice lies not in their 
cause." We are also willing to admit, that the essence of every- 
thing lies in its own nature, and not in its cause. But why is 
this proposition brought forward ? What purpose is it designed 
to serve in the philosophy of the author ? 

This question is easily answered. He contends that true vir- 
tue may be, and is,, necessitated to exist by powers and causes 
over which we have no control. If we raise our eyes to such 
a source of virtue, its intrinsic lustre and beauty seem to fade 
from our view. The author , indeed, endeavours to explain why 
*»t is, that the scheme of necessity seems to be inconsistent with 
the nature of true virtue. The main reason is, says he, because 
we imagine that the essence of virtue and vice consists, not in 
their nature, but in their origin and cause. Hence this per- 
suasion not to busy ourselves about the origin or cause of vir- 
tue and vice, but to estimate them according to their nature. 

We are fully persuaded. If any can be found who will 
assert " that the virtuousness of the dispositions or acts of the 
will, consists not in the nature of these dispositions or acts of 
the will, but wholly in the origin or cause of them," we must 
deliver them up to the tender mercies of President Edwards. 
Or if any shall talk so absurdly as to say, " that if the dispo- 
sitions of the mind, or acts of the will, he never so good, yet if 
the cause of the disposition or act be not our virtue, there is 
nothing virtuous or praiseworthy in it," we have not one word 
to say in his defence ; nor shall we ever raise our voice in favour 
of any one, who shall maintain, that " if the will, in its inclina- 
tions or acts, be never so bad, yet, unless it arises from something 
that is our vice or fault, there is nothing vicious or blame- 



128 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I, 

worthy in it." For we are firmly persuaded, that if the acts 
of the will be good, then they are good ; and if they be bad, 
then they are bad ; whatever may have been their origin or 
cause. We shall have no dispute about such truisms as these. 

We insist, indeed, that the first virtuous act of the first man 
was so, because it partook of the nature of virtue, and not 
because it had a virtuous origin or cause in a preceding vir- 
tuous disposition of the mind. But, in his work on Original 
Sin, Edwards contends otherwise. He there contends, that no 
act of Adam could have been virtuous, unless it had proceeded 
from a virtuous origin or cause in the disposition of his heart ; 
and that this could have had no existence in the world, unless 
it had proceeded from the power of the Creator. Thus he 
looked beyond the nature of the act itself, even to its origin 
and cause, in order to show upon what its moral nature de- 
pended ; but now he insists that we should simply look at its 
own nature, and not to its origin or cause, in order to determine 
this point. He ascends from acts of the will to their origin or 
cause, in order to show that virtue can only consist with the 
scheme of necessity ; and yet he denies to us the privilege of 
ascending. with him, in order to show that the nature of virtue 
cannot at all consist with the scheme of necessity ! 

We admit that the virtuousness of every virtuous act lies, not 
in its origin or cause, but in itself. But still we insist that a 
virtuous act, as well as everything else, may be traced to a false 
origin or cause that is utterly inconsistent with its very nature. 
A horse is undoubtedly a horse, come from whence it may ; but 
yet if any one should tell us that horses grow up out of the earth, 
or drop down out of the clouds, we should certainly understand 
him to speak of mere phantoms, and no real horses, or we should 
think him very greatly mistaken. In like maimer, when we are 
told that virtue may be, and is, necessitated to exist in us by 
causes over which we have no control ; that we may be to praise 
for any gift bestowed upon us by the divine power ; we arc con- 
strained to believe that he has given a false genealogy of moral 
goodness, and one that is utterly inconsistent with its nature. 
Nor can we be made to blink this truth, which so perfectly ac- 
cords, as we have seen, with the universal sentiment of mankind, 
by being reminded that moral goodness consists, not in its origin 
or cause, but in its own nature. Virtue is always virtue, we 



Chapter III.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 129 

freely admit, proceed from what quarter of the universe it may ; 
yet do we insist that it can no more be produced in us by an 
extraneous agency than it can grow up out of the earth, or drop 
down out of the clouds of heaven. That which is produced in 
us by such an agency, be it what it may, is not our virtue, nor 
is any praise therefor due to us. To mistake such effects or 
passive impressions for virtue, is to mistake phantoms for things, 
shadows for substances, and dreams for realities. 



SECTION" IV. 

The scheme of necessity seems to be inconsistent with the reality of moral dis- 
tinctions, not because we confound natural and moral necessity, out because 
it is really inconsistent therewith. 

Let us then look at this matter, and see if we are really so 
deplorably blinded by the ambiguity of a word, that we cannot 
contemplate the glory of the scheme of moral necessity as it is 
in itself. The distinction between these two things, natural and 
moral necessity, is certainly a clear and a broad one. Let us see, 
then, if we may not find our way along the line of this distinc- 
tion, without that darkness and confusion by which our judg- 
ment is supposed to be so sadly misled and perverted. 

It is on all sides conceded, that natural necessity is inconsist- 
ent with the good or ill desert of human actions. If a man were 
commanded, for example, to leap over a mountain, or to lift the 
earth from its centre, he would be justly excusable for the non- 
performance of such things, because they lie beyond the range 
of his natural power. " There is here a limit to our power," as 
Dr. Chalmers says, " beyond which we cannot do that which we 
please to do ; and there are many thousand such limits."* This 
is natural necessity, in one of its branches. It circumscribes and 
binds our natural power. It limits the external sphere beyond 
which the effects or consequences of our volitions cannot be 
projected. It reaches not to the interior sphere of the will 
itself, and has no more to do with its freedom than has the in- 
fluence of the stars. We may please to do a thing, nay, we 
may freely will it, and yet a natural necessity may cut off and 
prevent the external consequence of the act. 

Again, if by a superior force, a man's limbs or external 

* Institutes of Theology, part iii, chap. i. 
9 



130 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT IJPart 1, 

bodily organs should be used as instruments of good or evil, 
without his concurrence or consent, he would be excusable for 
the consequences of such use. This is the other branch of natu- 
ral necessity. It is evident that it has no relation to the freedom 
or to the acts of the will, but only to the external movements 
of the body. It interferes merely with that external freedom 
of bodily motion, about which we heard so much in the first 
chapter of this work, and which the advocates of necessity have, 
for the most part, so industriously laboured to pass off upon the 
world for the liberty of the will itself. As this natural neces- 
sity, then, trenches not upon the interior sphere of the will, so 
it merely excuses for the performance or non-performance of 
external actions. It leaves the great question with respect to 
man's accountability for the acts of the will itself, from which 
his external actions proceed, wholly untouched and undeter- 
mined. 

Far different is the case with respect to moral necessity. 
This acts directly upon the will itself, and absolutely controls 
all its movements. Within its own sphere it is conceded to be 
" as absolute as natural necessity,"* and " as sure as fatalism. "f 
It absolutely and unconditionally determines the will at all 
times, and in all cases. Yet we are told that we are accounta- 
ble for all the acts thus produced in us, because they are the 
acts of our own wills ! Nothing is done against our wills, as in 
the case of natural necessity ; (they should rather say, against 
the external effects of our wills ;) but our wills always follow, 
and we are accountable therefor, though they cannot but fol- 
low. Moral necessity is not irresistible, because this implies re- 
sistance, and our wills never resist that which makes us willing. 
It is only invincible ; and invincible it is indeed, since with the 
mighty, sovereign power of the Almighty it controls all the 
thoughts, and feelings, and volitions of the human mind. Now 
we see this scheme as it is in itself, in all its nakedness, just as 
it is presented to us by its own most able and enlightened de- 
fenders. And seeing it thus removed from all contact with the 
scheme of natural necessity, we ask, whether agents can be 
justly held accountable for acts thus determined and controlled 
by the power of God, or by those invincible causes which his 
omnipotence marshalleth ? 

° President Edwards. f Dr. Chalmers. 



Chapter III] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 131 

We speak not of external acts ; and hence we lay aside the 
whole scheme of natural necessity. We speak of the acts of 
the will ; and we ask, if these be not free from the dominion 
of moral necessity, from necessitating canses over which we 
have no control, can we be accountable for them? Can we be 
to praise or to blame for them ? Can they be our virtue or our 
vice ? These questions, we think, we may safely submit to the 
impartial decision of every unbiassed mind. And to such minds 
we shall leave it to determine, whether the scheme of moral 
necessity has owed its hold upon the reason of man to a dark 
confusion of words and things, or whether its glory has been 
obscured by the misconception of its opponents ? 

In conclusion, we shall simply lay down, in a few brief propo- 
sitions, what we trust has now been seen in relation to the 
nature of virtue and vice : — 1. No necessitated act of the mind 
can be its virtue or its vice. 2. In order that any act of the 
will should partake of a moral nature, it must be free from the 
dominion of causes over which it has no control, or from whose 
influence it cannot depart. 3. Yirtue and vice lie not in the 
passive state of the sensibility, nor in any other necessitated 
states of the mind, but in acts of the will, and in habits formed 
by a repetition of such free voluntary acts. Whatever else may 
be said in relation to the nature of virtue and of vice, and to 
the distinction between them, these things appear to be clearly 
true ; and if so, then the scheme of moral necessity is utterly 
inconsistent with their existence, and saps the very foundation 
of all moral distinctions. 



132 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I, 



CHAPTEK IY. 

THE MORAL WORLD NOT CONSTITUTED ACCORDING TO THE SCHEME OF 
NECESSITY. 

I made him just and right ; 
Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall. 
Such I created all the ethereal powers 
And spirits, both them who stood and them who fail'd ; 
Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell. — Milton. 

We have already witnessed the strange inconsistencies into 
which the most learned and ingenious men have fallen, in their 
attempts to reconcile the doctrine of necessity with the account- 
ability of man, and the glory of God. Having involved them- 
selves in that scheme, on what has appeared to them conclusive 
evidence, they have seemed to struggle in vain to force their 
way out into the clear and open light of nature. They have 
seemed to torment themselves, and to confound others, in their 
gigantic efforts to extricate themselves from a dark labyrinth, 
out of which there is absolutely no escape. Let us see, then, 
if we may not refute the pretended demonstration in favour of 
necessity, and thereby restore the mind to that internal satis- 
faction which it so earnestly desires, and which it so constantly 
seeks in a perfect unity and harmony of principle. 

SECTION I. 
T7ie scheme of necessity is oased on a false psychology. 

There are three great leading faculties or attributes of the 
human mind ; namely, the intelligence, the sensibility, and the 
will. By means of these we think, yvefeel, and we act ISTow, 
the phenomena of thinking, feeling, and acting, will be found, 
on examination, to possess different characteristics ; of which we 
must form clear and fixed conceptions, if we would extricate 
the philosophy of the will from the obscurity and confusion in 
which it has been so long involved. Let us proceed then to 
examine them, to interrogate our consciousness in relation to 
them. 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 133 

Suppose, for example, that an apple is placed before me. I 
fix my attention upon it, and consider its form : it is round. 
This judgment, or decision of the mind, in relation to the form 
of the apple, is a state of the intelligence. It does not depend 
on any effort of mine, whether it shall appear round to me or 
not: I could not possibly come to any other conclusion if I 
would : I could as soon think it as large as the globe as believe 
it to be square, or of any other form than round. Hence this 
judgment, this decision, this state of the intelligence, is neces- 
sitated. The same thing is true of all the other perceptions or 
states of the intelligence. M. Cousin has truly said : " Undoubt- 
edly different intellects, or the same intellect at different periods 
of its existence, may sometimes pass different judgments in 
regard to the same thing. Sometimes it may be deceived ; it 
will judge that which is false to be true, the good to be bad, 
the beautiful to be ugly, and the reverse : but at the moment 
when it judges that a proposition is true or false, an action 
good or bad, a form beautiful or ugly, at that moment it is not 
in the power of the intellect to pass any other judgment than 
that it passes. It obeys laws it did not make. It yields to 
motives which determine it independent of the will. In a word, 
the phenomenon of intelligence, comprehending, judging, know- 
ing, thinking, whatever name be given to it, is marked with the 
characteristic of necessity."* 

Once more I fix my attention on the apple : an agreeable 
sensation arises in the mind; a desire to eat it is awakened. 
This desire or appetite is a state of the sensibility. Whether I 
shall feel this appetite or desire, does not depend upon any 
effort or exertion of my will. The mind is clearly passive in 
relation to it ; the desire, then, is as strongly marked with the 
characteristic of necessity, as are the states of the intelligence. 
The same is true of all our feelings ; they are necessarily deter- 
mined by the objects in view of the mind. There is no con- 
troversy on these points ; it is universally agreed that every 
state of the intelligence and of the sensibility is necessarily 
determined by the evidence and the object in view of the mind. 
It is not, then, either in the intelligence or in the sensibility 
that we are to look for liberty. 

But once more I fix my attention on the apple : the desire is 

° Psychology, p. 247. 



134 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

awakened, and I conclude to eat it. Hitherto I have done 
nothing except in fixing my attention on the apple. I have 
experienced the judgment that it is round, and felt the desire 
to eat it. But now I conclude to eat it, and I make an effort 
of the mind to put forth my hand to take the apple and eat it. 
It is done. Now here is an entirely new phenomenon ; it is an 
effort, an exertion, an act, a volition of the mind. The name is of 
no importance ; the circumstances under which the phenomenon 
arises have called attention to it, and the precise thing intended 
is seen in the light of consciousness. Let us look at it closely, 
and mark its characteristic well, being careful to see neither 
more nor less than is presented by the phenomenon itself. 

We are conscious, then, of the existence of an act, of a voli- 
tion: everybody can see what this is. We must not say, as 
the advocates of free-agency usually do, that when we put forth 
this act or volition we are conscious of a power to do the con- 
trary ; for this position may be refuted, and the foundation on 
which we intend to raise our superstructure undermined. We 
are merely conscious of the existence of the act itself, and not 
even of the power by means of which we act ; the existence of 
the power is necessarily inferred from its exercise. This is the 
only way in which we know it, and not from the direct testi- 
mony of consciousness. Much less if we had refused to act, 
should we have been conscious of the power to withhold it; 
much less again are we conscious of the power to withhold the 
act, as we do not in the case supposed exercise this power. But 
certainly we are conscious of the act itself; all men will con- 
cede this, and this is all our argument really demands. 

Here then we are conscious of an act, of an effort, of the 
mind. Look at it closely. Is the mind passive in this act? 
No ; we venture to answer for the universal intelligence of man. 
If this act had been produced in us by a necessitating cause, 
would not the mind have been passive in it ? In other words, 
would it not have been a passive impression, and not an act, 
not an effort of the mind at all 1 Yes ; we again venture to 
answer for the unbiassed reason of man. But it is not, we have 
seen, a passive impression ; it is an act of the mind, and hence 
it is not necessitated. It is not necessitated, because it is not 
stamped with the characteristic of necessity. The universal 
reason of man declares that the will has not necessarily yielded 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 135 

like the intelligence and the sensibility, to motives over which 
it had no control. It does not bear upon its face the mark of 
any snch subjection "to the power and action" of a cause. It 
is marked with the characteristic, not of necessity, but of liberty. 
We would not say, with Dr. Samuel Clarke, that " action and 
liberty are identical ideas ;" but we will say, that the idea of 
action necessarily implies that of liberty ; for if we duly reflect 
on the nature of an act we cannot conceive it as being necessi- 
tated. This consideration furnishes an easy and satisfactory 
solution of a problem, by which necessitarians are sadly per- 
plexed. They endeavour in various ways to account for the 
fact that we believe our volitions to be free, or not necessarily 
caused. Some resolve this belief and feeling of liberty into a 
deceitful sense ; some imagine that we are deceived by the 
ambiguities of language ; and some resort to other methods of 
explaining the phenomenon. "It is true," says President 
Edwards, " I find myself possessed of my volitions before I can 
see the effectual power of any cause to produce them, for the 
power and efficacy of the cause is not seen but by the effect ; 
and this, for aught I know, may make some imagine that 
volition has no cause, or that it produces itself." But this is 
not a satisfactory account of the imagination, as he would term 
it. "We also find ourselves possessed of our judgments and 
feelings before we perceive the effectual power of the cause 
which produces them. "Why then do we refer these to the 
operation of a necessary cause, and not our volitions ? If the 
power and efficacy of the cause is seen only by the effect in the 
one>case, it is only seen in the same manner in the other. Why 
then do we differ in our conclusions with respect to them? 
Why do we refer the judgment and the feeling to necessary 
causes, and fail to do the same in relation to the volition % The 
reason is obvious. The mind is passive in judging and feeling, 
and hence these phenomena necessarily demand the operation 
of causes to account for them ; but the mind is active in its voli- 
tions, and this necessarily excludes the idea of causes to pro- 
duce them. The mind clearly perceives, by due reflection, and 
at all times sees dimly, at least, that an act or volition is different 
in its nature from a passive impression or a produced effect ; 
and hence it knows and feels that it is exempt from the power 
and efficacy of a producing cause in its volitions. This fact of 



136 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT LPart 1, 

our consciousness it is not in the power of sophistry wholly to 
conceal, nor in the power of human nature to evade. Hence 
we carry about with us the irresistible conviction that we are 
free ; that our wills are not absolutely subject to the dominion 
of causes over which we have no control. Hence we see and 
know that we are self-active. 

Having completed our analysis, in as far as our present pur- 
pose demands, we may proceed to show that the system of 
necessity is founded on a false psychology, — on a dark confusion 
of the facts of human nature. It is very remarkable that all the 
advocates of this system, from Hobbes down to Edwards, will 
allow the human mind to possess only two faculties, the under- 
standing and the will. The will and the sensibility are expressly 
identified by them. Locke distinguished between will and de- 
sire, between the faculty of willing and the susceptibility to feel- 
ing ; but Edwards has endeavoured to show that there is no such 
distinction as that for which Locke contends. We shall not 
arrest the progress of our remarks in order to point out the 
manner in which Edwards has deceived himself by an appeal 
to logic rather than to consciousness, because the threefold dis- 
tinction for which we contend is now admitted by necessitarians 
themselves. Indeed, after the clear and beautiful analysis by 
M. Cousin, they could not well do otherwise than recognise this 
threefold distinction ; but they have done so, we think it will be 
found, without perceiving all the consequences of such an ad- 
mission to their system. It is an admission which, in our 
opinion, will show the scheme of necessity to be insecure in its 
foundation, and disjointed in all its parts. 

With the light of this distinction* in our minds, it will be easy 
to follow and expose the sophistries of the necessitarian. He 
often declaims against the idea of liberty for which we contend, 
on the ground that it would be, not a perfection, but a very 
great imperfection of our nature to possess such a freedom. 
But in every such instance he confounds the will with one of 
the passive susceptibilities of the mind. Tims, for example, 
Collins argues that liberty would be a great imperfection, be- 
cause "nothing can be more irrational and absurd than to be 
able to refuse our assent to what is evidently true to us, and to 
assent to what we see to be false." Now, all this is true, but it 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 137 

is not to the purpose ; for no one contends that the intelligence 
is free in assenting to, or in dissenting from, the evidence in 
view of the mind. !Nb rational being, we admit, could desire 
such a freedom ; could desire to be free, for example, from the 
conviction that two and two make four. M. Lamartine, we are 
aware, expresses a very lively abhorrence of the mathematics, 
because they allow not a sufficient freedom of thought — because 
they exercise so great a despotism oner the intellect. But the 
circumstance which this flowery poet deems an imperfection in 
the mathematics, every enlightened friend of free-agency will 
regard as their chief excellency and glory. 

The same error is committed by Spinoza : " "We can consider 
the soul imder two points of view," says he, " as thought and as 
desire." Here the will is made to disappear, and we behold 
only the two susceptibilities of the soul, which are stamped with 
the characteristic of necessity. Where, then, will Spinoza find 
the freedom of the soul ? Certainly not in the will, for this has 
been blotted out from the map of his psychology. Accordingly 
he says : " The free will is a chimera of the species, flattered by 
our pride, and founded upon our ignorance." He must find the 
freedom of the soul then, if he find it at all, in one of its passive 
susceptibilities. This, as we have already seen, is exactly what 
he does ; he says the soul is free in the affirmation that two and 
two are four ! Thus he finds the liberty of the soul, not in the 
exercises of its will, of its active power, but in the bosom of the 
intelligence, which is absolutely necessitated in all its deter- 
minations. 

In this particular, as well as in most others, Spinoza merely 
reproduces the error of the ancient Stoics. It was a principle 
with them, says Kitter, " that the will and the desire are one 
with thought, and may be resolved into it."* Thus, by the an- 
cient Stoics, as well as by Hobbes, and Spinoza, and Collins, 
and Edwards, the will is merged in one of the passive elements 
of the mind, and its real characteristic lost sight of. " By the 
freedom of the soul," says Bitter, " the Stoics understood simply 
that assent which it gives to certain ideas."f Thus the ancient 
Stoics endeavoured to find the freedom of the soul, where Spi- 
noza and so many modern necessitarians have sought to find it, 
in the passive, necessitated states of the intelligence. This was 

s History of Ancient Philosophy, vol. iii, p. 555. f Ibid. 



138 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT LPart I, 

indeed to impose upon themselves a mere shadow for a sub- 
stance, — a dream for a reality. 

" By whatever name we call the act of the will," says Ed- 
wards, " choosing, refusing, approving, disapproving, liking, 
disliking, embracing, rejecting, determining, directing, com- 
manding, forbidding, inclining or being averse, being pleased or 
displeased with — all may be reduced to this of choosing."* 
Thus, in the vocabulary and according to the psychology of 
this great author, the phenomena of the sensibility and those of 
the will are identified, as well as the faculties themselves. 
Pleasing and willing, liking and acting, are all one with him. 
His psychology admits of no distinction, for example, between 
the pleasant impression made by an apple on the sensibility, 
and the act of the will by which the hand is put forth to take 
it. " The will and the affections of the soul," says he, " are not 
two faculties ; the affections are not essentially distinct from the 
will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and 
inclination, but only in the liveliness and sensibility of exer- 
cise.'^ And again, " I humbly conceive that the affections of 
the soul are not properly distinguished from the will, as though 
there were two faculties.":): And still more explicitly, " all acts 
of the will are truly acts of the affections."§ Is it not strange, 
that one who could exhibit such wonderful discrimination when 
the exigences of his system demanded the exercise of such a 
power, should have confounded things so clearly distinct in 
their natures as an act of the will and an agreeable impression 
made on the sensibility ? 

It is not possible for any mind, no matter how great its 
powers, to see the nature of things clearly when it comes to the 
contemplation of them with such a confusion of ideas. Even 
President Edwards is not exempt from the common lot of hu- 
manity. His doctrine is necessarily enveloped in obscurity. 
We can turn it in no light without being struck with its incon- 
sistencies or its futility. He repeatedly says, the will is always 
determined by the strongest affection, or appetite, or passion ; 
that is, by the most agreeable state of the sensibility. But 
if the will and the sensibility are identical, as his language 
expressly makes them ; or if the states of the one are not dis- 

** President Edwards's Works, vol. ii, p. 16. f Id., vol. v, pp. 10, 11. 

I Id., vol. iv, p. 82. § Ibid. 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 139 

tinguishable from the states of the other, then to say that the 
will is always determined by the sensibility, or an act of the 
will by the strongest affection of the sensibility, is to say that 
a thing is determined by itself. It is to say, in fact, that the 
will is always determined by itself; a doctrine against which 
he uniformly protests. Nay, more, that an act of the will causes 
itself ; a position which he has repeatedly ascribed to his oppo- 
nents, and held np to the derision of mankind. 

It is very remarkable, that Edwards seems to have been con- 
scious, at times, that he laid himself open to the charge of such 
an absurdity, when he said that the will is determined by the 
greatest apparent good, or by what seems most agreeable to the 
mind. For he says, " I have chosen rather to express myself 
thus, that the will always is as the greatest apparent good, or 
as what appears most agreeable, than to say the will is deter- 
mined by the greatest apparent good, or by what seems most 
agreeable ; because an appearing most agreeable to the mind, 
and the mind's preferring, seem scarcely distinct" We have 
taken the liberty to emphasize his words. ISTow here he tells 
us that the " mind's preferring," by which word he has 
explained himself to mean willing,* is scarcely distinct from 
" an appearing most agreeable to the mind." Here he returns 
to his psychology, and identifies the most agreeable impression 
made on the sensibility with an act of the will. He does not 
like to say, that the act of the will is caused by the most agree- 
able sensation, because this seems to make a thing the cause 
of itself. 

In this he does wisely ; but having shaped his doctrine to 
suit himself more exactly, in what form is it presented to us % 
Let us look at it in its new shape, and see what it is. The will 
is not determined by the greatest apparent good, because a 
thing is not determined by itself; but the will is always as the 
greatest apparent good ! Thus the absurdity of saying a thing 
is determined by itself is avoided ; but surely, if an appearing 
most agreeable to the mind is not distinct from the mind's act- 
ing, then to say that the mind's acting is always as that which 
appears most agreeable to it is merely to say, that the mind's 
acting is always as the mind's acting ! or, in other words, that 
a thing is always as itself ! Thus, his great fundamental propo- 

° Inquiry, p. 17. 



140 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

sition is, in one form, a glaring absurdity ; and in the other, it 
is an insignificant truism; and there is no escape from this 
dilemma except through a return to a better psychology, to a 
sounder analysis of the great facts of human nature. 

When Edwards once reaches the truism that a thing is always 
as itself, he feels perfectly secure, and defies with unbounded 
confidence the utmost efforts of his opponents to dislodge him. 
" As we observed before," says he, " nothing is more evident 
than that, when men act voluntarily, and do what they please, 
then they do what appears most agreeable to them ; and to say 
otherwise, would be as much as to affirm, that men do not 
choose what appears to suit them best, or what seems most 
pleasing to them ; or that they do not choose what they prefer — 
which brings the matter to a contradiction." True ; this brings 
the matter to a contradiction, as he has repeatedly told us ; for 
choosing, and preferring, or willing, are all one. But if any 
one denies that a man does what he pleases when he does what 
he pleases ; or if he affirms that he pleases without pleasing, or 
chooses without choosing, or prefers without preferring, we 
shall leave him to the logic of the necessitarian and the phy- 
sician. We have no idea that he will ever be able to refute 
the volumes that have been written to confound him. Presi- 
dent Edwards clearly has the better of him ; for he puts " the 
soul in a state of choice," and yet affirms that it " has no choice." 
He might as well say, indeed, that " a body may move while 
it is in a state of rest," as to say that " the mind may choose 
without choosing," or without having a choice. He is very 
clearly involved in an absurdity ; and if he can read the three 
hundred pages of the Inquiry, without being convinced of his 
error, his case must indeed be truly hopeless. 

Edwards is far from being the only necessitarian who has 
fallen into the error of identifying the sensibility with the will ; 
thus reducing his doctrine to an unassailable truism. In his 
famous controversy with Clarke, Leibnitz has done the same 
thing. " Thus," says he, " in truth, the motives comprehend 
all the dispositions which the mind can have to act voluntarily ; 
for they include not only reasons, but also the inclinations and 
passions, or other preceding impressions. Wherefore if the 
mind should prefer a weak inclination to a strong one, it would 
act against itself, and otherwise than it is disposed to act." 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 141 

ISTow is it not wonderful, that so profound a thinker, and so 
acute a metaphysician, as Leibnitz, should have supposed that 
he was engaged in a controversy to show that the mind never 
acts otherwise than it acts; that it never acts against itself? 
Having reduced his doctrine to this truism, he says, this " shows 
that the author's notions, contrary to mine, are superficial, and 
appear to have no solidity in them, when they are well con- 
sidered." True, the notions of Clarke were superficial, and 
worse than superficial, if he supposed that the mind ever acts 
contrary to its act, or otherwise than it really acts. But Clarke 
distinguished between the disposition and the will. 

In like manner Thummig, the disciple of Leibnitz, has the 
following language, as quoted by Sir William Hamilton : " It 
is to philosophize very crudely concerning mind, and to image 
everything in a corporeal mamier, to conceive that actuating 
reasons are something external, which make an impression on 
the mind, and to distinguish motives from the active principle 
itself." Now this language, it seems, is found in Thummig's 
defence of the last paper of Leibnitz (who died before the con- 
troversy was terminated) against the answer of Clarke. But, 
surely, if it is a great mistake, as the author insists it is, to dis- 
tinguish motives from the active principle itself; then to say 
that the active principle is determined by motives, is to say 
that the active principle is determined by itself. And having 
reached this point, the disciple of Leibnitz finds himself planted 
precisely on the position he had undertaken to overthrow, 
namely, that the will is determined by itself. And again, if it 
be wrong to distinguish the motive from the active principle 
itself, then to say that the active principle never departs from 
the motive, is to affirm that a thing is always as itself. 

The great service which a false psychology has rendered to 
the cause of necessity is easily seen. For having identified an 
act of the will with a state of the sensibility, which is univer- 
sally conceived to be necessitated, the necessitarian is delivered 
from more than half his labours. By merging a phenomenon 
or manifestation of the will in a state of the sensibility, it seems 
to lose its own characteristic, which is incompatible with the 
scheme of necessity, and to assume the characteristic of feeling, 
which is perfectly reconcilable with it; nay, which demands 
the scheme of necessity to account for its existence. Thus, the 



142 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT LPart I, 

system of necessity is based on a false psychology, on which it 
has too securely stood from the earliest times down to the 
present day. But the stream of knowledge, ever deepening 
and widening in its course, has been gradually undermining the 
foundations of this dark system. 



SECTION II. 
The scheme of necessity is directed against a false issue. 

As we have seen in the last section, the argument of the 
necessitarian is frequently directed against a false issue ; but the 
point is worthy of a still more careful consideration. 

We shall never cease to admire the logical dexterity with 
which the champions of necessity assail and worry their adver- 
saries. They have said, in all ages, that "nothing taketh 
beginning from itself;" but who ever imagined or dreamed of 
so wild an absurdity? It is conceded by all rational beings. 
Motion taketh not beginning from itself, but from action ; action 
taketh not beginning from itself, but from mind ; and mind 
taketh not beginning from itself, but from God. It is false, 
however, to conclude that because nothing taketh beginning 
from itself, it is brought to pass " by the action of some immediate 
agent without itself." The motion of body, as we have seen, is 
produced by the action of some immediate agent without itself; 
but the action of mind is produced, or brought to pass, by no 
action at all. It taketh beginning from an agent, and not from 
the action of an agent. This distinction, though so clearly 
founded in the nature of things, is always overlooked by the 
logic of the necessitarian. They might well adopt the language 
of Bacon, that the subtilty of nature far surpasseth that of our 
logic. 

Hobbes was content to rest on a simple statement of the fact, 
that nothing can produce itself; but it is not every logician 
who is willing to rely on the inherent strength of such a posi- 
tion. Ask a child, Did you make yourself? and the child will 
answer, No. Propound the same question to the roving savage, 
or to the man of mere common sense, and he will also answer, 
No. Appeal to the universal reason of man, and the same 
emphatic No, will come up from its profounclest depths. But 
your redoubtable logicians are not satisfied to rely on such testi- 



Chapter IV/] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 143 

mony alone : they dare not build on such a foundation unless it 
be first secured and rendered firm by the aid of the syllogistic 
process. I know "I did not make myself," says Descartes, 
" for if I had made myself, I should have given myself every 
perfection." Now this argument in true syllogistic form stands 
thus : If I had made myself, I should have endowed myself 
with every perfection ; I am not endowed with every perfec- 
tion ; therefore I did not make myself. Surely, after so clear 
a process of reasoning, no one can possibly doubt the proposi- 
tion that Descartes did not make himself! In the same way 
we might prove that he did not make his own logic : for if he 
had made his logic, he would have endowed it with every pos- 
sible perfection ; but it is not endowed with every possible per- 
fection, and therefore he did not make it. 

But President Edwards has excelled Descartes, and every 
other adept in the syllogistic art, except Aristotle in his physics, 
in his ability to render the light of perfect day clearer by a few 
masterly strokes of logic. He has furnished the reason why 
some persons imagine that volition has no cause of its existence, 
or " that it produces itself." JSTow, by the way, would it not 
have been as well if he had first made sure of the fact, before 
he undertook to explain it ? But to proceed : let us see how he 
has proved that volition does not produce itself, — that it does not 
arise out of nothing and bring itself into existence. 

He does this in true logical form, and according to the most 
approved methods of demonstration. He first establishes the 
general position, that no existence or event whatever can give 
rise to its own being,* and he then shows that this is true of 
volition in particular.-)- And having reached the position, that 
volition does not arise out of nothing, but must " have some 
antecedent" to introduce it into being; he next proceeds to 
prove that there is a necessary connexion between volition and 
the antecedents on which it depends for existence. This com- 
pletes the chain of logic, and the process is held up by his fol- 
lowers to the admiration of the world as a perfect demonstra- 
tion. Let us look at it a little more closely, and examine the 
nature and mechanism of its parts. 

If the huge frame of the earth, with all its teeming popula- 
tion and productions, could rise up out of nothing, he argues, 

* Inquiry, part i, sec. iii. f Id., part i, sec. iv. 



144 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

and bring itself into being without any cause of its existence, 
then we could not prove the being of a God. All this is very 
true. For, as he truly alleges, if one world could thus make 
itself, so also might another and another, even unto millions 
of millions. The universe might make itself, or come into 
existence without any cause thereof, and hence we could never 
know that there is a God. But surely, if any man imagined 
that even one world could create itself, it is scarcely worth 
while to reason with him. It is not at all likely that he 
would be frightened from his position by such a reductio ad 
dbsurdum. We should almost as soon suspect a sane man of 
denying the existence of God himself, as of doubting the pro- 
position that " nothing taketh beginning from itself." 

Having settled it to his entire satisfaction, by this and other 
arguments, that no effect whatever can produce itself, he then 
proceeds to show that this proposition is true of volitions as well 
as of all other events or occurrences. " If any should imagine," 
says he, " there is something in the sort of event that renders 
it possible to come into existence without a cause, and should 
say that the free acts of the will are existences of an exceeding 
different nature from other things, by reason of which they 
may come into existence without previous ground or reason of 
it, though other things cannot; if they make this objection in 
good earnest, it would be an evidence of their strangely forget- 
ting themselves ; for it would be giving some account of the 
existence of a thing, when, at the same time, they would main- 
tain there is no ground of its existence."* True, if any man 
should suppose that a volition rises up in the world " without 
any ground or reason of its existence," and afterward endeavour 
to assign a ground or reason of it, he would certainly be 
strangely inconsistent with himself; but Ave should deem his 
last position, that there must be a ground or reason of its exist- 
ence, to be some evidence of his coming to himself, rather than 
of his having forgotten himself. But to proceed with the argu- 
ment. " Therefore I would observe," says he, " that the par- 
ticular nature of existence, be it never so diverse from others, 
can lay no foundation for that thing coming into existence with- 
out a cause ; because, to suppose this, would be to suppose the 
particidar nature of existence to be a thing prior to existence, 

° Inquiry, pp. 6 I, 55. 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 145 

without a cause or reason of existence. But that which in any 
respect makes way for a thing coming into being, or for any 
manner or circumstance of its first existence, must be prior to 
existence. The distinguished nature of the effect, which is 
something belonging to the effect, cannot have influence back- 
ward to act before it is. The peculiar nature of that thing 
called volition, can do nothing, can have no influence, while it 
is not. And afterward it is too late for its influence : for then 
the thing has made sure of its existence already without its 
help."* After all this reasoning, and more to the same effect, 
we are perfectly satisfied that volition, no matter what its 
nature may be, cannot produce itself; and that it must have 
some ground or reason of its existence, some antecedent with- 
out which it could not come into being. 

We shall not do justice to this branch of our subject, if we 
leave it without laying before the reader one or two more speci- 
mens of logic from the celebrated Inquiry of President Edwards. 
He is opposing " the hypothesis," he tells us, " of acts of the will 
coming to pass without a cause." Now, according to his defini- 
tion of the term ccmse, as laid down at the beginning of the 
section under consideration, it signifies any antecedent on which 
a thing depends, in whole or in part, for its existence, or which 
constitutes the reason why it is, rather than not.f His doctrine 
is, then, that nothing ever comes to pass without some " ground 
or reason of its existence," without some antecedent which is 
necessary to account for its coming into being. And those who 
deny it are bound to maintain the strange thesis, that something 
may come into existence without any antecedent to account for 
it ; that it may rise from nothing and bring itself into existence. 
It is against this thesis that his logic is directed. 

" If it were so," says he, " that things only of one kind, viz., 
acts of the will, seemed to come to pass of themselves ; and it 
were an event that was continual, and that happened in a course 
whenever were found subj ects capable of such events ; this 
very thing would demonstrate there was some cause of them, 
which made such a difference between this event and others. 
For contingency is blind, and does not pick and choose a par- 
ticular sort of events. Nothing has no choice. This no-cause, 
which causes no existence, cannot cause the existence which 

Inquiry, p. 55. f Id., p. 50. 

10 



146 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

comes to pass to be of one particular sort only, distinguished 
from all others. Thus, that only one sort of matter drops out 
of heaven, even water ; and that this comes so often, so con- 
stantly and plentifully, all over the world, in all ages, shows 
that there is some cause or reason of the falling of water out of 
the heavens, and that something besides mere contingence 
had a hand in the matter."* "We do not intend to comment on 
this passage ; we merely wish to advert to the fact, that it is a 
laboured and logical effort to demolish the hypothesis that acts 
of the will do not bring themselves into existence, and to show 
that there must be some antecedent to account for their coming 
into being. "We shall only add, "it is true that nothing has no 
choice ;" but who ever pretended to believe that nothing puts 
forth volitions ? that there is no mincl, no motive, no ground or 
reason of volition ? Is it not wonderful that the great metaphy- 
sician of New-England should thus worry himself and exhaust 
his powers in grappling with shadows and combatting dreams, 
which no sane man ever seriously entertained for a moment ? 

" If we should suppose non-entity to be about to bring forth,'' 
he continues, " and things were coming into existence without 
any cause or antecedent on which the existence, or kind or 
manner of existence depends, or which could at all determine 
whether the things should be stones or stems, or beasts or 
angels, or human bodies or souls, or only some new motion or 
figure in natural bodies, or some new sensation in animals, or 
new idea in the human understanding, or new volition in the 
will, or anything else of all the infinite number of possibles, — 
then it certainly would not be expected, although many millions 
of millions of things were coming into existence in this manner 
all over the face of the earth, that they should all be only of one 
particular kind, and that it should be thus in all ages, and that 
this sort of existences should never fail to come to pass when 
there is room for them, or a subject capable of them, and that 
constantly whenever there is occasion."f Now all these words 
are put together to prove that non-entity cannot bring forth 
effects, at least such effects as we see in the world ; for if non- 
entity brought them forth, that is, to come to the point in dis- 
pute, if non-entity brought forth our volitions, they would not 
be always of one particular sort of effects. But they are of one 

° Inquiry, p. 54. f Id., p. 55. 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 147 

particular sort, and hence there must be some antecedent to 
account for tins uniformity in their nature, and they could not 
have been brought forth by nonentity ! Surely if anything 
can equal the fatuity of the hypothesis that nonentity can bring 
forth, or that a thing can produce itself, it is a serious attempt 
to refute it. How often, while poring over the works of neces- 
sitarians, are we lost in amazement at the logical mania which 
seems to have seized them, and which, in its impetuous efforts 
to settle and determine everything by reasoning, leaves reason 
itself neither time nor opportunity to contemplate the nature of 
things themselves, or listen to its own most authoritative and 
irreversible mandates. 

But lest we should be suspected of doing this great metaphy- 
sician injustice, we must point out the means by which he has 
so grossly deceived himself. According to his definition of 
motive, as the younger Edwards truly says, it includes every 
cause and condition of volition. If anything is merely a condi- 
tion, without which a volition could not come to pass, though 
it exerts no influence, it is called a cause of that volition, and 
placed in the definition of motive. And if anything exerts a 
positive influence to produce volition, this is also a cause of it, 
and is included in the same definition. In short, this definition 
embraces every conceivable antecedent on which volition in 
any manner, either in whole or in part, either negatively or 
positively, depends. Thus the most heterogeneous materials are 
crowded together under one and the same term, — the most dif- 
ferent ideas under one and the same definition. Is it possible 
to conceive of a better method of obscuring a subj ect than such 
a course ? When Edwards merely means a condition, why does 
he not say so % and when he means a producing cause, why does 
he not use the right word to express his meaning ? If he had 
carried on the various processes of his reasoning with some one 
clear and distinct idea before his mind, we might have expected 
great things from him ; but he has not chosen to do so. It is 
with the term cause that he operates, against the ambiguities 
of which he has not guarded himself or his reader. 

"Having thus explained what I mean by cause," says he, 
"I assert that nothing ever comes to pass without a cause." 
We have seen his reasoning on this point. He labours through 
page after page to establish his very ambiguous proposition, in 



148 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

a sense in which nobody ever denied it ; unless some one has 
affirmed that a thing may come into being without any ground 
or reason of its existence, — may arise out of nothing and help 
itself into existence. Having sufficiently established his funda- 
mental proposition in this sense, he proceeds to show that every 
effect and volition in particular, is necessarily connected with 
its cause. "It must be remembered," says he, "that it has 
been already shown, that nothing can ever come to pass with- 
out a cause or a reason ;"* and he then proceeds to show, that 
" the acts of the will must be connected with their cause. 5 ' In 
this part of his argument, he employs his ambiguous proposi- 
tion in a different sense from that in which he established it. 
In the establishment of it he only insists that there must be 
some antecedent sufficient to account for every event ; and in 
the application of it he contends, that the antecedent or cause 
must produce the event. These ideas are perfectly distinct. 
There could be no act of the mind unless there were a mind to 
act, and unless there were a motive in view of which it acts ; 
but it does not follow that the mind is compelled to act by 
motive. But let us see how he comes to this conclusion. 

" For an event," says he, " to have a cause and ground of its 
existence, and yet not be connected with its cause, is an incon- 
sistency. For if the event be not connected with its cause, it 
is not dependent on the cause : its existence is, as it were, loose 
from its influence, and may attend it or may notP^ " Depend- 
ence on the influence of a cause is the very notion of an effect." \ 
Again, " to suppose there are some events which have a cause 
and ground of their existence, that yet are not necessarily con- 
nected with their cause, is to suppose that they have a cause 
which is not their cause. Thus, if the effect be not necessarily 
connected with the cause, with its influence and influential cir- 
cumstances, then, as I observed before, it is a thing possible and 
Kiqiposable that the cause may sometimes exert the same influ- 
ence under the same circumstances, and yet the effect not fol- 
low^ He has much other similar reasoning to show that it is 
absurd and contradictory to say that motive is the cause of 
volition, and yet admit that volition may be loose from the 
influence of motive, or that "the cause is not sufficient to pro- 
duce the effect."! In all this he uses the term in its most nar- 

:: Inquiry, p. 77. f Ibid. J Ibid. § Id., p. 78. || Id., p. 79. 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 149 

row and restricted sense. It is no longer a mere antecedent or 
antecedents, which are sufficient to account for the existence of 
the phenomena of volition ; it is an efficient cause which pro- 
duces volitions. Thus he establishes his ambiguous proposition 
in one sense, and builds on it in another. He explains the 
term cause to signify any antecedent, in order, he tells us, to 
prevent objection to his doctrine, when he alleges that nothing 
ever comes to pass without some cause of its existence ; and 
yet, when he applies this fundamental proposition to the con- 
struction of his scheme, he returns to the restricted sense of the 
word, in which it signifies, " that which has a positive efficacy or 
influence to produce a thing." It is thus that the great scheme 
of President Edwards is made up of mere words, having no intrin- 
sic coherency of parts, and appearing consistent throughout, 
only because its disj ointed fragments seem to be united, and its 
huge chasms concealed by means of the ambiguities of language. 

SECTION III. 

The scheme of necessity is supported by false logic. 

One reason why the advocates of necessity deceive themselves, 
as well as others, is, that there is great want of j>recision and 
distinctness in their views and definitions. We are told by 
them that the will is always determined by the strongest 
motive ; that this is invariably the cause of volition. But what 
is meant by the term cause f "We have final causes, instru- 
mental causes, occasional causes, predisposing causes, efficient 
causes, and many others. Now, in which of these senses is the 
word used, when we are informed that motive is the cause of 
volition? On this point we are not enlightened. Neither 
Leibnitz nor Edwards is sufficiently explicit. The proposition, 
as left by them, is vague and obscure. 

Leibnitz inclined to the use of the word reason, because he car- 
ried on a controversy with Bayle and Hobbes, who were atheists ; 
though he frequently speaks of a chain of causes which embrace 
human volitions.* While Edwards, who opposed the Armini- 
ans, generally employs the more rigid term cause y though he, 
too, frequently represents motive as " the ground and reason " 
of volition. The one softens his language, in places, as he con- 

* Theodicee. 



150 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I, 

tends with those who had rendered themselves obnoxious to the 
Christian world by an advocacy of the doctrine of necessity in 
connexion with atheistical sentiments. The other appears to 
prefer the stronger expression, as he puts forth his power against 
antagonists whose views of liberty were deemed subversive of 
the tenets of Calvinism. But the law of causality, as stated by 
Edwards, and the principle of the sufficient reason, as defined 
and employed by Leibnitz, are perfectly identical. 

When we are told that motive is the cause of volition, it is 
evident we cannot determine whether to deny or to assent to 
the proposition, unless we know in what sense the term cause 
is used. We might discuss this perplexed question forever, by 
the use of such vague and indefinite propositions, without pro- 
gressing a single step toward the end of the controversy. We 
must bring a more searching analysis to the subject, if we hope 
to accomplish anything. We must take the word cause or 
reason, in each of its significations, in order to discover in what 
particulars the contending parties agree, and in what particu- 
lars they disagree, in order to see how far each party is right, 
and how far it is wrong. This is the only course that prom- 
ises the. least prospect of a satisfactory result. 

If we mean by the cause of volition, that which wills or exerts 
the volition, there is no controversy ; for in this sense the advo- 
cates of necessity admit that the mind is the cause of volition. 
Thus says Edwards : " The acts of my will are my own ; i. e., they 
are acts of my will."* It is universally conceded that it is the 
mind which wills, and nothing else in the place of it ; and hence, 
in this sense of the word, there is no question but that the mind 
is the cause of volition. But the advocates of necessity cannot 
be understood in this sense ; for they deny that the mind is the 
cause of volition, and insist that it is caused by motive. 

The term cause is very often used to designate the condition 
of a thing, or that without which it could not happen or come 
to pass. Thus we are told by Edwards, that he sometimes uses 
" the word cause to signify any antecedent" of an event, 
" whether it has any influence or not," in the production of such 
event, f If this be the meaning, when it is said that motive is 
the cause of volition, the truth of the proposition is conceded by 
the advocates of free-agency. In speaking of arguments and 

Inquiry, p. 277. f Id., pp. 50, 61. 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 151 

motives, Dr. Samuel Clarke says : " Occasions indeed there may 
be, and are, upon which that substance in man, wherever the 
self-moving principle resides, freely exerts its active power."* 
Herein, then, there is a perfect agreement between the con- 
tending parties. The fact that the mind requires certain con- 
ditions or occasions, on which to exercise its active power, does 
not at all interfere with its freedom ; and hence the advocates 
:>f free-agency have readily admitted that motives are the occa- 
sional causes of volition. We must look out for some other 
meaning of the term, then, if we would clearly and distinctly 
fix our minds on the point in controversy. 

We say that an antecedent is the cause of its consequent, 
when the latter is produced by the action of the former. For 
exanrple, a motion of the body is said to be caused by the mind ; 
because it is produced by an act of the mind. This seems to be 
what is meant by an "efficient cause." It is, no doubt, the most 
proper sense of the word ; and around this it is that the con- 
troversy still rages, and has for centuries raged. 

The advocates of necessity contend, not only that volition is 
the effect of motive, but also that " to be an effect implies ^>$s- 
siveness, or the being subject to the power and action of its 
cause."f Such precisely is the doctrine of Edwards, and Col- 
lins, and Hobbes. In this sense of the word it is denied that 
motive is the cause of volition, and it is affirmed that mind is 
the cause thereof. Thus, says Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his reply 
to Collins, " T is the self-moving principle, and not at all the 
reason or motive, which is the physical or efficient cause of 
action ;" by which we understand him to mean volition, as that 
is the thing in dispute. Now, when the advocates of free- 
agency insist that motive is not the efficient cause of volition, 
and that mind is the efficient cause thereof, we suppose them 
to employ the expression, efficient cause, in one and the same 
sense in both branches of the proposition. This is the only fair 
way of viewing their language ; and if they wished to be under- 
stood in any other manner, they should have taken the pains 
to explain themselves, and not permit us to be misled by an 
ambiguity. Here the precise point in dispute is clearly pre- 
sented ; and let us hear the contending parties, before we pro- 
ceed to decide between them. 

° Remarks upon Collins's Philosophical Inquiry. f Inquiry, p. 198. 



152 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I, 

You are in error, says the necessitarian to his opponents, in 
denying that motive, and in affirming that mind, is the efficient 
cause of volition. For if an act of the mind, or a volition, is 
caused by the mind, it must be produced by a preceding act of 
the mind, and this act must be produced by another pre2eding 
act of the mind, and so on ad infinitum • which reduces the 
matter to a plain impossibility. Now, if the necessitarian has 
not been deceived by an unwarrantable ambiguity on the part 
of his adversary, he has clearly reduced his doctrine to the 
absurdity of an infinite series of acts : that is to say, if the advo- 
cate of free-agency does not depart from the ordinary meaning 
of words, when he affirms that mind is the efficient cause of 
volition ; and if he does not use these terms " efficient cause" in 
different senses in the same sentence, then we feel bound to 
say that he is fairly caught in the toils of his adversary. But 
we are not yet in condition to pass a final judgment between 
the parties. 

The necessitarian contends that " volition, or an act of the 
mind, is the effect of motive, and that it is subj ect to the power 
and action of its cause."* The advocate of free-will replies, If 
we must suppose an action of motive on the mind to account 
for its act, we must likewise suppose another action to account 
for the action of motive ; and so on ad infinitum. Thus the 
necessitarian seems to be fairly caught in his own toils, and 
entrapped by his own definition and arguments. 

Our decision (for the correctness of which we appeal to the 
calm and impartial judgment of the reader) is as follows : If 
the term cause be understood in the first or the second sense 
above mentioned, there is no disagreement between the con- 
tending parties ; and if it be understood in the third sense, then 
both parties are in error. If, in order to account for an act of 
the mind, we suppose it is caused by an action of motive, we 
are involved in the absurdity of an infinite series of actions ; 
and on the other hand, if we suppose it is caused by a preced- 
ing act of the mind itself, we are forced into the same absurdity. 
Hence, we conclude, that an act of the mind, or a volition, is not 
produced by the action of either mind or motive, but takes its 
rise in the world without any such efficient cause of its exist- 
ence. 

° Edwards's Inquiry, p. 178. 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 153 

Each part j lias refuted his adversary, and in the enjoyment 
of his triumph he seems not to have duly reflected on the de- 
struction of his own position. Both are in the right, and both 
are in the wrong ; but, as we shall hereafter see, not equally so. 
If we adopt the argument of both sides, in so far as it is true, 
we shall come to the conclusion that action must take its 
rise somewhere in the universe without being caused by pre- 
ceding action. And if so, where shall we look for its origin ? 
in that which by nature is endowed with active power, or in 
that which is purely and altogether passive ? 

We lay it down, then, as an established and fundamental] 
position, that the mind acts or puts forth its volitions without* 
being efficiently caused to do so, — without being impelled by its 
own prior action, or by the prior action of anything else. The 
conditions or occasions of volition being supplied, the mind 
itself acts in view thereof, without being subject to the power 
or action of any cause whatever. All rational beings must, as 
we have seen, either admit this exemption of the mind in 
willing from the power and action of any cause, or else lose 
themselves in the labyrinth of an infinite series of causes. It 
is this exemption which constitutes the freedom of the human 
soul. 

"We are now prepared to see, in a clear light, the sophistical 
nature of the pretended demonstration of the scheme of neces- 
sity. " It is impossible to consider occurrences," says Sir James 
Mackintosh, otherwise than as bound together in " the relation 
of cause and effect P Jfow this relation, if we interpret it 
according to the nature of things, and not according to the 
sound of words, is not one, but two. 

The motions of the body are caused by the mind, that is, 
they are produced by the action of the mind ; this constitutes 
one relation : but acts of the mind are caused, that is, they are 
produced by the action of nothing ; and this is a quite different 
relation. In other words, the motions of body are produced by 
preceding action, and the acts of the mind are not produced by 
preceding action. Hence, the first are necessitated, and the 
last are free : the first come under " the relation of cause and 
effect," and the last come under a very different relation. The 
relation of cause and effect connects the most remote conse- 
quences of volition with volition itself; but when we reach voli- 



154 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

tion, there a new relation arises : it is the relation which sub- 
sists between an agent and its act. We may trace changes in 
the external world up to the volitions or acts of mind, and per- 
ceive no diversity in the chain of dependencies ; but precisely 
at this point the chain of cause and effect ceases, and agency 
begins. The surrounding circumstances may be conditions, 
may be occasional causes, may be predisposing causes, but they 
are not, and cannot be, producing or efficient causes. Here, 
then, the iron chain terminates, and freedom commences, In 
the ambiguity which fails to distinguish between " the relation 
of cause and effect," and the relation which volition bears to its 
antecedents, " consists the strength of the necessitarian system." 
Let this distinction be clearly made and firmly borne in mind, 
and the great boasted adamantine scheme of necessity will 
resolve itself into an empty, ineffectual sound. 

Hence, if we would place the doctrine of liberty upon solid 
grounds, it becomes necessary to modify the categories of M. 
Cousin. All things, says he, fall under the one or the other of 
the two following relations: the relation between subject and 
attribute, or the relation between cause and effect. This last- 
category, we think, should be subdivided, so as to give two 
relations ; one between cause and effect, properly so called, and 
the other between agent and action. Until this be done, it will 
be impossible to extricate the phenomena of the will from the 
mechanism of cause and effect. 

"We think we might here leave the stupendous sophism of the 
necessitarian ; but as it has exerted so wonderful an influence 
over the human mind, and obscured, for ages, the glory of the 
moral government of God, we may well be permitted to pursue 
it further, and to continue the pursuit so long as a fragment or 
a shadow of it remains to be demolished. 

SECTION" IV. 
The scheme of necessity is fortified by false conceptions. 

One of the notions to which the cause of necessity owes 
much of its strength, is a false conception of liberty, as consist- 
ing in " a power over the determinations of the will." Hence it 
is said that this power over the will can do nothing, can cause 
no determination except by acting to produce it. But accord 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 155 

ing to this notion of liberty, this causative act cannot be free 
unless it be also caused by a preceding act; and so on ad 
infinitum. Such is one of the favourite arguments of the 
necessitarian. But in truth the freedom of the mind does not 
consist in its possessing a power over the determinations of its 
own will, for the true notion of freedom is a negative idea, and 
consists in the absence of every power over the determinations 
of the will. The mind is free because it possesses a power of 
acting, over which there is no controlling power, either within 
or without itself. 

It must be admitted, it seems to us, that the advocates of 
free-agency have too often sanctioned this false conception of 
liberty, and thereby strengthened the cause of their opponents. 
Cudworth, Clark, Stuart, Coleridge, and Eeid, all speak of this 
supposed power of the mind over the determinations of the will, 
as that which constitutes its freedom. Thus says Reid, for 
example : " By the liberty of a moral agent, I understand a 
power over the determinations of his own will." Eow, it is 
not at all strange that this language should be conceived by 
necessitarians in such a manner as to involve the doctrine of 
liberty in the absurd consequence of an infinite series of acts, 
since it is so understood by some of the most enlightened advo- 
cates of free-agency themselves. " A power over the determi- 
nations of our will," says Sir William Hamilton, " supposes an 
act of the will that our will should determine so and so ; for we 
can only exert power through a rational determination or volition. 
This definition of liberty is right. But the question upon ques- 
tion remains, (and this ad infinitum) — have we a power (a will) 
over such anterior will ? and until this question be definitively 
answered, which it never can, we must be unable to conceive 
the possibility of the fact of liberty. But, though inconceivable, 
this fact is not therefore false." True, we are unable to con- 
ceive the possibility of the fact of liberty, if this must be con- 
ceived as consisting in a power over the determinations of the 
will ; but, in our humble opinion, this definition of liberty is 
not right. It seems more correct to say, that the freedom of 
the will consists in the absence of a power over its determina- 
tions, than in the presence of such a power. 

There is another false conception which has given great 
apparent force to the cause of necessity. It is supposed that 



156 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

the states of the will, the volitions, are often necessitated by the 
necessitated states of the sensibility. In other words, it is sup- 
posed that the appetites, passions, and desires, often act upon 
the will, and produce its volitions. But this seems to be a 
very great mistake, which has arisen from viewing the subtle 
operations of the mind through the medium of those mechanical 
forms of thought that have been derived from the contempla- 
tion of the phenomena of the material world. In truth, the 
feelings do not act at all, and consequently they cannot act 
upon the will. It is absurd, as Locke and Edwards well say, to 
ascribe power, which belongs to the agent himself, to the 
properties of an agent. Hence, it is absurd to suppose that our 
feelings, appetites, desires, and passions, are endowed with 
power, and can act. They are not agents — they are merely the 
properties of an agent. It is the mind itself which acts, and 
not its passions. These are but passive impressions made upon 
the sensibility ; and hence, " it is to philosophize very crudely 
concerning mind, and to image everything in a corporeal man- 
ner," to conceive that they act upon the will and control its 
determinations, just as the motions of body are caused and 
controlled by the action of mind.* 

This conception, however, is not peculiar to the necessitarian. 
It has been most unfortunately sanctioned by the greatest advo- 
cates of free-agency. Thus says Dr. Heicl, in relation to the 
appetites and passions : " Such motives are not addressed to the 
rational powers. Their influence is immediately upon the will." 
" When a man is acted upon by contrary motives of this kind, 
he finds it easy to yield to the strongest. They are like two 
forces pushing him in contrary directions. To yield to the 
strongest he needs only he passive." If this be so, how can Dr. 
Keid maintain, as he does, that " the determination was made 
by the man, and not by the motive?" To this assertion Sir 
William Hamilton replies : " But was the man determined by 
no motive to that determination ? Was his specific volition to 
this or to that without a cause ? On the supposition that the 
sum of the influences (motives, dispositions, tendencies) to voli- 
tion A is equal to 12, and the sum of counter volition B, 
equal to 8 — can we conceive that the determination of volition 
A should not be necessary ? We can only conceive the voli 

° See Examination of Edwards on the Will. 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 157 

tion B to be determined by supposing that the man creates 
(calls from nonexistence into existence) a certain supplement 
of influences. But this creation as actual, or in itself, is incon- 
ceivable ; and even to conceive the possibility of this inconceiv- 
able act, we must suppose some cause by which the man is 
determined to exert it. "We thus m thought, never escape 
determination and necessity. It will be observed that I do not 
consider this inability to notion any disproof of the fact of free- 
will." 

Jt is true, that if we suppose, according to the doctrine of Sir 
William and Dr. Reid, that two counter influences act upon th e 
will, the one being as 12 and the other as 8, then the first must 
necessarily prevail. But if this supposition be correct, we are 
not only unable to conceive the fact of liberty, we are also able 
to conceive that it cannot be a fact at all. There is a great dif- 
ference, we have been accustomed to believe, between being 
unable to conceive how a thing is, and being able to conceive 
that it cannot be anyhow at all : the first would leave it a mere 
mystery, — the last would show it to be an absurdity. In the one 
case, the thing would be above reason, and in the other, con- 
trary to reason. ISTow, to which of these categories does the 
fact of liberty, as left by Sir William Hamilton, belong? Is it 
a mystery, or is it an absurdity % Is it an inconceivable fact, or 
is it a conceived impossibility ? It seems to us that it is the 
latter; and that if we will only take the pains to view the 
phenomena of mind as they exist in consciousness, and not 
through the medium of material analogies, we shall be able to 
untie the knot which Sir William Hamilton has found it neces- 
sary to cut. 

The doctrine of liberty, if properly viewed, is perfectly con- 
ceivable. We can certainly conceive that the omnipotence of 
God can put forth an act without being impelled thereto by a 
power back of his own; and to suppose otherwise, is to sup- 
pose a power greater than God's, and upon which the exercise 
of his omnipotence depends. By parity of reason, we should 
be compelled to suppose another power still back of that, and 
so on ad infinitum. This is not only absurd, but, as Calvin 
truly says, it is impious. Here, then, we have upon the throne 
of the universe a clear and unequivocal instance of a self-active 
power, — a power whose goings forth are not impelled by any 



158 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT |_Part I, 

power without itself. It goes forth, it is true, in the light of 
the Eternal Reason, and in pursuit of the ends of the Eternal 
Goodness ; but yet in itself it possesses an infinite fulness, being 
self-sustained, self-active, and wholly independent of all other 
powers and influences whatsoever. 

ISTow, if such a Being should create at all, it is not difficult to 
conceive that he would create subordinate agents, bearing his 
own image in this, namely, the possession of a self-active 
power. It is not difficult to conceive that he should produce 
spiritual beings like himself, who can act without being neces- 
sitated to act, like the inanimate portions of creation, as well 
as those of an inferior nature. Nor is it more difficult to con- 
ceive that man, in point of fact, possesses such a limited self- 
active power, than it is to conceive that God possesses an infinite 
self-active power. Indeed we must and do conceive this, or 
else we should have no type or representative in this lower part 
of the world, by and through which to rise to a contemplation 
of its universal Lord and Sovereign. We should have a temple 
without a symbol, and a universe without a God. But God 
has not thus left himself without witness ; for he has raised man 
above the dust of the earth in this, that he is endowed with a 
self-active power, from whence, as from an humble platform, 
he may rise to the sublime contemplation of the Universal 
Mover of the heavens and the earth. But for this ray of light, 
shed abroad in our hearts by the creative energy of God, the 
nature of the divine power itself would be unknown to us, and 
its eternal, immutable glories shrouded in impenetrable dark- 
ness. The idea of an omnipotent power, moving in and of 
itself in obedience to the dictates of infinite wisdom and good- 
ness, would be forever merged and lost in the dark scheme of 
an implexed series and concatenation of causes, binding all 
things fast, God himself not excepted, in the iron bonds of 
fate. 

If liberty be a fact, as Sir "William Hamilton contends it is, 
then no such objections can be urged against it as those in 
which he supposes it to be involved. We are aware of what 
may be said in favour of such a mode of viewing subjects 
of this kind, as well as of the nature of the principles from 
which it takes its rise. But we cannot consider those principles 
altogether sound. They appear to be too sceptical, with respect 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 159 

to the powers of the human mind, and the destiny of human 
knowledge. The sentiment of Leibnitz seems to rest upon a 
more solid foundation. " It is necessary to come," says he, " to 
the grand question which M. Bayle has recently brought upon 
the carpet, to wit, whether a truth, and especially a truth of 
faith, can be subject to unanswerable objections. That excel- 
lent author seems boldly to maintain the affirmative of this 
question : he cites grave theologians on his side, and even those 
of Rome, who appear to say what he pretends ; and he adduces 
philosophers who have believed that there are even philosophi- 
cal truths, the defenders of which cannot reply to objections 
made against them." " For my part," says Leibnitz, " I avow 
that I cannot be of the sentiment of those who maintain that a 
truth can be liable to invincible obj ections ; for what is an 
objection but an argument of which the conclusion contradicts 
our thesis? and is not an invincible argument a demonstra- 
tion?" "It is always necessary to yield to demonstrations, 
whether they are proposed for our adoption, or advanced in the 
form of objections. And it is unjust and useless to wish to 
weaken the proofs of adversaries, under the pretext that they 
are only objections; since the adversary has the same right, 
and can reverse the denominations, by honouring his arguments 
with the name of proofs, and lowering yours by the disparaging 
name of objections."* 

There is another false conception, by which the necessitarian 
fortifies himself in his opposition to the freedom of the will. As 
he identifies the sensibility and the will, so when the indiffer- 
ence of the latter is spoken of, the language is understood to 
niean that the mind is indifferent, and destitute of all feeling or 
emotion. But this is to view the doctrine of liberty, not as it 
is held by its advocates, but as it is seen through the medium 
of a false psychology. We might adduce a hundred examples 
of the truth of this remark, but one or two must suffice. Thus, 
Collins supposes that the doctrine of liberty implies, that the 
mind is " indifferent to good and evil ;" " indifferent to what 
causes pleasure or pain;" " indifferent to all objects, and swayed 
by no motives." Gross as this misrepresentation of the doctrine 
of free-agency is, it is frequently made by its opponents. It oc- 
curs repeatedly in the writings of President Edwards and Presi- 
* Discours de la Conformite de la Foi avec la Raison. 



160 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT LPart I, 

dent Day.* The freedom of the will, indeed, no more implies 
an indifference of the sensibility than the power of a bird to fly 
implies the existence of a vacuum. 

SECTION V. 
The scheme of necessity is recommended by false analogies. 

It is insisted that there is no difficulty in conceiving of a 
caused action or volition ; but this position is illustrated by false 
and deceptive analogies. Thus says an advocate of necessity : 
" The term passive is sometimes employed to express the rela- 
tion of an effect to its cause. In this sense, it is so far from 
being inconsistent with activity, that activity may be the very 
effect which is produced. A cannonshot is said to be passive, 
with respect to the charge of powder which impels it. But is 
there no activity given to the ball ? Is not the whirlwind active 
when it tears up the forest ?"f Not at all, in any sense pertain- 
ing to the present controversy. The tremendous power, what- 
ever it may be, which sets the whirlwind in motion, is active ; 
the wind itself is perfectly passive. The air is acted on, and it 
merely suffers a change of place. If it tears up the forest, this 
is not because it exercises an active power, but because it is 
body coming into contact with body, and both cannot occupy 
the same space at one and the same time. It tears up the 
forest, not as an agent, but as an instrument. 

The same is true of the cannonball. This does not act ; it 
merely moves. It does not put forth a volition, or an exercise 
of power ; it merely suffers a change of place. In one word, 
there is no sort of resemblance between an act of mind and the 
motion of body. This has no active power, and cannot be made 
to act : it is passive, however, and may be made to move. If 
the question were, Can a body be made to move ? these illustra- 
tions would be in point ; but as it relates to the possibility of 
causing the mind to put forth a volition, they are clearly irrel- 
evant. And if they were really apposite, they would only show 
that the mind may be caused to act like a cannonball, a whirl- 
wind, a clock, or any other piece of machinery. This is the 
only kind of action they serve to prove may be caused ; and 

° See Examination of Edwards on the Will, sec. ix. 
| President Day on the Will, p. 1G0. 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 161 

such action, as it is called, has far more to do with machinery 
than with human agency. 

President Edwards also has recourse to false analogies. To 
select only one instance : " It is no more a contradiction," says 
he, " to suppose that action may be the effect of some other 
cause besides the agent, or being that acts, than to suppose that 
life may be the effect of some other cause besides the being that 
lives."* JSTow, as we are wholly passive in the reception of 
life, so it may be wholly conferred upon us by the power and 
agency of God. The very reason why we suppose an act cannot 
be caused is, that it is a voluntary exercise of our own minds ; 
whereas, if it were caused, it would be a necessitated passive 
impression. How can it show the fallacy of this position, to re- 
fer to the case of a caused life, in regard to which, by universal 
consent, we do not and cannot act at all ? 

The younger Edwards asserts, that." to say that an agent that 
is acted upon cannot act, is as groundless as to say that a body 
acted upon cannot move." Again : " My actions are mine / 
but in what sense can they be properly called mine, if I be not 
the efficient cause of them ? — Answer : my thoughts and all my 
perceptions and feelings are mine ; yet it will not be pretended 
that I am the efficient cause of them."f But in regard to all 
our thoughts and feelings, we are, as we have seen, altogether 
passive ; and these are ours, because they are necessarily pro- 
duced in us. Is it only in this sense that our acts are ours ? 
Are they ours only because they are necessarily caused to exist 
in our minds ? If so, then indeed we understand these writers ; 
but if they are not merely passive impressions, why resort to 
states of the intelligence and the sensibility, which are con- 
ceded to be passive, in order to illustrate the reasonableness of 
their scheme, and to expose the unreasonableness of the oppo- 
site doctrine? "We admit that every passive impression is 
caused ; but the question is, Can the mind be caused to act ? 
As we lay all the stress on the nature of an act, as seen in the 
light of consciousness, what does it signify to tell us that another 
thing, which possesses no such nature, may be efficiently caused ? 
All such illustrations overlook the essential difference between 
action and passion, between doing and suffering. 

° Inquiry, p. 203. f Dissertation, p. 181. 

11 



162 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT |_Part I. 



SECTION VI. 
The scheme of necessity is rendered 'plausible by a fahe phraseology. 

The false psychology, of which we have spoken, has been 
greatly strengthened and confirmed in its influences by the 
phraseology connected with it. As Mr. Locke distinguished 
between will and desire, partially at least, so he likewise distin- 
guished a preference of the mind from a volition. But Presi- 
dent Edwards is not satisfied with this distinction. " The 
instance he mentions" says Edwards, " does not prove there is 
anything else in willing but merely preferring."* This may 
be very true ; but is there nothing in willing, in acting, but 
merely preferring f This last term, however it may be applied, 
seems better adapted to express a state of the intelligence, thau 
an act of the will. Two obj ects are placed before the mind : 
one affects the sensibility in a more agreeable manner than the 
other, and therefore the intelligence pronounces that one is 
more to be desired than the other. This seems to be precisely 
what is meant by the use of the term preference. One prefers 
an orange to an apple, for instance, because the orange affects 
his sensibility more agreeably than the apple ; and the intelli- 
gence perceiving this state of the sensibility, declares in favour 
of the orange. This decision of the judgment is what is usually 
meant by the use of the term preference, or choice. To prefer, 
is merely to judge, in view of desire, which of two objects is 
more agreeable. But judging and desiring are, as we have 
seen, both necessitated states of the mind. Why, then, apply 
the term preference, or choice, to acts of the will ? Why apply 
a term, which seems to express merely a state of the intelli- 
gence, which all concede is necessitated, to an act of the will ? 
Is it not evident, that by such a use of language the cause of 
necessity gains great apparent strength ? 

There is another way in which the language of the necessi- 
tarian deceives. The language he employs often represents the 
facts of nature, but not facts as they would be, if his system 
were true. Hence, when this system is attacked, its advo- 
cates repel the attack by the use of words which truly represent 
nature, but not their errors. This gives great plausibility 

Inquiry of Edwards, p. 222. 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 163 

to their apologies. Thus, when it is objected that the scheme 
of necesssity "makes men no more than mere machines," 
they are always ready to reply, " that notwithstanding this doc- 
trine, man is entirely, perfectly, and unspeakably different from 
a machine." But how ? Is it because his volitions, as they are 
called, are not necessarily determined by causes ? No. Is it be- 
cause his will may be loose from the influence of motives ? No. 
Is it because he may follow the strongest motive, or may not fol- 
low it? No. Nothing of the kind is hinted. How does the man, 
then, differ so entirely from a machine? Why, " in that he has 
reason and understanding, with a faculty of will, and so is capa- 
ble of volition and choice." True, a machine has no reason or 
understanding ; but suppose it had, would it be a person ? By 
no means. We have seen that the understanding, or the intel- 
ligence, is necessarily determined ; all its states are necessitated 
as completely as the movements of a machine. This constitutes 
an essential likeness, and it is what is always meant, when it 
is said that necessity makes men mere machines. But it seems 
that man also has " a faculty of will, and so is capable of volition 
or choice."* Yes, he can act. Now this language means 
something according to the system of nature ; but what does it 
mean according to the system of necessity ? It merely means 
that the human mind is susceptible of being necessitated to 
undergo a change by the "power and action of a cause," 
which the advocates of that system are pleased to call an act. 
They never hint that we are not machines, because we have 
any power by which we are exempt from the most absolute 
dominion of causes. They never hint that we are not machines, 
because our volitions, or acts, are not as necessarily produced 
in us, as the motions of a clock are produced in it. Now, if 
this scheme were true, there would be no such things as acts 
or volitions in us : all the phenomena of our minds would be 
passive impressions, like our judgments and feelings. When 
they speak of the will, then, which is capable of volitions, or 
acts, they deceive by using the language of nature, and not of 
their false scheme. 

° Edwards's Inquiry, p. 222. 



164 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 



SECTION VII. 

The scheme of necessity originates in a false method, and terminates in a 

false religion. 

This system, as we have seen, has been built up, not by an 
analysis of the phenomena of the human mind, but by means 
of universal abstractions and truisms. It takes its rise, not from 
the facts of nature, but from the conceptions of the intellect. In 
other words, instead of anatomizing the world which God has 
made so as to exhibit the actual plan according to which it has 
been constituted, it sets out from certain identical propositions, 
such as that every effect must have a cause, and proceeds to 
inform us how the world must have been constituted. This 
" usual method of discovery and proof," as Bacon says, " by 
first establishing the most general propositions, then applying 
and proving the intermediate axioms according to these, is the 
parent of error and the calamity of every science." Nowhere, 
it is believed, can a more striking illustration of the truth of 
these pregnant words be found, than in the method adopted by 
necessitarians. They begin with the universal proposition, that 
every effect must have a cause, as a self-evident truth, and then 
proceed, not to examine and discover how the world is made, 
but to demonstrate how it must have been constructed. This 
is not to "interpret," it is to " anticipate" nature. 

By this high a priori method the freedom of the human 
mind is demonstrated, as we have seen, to be an impossibility, 
and the accountability of man a dream. Man is not respon- 
sible for sin, or rather, there is no such thing as moral good 
and evil in the lower world ; since God, the only efficient foun- 
tain of all things and events, is the sole responsible author of 
all evil as well as of all good. Such, as we have seen, are the 
inevitable logical consequences of this boasted scheme of ne- 
cessity. 

But we have clearly shown, we trust, that the grand demon- 
tration of the necessitarian is a sophism, whose apparent force 
is owing to a variety of causes : — First, it seeks out, and lays 
its foundation in, a false psychology ; identifying the feelings, 
or affections, and the will. Secondly, by viewing the opposite 
scheme through the medium of this false psychology, it reduces 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 165 

its main position to the pitiful absurdity that a thing may pro- 
duce itself, or arise out of nothing, and bring itself into exist- 
ence ; and then demolishes this absurdity by logic ! Thirdly, 
it reduces itself to the truism, that a thing is always as it is ; 
and being entrenched in this stronghold, it gathers around 
itself all the common sense and all the reason of mankind, as 
well it may, and looks down with sovereign contempt on the 
feeble attacks of its adversaries. Fourthly, it fortifies itself by 
a multitude of false conceptions, arising from a hasty applica- 
tion of its universal truism, and not from a severe inspection 
and analysis of things. Fifthly, it decorates itself in false anal- 
ogies, and thereby assumes the imposing appearance of truth. 
Sixthly, it clothes itself in deceptive and ambiguous phrase- 
ology,, by which it speaks the language of truth to the ear, but 
not to the sense. And, seventhly, it takes its rise in a false 
method, and terminates in a false religion. 

These are some of the hidden mysteries of the scheme of 
necessity ; which having been detected and exposed, we do not 
hesitate to pronounce it a grand imposition on the reason of 
mankind. As such, we set aside this stupendous sophism, 
whose dark shadow has so long rested on the beauty of the 
world, obscuring the intrinsic majesty and glory of the infinite 
goodness therein displayed. We put away and repudiate this 
vast assemblage of errors, which has so sadly perplexed our 
mental vision, and so frightfully distorted the real proportions 
of the world, as to lead philosophers, such as Kant and others, 
to pronounce a Theodicy impossible. We put them aside utterly, 
in order that we may proceed to vindicate the glory of God, as 
manifested in the constitution and government of the moral 
world. 



166 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 



CHAPTEK Y. 

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE HUMAN WILL AND THE DIVINE AGENCY. 

Thou art the source and centre of all minds, 

Their only point of rest, eternal Word ! 

From Thee departing, they are lost and rove 

At random, without honour, hope, or peace. 

From Thee is all that soothes the life of man, — 

His high endeavour and his glad success, 

His strength to suffer and his will to serve. — Cowper. 

And God proclaimed from heaven, and by an oath 
Confirmed, that each should answer for himself; 
And as his own peculiar work should be 
Done by his proper self, should live or die. — Pollok. 

The evils of haste and precipitancy in the formation of opinions 
are, perhaps, nowhere more deplorably exhibited, than in regard 
to the relation between human and divine agency. Indeed, so 
many rash judgments have been put forth on this important 
subject, that the very act of approaching it has come to be 
invested, in the minds of many persons, with the character of 
rashness and presumption. Hence the frequent warnings to 
turn our attention from it, as a subject lying beyond the range 
of all sober speculation, and as unsuited to the investigation of 
our finite minds. If this be a wise conclusion, it would be well 
to leave it to support itself, instead of attempting to bolster it 
up with the reasons frequently given for it. 

SECTION I. 
General mew of the relation "between the divine and the human power. 

It is frequently said, for example, that it is impossible to 
reconcile the agency of God with that of man ; because we do 
not know how the divine power operates upon the human mind. 
But, if we examine the subject closely, we shall find that the 
manner in which the Spirit of God operates, is not what we 
want to know, in order to remove the great difficulty in ques- 
tion. If such knowledge were possessed in the greatest possible 
perfection, we have no reason to believe that our insight into 



Chapter V.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 167 

the relation between the human and the divine power would 
be at all improved. For aught we can see, our notions on this 
point would remain as dim and feeble as if we possessed no 
such knowledge. If we could ascertain, however, precisely 
what is done by the power of man, then we should see whether 
there be any real inconsistency or conflict between them or not. 
This is the point on which we need to be enlightened, in order 
to clear up the difficulty in question ; and on this point the 
most satisfactory light may be attained. If we must wait to 
understand the modus operandi of the divine Spirit, before we 
can dispel the clouds and darkness which his influence casts 
over the free-agency of man, then must we indeed defer this 
great mystery to another state of being, and perhaps forever. 
Those who have looked in this direction for light, may well 
deplore our inability to see it. But let us look in the right 
direction : let us consider, not the modus operandi of the divine 
power, but the effects produced by it, and then, perhaps, we 
may behold the beautiful harmony subsisting between the 
agency of God and the freedom of man. 

The reason why the views of most persons concerning this 
relation are so vague and indistinct is, that they do not possess 
a sufficiently clear and perfect analysis of the human mind. 
The powers and susceptibilities of the mind, as well as the laws 
which govern its phenomena, seem blended together in their 
minds in one confused mass ; and hence the relations they bear 
to each other, and to the divine agency, are as dim and fluctu- 
ating as an ill-remembered dream. In this confusion of laws 
and phenomena, of powers and susceptibilities, of facts and fan- 
cies, it is no wonder that so many crude conceptions and vague 
hypotheses have sprung up and prevailed concerning the great 
difficulty under consideration. In the dim twilight of mental 
science, which has shown all things distorted and nothing in its 
true proportions, it is no wonder that the beautiful order and 
perspective of the moral world should have been concealed 
from our eyes. It was to have been expected, that every 
attempt to delineate this order, would, under such circum- 
stances, prove premature, and aggravate rather than lessen 
the apparent disorders prevailing in the spiritual world. Ac- 
cordingly, such attempts generally terminate, either in the 
denial of the free-agency of man, or of the sovereignty of God ; 



168 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I, 

and those who have maintained both of these tenets in reality, 
as well as in name, have usually refused to allow themselves to 
be troubled by the apparent contradictions in which they are 
involved. While they recognise the two spheres of the human 
and of the divine agency, they have left them so shadowy and 
indistinct, and so distorted from their real proportions, that they 
have inevitably seemed to clash with each other. Hence, to 
describe these two spheres with clearness and precision, and 
to determine the precise point at which they come into contact 
without intersecting each other, is still a desideratum in the 
science of theology. We shall endeavour to define the human 
power and the divine sovereignty, and to exhibit the harmony 
subsisting between them, in such a manner as to supply, in 
some small degree at least,. this great desideratum which has so 
long been the reproach of the most sublime of all the sciences. 
But this is not to be done by planting ourselves upon any one 
particular platform, and dogmatizing from thence, as if that par- 
ticular point of view necessarily presented us with every possible 
phase of the truth. There has been, indeed, so much of this 
one-sided, exclusive, and dogmatizing spirit manifested in rela- 
tion to the subj ect in question, as to give a great appearance of 
truth to the assertion of an ingenious writer, that inasmuch as 
different minds contemplate the divine and human agency from 
different points of view, the predominant or leading idea pre- 
sented to them can never be the same ; and hence they can 
never agree in the same representation of the complex whole. 
The one, says he, " necessarily gives a greater prominence to the 
divine agency, and the other to the scope and influence of the 
human will, and consequently they pronounce different judg- 
ments; just as a man who views a spherical surface from the 
inside will forever affirm it to be concave, while he who con- 
templates it from the outside will as obstinately assert that it is 
convex." But although this has been the usual method of treat- 
ing the subject in question, such weakness and dogmatizing is 
self-imposed, and not an inevitable condition of the human 
mind. We may learn wisdom from the errors of the past, no 
less than from its most triumphant and glorious discoveries. 

In the discussion of this subject, it is true that opposite par- 
ties have confined themselves to first appearances too much, and 
rested on one-sided views. But are we necessarily tied down to 



Chapter V.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 169 

such inadequate conceptions % The causes which separate men 
in opinion, and the obstacles which keep them asunder, are in- 
deed powerful ; but we hope they do not form an eternal bar- 
rier between the wise and good. In regard to doctrines so 
fundamental and so vital as the divine sovereignty and human 
freedom, it is to be hoped that all good men will some day unite, 
and perfectly harmonize with each other. 

As we are rational beings, so we are not tied down to that 
appearance of things which is presented to one particular point 
of view. If this were the case, the science of astronomy would 
never have had an existence. Even the phenomena of that 
noble science are almost inconceivably different from those pre- 
sented to the mind of man at his particular point of view. From 
the small shining objects which are brought to our knowledge 
by the sense of sight, the reason rises to the true dimensions of 
those tremendous worlds. And after the human mind has thus 
furnished itself with the facts of the solar system, it has pro- 
ceeded but a small way toward a knowledge of the system itself. 
It has also to deduce the laws of the material world from its first 
appearances, and, armed with these, it must transport itself from 
the earth to the true centre of the system, from which its won- 
derful order and beauty may be contemplated, and revealed to 
the world. Then these innumerable twinkling points of light, 
which sparkle in the heavens like so many atoms, become to 
the eye of reason the stupendous suns and centres of other 
worlds and systems. 

If we should judge from first appearances, indeed, if we 
could not emancipate ourselves from phenomena as they are ex- 
hibited to us from one particular point of view, then should we 
never escape the conclusion; that the earth is the fixed centre 
of the universe, around which its countless myriads of worlds 
perform their eternal revolutions. But, fortunately, we are 
subject to no such miserable bondage. The mind of man has 
already raised itself from the planet to which his body is con- 
fined, and, planting itself on the true centre of the system, has 
beheld the sublime scheme planned by the infinite reason, and 
executed by the almighty power of the Divine Architect. Surely 
the mind which can do, and has done, all this, has the capacity 
to understand, place it where you will, that although the inside 
of a sphere is concave, the outside may be convex; as well as 



170 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

some 'other things which may perhaps have been placed beyond 
its power, without due consideration. But in every attempt to 
emancipate ourselves from first appearances, and to reach a 
knowledge of the truth, " not as reflected under a single angle," 
but as seen in all its fulness and beauty, it is indispensable to 
contemplate it on all sides, and to mark the precise boundaries 
of all its phases. 

Hence we shall not plant ourselves on the fact of man's 
power alone, and, viewing the subject exclusively from thence, 
enlarge the sphere of human agency to such an extent as to 
shut the divine agency quite out of the intellectual and moral 
world. Nor, on the other hand, shall we permit ourselves to 
become so completely absorbed in the contemplation of the 
majesty of God, to dwell so warmly on his infinite sovereignty 
and the littleness of man, as to cause the sphere of human 
power to dwindle down to a mere point, and entirely disappear. 
We shall endeavour to find the true medium between these 
two extreme opinions. That such a medium exists somewhere, 
will not be denied by many persons. The only question will 
be, as to where and how the line should be drawn to strike out 
this medium. In most systems of theology, this line is not 
drawn at all, but left completely in the dark. We are shown 
some things on both sides of this line, but we are not shown the 
line itself. We are made to see, for example, the fact of human 
existence as something distinct from God, that we may not err 
with Spinoza, in reducing man to a mere fugitive mode of the 
Divine Being, to a mere shadow and a dream. And on the 
other side, we are made to contemplate the omnipotence of 
God, that we may not call in question his sovereignty and 
dominion over the moral world. But between these two posi- 
tions, on which the light of truth has thus been made to fall, 
there is a tract of dark and unexplored territory, a terra incog- 
nita, which remains to be completely surveyed and delineated, 
before we can see the beauty of the whole scene. In the 
attempt to map out this region, to define the precise boun- 
dary of that imperium in imperio, of which Spinoza and others 
entertained so great a horror, we should endeavour to follow 
the wise maxim of Bacon, " to despise nothing, and to admire 
nothing." 

In other words, we should endeavour to "prove all things. 



Chapter V.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 171 

and to hold fast that which is good," without yielding a blind 
veneration to received dogmas, or a blind admiration to the 
seductive charms of novelty. Hence, we shall first stand on 
the same platform with Pelagius, and endeavour to view the 
subj ect with his eyes ; to see all that he saw, as well as to cor- 
rect the eiTors of his observation. And having done this, we 
shall then transport ourselves to the platform of Augustine, 
and contemplate the subject from his point of view, so as to 
possess ourselves of his great truths, and also to correct the 
errors of his observation. Having finished these processes, it 
will not be found difficult to combine the truths of these two 
conflicting schemes in a complete and harmonious system, 
which shall exhibit both the human and the divine elements of 
religion in their true proportions and just relations to each 
other. 

SECTION II. 

The 'Pelagian platform, or mew of the relation oetween the divine and the 

human power. 

The doctrine of Pelagius was developed from his own per- 
sonal experience, and moulded, in a great measure, by his oppo- 
sition to the scheme of Augustine. According to the historian, 
]STeander, as well as to the testimony of Augustine himself, the 
life of Pelagius was, from beginning to end, one " earnest moral 
effort." As his character was gradually formed by his own 
continued and unremitted exertions, without any sudden or 
violent revolution in his views or feelings, so the great fact of 
human agency presented itself to his individual consciousness 
with unclouded lustre. This fact was the great central position 
from which his whole scheme developed itself. And, as the 
history of his opinion shows, he was led to give a still greater 
predominance to this fact, in consequence of his opposition to 
the system of Augustine, by which it seemed to him to be sub- 
verted, and the interests of morality threatened. 

The great fact of free-will, of whose existence he was so well 
assured by his own consciousness, was so imperfectly interpreted 
by him, that he was led to exclude other great facts from his sys- 
tem, which might have been perfectly harmonized with his central 
position. Thus, as Meander well says, he denied the operation of 



172 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

the divine power in the renovation of the soul,* because he 
could not reconcile its influence with the free-agency of man. 
This was the weak point in the philosophy of Pelagius, as it has 
been in the system of thousands who have lived since his time. 
To reject the one of two facts, both of which rest upon clear 
and unequivocal evidence, is an error which has been con- 
demned by Butler and Burlamaqui, as well as by many other 
celebrated philosophers. But this error, so far as we know, has 
been by no one more finely reproved than by Professor Hodge, 
of Princeton. " If the evidence of the constant revolution of 
the earth round its axis," says he, " were presented to a man, it 
would certainly be unreasonable in him to deny the fact, merely 
because he could not reconcile it with the stability of everything 
on the earth's surface. Or if he saw two rays of light made to 
produce darkness, must he resist the evidence of his senses, 
because he knows that two candles give more light than one? 
Men do not act thus irrationally in physical investigations. 
They let each fact stand upon its own evidence. They strive 
to reconcile them, and are happy when they succeed. But 
they do not get rid of difficulties by denying facts. 

" If in the department of physical knowledge we are obliged 
to act upon the principle of receiving every fact upon its own 
evidence, even when unable to reconcile one with another, it is 
not wonderful that this necessity should be imposed upon us in 
those departments of knowledge which are less within the 
limits of our powers. It is certainly irrational for a man to 
reject all the evidence of the spirituality of the soul, because 
he cannot reconcile this doctrine with the fact that a disease of 
the body disorders the mind. Must I do violence to my nature 
in denying the proof of design afforded by the human body, 
because I cannot account for the occasional occurrence of de- 
formities of structure ? Must I harden my heart against all the 
evidence of the benevolence of God, which streams upon me in 
a flood of light from all his works, because I may not know 
how to reconcile that benevolence with the existence of evil ? 
Must I deny my free-agency, the most intimate of all convic- 

° A different view of the Pelagian doctrine on this point is given by Wiggers, 
and yet we suppose that both authors are in the right. The truth seems to me, 
that Pelagius, as usually happens to those who take one-sided views of the truth, 
has asserted contradictory positions. 



Chapter V.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 173 

tions, because I cannot see the consistency between the fine- 
ness of an act and the frequency of its occurrence ? May I 
deny that I am a moral being, the very glory of my nature, 
because I cannot change my character at will 8"* 

If this judicious sentiment had been observed by speculatists, 
it had been well for philosophy, and still better for religion. 
The heresy of Pelagius, and the countless forms of kindred 
errors, would not have infested human thought. But this senti- 
ment, however just in itself, or however elegantly expressed, 
should not be permitted to inspire our minds with a feeling 
of despair. It should teach us caution, but not despondency ; 
it should extinguish presumption, but not hope. For if " we 
strive to reconcile the facts" of the natural world, " and are 
happy when we succeed," how much more solicitous should we 
be to succeed in such an attempt to shut up and seal the very 
fountains of religious error ? 

Nothing is more wonderful to my mind, than that Pelagius 
should have such followers as Reimarus and Lessing, not to 
mention hundreds of others, who deny the possibility of a divine 
influence, because it seems to them to conflict with the intel- 
lectual and moral nature of man.f To assert, as these philoso- 
phers do, that the power of God cannot act upon the human 
mind without infringing upon its freedom, betrays, as we 
venture to affirm, a profound and astonishing ignorance of the 
whole doctrine of free-agency. It proceeds on the amazing 
supposition that the will is the only power of the human mind, 
and that volitions are the only phenomena ever manifested 
therein ; so that God cannot act upon it at all, unless it be to 
produce volitions. But is it true, that God must do all things 
within us, or he can do nothing? that if he produce a change 
in our mental state, then he must produce all conceivable 
changes therein ? In order to refute so rash a conclusion, and 
explode the wild supposition on which it is based, it will be 
necessary to recur to the threefold distinction of the intelligence, 
the sensibility, and the will, already referred to. 

In the perception of truth, as we have seen, the intelligence 
is perfectly passive. Every state of the intelligence is as com- 
pletely necessitated as is the affirmation that two and two are 

° The Way of Life, chap, iii, sec. ii. 

| Knapp's Theology, vol. ii, p. 471. Note by the translator. 



174 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti,. 

equal to four. The decisions of the intelligence, then, are not 
free acts ; indeed, they are not acts at all, in the proper sense 
of the word. They are passive states of the intellect. They 
are usually called acts, it is true ; and this use of language is, 
no doubt, one of the causes which has given rise to so many 
errors and delusions in regard to moral and accountable agency. 
With every decision or state of the intelligence, with every per- 
ception of truth by it, there is intimately associated, it is true, 
an act of the mind, a state of the will, a volition, by which the 
attention is directed to the subj ect under consideration ; and it 
is this intimate association in which the two states or mental 
phenomena seem blended into one, which has led so many to 
regard the passive susceptibility, called the intelligence, as an 
active power, and its states as free acts of the mind. A more 
correct analysis, a finer discrimination of the real facts of con- 
sciousness, must prevail on this subject, before light can be let 
in upon the philosophy of free and accountable agency. The 
dividing knife must be struck between the two phenomena in 
question, between an active state of the will and the passive 
states of the intelligence, and the obstinate association be severed 
in our imagination, before the truth can be seen otherwise than 
through distorting films of error. 

As every state of the intelligence is necessitated, so God may 
act upon this department of our mental frame without infring- 
ing upon the nature of man in the slightest possible degree. 
As the law of necessity is the law of the intelligence, so God 
may absolutely necessitate its states, by the presentation of 
truth, or by his direct and irresistible agency in connexion with 
the truth, without doing violence to the laws of our intellectual 
and moral nature. Nay, in so acting, he proceeds in perfect 
conformity with those laws. Hence, no matter how deep a 
human soul may be sunk in ignorance and stupidity, God may 
flash the light of truth into it, in perfect accordance with the 
laws of its nature. And, as has been well said, " The first 
effect of the divine power in the new, as in the old creation, is 
light." 

This is not all. Every state of the sensibility is a passive im- 
pression, a necessitated phenomenon of the human mind. No 
matter what fact, or what truth, may be present to the mind, 
either by its own voluntary attention or by the agency of God, 



Chapter V.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 175 

or by the cooperation of both, the impression it makes upon the 
sensibility is beyond the control of the will, except by refusing 
to give the attention of the mind to it. Hence, although truth 
may be vividly impressed upon the intelligence, although the 
glories of heaven and the terrors of hell may be made to shine 
into it, yet the sensibility may remain unaffected by them. It 
may be dead. Hence, God may act upon this, may cause it to 
melt with sorrow or to glow with love, without doing violence 
to any law of our moral nature. There is no difficulty, then, in 
conceiving that the second effect of the divine power in the new 
creation is " a new heart." 

Having done all this, he may well call on us to " work out 
our salvation with fear and trembling, for God worketh in us to 
will and to do of his own good pleasure." We have seen that 
the state of the will, that a volition is not necessitated by the in- 
telligence or by the sensibility ; and, hence, it may " obey the 
heavenly vision," or it may " resist and do despite to the Spirit 
of grace." If it obey, then the vivifying light and genial shower 
have not fallen upon the soul in vain. The free-will coalesces 
with the renovated intelligence and sensibility, and the man 
■"has root in himself." The blossom gradually yields to the 
fruit, and the germ of true holiness is formed in the soul. This 
consists in the voluntary exercise of the mind, in obedience to 
the knowledge and the love of God, and in the permanent habit 
formed by the repetition of such exercises. Hence, in the great 
theandric work of regeneration, we see the part which is per- 
formed by God, and the part which proceeds from man. 

This shows an absolute dependence of the soul upon the 
agency of God. For without knowledge the mind can no more 
perform its duty than the eye can see without light ; and with- 
out a feeling of love to God, it is as impossible for it to render 
a spiritual obedience, as it would be for a bird to fly in a vacu- 
um. Yet this dependence, absolute as it is, does not impair the 
free-agency of man. For divine grace supplies, and must sup- 
ply, the indispensable conditions of holiness ; but it does not 
produce holiness itself. It does not produce holiness itself, be- 
cause, as we have seen, a necessary holiness is a contradiction 
in terms. 

Is it not evident, then, that those who assert the impossibility 
of a divine influence, on the ground that it would destroy the 



1-76 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

free-agency of man, have proceeded on a wonderful confusion 
of the phenomena of the human mind ? Is it not evident that 
they have confounded those states of the intelligence and the 
sensibility, which are marked over with the characteristics of 
necessity, with those states of the will which inevitably suggest 
the ideas of freedom and accountability? But, strange as it 
may seem, the philosophers who thus shut the influence of the 
Divine Being out of the spiritual world, because they cannot 
reconcile it with the moral agency of man, do not always deny 
the influence of created beings over the mind. On the contrary, 
it is no uncommon thing to see philosophers and theologians, 
who begin by denying the influence of the Divine Spirit upon 
the human mind, in order to save the freedom of the latter, end 
by subjecting it to the most absolute dominion of facts, and cir 
cumstances, and motives. 



SECTION III. 

The Augustinian Platform, or view of the relation between the divine agency 

and the human. 

The doctrine of Augustine, like that of Pelagius, was de- 
veloped from the individual experience and consciousness of its 
author. The difference between them was, that the sensible 
experience of the one furnished him with only the human ele- 
ment of religion, which was unduly magnified by him ; while 
the divine element was the great prominent fact in the con- 
sciousness of the other, who accordingly rendered it too exclu- 
sive in the formation of his views. The one elevated the human 
element of religion at the expense of the divine ; the other per- 
mitted the maj esty of the divine to overshadow the human, and 
cause it to disappear. 

The causes which induced Augustine to take this sublime but 
one-sided view of religion may be easily understood. In the 
early part of his life, he abandoned himself to vicious excesses ; 
being hurried away, to use a metaphor, by the violence of his 
appetites and passions. His conscience, no doubt, often re- 
proved him for such a course of life, and gave rise to many 
resolutions of amendment. But experience taught him that he 
could not transform and mould his own character at pleasure. 
He lacked those views of truth, and those feelings of reverence 



Chapter V.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 177 

and love to God, without which true obedience is impossible. 
Hence he struggled in vain. He felt his own inrpotency. He 
still yielded to the importunities of appetite and passion. Of a 
sudden, however, he finds his views of divine things changed, 
and his religious sensibilities awakened. He knows this mar- 
vollous transformation is not effected by himself. He ascribes 
it, and he truly ascribes it, to the power of God ; by which he 
has been brought from a region of darkness to light. Old 
things had passed away, and all things become new. 

But now observe the precise manner in which the error of 
Augustine takes its rise in his mind. He, too, as well as Pela- 
gius, confounds the passive susceptibility of the heart with a 
voluntary state of the will. The intelligence and the sensibility 
are the only elements in his psychology ; the states of them, 
which are necessitated, constitute all the phenomena of the 
human mind. Holiness, according to him, consists in a feeling 
of love to God. He knows this is derived from the divine 
agency ; and hence he concludes, that the whole work of con- 
version is due to God, and no part of it is performed by himself. 
I know, says he, that I did not make myself love God, by 
which he means a feeling of love ; and this he takes to be true 
holiness, which has been wrought in his heart by the power of 
God. " Love is the fulfilling of the law ; but love to God is 
not shed abroad in our hearts by the law, but by the Holy 
Ghost." He is sure the whole work is from God, because he is 
sure that the intelligence and the sensibility are the whole of 
man. How many excellent persons are there, who, taking their 
stand upon the same platform of a false psychology, proceed to 
dogmatize with Augustine as confidently as if the only possible 
ground of difference from them was a want of the religious 
experience of the Christian consciousness, by which they have 
been so eminently blessed. We deny not the reality of their 
Christian experience ; but we do doubt the accuracy of their 
interpretation of it. 

Thus, the complex fact of consciousness, consisting in a state 
of the sensibility and a state of the will, was viewed from oppo- 
site points by Pelagius and Augustine. The voluntary phase 
of it was seen by Pelagius, and hence he became an exclusive 
and one-sided advocate of free-agency; the passive side was 
beheld by Augustine, and hence he became a one-sided and 

12 



178 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

exclusive advocate of divine grace. If we would possess the 
truth, and the whole truth, we must view it on all sides, and 
give a better interpretation of the natural consciousness of the 
one, as well as the supernatural consciousness of the other, than 
they themselves were enabled to give. Then shall we not 
instinctively turn to one-sicled views of revelation. Then shall 
we not always repeat with Pelagius, " Work out your own sal- 
vation with fear and trembling," nor always exclaim with 
Augustine, that " God worketh in us to will and to do of his 
good pleasure ;" but we shall with equal freedom and readiness 
approach and appropriate both branches of the truth. 

SECTION IV. 

The viezcs of those who, in later times, have symbolized with Augustine. 

Those divines who have adopted, in the main, the same lead- 
ing views with Augustine, have generally admitted the fact of 
free-agency ; but, because they could not reconcile it with their 
leading tenet, they have, as we have seen, explained it away. 
The only freedom which they allow to man, pertains, as we have 
shown, not to the will at all, but only to the external sphere 
of the body. They have maintained the great fact in words, 
but rejected it in substance. Though they have seen the absur- 
dity of rejecting one fact because they could not reconcile it 
with another, yet their internal struggle after a unity and har- 
mony of principle has induced them to deny, in reality, what 
they have seemed to themselves to preserve and maintain. 
Wq have seen, in the first chapter of this work, in what 
manner this has been done by them ; it now remains to take 
a view of the subject, in connexion with the point under con- 
sideration. 

The man who confounds the sensibility with the will should, 
indeed, have no difficulty in reconciling the divine agency with 
the human. If the state of the mind in willing is purely passive, 
like a state of the mind in feeling; then to say that it is 
produced by the power of God, would create no difficulty what- 
ever. Hence, the great difficulty of reconciling the human with 
the divine agency, which has puzzled and perplexed so many, 
should not exist for one who identifies the will with the sensi- 
bility ; and it would exist for no one holding this psychology. 



Chapter V.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 1*79 

if there were not more in the operations of his nature than in 
the developments of his system. Perhaps no one ever more 
completely lost sight of the true characteristic of the manifesta- 
tions of the will, by thrusting them behind the phenomena of 
the sensibility, than President Edwards ; and hence the diffi- 
culty in question seemed to have no existence for him. So far 
from troubling himself about the line which separates the human 
agency from the divine, he calmly and quietly speaks as if such 
a line had no existence. According to his view, the divine 
agency encircles all, and man is merely the subject of its influ- 
ence. It is true, he uses the terms active and actions, as appli- 
cable to man and his exertions ; but yet he regards his very acts, 
his volitions, as being produced by Gocl. " In efficacious grace," 
says he, " God does all, and we do all. God produces all, and 
we act all. For that is what he produces ; namely, our own 
acts." Now I think Edwards could not have used such lan- 
guage, if he had attached any other idea to the term act, than 
what really belongs to it when it is applied, as it often is, to 
the passive states of the intelligence and the sensibility. An 
act of the intellect, or an act of the affections, may be produced 
by the power of God ; but not an act of the will. For, as the 
Princeton Review well says, " a necessary volition is an ab- 
surdity, a thing inconceivable." 

It is scarcely necessary to add, that in causing all real human 
agency to disappear before the divine sovereignty, Edwards 
merely reproduced the opinion of Calvin ; which he endeav- 
oured to establish, not by a fierce, unreasoning dogmatism, but 
upon the principles of reason and philosophy. " The apostle," 
says Calvin, " ascribes everything to the Lord's mercy, and 
leaves nothing to our wills or exertions."* He even contends, 
that to " suppose man to be a cooperator with God, so that the 
validity of election depends on his consent," is to make the 
" will of man superior to the counsel of God ;"f as if there were 
no possible medium between nothing and omnipotence. 

° Institutes, b. iii, ch. xxiv. j Ibid. 



180 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti. 



SECTION V. 

The danger of mistaking distorted for exalted views of the divine 
sovereignty. 

There is no danger, it is true, that we shall ever form too 
exalted conceptions of the divine majesty. All notions mnst 
fall infinitely below the sublime reality. But we may proceed 
in the wrong direction, by making it our immediate aim and 
object to exalt the sovereignty of God. An object so vast and 
overwhelming as the divine omnipotence, cannot fail to trans- 
port the imagination, and to fill the soul with wonder. Hence, 
in our passionate, but always feeble, endeavours to grasp so 
wonderful an object, our vision may be disturbed by our emo- 
tions, and the glory of God badly reflected in our minds. Our 
utmost exertions may thus end, not in exalted, but in distorted 
views of the divine sovereignty. Is it not better, then, for 
feeble creatures like ourselves, to aim simply to acquire a 
knowledge of the truth, which, we may depend upon it, will 
not fail to exhibit the divine sovereignty in its most beautiful 
lights? 

If such be our obj ect, we shall find, we think, that God is the 
author of our spiritual views in religion, as well as those genuine 
feelings of reverence and love, without which obedience is 
impossible ; and that man himself is the author of the volitions 
by which his obedience is consummated. This shows the pre- 
cise point at which the divine agency ceases, and human agency 
begins ; the precise point at which the sphere of human power 
comes into contact with the sphere of omnipotence, without 
intersecting it and without being annihilated by it. It shows 
at once the absolute dependence of man upon God, without a 
denial of his free and accountable agency ; and it asserts the 
latter, without excluding the Divine Being from the affairs of 
the moral world. It renders unto Caesar the things which are 
Caesar's, and unto God the things which are God's. At the 
same time that it combines and harmonizes these truths, it 
shows the errors of the opposite extremes, and places the doc- 
trines of human and divine agency upon a solid and enduring 
basis, by preventing each from excluding the other. 

In all our inquiries, truth, and truth alone, should be oui 
grand object. All by-ends and contracted purposes, all party 



Chapter V.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 181 

schemes and sectarian zeal, will be almost sure to defeat their 
own objects, by seeking them with too direct and exclusive an 
aim. These, even when noble and praiseworthy, must be 
sought and reached, if reached at all, by seeking and finding 
the truth. Thus, for instance, would we exalt the sovereignty 
of God, then must we not directly seek to exalt that sovereignty, 
but put away from us all the forced contrivances and factitious 
lights which have been invented for that purpose. It is the 
light of truth alone, sought for its own sake, and therefore 
clearly seen, that can reveal the sublime proportions, and the 
intrinsic moral loveliness, of this awful attribute of the Divine 
Being. On the other hand, would we vindicate the freedom 
of man, and break into atoms the iron law of necessity, which 
is supposed to bind him to the dust, then again must we seek 
the truth without reference to this particular aim or object. 
We must study the great advocates of that law with as great 
earnestness and fairness as its adversaries. For it is by the 
light of truth alone, that the real position man occupies in the 
moral world, or the orbit his power moves in, can be clearly 
seen, free from the manifold illusions of error ; and until it be 
thus seen, the liberty of the human mind can never be suc- 
cessfully and triumphantly vindicated. If we would understand 
these things, then, we must struggle to rise above the foggy 
atmosphere and the refracted lights of prejudice, into the 
bright region of eternal truth. 



182 MOEAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 



CHAPTER VI. 

THE EXISTENCE OE MORAL EVIL, OR SIN, RECONCILED WITH THE 
HOLINESS OF GOD. 

One doubt remains, 
That wrings me sorely, if I solve it not. 
o o o c- o o o o a c- o 
The world, indeed, is even so forlorn 
Of all good, as thou speakest it, and so swarms 
With every evil. Yet, beseech thee, point 
The cause out to me, that myself may see 
And unto others show it : for in heaven 
One places it, and one on earth below. — Dante. 

Theology teaches that God is a being of infinite perfections.. 
Hence, it is concluded, that if he had so chosen, he might have 
secured the world against the possibility of evil ; and this 
naturally gives rise to the inquiry, why he did not thus secure 
it ? Why he did not preserve the moral universe, as he had 
created it, free from the least impress or overshadowing of evil ? 
Why he permitted the beauty of the world to become dis- 
figured, as it has been, by the dark invasion and ravages of sin ? 
This great question has, in all ages, agitated and disturbed the 
human mind, and been a prolific source of atheistic doubts 
and scepticism. It has been, indeed, a dark and perplexing 
enigma to the eye of faith itself. 

To solve this great difficulty, or at least to mitigate the stu- 
pendous darkness in which it seems enveloped, various theories 
have been employed. The most celebrated of these are the 
following : 1. The hypothesis of the soul's preexistence ; 2. The 
hypothesis of the Manicheans ; and, 3. The hypothesis of opti- 
mism. It may not be improper to bestow a few brief remai ks 
on these different schemes. 

SECTION I. 
The hypothesis of the souVs preexistence. 

This was a favourite opinion with many of the ancient phi- 
losophers. In the Phsedon of Plato, Socrates is introduced as 
maintaining it; and lie ascribes it to Orpheus as its original 



Chapter VI] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 183 

author. Leibnitz supposes that it was invented for the purpose 
of explaining the origin of evil ;* but the truth seems to be, 
that it arose from the difficulty of conceiving how the soul 
could be created out of nothing, or out of a substance so differ- 
ent from itself as matter. The hypothesis in question was also 
maintained by many great philosophers, because they imagined 
that if the past eternity of the soul were denied, this would 
shake the philosophical proof of its future eternity. f There 
can be no doubt, however, that after the idea of the soul's pre- 
existence had been conceived and entertained, it was very gen- 
erally employed to account for the origin of evil. 

But it must be conceded that this hypothesis merely draws 
a veil over the great difficulty it was designed to solve. 
The difficulty arises, not from the circumstance that evil exists 
in the present state of our being, but from the fact that it is 
found to exist anywhere, or in any state, under the moral 
administration of a perfect Gocl. It is as difficult to conceive 
why such a being should have permitted the soul to sin in a 
former state of existence, even if such a state were an estab- 
lished reality, as it is to account for its rise in the present world. 
To remove the difficulty out of sight, by transf erring the origin 
of evil beyond the sphere of visible things, is a poor substi- 
tute for a solid and satisfactory solution of it. The great 
problem of the moral world is not to be illuminated by any 
such fictions of the imaginatioa ; and we had better let it alone 
altogether, if we have nothing more rational and solid to advance. 



SECTION' II. 
Tlie hypothesis of the Manicheans. 

Though this doctrine is ascribed to Manes, after whom it is 
called, it is of a far more early origin. It was taught, says 
Plutarch, by the Persian Magi, whose views are exhibited by 
him in his celebrated treatise of Isis and Osiris. " Zoroaster," 
says he, " thought that there are two gods, contrary to each 
other in their operations — a good and an evil principle. To the 
former he gave the name of Oromazes, and to the latter that 
of Arimanius. The one resembles light and truth, the other 
darkness and ignorance." We do not allude to this theory for 

° Essais de Theodicee. f Cudworth's Intellectual System. 



184 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I, 

the purpose of combatting it ; we suppose it would scarcely "find 
a respectable advocate at the present day. This, like many 
other inventions of the great intellects of antiquity, has entirely 
disappeared before the simple but sublime doctrines of the 
religion of Jesus. 

M. Bayle, it is true, has exhausted the resources of his genius, 
as well as the rich stores of his learning, in order to adorn the 
doctrine of Manes, and to render it more plausible, if possible, 
than any other which has been employed to explain the origin 
and existence of evil. But this was not because he sincerely 
believed it to be founded in truth. He merely wished to show 
its superiority to other schemes, in order that by demolishing 
it he might the more effectually inspire the minds of men with 
a dark feeling of universal sce23ticism. It was decorated by him, 
not as a system of truth, but as a sacrifice to be offered up on 
the altar of atheism. True to the instincts of his philosophy, he 
sought on this subject, as well as on all others, to extinguish 
the light of science, and manifest the wonders of his power, 
by hanging round the wretched habitation of man the gloom 
of eternal despair. 

Though this doctrine is now obsolete in the civilized world, 
it was employed by a large portion of the ancient philosophers 
to account for the origin of evil. This theory does not, it is 
true, relieve the difficulty it was designed to solve ; but it shows 
that there was a difficulty to be solved, which would not have 
been the case if evil could have been ascribed to the Supreme 
God as its author. If those philosophers could have regarded 
him as a Being of partial goodness, they would have found no 
difficulty in explaining the origin and existence of evil ; they 
would simply have attributed the good and the evil in the 
world to the good and the evil supposed to pertain to his nature. 
But they could not do this, inasmuch as the human mind no 
sooner forms an idea of God, than it regards him as a being of 
unlimited and unmixed goodness. It has shown a disposition, 
in all ages, to adopt the most wild and untenable hypotheses, 
rather than entertain the imagination that evil could proceed 
from the Father of Lights. The doctrine of Manes, then, as 
well as the other hypotheses employed to explain the origin of 
evil, demonstrates how deep is the conviction of the human 
mind that God is light, and in him there is no darkness at all. 



Chapter VI.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 185 

In searching after the fountain of evil, it turns from the great 
source of life and light, and embraces the wildest extravagancies, 
rather than indulge a dark suspicion respecting the goodness 
of its Maker. 



SECTION III. 
The hypothesis of optimism. 

" The fundamental principle of the optimist is," says Dugald 
Stewart, "that all events are ordered for the best; and that 
evils which we suffer are parts of a great system conducted by 
almighty power under the direction of infinite wisdom and 
goodness." Leibnitz, who is unquestionably one of the greatest 
philosophers the world has produced, has exerted all his powers 
to adorn and recommend the scheme of optimism. We have, 
in a former chapter, considered the system of Leibnitz ; but we 
have not denied its fundamental principle, which is so well 
expressed in the above language of Mr. Stewart. If he had 
confined himself to that principle, without undertaking to 
explain how it is that God orders all things for the best, his 
doctrine would have been free from objections, except for a 
want of clearness and precision. 

Dr. Chalmers has said that the scheme of optimism, as left 
by Leibnitz, is merely an hypothesis. He insists, however, that 
even as an hypothesis, it may be made to serve a highly im- 
portant purpose in theology. " If it be not an offensive weapon," 
says he, " with which we may beat down and demolish the 
strongholds of the sceptic, it is, at least, an armour of defence, 
with which we may cause all his shafts to fall harmless at our 
feet." This remark of Dr. Chalmers seems to be well founded. 
The objection of the sceptic, as we have seen, proceeds on the 
supposition that if a Being of infinite perfections had so chosen, 
he might have made a better universe than that which actually 
exists. But we have as good reasons to make suppositions as 
the sceptic. Let us suppose, then, that notwithstanding the 
evil which reigns in the world, the universe is the best possible 
universe that even infinite wisdom, and power, and goodness, 
could have called into existence. Let us suppose that this 
would be clearly seen by us, if we only knew the whole of the 
case ; if we could only view the present condition of man in all 



186 MOEAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

its connexions and relations to God's infinite plans for the uni- 
verse and for eternity. In other words, let ns suppose, that if 
we were only omniscient, our difficulty would vanish, and where 
we now see a cloud over the divine perfections, we should 
behold bright manifestations of them. This is a mere supposi- 
tion, it is true, but it should be remembered that the obj ection 
in question is based on a mere supposition. When it is asked, 
why God permitted evil if he had both the power and the will 
to prevent it ? it is assumed that the prevention of evil is better, 
on the whole, than the permission of it, and consequently more 
worthy of the infinite wisdom and goodness ascribed to God. 
But as this is a mere supposition, which has never been proved 
by the sceptic, we do not see why it may not be sufficiently 
answered by a mere supposition. 

This is an important idea. In many a good old writer, it 
exists in the dark germ; in Dr. Chalmers it appears in the 
expanded blossom. Its value may be shown, and its beauty 
illustrated, by a reference to the affairs of human life ; for many 
of the most important concerns of society are settled and deter- 
mined by the application of this principle. If a man were on 
trial for his life, for example, and certain facts tending to 
establish his guilt were in evidence against him, no enlightened 
tribunal would pronounce him guilty, provided any hypothesis 
could be framed, or any supposition made, by which the facts 
in evidence could be reconciled with his innocence. "Evi- 
dence," says a distinguished legal writer, " is always insufficient, 
where, assuming all to be proved which the evidence tends to 
prove, some other hypothesis may still be true ; for it is the 
actual exclusion of any other hypothesis which invests mere 
circumstances with the force of proof."* This is a settled prin- 
ciple of law. If any supposition can be made, then, which 
would reconcile the facts in evidence with a man's innocence, 
the law directs that he shall be acquitted. Any other rule of 
decision would be manifestly unjust, and inconsistent with the 
dictates of a sound policy. 

This principle is applicable, whether the accused bear a good 
or a bad moral character. As, according to the hypothesis, he 
might be innocent ; so no tribunal on earth could fairly deter- 
mine that he was guilty. The hardship of such a conclusion 
° Starkie on Evidence. 



Chapter VI] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 187 

would be still more apparent in regard to the conduct of a man 
whose general character is well known to be good. In such a 
case, especially, should the facts be of such a nature as to ex- 
clude every favourable hypothesis, before either truth or justice 
would listen to an unfavourable decision and judgment. 

Such is the rule which human wisdom has established, in 
order to arrive at truth, or at least to avoid error, in relation to 
the acts and intentions of men. Hence, is it not reasonable, we 
ask, that we should keep within the same sacred bounds, when 
we come to form an estimate of the ways of God ? No one can 
fairly doubt that the world is replete with the evidences of his 
goodness. If he had so chosen, he might have made every 
breath a sigh, every sensation a pang, and every utterance of 
man's spirit a groan ; but how differently has he constituted the 
world within us, and the glorious world around us ! Instead of 
swelling every sound with discord, and clothing every object 
with deformity, he has made all nature music to the ear and 
beauty to the eye. The full tide of his universal goodness flows 
within us, and around us on all sides. In its eternal rounds, it 
touches and blesses all things living with its power. We live, 
and move, and have our very being in the goodness of God. 
Surely, then, we should most joyfully cling to an hypothesis 
which is favourable to the character of such a Being. Hence, 
we infinitely prefer the warm and generous theory of the opti- 
mist, which regards the actual universe as the best possible, to 
the dark and cold hypothesis of the sceptic, which calls in ques- 
tion the boundless perfections of God. 

In the foregoing remarks, we have concurred with Dr. Chal- 
mers in viewing the doctrine of Bayle as a mere unsupported 
hypothesis ; but have we any right to do so ? It has not been 
proved, it is true ; but there are some things which require no 
proof. Is not the doctrine of Bayle a thing of this kind? It 
certainly seems evident that if God hates sin above all things, 
and could easily prevent it, he would not permit it to appear in 
his dominions. This view of the subject recommends itself 
powerfully to the human mind, which has, in all ages, been 
worried and perplexed by it. It seems to carry its own evi- 
dence along with it ; to shake the mind with doubt, and over- 
spread it with darkness. Hence, we should either expose its 
fallacy or else fairly acknowledge its power. 



188 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

On the other hand, the theory of Leibnitz, or rather the great 
fundamental idea of his theory, is more than a mere hypothesis. 
It rests on the conviction of the human mind that God is in- 
finitely perfect, and seems to flow from it as a necessary conse- 
quence. For how natural, how irresistible the conclusion, that 
if God be absolutely perfect, then the world made by him must 
be perfect also ! But while these two hypotheses seem to be 
sound, it is clear that both cannot be so : there is a real conflict 
between them, and the one or the other must be made to give 
way before our knowledge can assume a clearly harmonious 
and satisfactory form. 

The effects of the hypothesis of the sceptic may be neutralized 
by opposing to it the hypothesis of the theist. But we are not 
satisfied to stop at this point. We intend, not merely to neu- 
tralize, but to explode, the theory of the sceptic. "We intend to 
wrest from it the element of its strength, and grind it to atoms. 
We intend to lay our finger precisely upon the fallacy which 
lies so deeply concealed in its bosom, and from which it derives 
all its apparent force and conclusiveness. We shall drag this 
false principle from its place of concealment into the open light 
of day, and thereby expose the utter futility, the inherent ab- 
surdity, of the whole atheistical hypothesis, to which it has so 
long imparted its deceptive power. If Leibnitz did not detect 
this false principle, and thereby overthrow the theory of Bayle, 
it was because he held this principle in common with him. We 
must eliminate this error, common to the scheme of the atheist 
and to that of the theist, if we would organize the truths which 
both contain, and present them together in one harmonious and 
symmetrical system ; into a system which will enable us, not 
merely to stand upon the defensive, and parry off the attacks of 
the sceptic, but to enter upon his own territory, and demolish 
his strongholds ; not merely to oppose his argument by a counter- 
argument, but to explode his sophism, and exhibit the cause of 
God in cloudless splendour. 

This false principle, this concealed fallacy, of which the athe- 
ist has been so long allowed to avail himself, has been the source 
of many unsuspected errors, and many lamentable evils. It has 
not only given power and efficacy to the weapons of the sceptic, 
but to the eye of faith itself has it cast clouds and darkness over 
the transcendent glory of the moral government of God. It has 



Chapter VI.1 WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 189 

prevented a Leibnitz from refuting the sophism of a Bayle, and 
induced a Kant to declare a theodicy impossible. It has, indeed, 
as we shall see, crept into and corrupted the whole mass of re- 
ligious knowledge ; converting the radiant and clearly-defined 
body of truth into a dark, heterogeneous compound of conflicting 
elements. Hence we shall utterly demolish it, that neither a 
fragment nor a shadow of it may remain to darken and delude 
the minds of men. 



SECTION IV. 

The argument of the atheist — The reply of Leibnitz and other theists—The 
insufficiency of this reply. 

Sin exists. This is the astounding fact of which the atheist 
avails himself. He has never ceased to contend, that as God 
has permitted sin to exist, he was either unable or unwilling to 
prevent it. God might easily have prevented sin, says he, if 
he had chosen to do so ; but he has not chosen to do so, and 
therefore his love of virtue is not infinite, his holiness is not 
unlimited. Kow, we deny this conclusion, and assert the infinite 
holiness of God. 

This assertion may be true, says Voltaire, and hence God 
would have prevented all sin, if his power had not been limited. 
The only conceivable way, says he, to reconcile the existence 
of sin with the purity of God, is " to deny his omnipotence." 
"We insist, on the contrary, that the power of God is absolutely 
without bounds or limits. Though sin exists, we still maintain, 
in o}3position to every form of atheism, that this fact implies no 
limitation of any of the perfections of God. 

Before proceeding to establish this position, we shall consider 
the usual reply of the theist to the great argument of the 
atheist. " The greatest love which a ruler can show for virtue," 
says Bayle, " is to cause it, if he can, to be always practised 
without any mixture of vice. If it is easy for him to procure 
this advantage to his subjects, and he nevertheless permits vice 
to raise its head in his dominions, intending to punish it after 
having tolerated it for a long time, his affection for virtue is not 
the greatest of which we can conceive ; it is then not infinite." 
This has been the great standing argument of atheism in all 
ages of the world. This argument, as held by the atheists of 



190 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT |_Part I, 

antiquity, is presented by Cudworth in the following words: 
" The supposed Deity and Maker of the world was either will- 
ing to abolish all evils, bnt not able ; or he was able bnt not 
willing; or else, lastly, he was both able and willing. This 
latter is the only thing that answers fully to the notion of a God. 
Now that the supposed Creator of all things was not thus both 
able and willing to abolish all evils, is plain, because then there 
would have been no evils at all left. Wherefore, since there 
is such a deluge of evils overflowing all, it must needs be that 
either he was willing, and not able to remove them, and then 
he was impotent ; or else he was able and not willing, and then 
he was envious ; or, lastly, he was neither able nor willing, and 
then he was both impotent and envious." This argument is, 
in substance, the same as that presented by Bayle, and relied 
upon by atheists in all subsequent times. 

To the argument of Bayle, the following reply is given by 
Leibnitz : " When we detach things that are connected together, 
— the parts from the whole, the human race from the universe, 
the attributes of God from each other, his power from his 
wisdom, — we are permitted to say that God can cause virtue to 
oe in the world without any mixture of vice, and even that he 
may easily cause it to he so"* But he does not cause virtue to 
exist without any mixture of vice, says Leibnitz, because the 
good of the whole universe requires the permission of moral 
evil. How the good of the universe requires the permission of 
evil, he has not shown us ; but he repeatedly asserts this to be 
the fact, and insists that if God were to prevent all evil, this 
would work a greater harm to the whole than the permission 
of some evil. Now, is this a sufficient and satisfactory reply to 
the argument of the atheist ? 

It certainly seems to possess weight, and is entitled to serious 
consideration. Bayle contends, that as evil exists, the Creator 
and Governor of the world cannot be absolutely perfect. He 
should have concluded with me, Leibnitz truly says, that as 
God is absolutely perfect, the existence of evil is necessary to 
the perfection of the universe, or is an unavoidable part of the 
best world that could have been created. It is thus that he 
neutralizes, without demolishing, the argument of the atheist, 
and each person is left to be more deeply affected by the argu- 

Theodicee. 



Chapter VL] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 191 

ment of Leibnitz, or by that of Bayle, as bis faith in the 
unlimited goodness of God is strong or weak. If the theist, by 
such means, should gain a complete victory, this would be due 
to the faith of the vanquished, rather than to the superiority 
of the logic by which he is subdued. 

To this argument of Leibnitz we may then well apply his 
own remarks upon another celebrated philosopher. Descartes 
met the argument of the necessitarian, not by exposing its 
fallacy, but by repelling the conclusion of it on extraneous 
grounds. " This was to cut the Gordian knot," says Leibnitz, 
who was himself a necessitarian, " and to reply to the conclu- 
sion of one argument, not by resolving it, but by opposing to it 
a contrary argument ; which is not conformed to the laws of 
philosophical controversy." The reply of Leibnitz to Bayle is 
clearly open to the same objection. It does not analyze the 
sophism of the sceptic, or resolve it into its elements, and point 
out its error ; it merely opposes its conclusion by the presenta- 
tion of a contrary argument. Hence it is not likely to produce 
very great effect ; for, as Leibnitz himself says, in relation to 
this mode of attacking sceptics, " It may arrest them a little, 
but they will always return to their reasoning, presented in dif- 
ferent forms, until we cause them to comprehend wherein the 
defect of their sophism consists." Leibnitz has, then, accord- 
ing to his own canons of criticism, merely cut the Gordian knot 
of atheism, which he should have unravelled. He has merely 
arrested the champions of scepticism " a little," whom he should 
have overthrown and demolished. 

His reply is not only incomplete, in that it does not expose 
the sophistry of the atheist ; it is also unsound. It carries in its 
bosom the elements of its own destruction. It is self-contra- 
dictory, and consequently untenable. It admits that it is easy for 
God to cause virtue to exist, and yet contends that, in certain 
cases, he fails to do so, because the highest good of the universe 
requires the existence of moral evil. But how is this possible ? 
It will be conceded that the good of the individual would be 
promoted, if God should cause him to be perfectly holy and 
happy. This would be for the good of each and every indi- 
vidual moral agent in the universe. How, then, is it possible 
for such an exercise of the divine power to be for the good 
of all the parts, and yet not for the good of the whole ? 



192 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

So far from being able to see how these things can hang 
together, it seems evident that they are utterly repugnant to 
each other. 

The highest good of the universe, we are told, requires the 
permission of evil. What good ? Is it the holiness of moral 
agents ? This, it is said, can be produced by the agency of 
God, without the introduction of evil, and produced, too, in the 
greatest conceivable degree of perfection. Why should evil be 
permitted, then, in order to attain an end, which it is conceded 
can be perfectly attained without it % Is there any higher end 
than the perfect moral purity of the universe, which God seeks 
to accomplish by the permission of sin ? It certainly is not the 
happiness of the moral universe ; for this can also be secured, 
in the highest possible degree, by the agency of the Divine 
Being, without the permission of moral evil. What good is 
there, then, beside the perfect holiness and happiness of the 
universe, to the production of which the existence of moral evil 
is necessary '? There seems to be no such good in reality. It 
appears to be a dream of the imagination, a splendid fiction, 
which has been recommended to the human mind by its horror 
of the cheerless gloom of scepticism. 



SECTION V. 

The sophism of the atheist exploded, and a perfect agreement shown to subsist 
between the existence of sin and the holiness of God. 

Supposing God to possess perfect holiness, he would certainly 
prevent all moral evil, says the atheist, unless his power were 
limited. This inference is drawn from a false premiss ; namely, 
that if God is omnipotent, he could easily prevent moral evil, 
and cause virtue to exist without any mixture of vice. This 
assumption has been incautiously conceded to the atheist by his 
opponent, and hence his argument has not been clearly and 
fully refuted. To refute this argument with perfect clearness, 
it is necessary to show two things : first, that it is no limitation 
of the divine omnipotence to say that it cannot work contra- 
dictious ; and secondly, that if God should cause virtue to exist 
in the heart of a moral agent, lie would work a contradiction. 
We shall endeavour to evince these two things, in order to 
refute the grand sophism of the sceptic, and lay a solid founcla- 



Chapter VL] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 193 

tion for a genuine scheme of optimism, against which no valid 
objection can be urged. 

In the first place, then, it is not a limitation of the divine 
omnipotence to say, that it cannot work contradictions. There 
will be little climcultj in establishing this point. Indeed, it 
will be readily conceded ; and if we offer a few remarks upon 
it, it is only that we may leave nothing dark and obscure behind 
us, even to those whose minds are not accustomed to such 
speculations. 

As contradictions are impossible in themselves, so to say that 
God could perform them, would not be to magnify his power, 
but to expose our own absurdity. When we affirm, that om- 
nipotence cannot cause a thing to be and not to be at one and 
the same time, or cannot make two and two equal to five, we 
do not set limits to it ; we simply declare that such things are 
not the objects of power. A circle cannot be made to possess 
the properties of a square, nor a square the properties of a 
circle. Infinite power cannot confer the properties of the one 
of these figures upon the other, not because it is less than 
infinite power, but because it is not within the nature, or 
province, or dominion of power, to perform such things, to 
embody such inherent and immutable absurdities in an actual 
existence. In regard to the doing of such things, or rather of 
such absurd and inconceivable nothings, omnipotence itself pos- 
sesses no advantage over weakness. Power, from its very 
nature and essence, is confined to the accomplishment of such 
things as are possible, or imply no contradiction. Hence it is 
beyond the reach of almighty power itself to break up and 
confound the immutable foundations of reason and truth. God 
possesses no such miserable power, no such horribly distorted 
attribute, no such inconceivably monstrous imperfection and 
deformity of nature, as would enable him to embody absurdities 
and contradictions in actual existence. It is one of the chief 
excellencies and glories of the divine nature, that its infinite 
power works within a sphere of light and love, without the least 
tendency to break over the sacred bounds of eternal trutn, into 
the outer darkness of chaotic night ! 

The truth of this remark, as a general proposition, will be 
readily admitted. In general terms, it is universally acknowl- 
edged ; and its application is easy where the impossibility is 

13 



194 MOEAL EVIL CONSISTENT |Part 1, 

plain, or the contradiction glaring. But there are things which 
really imply a contradiction, without being suspected to do so. 
We may well ask, in relation to such things, why God does not 
produce them, without being sensible of the absurdity of the 
inquiry. The production of virtue, or true holiness, in the 
breast of a moral agent, is a thing of this kind.* 

This conducts us to our second position ; namely, that if God 
should cause virtue to exist in the breast of a moral agent, he 
would work a contradiction. In other words, the production 
of virtue by any extraneous agency, is one of those impossible 
conceits, those inherent absurdities, which lie quite beyond the 
sphere of light in which the divine omnipotence moves, and 
has no existence except in the outer darkness of a lawless 
imagination, or in the dim regions of error, in which the true 
nature of moral goodness has never been seen. It is absurd, 
we say, to suppose that moral agents can be governed and 
controlled in any other way than by moral means. All physical 
power is here out of the question. By physical power, in con- 
nexion with wisdom and goodness, a moral agent may be 
created, and endowed with the noblest attributes. By physical 
power, a moral agent may be caused to glow with a feeling of 
love, and armed with an uncommon energy of will ; but such 
effects, though produced by the power of God, are not the 
virtue of the moral agent in whom they are produced. This 
consists, not in the possession of moral powers, but in the proper 
and obedient exercise of those powers, f If infinite wisdom, 
and goodness, and power, should muster all the means and 
appliances in the universe, and cause them to bear with united 
energy on a single mind, the effect produced, however grand 
and beautiful, would not be the virtue of the agent in whom it 
is produced. Nothing can be his virtue which is produced 
by an extraneous agency. This is a dictate of the universal 
reason and consciousness of mankind. It needs no meta- 
physical refinement for its support, and no scholastic jargon 
for its illustration. On this broad principle, then, which is so 
clearly deduced, not from the confined darkness of the schools, 
but the open light of nature, we intend to take our stand in 
opposition to the embattled ranks of atheism. 

The argument of the atheist assumes, as we have seen, that a 

° See chapter iii. \ Compare chap. iii. 



Chapter VL] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 195 

Being of infinite power conlcl easily prevent sin, and cause holi- 
ness to exist. It assumes that it is possible, that it implies no 
contradiction, to create an intelligent moral agent, and place it 
beyond all liability to sin. But this is a mistake. Almighty 
power itself, we may say with the most profound reverence, 
cannot create such a being, and place it beyond the possibility 
of sinning. If it could not sin, there would be no merit, no vir- 
tue, in its obedience. That is to say, it would not be a moral 
agent at all, but a machine merely. The power to do wrong, as 
well as to do right, is included in the very idea of a moral and 
accountable agent, and no such agent can possibly exist without 
being invested with such a power. To suppose such an agent 
to be created, and placed beyond all liability to sin, is to suppose 
it 'to be what it is, and not what it is, at one and the same time ; 
it is to suppose a creature to be endowed with a power to do 
wrong, and yet destitute of such a power, which is a plain con- 
tradiction. Hence, Omnipotence cannot create such a being, 
and deny to it a power to do evil, or secure it against the possi- 
bility of sinning. 

"We may, with the atheist, conceive of a universe of such 
beings, if we please, and we may suppose them to be at all 
times prevented from sinning by the omnipotent and irresistible 
energy of the Divine Being ; and having imagined all this, we 
may be infinitely better pleased with this ideal creation of our 
own than with that which God has called into actual existence 
around us. But then we should only prefer the absurd and 
contradictory model of a universe engendered in our own weak 
brains, to that which infinite wisdom, and power, and goodness 
have actually projected into being. Such a universe, if freed 
from contradictions, might be also free from evil, nay, from the 
very possibility of evil ; but only on condition that it should 
at the same time be free from the very possibility of good. It 
admits into its dominions moral and accountable creatures, 
capable of knowing and serving God, and of drinking at the 
purest fountain of uncreated bliss, only by being involved in ir- 
reconcilable contradiction. It may appear more delightful to 
the imagination, before it comes to be narrowly inspected, than 
the universe of God ; and the latter, being compared with it, 
may seem less worthy of the infinite perfections of its Author; 
but, after all, it is but a weak and crazy thing, a contradictious 



196 MOEAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

and impossible conceit. We may admire it, and make it the 
standard by which to try the work of God ; but, after all, it is 
but an "idol of the human mind," and not " an idea of the Di- 
vine Mii'.d." It is a little, distorted image of human weakness, 
and not a harmonious manifestation of divine power. Among 
all the possible models of a universe, which lay open to the in- 
finite mind and choice of God, a thing so deformed had no 
place ; and when the sceptic concludes that the perfections of 
the Supreme Architect are limited, because he did work after 
such a model, he only displays the impotency of his own wis- 
dom, and the blindness of his own presumption. 

Hence, the error of the atheist is obvious. He does not con- 
sider that the only way to place all creatures beyond a liability 
to sin, is to place them below the rank of intelligent and ac- 
countable beings. He does not consider that the only way to 
prevent "sin from raising its head" is to prevent holiness from 
the possibility of appearing in the universe. He does not con- 
sider that among all the ideal worlds present to the Divine Mind, 
there was not one which, if called into existence, would have 
been capable of serving and glorifying its Maker, and yet in- 
capable of throwing off his authority. Hence, he really finds 
fault with the work of the Almighty, because he has not framed 
the world according to a model which is involved in the most 
irreconcilable contradictions. In other words, he fancies that 
God is not perfect, because he has not embodied an absurdity 
in the creature. If God, he asks, is perfect, why did he not 
render virtue possible, and vice impossible? Why did he not 
create moral agents, and yet deny to them the attributes of 
moral agents? Why did he not give his creatures the power to 
do evil, and yet withhold this power from them ? He might 
just as well have demanded, why he did not create matter 
without dimensions, and circles without the properties of a circle. 
Poor man ! he cannot see the wisdom and power of God mani- 
fested in the world, because it is not filled with moral agents 
which are not moral agents, and with glorious realities that are 
mere empty shadows ! 

If the above remarks be just, then the great question, why 
has God permitted sin, which has exercised the ingenuity of man 
in all ages, is a most idle and insignificant inquiry. The only 
real question is, why he created such beings as men at all ; and 



Chapter VI.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 197 

not why lie created them, and then permitted them to sin. The 
first question is easily answered. The second, though often pro- 
pounded, seems to be a most unmeaning question. It is unmean- 
ing, because it seeks to ascertain the reason why God has per- 
mitted a thing, which, in reality, he has not permitted at all. 
Having created a world of moral agents, that is, a world en- 
dowed with a power to sin, it was impossible for him to prevent 
sin, so long as they retained this power, or, in other words, so 
long as they continued to exist as moral agents. A universe of 
such agents given, its liability to sin is not a matter for the will 
of God to permit; this is a necessary consequence from the 
nature of moral agents. He could no more deny peccability to 
such creatures than he could deny the properties of the circle to 
a circle ; and if he could not prevent such a thing, it is surely 
very absurd to ask why he permitted it. 

On the supposition of such a world, God did not permit sin 
at all ; it could not have been prevented. It would be consid- 
ered a very absurd inquiry, if we should ask, why God permit- 
ted two and two to be equal to four, or why he permitted the 
three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles. But 
all such questions, however idle and absurd, are not more so 
than the great inquiry respecting the permission of moral evil. 
If this does not so appear to our minds, it is because we have 
not sufficiently reflected on the great truth, that a necessary 
virtue is a contradiction in terms, an inherent and utter impos- 
sibility. The full possession of this truth will show us, that 
the cause of theism has been encumbered with great difficulties, 
because its advocates have endeavoured to explain the reason 
why God has permitted a thing, which, in point of fact, he has 
not permitted. Having attempted to explain a fact which has 
no existence, it is no wonder that they should have involved 
themselves in clouds and darkness. Let us cease then, to seek 
the reason of that which is not, in order that we may behold 
the glory of that which is. 

We have seen that it is impossible for Omnipotence to create 
moral agents, and yet prevent them from possessing an ability 
to sin or transgress the law of God. In other words, that the 
Almighty cannot give agents a power to sin, and at the same 
time deny this power to them. To expect such things of him, 
is to expect him to work contradictions ; to expect him to cause 



198 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

a thing to be what it is, and not what it is, at one and the 
same time. Thus, although sin exists, we vindicate the charac- 
ter of God, on the ground that it is an inherent impossibility 
to exclude all evil from a moral universe. This is the high, 
impregnable ground of the true Christian theist. 

We have already said, that the only real question is, not why 
God permitted evil, but why he created beings capable of sin- 
ning. Such creatures are, beyond all question, the most noble 
specimens of his workmanship. St. Augustine has beautifully 
said, that the horse which has gone astray is a more noble 
creature than a stone which has no power to go astray. In like 
manner, we may say, a moral agent that is capable of knowing, 
and loving, and serving God, though its very nature implies an 
ability to do otherwise, is a more glorious creature than any 
being destitute of such a capacity. If God had created no such 
beings, his work might have represented him " as a house doth 
the builder," but not " as a son doth his father." If he had 
created no such beings, there would have been no eye in the 
universe, except his own, to admire and to love his works. 
Traces of his wisdom and goodness might have been seen here 
and there, scattered over his works, provided any eye had been 
lighted up with intelligence to see them ; but nowhere would 
his living and immortal image have been seen in the magnifi- 
cent temple of the world. It will be conceded, then, that there 
is no difficulty in conceiving why God should have preferred a 
universe of creatures, beaming with the glories of his own 
image, to one wholly destitute of the beauty of holiness and the 
light of intelligence. But having preferred the noblest order 
of beings, its inseparable incident, a liability to moral evil, could 
not have been excluded. 

Hence God is the author of all good, and of good alone ; and 
evil proceeds, not from him nor from his permission, but from 
an abuse of those exalted and unshackled powers, whose nature 
and whose freedom constitute the glory of the moral universe. 

This, then, is the sublime purpose of God, to give and con- 
tinue existence to free moral agents, and to govern them for 
their good as well as for his own glory. This is the decree of 
the Almighty, to call forth from nothing into actual existence, 
the universe which now shines around us, and spread over it 
the dominion of his perfect moral law. He does not cause sin. 



Chapter VI.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 199 

He does not permit sin. He sees that it will raise its hideous 
head, but he does not say — so let it he. ~No ! sin is the thing 
which God hates, and which he is determined, by all the means 
within the reach of his omnipotence, utterly to root out and 
destroy. The word has gone forth, " Offences must needs come, 
but woe unto the man by whom they come !" His omnipotence 
is pledged to wipe out the stain and efface the shadow of evil, 
in as far as possible, from the glory of his creation. But yet, 
so long as the light and glory of the moral universe is permitted 
to shine, may the dark shadow of evil, which moral agents cast 
upon its brightness and its beauty, continue to exist and par- 
tially obscure its divine perfections. And would it not be un- 
worthy of the divine wisdom and gooelness to remove this par- 
tial shadow, by an utter extinction of the universal light I 

SECTION VI. 

The true and only foundation of optimism. 

Though few have been satisfied with the details of the system 
of optimism, yet has the great fundamental conception of that 
system been received by the wise and good in all ages. " The 
atheist takes it for granted," says Cudworth, "that whosoever 
asserts a God, or a perfect mind, to be the original of all things, 
does therefore ipso facto suppose all things to be well made, 
and as they should be. And this, doubtless, was the sense of 
all the ancient theologers," &c* This distingushed philosopher 
himself maintains, as well as Leibnitz, that the intellectual 
world could not have been made better than it is, even by a 
being of infinite power and goodness. "To believe a God,"" 
says he, " is to believe the existence of all possible good and 
perfection in the universe ; it is to believe that things are as- 
they should be, and that the world is so well framed and 
governed, as that the whole system thereof could not possibly 
have been better."f 

But while this fundamental principle has been held by philos- 
ophers, both ancient and modern, it has been, as we have 
seen, connected with other doctrines, by which it is contra- 
dicted, and its influence impaired. The concession which is- 
imiversally made to the sceptic, that if God is omnipotent, he- 

° Intellectual System, vol. ii, p. 328. f Id., vol. ii, p. 149. 



200 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT |_Part I, 

can easily cause virtue to exist without any mixture of vice, is 
fatal to the great principle that lies at the foundation of optim- 
ism. It resolves the whole scheme, which regards the w:rld 
as the best that could possibly be made, into a loose, vague, 
and untenable hypothesis. It is true, the good man would 
infinitely prefer this hypothesis to the intolerable gloom of 
atheism ; but yet our rational nature demands something more 
solid and clear on which to repose. Indeed, the warmest sup- 
porters of optimism have supplied us with the lofty sentiments 
of a pure faith, rather than with substantial and satisfactory 
views. The writings of Plato, Leibnitz, Cudworth, and Ed- 
wards, all furnish illustrations of the justness of this remark. 
But nowhere is its truth more clearly seen than in the following 
passage from Plotinus : " God made the whole most beautiful, 
entire, complete, and sufficient," says he ; " all agreeing friendly 
with itself and its parts ; both the nobler and the meaner of them 
being alike congruous thereunto. Whosoever, therefore, from 
the parts thereof, will blame the whole, is an absurd and unjust 
censurer. For we ought to consider the parts not alone by 
themselves, but in reference to the whole, whether they be 
harmonious and agreeable to the same ; otherwise we shall 
not blame the universe, but some of its parts taken by them- 
selves."* 

The theist, however, who maintains this beautiful sentiment, 
is accustomed to make concessions by which its beauty is 
marred, and its foundation subverted. For if God could easily 
cause virtue to exist without any mixture of vice, it is demon- 
strable that the universe might be rendered more holy and 
happy than it is, in each and every one of its parts, and con- 
sequently in the whole. But if we assume the position, as in 
truth we may, that a necessary virtue is a contradiction in 
terms, then we can vindicate the infinite perfections of God, by 
showing that sin may enter into the best possible world. This 
great truth, then, that " a necessary holiness is a contradiction 
in terms," which has been so often uttered and so seldom fol- 
lowed out to its consequences, is the precise point from which 
we should contemplate the world, if we would behold the power 
and goodness of God therein manifested. This is the secret of 
the world by which the dark enigma of evil is to be solved. 

° Cudwortk's Intellectual System, vol. ii, p. 338. 



Chapter VI] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 201 

This is the clew, by which we are to be conducted from the 
dark labyrinth of atheistical doubt and scepticism, into the clear 
and open light of divine providence. This is the great central 
light which has been wanting to the scheme of optimism, to 
convert it from a mere bnt magnificent hypothesis, into a clearly 
manifested and glorious reality. 

God governs everything according to the nature which he 
has given it. Indeed, it would be as impossible to necessitate 
true and genuine obedience by the application of power, as it 
would be to convert a stone into a moral agent by the appli- 
cation of motives and persuasion. As sin is possible, then, 
though omnipotence be pledged to prevent its existence, it is 
clear that it cannot be regarded as a limitation of the divine 
power. This cuts off the objection of Yoltaire, and explodes 
the grand sophism on which it is based. God hates sin above 
all things, and is more than willing to prevent it ; and he actu- 
ally does so, in so far as this is possible to infinite wisdom and 
power. This refutes the objection of Bayle, and leaves his 
argument without the shadow of a foundation. God does not 
choose sin, or permit it as a means of the highest good, as if 
there could be any higher good than absolute and universal 
holiness ; but it comes to pass, because God has created a world 
of moral agents, and they have transgressed his law. This 
removes the high and holy God infinitely above the contami- 
nation of all evil, above all contact with the sin of the world, 
and shows an impassable gulf between the purity of the Cre- 
ator and the pravity of the creature. By revealing the true 
connexion of sin with the moral universe, and its relation to 
God, it clearly shows that its existence should not raise the 
slightest cloud of suspicion respecting his infinite goodness and 
power, and thus reconciles the fact of sin's existence with the 
adorable perfections of the Governor of the world. 

It may be said, that although God could not cause holiness 
to prevail universally, by the exercise of his power, yet he 
might employ means and influences sufficient to prevent the 
occurrence of sin. To this there are two satisfactory answers. 
First, it is a contradiction to admit that God cannot necessitate 
virtue, because such a thing is impossible ; and yet suppose that 
he could, in all cases, secure the existence of it, without any 
chance of failure. It both asserts and denies at the same time, 



202 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT |Part I, 

the idea of a necessary holiness. Secondly, the objection in 
question proceeds on the supposition, that there are resources 
in the stores of infinite wisdom and goodness, which might 
have been successfully employed for the good of the universe, 
and which God has failed to employ. But this is a mere gra- 
tuitous assumption. It never has been, and it never can be 
proved. It has not even the appearance of reason in its favour. 
Let the objector show wherein the Almighty could have done 
more than he has actually done to prevent sin, and secure holi- 
ness, without attempting violence to the nature of man, and 
then his objection may have some force, and be entitled to 
some consideration. But if he cannot do this, his objection 
rests upon a mere unsupported hypothesis. It is very easy to 
conceive that more light might have been imparted to men, 
and greater influences brought to bear on their feelings ; but it 
will not follow that such additional inducements to virtue would 
have been good for them. For aught we know, it might only 
have added to their awful responsibilities, without at all con- 
ducing to their good. For aught we know, the means employed 
by God for the salvation of man from sin and misery have, both 
in kind and degree, been precisely such as to secure the maxi- 
mum of good and the minimum of evil. 

Let the sceptic frame a more perfect moral law for the gov- 
ernment of the world than that which God has established ; let 
him show where more tremendous sanctions might be found to 
enforce that law ; let him show how the Almighty might have 
made a more efficacious display of his maj esty, and power, and 
goodness, than he has actually exhibited to us ; let him refer 
to more powerful influences, consistent with the free-agency 
and accountability of man, than those exerted by the Spirit of 
God ; let him do all this, we say, and then he may have some 
right to object and find fault. In one word, let him meet the 
demand of the Most High, " what more could have been done 
to my vineyard, that I have not clone in it," and show it to be 
without foundation, and then there will be some appearance of 
reason in his objection. 



Chapter VI-1 WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 203 



SECTION VII. 

The glory of God seen in the creation of a world, which he foresaw would 
fall under the dominion of sin. 

It may be said that we have not yet gone to the bottom of 
the difficulty ; that although omnipotence could not deny the 
capacity to commit sin to a moral agent, yet God could pre- 
vent moral evil, by refusing to create any being who he fore- 
knew would transgress his law. As God might have prevented 
the rise of evil in our world, by refusing to create man, why, 
it may be asked, did he not do so ? Why did he not, in this 
way, spare the universe that spectacle of crime and suffering 
which has been presented in the history of our fallen race ? To 
this we answer, that God did not choose to prevent sin in this 
way, but to create the world exactly as he did, though he fore- 
saw the fall and all its consequences ; "because the highest good 
of the universe required the creation of such a world. We are 
now prepared to see this great truth in its true light. 

The highest good of the universe may, no doubt, be promoted 
in various ways by the redemption of our fallen race, of which 
Ave have no conception in our present state of darkness and 
ignorance. But we are furnished with some faint glimpses of 
the true source of that admiration and wonder with which the 
angels of God are inspired, as they contemplate the manifesta- 
tion of his glory in reconciling the world to himself. The 
felicity of the angels, and no doubt of all created intelligences, 
must be found in the enjoyment of God. jSTo other object is 
sufficiently vast to fill and satisfy the unlimited desires of the 
mind. And as the character of God must necessarily constitute 
the chief happiness of his creatures, so every new manifesta- 
tion of the glory of that character must add to their supreme 
felicity. 

Now, if there had been no such thing as sin, the compassion 
of God would have been forever concealed from the eyes of his 
intelligent creatures. They might have adored his purity ; but 
of that tender compassion which calls up the deepest and most 
pleasurable emotions in the soul, they could have known abso- 
lutely nothing. They might have witnessed his love to sinless 
beings ; but they could never have seen that love in its omnipo- 



204 MOEAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

tent yearnings over the ruined and the lost. The attribute of 
mercy or compassion would have been forever locked up and 
concealed in the deep recesses of the Divine Mind ; and the 
blessing, and honour, and glory, and dominion, which shall be 
ascribed by the redeemed unto Him that sitteth upon the throne, 
and unto the Lamb, forever and ever, would not have been 
heard in the universe of God. The chord which now sends 
forth the sweetest music in the harmony of heaven, filling its 
inhabitants with deep and rapturous emotions of sympathy and 
delight, would never have been touched by the finger of God. 

How far such a display of the divine character is necessary 
to the ends of the moral government of God can be known only 
to himself. "We are informed in his word, that it is by the 
redemption of the world, through Christ, that the ends of his 
moral government are secured. It pleased the Father, saitli 
St. Paul, that in Christ all fulness should dwell; and having 
made peace through the blood of his cross, by him to reconcile 
all things unto himself, whether they be things in earth, or 
things in heaven. Thus we are told that all things in heaven 
are reconciled unto God, by the blood of the cross. But it may 
be asked, How was it possible to reconcile those beings unto 
God who had never sinned against him, nor been estranged 
from him ? According to the original, God is not exactly said 
to reconcile, but to keep together, all things, by the mediation 
and work of Christ. The angels fell from heaven, and man 
sinned in paradise ; but the creatures of God are secured from 
any further defection from him, by the all-controlling display 
of his character, and by the stupendous system of moral agen- 
cies and means which have been called forth in the great work 
of redemption. 

In this view of the passage in question we are happy to find 
that we are confirmed by so enlightened a critic as Dr. Mac- 
knight. In relation to these words, " And by him to reconcile 
all things," he says, " Though I have translated the a-noKaraXka^a. 
to reconcile, which is its ordinary meaning, I am clearly of 
opinion that it signifies here to unite simply ; because the good 
angels are said, in the latter part of the verse, to be reconciled 
with Christ, who never were at enmity with him. I therefore 
take the apostle's meaning to be this : ' It pleased the Father, 
by Christ, to unite all things to Christ, namely, as their Head and 



Chapter VI.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 205 

Governor.' ; (Col. i, 20.) The same sublime truth is revealed in 
other portions of Scripture, as in the fifteenth chapter of First Cor- 
inthians, where it is said, that it is the design of God to subj ect 
all things to Christ, and exception is made only of Him by 
whom this universal subjection and dominion is established. 

The accomplishment of such an object, it will be admitted, is 
me of unspeakable importance. For no government, however 
perfect and beautiful in other respects, can be of much value 
unless it be so constructed as to secure its own permanency. 
This grand object, revelation informs us, has been attained by 
the redemption of the world through Christ. But for his work, 
those blessed spirits now bound together in everlasting society 
with God, by the sacred ties of confidence and love, might have 
fallen from him into the outer darkness, as angels and arch- 
angels had fallen before them. The ministers of light, though 
having drunk deeply of the goodness of God, and rejoiced in 
his smile, were not satisfied with their condition, and, striving 
to better it, plucked down ruin on their heads. So, man in 
paradise, not content with his happy lot, but vainly striving to 
raise himself to a god, forsook his allegiance to his Maker, and 
yielded himself a willing servant to the powers of darkness. 
But an apostle, though born in sin, having tasted the bitter 
fruits of evil, and the sweet mercies of redeeming love, felt 
such confidence in God, that in whatsoever state he was, he 
could therewith be content. Not only in heaven — not only in 
paradise — but in a dungeon, loaded with irons, and beaten with 
stripes, he could rejoice and give glory to God. This firm and 
unshaken allegiance in a weak and erring mortal to the throne 
of the Most High God, presents a spectacle of moral grandeur 
and sublimity to which the annals of eternity, but for the ex- 
istence of sin, had presented no parallel. 

It is by the scheme of Christianity alone that the confidence 
of the creature in Ins God has been rendered too strong for the 
gates of hell to prevail against him. But for this scheme, the 
moral government of God might have presented scenes of mu- 
tability and change, infinitely more appalling than the partial 
evil which we behold in our present state. Or if God had 
chosen to prevent this, to render it absolutely impossible, by 
the creation of no beings who he foreknew would rebel against 
him, this might have contracted his moral empire into the most 



206 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

insignificant limits. Thus, by the creation of the world, God 
has prepared the way to extend the boundaries of his empire, 
and to secure its foundations. Christ is the corner-stone of the 
spiritual universe, by which all things in heaven and earth are 
kept from falling away from God, its great centre of light and 
life. No wonder, then, that when this crowning event in the 
moral government of the universe was about to be accomplished, 
the heavenly host should have shouted, " Glory to God in the 
highest !" 

This view of the subject of moral evil, derived from revela- 
tion, harmonizes all the phenomena of the moral world with the 
perfections of God, as well as warms and expands the noblest 
feelings of the human heart. St. Paul ascribes the stability of 
all things in heaven to the manifestation of the divine character 
in the redemption of our fallen race. If this be the case, then 
those who so confidently assert that God might have preserved 
the world in holiness, without impairing the free-agency of man, 
as easily as he keeps the angels from falling, are very much 
mistaken. This assertion is frequently made ; but, as we con- 
ceive, without authority either from reason or revelation. It is 
said by a learned divine, "That God has actually preserved 
some of the angels from falling ; and that he has promised to 
preserve, and will, therefore, certainly preserve the spirits of 
just men made perfect ; and that this has been, and will be, 
done without infringing at all on their moral agency. Of 
course, he could just as easily have preserved Adam from fall- 
ing, without infringing on his moral agency."* This argument 
is pronounced by its author to be conclusive and " unanswer 
able." But if God preserves one portion of his creatures from 
falling, by the manner in which he has dealt with those who 
have fallen, it does not follow that he could just as easily have 
kept each and every portion of them from a defection. If a 
ruler should prevent a part of his subjects from rebellion, by 
the way in which he has dealt with those who have rebelled, 
does it follow that he might just as easily have secured obedi- 
ence in the rebels ? It clearly does not ; and hence there is a 
radical defect in the argument of these learned divines and the 
school to which they belong. Let them show that all things in 
heaven are not secured in their eternal allegiance to God by the 

Dwiglit's Sermons, vol. i, pp. 251-412. Dick's Lee, p. 248. 



Chapter VI.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 207 

work of Christ, and then they may safely conclude, that man 
might have been as certainly and infallibly secured against a 
defection as angels and just men made perfect. If God binds 
the spiritual universe to himself, by the display of his un- 
bounded mercy to a fallen race, it does not follow that he could, 
by the same means, have preserved that race itself, and every 
other order of beings, from a defection. For, on this supposi- 
tion, there would have been no fallen race to call forth his 
infinite compassion, and send its binding influences over angels 
and the spirits of just men made perfect. 

According to the sublime idea of revelation, it is the trans- 
cendent glory of the cross that it exerts moral influences, which 
have bound the whole intelligent creation together in one har- 
monious society with God, its sovereign and all-glorious head. 
For aught we know, the stability of the spiritual universe could 
not possibly have been secured in any other way ; and hence, 
if there had been no fall, and no redemption, the grand intel- 
lectual system which is now so full of confidence and joy, 
might have been without a secure foundation. We have seen 
that its foundation could not, from the very nature of things, 
have been established and fixed by mere power ; for this could 
not have kept a single moral agent from the possibility of sin- 
ning, much less a boundless universe of such beings. 

The Christian believer, then, labours under no difficulty in 
regard to the existence of evil, which should in the least opjjress 
his mind. If he should confine his attention too narrowly to 
the nature of evil as it is in itself, he may, indeed, perplex his 
brain almost to distraction; but he should take a freer and 
wider range, viewing it in all its relations, dependencies, and 
ultimate results. If he should consider the origin of evil 
exclusively, he may only meet with impenetrable obscurity and 
confusion, as he endeavours to pry into the dark enigma of the 
world ; but all that is painful in it will soon vanish, if he will 
only view it in connexion with God's infinite plans for the good 
of the universe. He will then see, that this world, with all its 
wickedness and woe, is but a dim speck of vitality in a bound- 
less dominion of light, that is necessary to the glory and per- 
fection of the whole. 

The believer should not, for one moment, entertain the low 
view, that the atonement confers its benefits on man alone. 



208 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

The plan of redemption was not an after-thought, designed to 
remedy an evil which the eye of omniscience had not foreseen ; 
it was formed in the counsels of infinite wisdom long before the 
foundations of the world were laid. The atonement was made 
for man, it is true ; but, in a still higher sense, man was mado 
for the atonement. All things were made for Christ. God, 
whose prerogative it is to bring good out of evil, will turn the 
short-lived triumph of the powers of darkness into a glorious 
victory, and cause it to be a universal song of rejoicing to his 
great name throughout the endless ages of eternity. 

Who would complain, then, that he is subject to the evils of 
this life, since he has been subjected in hope? Everything 
around us is a type and symbol of our high destiny. All things 
shadow forth the glory to be revealed in us. The insignificant 
seed that rots in the earth does not die. It lives, it germinates, 
it grows, it springs up into the stately plant, and is crowned 
with beauty. The worm beneath our feet, though seemingly so 
dead, is, by the secret all-working power of God, undergoing 
changes to fit it for a higher life. In due time it puts off its 
form of death, and rises, " like a winged flower," from the cold 
earth into a warm region of life and light. In like manner, 
the bodies we inhabit, wonderfully and fearfully as they are 
made, are destined to moulder in the grave, and become the 
food of worms, before they are raised like unto Christ's glorified 
body, clothed with power and immortality. Nature itself, with 
all its teeming forms of beauty, must decay, till "pale con- 
cluding winter comes at last, and shuts the scene." But the 
scene is closed, and all its magnificence shut in, only that it 
may open out again, as it were, into all the wonders of a new 
creation. Even so the human soul, although it be subjected to 
the powers of darkness for a season, may emerge into the light 
and blessedness of eternity. Such is the destiny of man; and 
upon himself, under God, it depends whether this high des- 
tiny be fulfilled, or his bright hopes blasted. " I call heaven 
and earth this day to witness," saith the Lord, " that I have set 
before you life and death, blessing and cursing ; therefore choose 
life." 



Chapter VI.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 209 

SECTION VIII. 

The little, captious spirit of Voltaire, and other atheizing minute philosophers. 

It will be objected, no doubt, that in the foregoing vindication 
of the divine holiness, we have taken for granted the Christian 
scheme of redemption ; bnt it should be remembered, that we 
do not propose " to justify the ways of God to man" on deistical 
principles. We are fully persuaded, that if God had merely 
created the world, and remained satisfied to look down as an 
idle spectator upon the evils it had brought upon itself, his 
character and glory would not admit of vindication ; and we 
should not have entered upon so chimerical an enterprise. "We 
have attempted to reconcile the government of the world, as set 
forth in the system we maintain, and in no other, with the per- 
fections of God; and whoever objects that this cannot be done, 
is bound, we insist, to take the system as it is in itself, and not 
as it is mangled and distorted by its adversaries. We freely 
admit, that if the Christian religion does not furnish the means 
of such a reconciliation, then we do not possess them, and are 
necessarily devoted to despair, 

Here we must notice a very great inconsistency of atheists. 
They insist that if the world had been created by an infinitely 
perfect Being, he would not have permitted the least sin or dis- 
order to arise in his dominions ; yet, when they hear of any 
interposition on his part for the good of the world, they pour 
ridicule upon the idea of such intervention as wholly unworthy 
of the majesty of so august a Being. So weak and wavering- 
are their notions, that it agrees equally well with their creed, 
that it becomes an infinitely perfect Being to do all things, and 
that it becomes him to do nothing ! Can you believe that an 
omnipotent God reigns, says M. Voltaire, since he beholds the 
frightful evils of the world without putting forth his arm to 
redress them? Can you believe, asks the same philosopher, 
that so great a being, even if he existed, would trouble himself 
about the affairs of so insignificant a creature as man ? 

Such inconsistencies are hardly worthy of a philosopher, who 
possesses a wisdom so sublime, and a penetration so profound, 
as to authorize him to sit in judgment on the order and har- 
mony of the universe. They are perfectly worthy, however, 

14 



210 MOEAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

of the author of Candidus. The poison of this work consists, 
not in its argument, but in its ridicule. Indeed, it is not even 
an attempt at argument or rational criticism. The sole aim 
of the author seems to be to show the brilliancy of his wit, at 
the expense of " the best of all possible worlds ;" and it must 
be confessed that he has shown it, though it be in the worst 
of all possible causes. 

Instead of attempting to view the existence of evil in the light 
of any principle whatever, he merely accumulates evil upon 
evil ; and when the mass has become sufficiently terrific, with 
the jeering mockery of a small fiend, he delights in the con- 
templation of the awful spectacle as a conclusive demonstration 
that the Ruler of the world is unequal to the government of his 
creatures. His book is merely an appeal to the ignorance and 
feelings of the reader, and can do no mischief, except when it 
may happen to find a weak head in union with a corrupt heart. 
For what does it signify that the castle of the Baron Thunder- 
ten-trock was not the most perfect of all possible castles ; does 
this disprove the skill of the great Architect of the universe? 
Or what does it signify that Dr. Pangloss lost an eye ; does this 
extinguish a single ray of the divine omniscience, or depose 
either of the great lights which God ordained to rule the world ? 
Lastly, what does it signify that M. Voltaire, by a horrible 
abuse of his powers, should have extinguished the light of 
reason in his soul; does this disprove the goodness of that 
Being by whom those powers were given for a higher and a 
nobler purpose ? A fracture in the dome of St. Paul's would, 
no doubt, present as great difficulties to an insect lost in its 
depths, as the disorders of this little world presented to the 
captious and fault-finding spirit of M. Yoltaire ; and would as 
completely shut out the order and design of the whole structure 
from its field of vision, as the order and design of the ma^nifi- 
cent temple of the world was excluded from the mind of this 
very minute philosopher. 



Chapter Vn.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 211 



CHAPTER YIL 

OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED. 

Heaven seeth all, and therefore knows the sense 

Of the whole beauteous frame of Providence. 

His judgment of God's kingdom needs must fail, 

Who knows no more of it than this dark jail. — Baxter. 

One part, one little part, we dimly scan, 

Through the dark medium of life's feverish dream ; 

Yet dare arraign the whole stupendous plan, 

If hut that little part incongruous seem. — Beattie. 

Though we have taken great pains to obviate obj ections by the 
manner in which we have unfolded and presented our views, 
yet we cannot but foresee that they will have to run the gaunt- 
let of adverse criticism. Indeed, we could desire nothing more 
sincerely than such a thing, provided they be subjected to the 
test of principle, and not of prejudice. But how can such a 
thing be hoped for? Is all theological prejudice and bigotry 
extinct, that an author may hope to have a perfectly fair hear- 
ing, and impartial decision ? Experience has taught us that we 
must expect to be assailed by a great variety of cavils, and that 
the weakest will often produce as great an effect as the strongest 
upon the minds of sectarians. Hence, we shall endeavour to 
meet all such objections as may occur to us, provided they can 
be supposed to exert any influence over the mind. 

SECTION I. 
It may be objected that the foregoing scheme is "new theology." 

If nothing more were intended by such an objection, than to 
put the reader on his guard against the prejudice in favour of 
novelty, we could not complain of it. For surely every new 
opinion which comes into collision with received doctrines, 
should be held suspected, until it is made to undergo the 
scrutiny to which its importance and appearance of truth 
may entitle it. ~No reasonable man should complain of 



212 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

such a precaution. Certainly, the present writer should not 
complain of such treatment, for it is precisely the treatment 
which he has received from himself. He well remembers, 
that when the great truths, as he now conceives them to be, 
first dawned upon his own mind, how sadly they disturbed and 
perplexed his blind veneration for the past. As he was him- 
self, then, so ready to shrink from his own views as "new 
theology," he surely cannot censure any one else for so doing, 
provided he will but give them a fair and impartial hearing 
before he proceeds to scout them from his presence. 

It is true, after the writer had once fairly made the discovery 
that "old theology" is not necessarily true theology, he could 
proceed with the greater freedom in his inquiries. He did not 
very particularly inquire whether this or that was old or new, 
but whether it was true. He felt assured, that if he could only 
be so fortunate as to find the truth, the defect of novelty would 
be cured by lapse of time, and he need give himself no very 
great concern about it. 

JSTot many centuries ago, as everybody knows, Galileo was 
condemned and imprisoned for teaching " new theology." He 
had the unbounded audacity to put forth the insufferable heresy, 
" directly against the very word of God itself," that the sun 
does not revolve around the earth. The Yatican thundered, 
and crushed Galileo ; but it did not shake the solar system. 
This stood as firm in its centre, and rolled on as calmly and as 
majestically in its course, as if the Yatican had not uttered its 
anathema. Its thunders are all hushed now. Nay, it has even 
reversed its former decree, and concluded to permit the orbs 
of light to roll on in the paths appointed for them by the 
mighty hand that reared this beautiful fabric of the heavens and 
the earth. Even so will it be, in relation to all sound views 
pertaining to the constitution and government of the moral 
world; and those who may deem them unsound, will have to 
give some more solid reason than an odious epithet, before 
they can resist their progress. 

We do not pretend that they have not, or that they cannot 
give, more solid reasons for this opposition to what is called 
"new theology." We only mean, that an objection, which, 
entirely overlooking the truth or the falsehood of an opinion, 
appeals to prejudice by the use of an odious name, is unworthy 



Chapter VII] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 213 

of a serious and candid inquirer after truth, and therefore 
should be laid aside by all who aspire to such a character. 



SECTION II. 

It may oe imagined that the views herein set forth limit the omnipotence of 

God. 

This objection has already been sufficiently answered; but it 
may be well to notice it more distinctly and by itself, as it is 
one upon which great reliance will be placed. It is not deny- 
ing the omnipotence of God, as all agree, to say that he cannot 
work contradictions ; but, as we have seen, a necessitated voli- 
tion is a contradiction in terms. Hence, it does not deny or 
limit the divine omnipotence, to say, it cannot produce or neces- 
sitate our volitions. It is absurd to say, that that is a voluntary 
exercise of power, which is produced in us by the power of God. 
Both of these principles are conceded by those who will be 
among the foremost, in all probability, to deny the conclusion 
which necessarily flows from them. Thus, the Princeton 
Eeview, for example, admits that God cannot work contradic- 
tions; and also that "a necessary volition is an absurdity, a 
thing inconceivable." But will it say, that God cannot work a 
volition in the human mind ? that omnipotence cannot work this 
particular absurdity? If that journal should speak on this 
subject at all, we venture to predict it will be seen that it has 
enounced a great truth, without perceiving its bearing upon the 
Princeton school of theology. 

If this objection has any solidity, it lies with equal force 
against the scheme of Leibnitz, Edwards, and other philosophers 
and divines, as well as against the doctrine of the foregoing 
treatise. For they affirm, that God chooses sin as the necessary 
means of the greatest good ; and that he could not exclude sin 
from the universe, without causing a greater evil than its per- 
mission. This sentiment is repeatedly set forth in the Essais de 
Theodicee of Leibnitz ; and it is also repeatedly avowed by Ed- 
wards. Now, here is an inherent impossibility ; namely, the 
prevention of sin without producing a greater evil than its per- 
mission, which it is assumed God cannot work. In other words, 
when it is asserted, that he chooses sin as the necessary means 
of the greatest good, it is clearly intended that he cannot secure 



214 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

the greatest good without choosing that sin should exist. Hence 
if the doctrine of this discourse limits the omnipotence of God, 
no less can be said of that to which it is opposed. 

But both schemes may be objected to on this ground, and 
both be set aside as limiting the perfections of God. Indeed, 
it has been objected against the scheme of Leibnitz, "that it 
seems to make something which I do not know how to express 
otherwise than by the ancient stoical fate, antecedent and supe- 
rior even to God himself. I would therefore think it best to 
say, with the current of orthodox divines, that God was per- 
fectly free in his purpose and providence, and that there is no 
reason to be sought for the one or the other beyond himself."* 
We do not know what reply Leibnitz would have made to such 
an objection; but we should be at no loss for an answer, were 
it urged against the fundamental principle of the preceding 
discourse. We should say, in the first place, that it was a very 
great pity the author could not find a better way of expressing 
his objection, " than by the ancient stoical fate, antecedent and 
superior even to God himself." To say that God cannot work 
contradictions, is not to place a stoical fate, nor any other kind 
of fate, above him. And if it is, this impiety is certainly prac- 
tised by " the current of orthodox divines," even in the author's 
own sense of the term ; for they all affirm that God cannot 
work contradictions. 

If such an objection has any force against the present treatise, 
it might be much better expressed than by an allusion to " the 
ancient stoical fate." Indeed, it is much better expressed by 
Luther, in his vindication of the doctrine of consubstantiation. 
When it was urged against that doctrine, that it is a mathe- 
matical impossibility for the same corporeal substance to be in 
a thousand different places at one and the same time, the great 
reformer resisted the objection as an infringement of the divine 
sovereignty : " God is above mathematics," he exclaimed : " I 
reject reason, common-sense, carnal arguments, and mathe- 
matical proofs."f There is no doubt but the orthodox divines 
of the present day will be disposed to smile at this specimen 
of Luther's pious zeal for the sovereignty of God ; and although 

° Witherspoon, as quoted in "New and Old Theology," issued by the Presby- 
terian Board of Publication. 

f D'Aubigne's History of the Reformation, book xiii. 



Chapter VII.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 215 

they may not be willing to admit that God is above all reason and 
common-sense, yet will they be inclined to think that, in some 
respects, Luther was a little below them. But while they smile 
at Luther, might it not be well to take care, lest they should 
display a zeal of the same kind, and equally pleasant in the 
estimation of posterity ? 

In affirming that omnipotence cannot work contradictions, 
we are certainly very far from being sensible that we place a 
" stoical fate " above God, or any other kind of fate. We would 
not place mathematics above God ; much less would we place 
him below mathematics. Nor would we say anything which 
would seem to render him otherwise than " perfectly free in 
his purpose, or in his providence." To say that he cannot make 
two and two equal to five, is not, we trust, inconsistent with 
the perfection of his freedom. If it would be a great imper- 
fection in mortals, as all orthodox divines will admit, to be able 
to affirm and believe that two and two are equal to five ; then 
it would be a still greater imperfection in God, not only to be 
able to affirm such a thing, but to embody it in an actual 
creation. In like manner, if it would be an imperfection in 
us to be able to affirm so great " an absurdity," a thing so 
" inconceivable " as a " necessary volition ;" then it could not 
add much to the glory of the Divine Being, to suppose him 
capable of producing such a monstrosity in the constitution and 
government of the world. 

There is a class of theologians who reject every explication 
of the origin of evil, on the ground that they limit the divine 
sovereignty ; and to the question why evil is permitted to exist, 
they reply, " We cannot tell." If God can, as they insist he 
can, easily cause holiness to shine forth with unclouded, uni- 
versal splendour, no wonder they cannot tell why he does not 
do so. If, by a single glance of his eye, he can make hell itself 
clear up and shine out into a heaven, and fix the eternal glories 
Df the moral universe upon an immovable foundation, no wonder 
they can see no reason why he refuses to do so. The only 
wonder is that they cannot see that, on this principle, there is 
no reason at all for such refusal, and the permission of moral 
evil. For if God can do all this, and yet permits sin "to raise 
its hideous head in his dominions," then there is, and must be, 
something which he loves more than holiness, or abhors more 



216 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT |_Part I, 

than sin. And hence, the reason why they cannot tell is, in 
our humble opinion, because they have already told too much, — 
more than they know. To doubt in the right place, is often the 
best cure for doubt ; and to dogmatize in the wrong place, is 
often the most certain road to scepticism. 



SECTION III. 
The foregoing scheme, it may oe said, presents a gloomy view of the universe. 

If we say that God cannot necessitate our volitions, or neces- 
sarily exclude all evil from a moral system, it will be obj ected, 
that, on these principles, " we have no certainty of the con- 
tinued obedience of holy, angelic, and redeemed spirits."* 
This is true, if the scheme of necessity affords the only ground 
of certainty in the universe. But we cannot see the justness 
of this assumption. It is agreed on all sides, that a fixed habit 
of acting, formed by repeated and long-continued acts, is a 
pretty sure foundation for the certainty of action. Hence, there 
may be some little certainty, some little stability in the moral 
world, without supposing all things therein to be necessitated. 
Perhaps there may be, on this hypothesis, as great certainty 
therein, as is actually found to exist. In the assertion so often 
made, that if all our volitions are not controlled by the divine 
power, but left to ourselves, then the moral world will not be 
so well governed as the natural, and disorders will be found 
therein ; the fact seems to be overlooked, that there is actually 
disorder and confusion in the moral world. If it were our object 
to find an hypothesis to overturn and refute the facts of the 
moral world, we know of none better adapted to this purpose 
than the doctrine of necessity ; but if it be our aim, not to deny, 
but to explain the phenomena of the moral world, then must 
we adopt some other scheme. 

But it has been eloquently said, that " if God could not have 
prevented sin in the universe, he cannot prevent believers from 
falling ; he cannot prevent Gabriel and Paul from sinking at 
once into devils, and heaven from turning into a hell. And 
were he to create new races to fill the vacant seats, they might 
turn to devils as fast as he created them, in spite of anything 
that he could do short of destroying their moral agency. He 

Old and New Theology, p. 38. 



Chapter VIL] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 217 

is liable to be defeated in all bis designs, and to be as miserable 
as be is benevolent. Tbis is infinitely tbe gloomiest idea that 
was ever thrown upon the world. It is gloomier than hell 
itself.'' True, there might be a gloomier spectacle in the uni- 
verse than hell itself ; and for this very reason it is, as we have 
seen, that God has ordained hell itself, that snch gloomier 
spectacle may never appear in the universe to darken its trans- 
cendent and eternal glories. It is on this principle that we 
reconcile the infinite goodness of God with the awful spectacle 
of a world lying in ruins, and the still more awful spectacle of 
an eternal hell beyond the grave. 

It is true, there might be a gloomier idea than hell itself; 
there might be two such ideas. Nay, there might be two such 
things ; but yet, so far as we know, there is only one. We beg 
such objectors to consider, there are some things which, even 
according to our scheme, will not take place quite so fast as 
they may be pleased to imagine them. It is true, for example, 
that a man, that a rational being, might take a copper instead 
of a guinea, if both were presented for his selection; but 
although we may conceive this, it does not follow that he will 
actually take the copper and leave the guinea. It is also true, 
that a man might throw himself down from the brink of a 
precipice into a yawning gulf; yet he may, perhaps, refuse to 
do so. This may be merely a gloomy idea, and may never 
become a gloomy fact. In like manner, as one world fell away 
from God, so might another, and another. But yet this imagin- 
ation may never be realized. Indeed, the Supreme Ruler of 
all things has assured us that it will not be the case ; and in 
forming our views of the universe, we feel more disposed to 
look at facts than at fancies. 

We need not frighten ourselves at " gloomy ideas." There 
are gloomy facts enough in the universe to call forth all our 
fears. Indeed, if we should permit our minds to be directed, 
not by the reality of things, but by the relative gloominess of 
ideas, we should altogether deny the eternity of future torments, 
and rejoice in the contemplation of the bright prospects of the 
universal holiness and happiness of created beings. We believe, 
however, that when the truth is once found, it will present the 
universe of God in a more glorious point of view, than it can 
be made to display by any system of error whatever. Whether 



218 MOEAL EVIL CONSISTENT . [Parti, 

the foregoing scheme possesses this characteristic of truth or 
not, the reader can now determine for himself. He can deter- 
mine whether it does not present a brighter and more lovely 
spectacle to contemplate God, the great fountain of all being 
and all light, as doing all that is possible, in the very nature of 
things, for the holiness and happiness of the universe, and 
actually succeeding, through and by the cooperation of his 
creation, in regard to all worlds but this ; than to view him as 
possessing the power to shut out all evil from the universe, for 
time and for eternity, and yet absolutely refusing to do so. 

But let me insist upon it, that the first and the all-important 
inquiry is, " What is truth f This is the only wise course ; and 
it is the only safe course for the necessitarian. For no system, 
when presented in its true colours, is more gloomy and appalling 
than his own. It represents the great God, who is seated upon 
the throne of the universe, as controlling all the volitions of his 
rational creatures by the omnipotence of his will. The first 
man succumbs to his power. At this unavoidable transgression, 
God kindles into the most fearful wrath, and dooms both him- 
self and his posterity to temporal and eternal misery. If this 
be so, then let me ask the reader, if the fact be not infinitely 
"gloomier than hell itself?" 



SECTION IV. 

It may be alleged, that in refusing to subject the volitions of men to the 
power and control of God, we undermine the sentiments of humility and 



This objection is often made : it is, indeed, the great prac- 
tical ground on which the scheme of necessity plants itself. 
The obj ect is, no doubt, a most laudable one ; but every laud- 
able object is not always promoted by wise means. Let us 
see, then, if it be wise thus to assert the doctrine of a necessi- 
tated agency, in order to abase the pride of man, and teach him 
a lesson of humility. 

If we set out from this point of view, it will be found exceed- 
ingly difficult, if not inrpossible, to tell when and where to stop. 
In fact, those who rely upon this kind of argument, often carry 
it much too far ; and if we look around us, we shall find that 
the only means of escaping the charge of pride, is to swallow 



Chapter VII.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 219 

all the doctrines which the teachers of humility may be pleased 
to present to us. Thus, for example, Spinoza would have us 
to believe that man is not a person at all, but a mere fugitive 
mode of the Divine Being. Nothing is more ridiculous, in his 
eyes, than that so insignificant a thing as a man should aspire 
to the rank of a distinct, personal existence, and assume to him- 
self the attribute of free-will. " The free-will," says he, " is a 
chimera of the same kind, nattered by our pride, and in reality 
founded upon our ignorance." ISTow it may not be very hum- 
ble in us, but still we beg leave to protest against this entire 
annihilation of our being. 

Even M. Comte, who in his extreme modesty, denies the 
existence of a God, insists that it is nothing but the fumes of 
pride and self-conceit, the intoxication of vanity, which induces 
us to imagine that we are free and accountable beings. ISTo 
doubt he would consider us sufficiently humble and submissive, 
provided we would only forswear all the light which shines 
within us and around us, and swallow his atheistical dogmae. 
But there is something more valuable in the universe, if we 
mistake not, than even a reputation for humility. 

But no one will expect us to go so far in self-abasement 
and humility, as to submit our intellects to all sorts of dogmas. 
It will be amply sufficient, if we only go just far enough to 
receive the dogmas of his particular creed. Thus, for example, 
if you assail the doctrine of necessity, on which, as we have 
seen, Calvinism erects itself, the Puseyite will clasp his hands, 
and cry out, " Well done !" But if you turn around and oppose 
any of his dogmas, then what pride and presumption to set up 
your individual opinion against " the decisions of the mother 
Church !"* And he will be sure to wind up his lesson of humil- 
ity with that of St. Yincentius : " Quod ubique, quod semper, 
quod ab omnibus." Seeing, then, that a reputation for humility 
is not the greatest good in the universe, and that the only pos- 
sibility of obtaining it, even from one party, is by a submission 
of the intellect to its creed ; would it not be as well to leave 
such a reputation to take care of itself, and use all exertions to 
search out and find the truth ? 

Tell a carnal, unregenerate man, it is said, that though 
God had physical power to create him, he has not moral power 
° The writer here speaks from personal experience. 



220 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part I, 

to govern him, and yon conld not furnish his mind with better 
aliment for pride and rebellion. Should yon, after giving this 
]esson, press upon him the claims of Jehovah, yon might expect 
1o be answered, as Moses was by the prond oppressor of Israel : 
" Who is the Lord, that I shonld obey his voice ? "* He must, 
indeed, be an exceedingly carnal mem, who should draw such 
an inference from the doctrine in question. But we should not 
tell him that " God had no moral power to govern him." We 
should tell him, that God could not control all his volitions ; 
that he could not govern him as a machine is governed, 
without destroying his free-agency ; but we should still insist 
that he possessed the most absolute and uncontrollable power 
to govern him ; that God can give him a perfect moral law, 
and power to obey it, with the most stupendous motives for 
obedience ; and then, if he persist in his disobedience, God 
can, and will, shut him up in torments forever, that others, 
seeing the awful consequences of rebellion, may keep their 
allegiance to him. Is this to deny the power of God to govern 
his creatures ? 

But is it not wonderful that a Calvinist should undertake to 
test a doctrine by the consequences which a " proud oppressor," 
or " a carnal man," might draw from it ? If we should tell 
such a man, that God possesses the absolute power to control 
his volitions, and that nothing ever happens on earth but in 
perfect accordance with his good will and pleasure, might we 
not expect him to conclude, that he would then leave the matter 
with God, and give himself no trouble about it ? 

If we may judge from the practical effect of doctrines, then 
the authors of the objection in question do not take the best 
method to inculcate the lesson of humility. They take the pre- 
cise course pursued by Melancthon, and often with the same 
success. This great reformer, it is well known, undertook to 
frame his doctrine so as to teach humility and submission : with 
this view he went so far as to insist, that man was so insignifi- 
cant a thing, that he could not act at all, except in so far as he 
was acted upon by the Divine Being. Having reached this 
position, he not only saw, but expressly adopted the conclusion, 
that God is the author of all the volitions of men ; that he was 
the author of David's adultery as well as of Saul's conversion. 

° Old and New Theology, p. 40. 



Chapter VII. ] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 221 

Now, it is true, if the human mind could abase itself so low as 
to embrace such a doctrine, it would give a most complete, if 
not a most pleasing example of its submissiveness. But it can- 
not very well do so. For even amid the ruins of our fallen 
nature, there are some fragments left, which raise the intellect 
and moral nature of man above so blind and so abject a 
submission to the dominion of error. Hence it was, that 
Melancthon himself could not long submit to his own doctrine ; 
and he who had undertaken to teach others humility, became 
one of the most illustrious of rebels. This suggests the profound 
aphorism of Pascal : " It is dangerous to make us see too much 
how near man is to the brutes, without showing him his great- 
ness. It is also dangerous to make him see his greatness with- 
out his baseness. It is still more dangerous to leave him igno- 
rant of both. But it is very advantageous to represent to him 
both the one and the other. "* 

The fact is, that nothing can teach the human intellect a 
genuine submission but the light of evidence : this, and this 
alone, can rivet upon our speculative faculty the chains of 
inevitable conviction, and bind it to the truth. Those who 
teach error, then, may preach humility with success to the 
blind and the unthinking ; but wherever men may be disposed 
to think for themselves, they must expect to find rebels. How 
many at the present day have begun, like Melancthon, by the 
preaching of submission, and ended by the practice of rebellion 
against their own doctrines. It is wonderful to observe the 
style of criticism usually adopted by the faithful, as one illus- 
trious rebel after another is seen to depart from their ranks. 
The moment he is known to doubt a single dogma of the estab- 
lished faith, the awful suspicion is set afloat, " there is no tell- 
ing where he will end." Alas ! this is but too true ; for when 
a man has once discovered that what he has been taught all his 
life to regard and reverence as a great mystery, is in reality an 
absurdity and an imposition on his reason, there is no telling 
where he will end. The reaction may be so great, indeed, as 
to produce an entire shipwreck of his faith. But in this case, 
let us not chide our poor lost brother with pride and presump- 
tion, as if we ourselves were unstained with the same sin. Let 
us remember, that the fault may be partly our own, as well as 
° Pensees, I. Partie, art. iv, sec. vii. 



222 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

his. Let us remember, that the sin of not even every unwar- 
rantable innovation, is exclusively imputable to the innovator 
himself. For, as Lord Bacon says, " A fro ward retention of 
customs is a great innovator." 

If those who, some centuries ago, formed the various creeds 
of the Christian world, were fallible men, and if they permitted 
serious errors to creep into the great mass of religious truth con- 
tained in those creeds, then the best way to prevent innovation 
is, not to preach humility and submission, but to bring those 
formularies into a conformity with the truth. For, if the " Old 
Theology" be unsound, the "New Theology" will have the 
audacity to show itself. And who, among the children of men, 
will set bounds to the progress of the human mind, either in the 
direction of God's word or his work, and say, Hitherto shalt 
thou come, and here shall thy proud waves be stayed ? Who 
will lash the winds into submission, or bind the raging ocean at 
his feet? 

SECTION V. 
The foregoing treatise may oe deemed inconsistent with gratitude to God. 

" Such reflections," it has been urged, " afford as little ground 
for gratitude as for submission. Why do we feel grateful to 
God for those favours which are conferred on us by the agency 
of our fellow-men, except on the principle that they are instru- 
ments in his hand, who, without ' offering the least violence to 
their wills, or taking away the liberty or contingency of second 
causes,' hath most sovereign dominion over them, to do by 
them, and upon them, whatsoever himself pleaseth? On any 
other ground, they would be worthy of the principal, and He of 
the secondary praise."* True, if men are " only instruments in 
his hand" we should give him all the praise ; but we should 
never feel grateful to our earthly friends and benefactors. As 
we should not, on this hypothesis, be grateful for the greatest 
benefits conferred on us by our fellow-men ; so, in the language 
of Hartley, and Belsham, and Diderot, we should never resent, 
nor censure, the greatest injuries committed by the greatest 
criminals. But on our principles, while we have infinite ground 
for gratitude to God, we also have some little room for grati- 
tude to our fellow-men. 

Old and New Theology. 



Chapter VIL] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 223 



SECTION VI. 

It may be contended, that it is unfair to urge the preceding difficulties against 
the scheme of necessity ; inasmuch as the same, or as great, difficulties at- 
tach to the system of those by whom they are urged. 

This is the great standing objection with all the advocates of 
necessity. Indeed, we sometimes find it conceded by the ad- 
vocates of free-agency ; of which concessions the opposite party 
are ever ready and eager to avail themselves. In the statement 
of this fact, I do not mean to complain of a zeal which all can- 
did minds must acknowledge to be commendable on the part of 
the advocates of necessity. It is a fact, however, that the fol- 
lowing language of Archbishop Whately, in relation to the 
difficulty of accounting for the origin of evil, is often quoted by 
them : " Let it be remembered, that it is not peculiar to any 
one theological system : let not therefore the Calvinist or the 
Arminian urge it as an objection against their respective ad- 
versaries ; much less an objection clothed in offensive language, 
which will be found to recoil on their own religious tenets, as 
soon as it shall be perceived that both parties are alike unable 
to explain the difficulty ; let them not, to destroy an opponent's 
system, rashly kindle a fire which will soon extend to the no 
less combustible structure of their own." 

No one can doubt the justice or wisdom of such a maxim; 
and it would be well if it were observed by all who may be dis- 
posed to assail an adversary's scheme with objections. Every 
such person should first ask himself whether his objection 
might not be retorted, or the shaft be hurled back with destruc- 
tive force at the assailant. But although the remark of Arch- 
bishop Whately is both wise and just, it is not altogether so in 
its application to Archbishop King, or to other Arminians. For 
example, it is conceded by Dr. Keid, that he had not found 
the means of reconciling the existence of moral evil with the 
perfections of God ; but is this any reason why he should not 
shrink with abhorrence from the doctrine of necessity which so 
clearly appeared to him to make God the direct and proper 
cause of moral evil? "We acknowledge," says he, "that 
nothing can happen under the administration of the Deity 
which he does not permit. The permission of natural and moral 
evil is a phenomenon which cannot be disputed. To account 



224 MOKAL EVIL CONSISTENT |_Part I, 

for this phenomenon under the government of a Being of in- 
finite goodness, has, in all ages, been considered as difficult to 
human reason, whether we embrace the system of liberty or 
that of necessity." But because he could not solve this diffi- 
culty, must he therefore embrace, or at least cease to object 
against every absurdity which may be propounded to him ? 
Because he cannot comprehend why an infinitely good Being 
should permit sin, does it follow that he should cease to protest 
against making God the proper cause and agent of all moral 
evil as well as good ? In his opinion, the scheme of necessity 
does this ; and hence he very properly remarks : " This view of 
the divine nature, the only one consistent with the scheme of 
necessity, appears to me much more shocking than the permis- 
sion of evil upon the scheme of liberty. It is said, that it re- 
quires only strength of mind to embrace it : to me it seems to 
require much strength of countenance to profess it." In this 
sentiment of Dr. Reid the moral sense and reason of mankind 
will, I have no doubt, perfectly concur. For although we may 
not be able to clear up the stupendous difficulties pertaining to 
the spiritual universe, this is no reason why we may be permit- 
ted to deepen them into absurdities, and cause them to bear, in 
the harshest and most revolting form, upon the moral senti- 
ments of mankind. 

The reason why Dr. Beid and others could not remove the 
great difficulty concerning the origin of evil is, as we have seen, 
because they proceeded on the supposition that God could 
create a moral system, and yet necessarily exclude all sin from 
it. This mistake, it seems to me, has already been sufficiently 
refuted, and the existence of moral evil brought into perfect 
accordance and harmony with the infinite holiness of God. 

But it is strenuously insisted, in particular, that the divine 
foreknowledge of all future events establishes their necessity; 
and thus involves the advocates of that sublime attribute in all 
the difficulties against which they so loudly declaim. As I 
have examined this argument in another place,* I shall not 
dwell upon it here, but content myself with a few additional 
remarks. The whole strength of this argument in favour of 
necessity arises from the assumption, that if God foresees the 
future volitions of men, they must be bound together with other 

° Examination of Edwards on the Will. 



Chapter VH.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 225 

things according to the mechanism of cause and effect ; that is to 
say that God could not foresee the voluntary acts of men, unless 
they should be necessitated by causes ultimately connected with 
his own will. Accordingly ^ this bold position is usually as- 
sumed by the advocates of necessity. But to say that God 
could not foreknow future events, unless they are indissolubly 
connected together, seems to be a tremendous flight for any 
finite mind ; and especially for those who are always reminding 
us of the melancholy fact of human blindness and presumption. 
Who shall set limits to the modes of knowledge possessed by an 
infinite, all-comprehending mind? Who shall tell how God 
foresees future events ? Who shall say it must be in this or that 
particular way, or it cannot be at all ? 

Let the necessitarian prove his assumption, let him make it 
clear that God could not foreknow future events unless they are 
necessitated, and he will place in the hands of the sceptic the 
means of demonstrating, with absolute and uncontrollable cer- 
tainty, that God does not foreknow all future events at all, 
that he does not foresee the free voluntary acts of the human 
mind. For we do know, as clearly as we can possibly know 
anything, not even excepting our own existence, or the exist- 
ence of a God, that we are free in our volitions, that they are 
not necessitated ; and hence, according to the assumption in 
question, God could not foresee them. If the sceptic could see 
what the necessitarian affirms, he might proceed from what he 
Jcnows, by a direct and irresistible process, to a denial of the 
foreknowledge of God, in relation to human volitions. 

But fortunately the assumption of the necessitarian is not 
true. ' By the fundamental laws of human belief, we know that 
our acts are not necessitated ; and hence, we infer that as God 
foresees them all, he may do so without proceeding from cause 
to effect, according to the method of finite minds. We thus 
reason from the known to the unknown; from the clear light of 
facts around us up to the dark question concerning the possi- 
bility of the modes in relation to the divine prescience. We 
would not first settle this question of possibility, we would not 
say that God cannot foreknow except in one particular way, 
and then proceed to reason from such a postulate against the 
clearest facts in the universe. ISTo logic, and especially no logic 
based upon so obscure a foundation, shall ever be permitted to 

is 



226 MOEAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Parti, 

extinguish for us the light of facts, or convert the universal intel- 
ligence of man into a falsehood. 

Those who argue from foreknowledge in favour of necessity, 
usually admit that there is neither before nor after with God. 
This is emphatically the case with the Edwarclses. Hence, fore- 
knowledge infers necessity in no other sense than it is inferred 
by present or concomitant knowledge. This is also freely con- 
ceded by President Edwards. In what sense, then, does present 
knowledge infer necessity ? Let us see. I know a man is now 
walking before me ; does this prove that he could not help 
walking? that he is necessitated to walk? It is plain that it 
infers no such thing. It infers the necessary connexion, not 
between the act of the man in walking and the causes impelling 
him thereto, but between my knowledge of the fact and the 
existence of the fact itself. This is a necessary connexion 
between two ideas, or propositions, and not between two events. 
This confusion is perpetually made in the " great demonstra- 
tion" from foreknowledge in favour of necessity. It proves 
nothing, except that the greatest minds may be deceived and 
misled by the ambiguities of language. 

This argument, we say, only shows a necessary connexion 
between two ideas or propositions. This is perfectly evident 
from the very words in which it is often stated by the advocates 
of necessity. " I freely allow," says President Edwards, " that 
foreknowledge does not prove a thing necessary any more than 
after-knowledge ; but the after-knowledge, which is certain and 
infallible, proves that it is now become impossible but that the 
proposition known should be true." Now, here we have a 
necessary connexion between the certain and infallible knowl- 
edge of a thing, and the infallible certainty of its existence ! 
What has this to do with the question about the will ? If any 
man has ever undertaken to assert its freedom, by denying the 
necessary connexion between two or more ideas, propositions, 
or truths, this argument may be applied to him ; we have 
nothing to do with it. 

Again : "To suppose the future volitions of moral agents, " 
says President Edwards, " not to be necessary events ; or, which 
is the same thing, events which are not impossible but that they 
may not come to pass ; and yet to suppose that God certainly 
foreknows them, and knows all things, is to suppose God's 



Chapter VII.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 227 

knowledge to be inconsistent with itself. For to say, that God 
certainly, and without all conjecture, knows that a thing will 
infallibly be, which at the same time he knows to be so contin- 
gent that it may possibly not be, is to suppose his knowledge 
inconsistent with itself ; or that one thing he knows is utterly 
inconsistent with another thing he knows. It is the same thing 
as to say, he now knows a proposition to be of certain infallible 
truth which he knows to be of contingent uncertain truth." 
JSTow all this is true. If we affirm God's foreknowledge to be 
certain and at the same time to be uncertain, we contradict 
ourselves. But what has this necessary connexion between the 
elements of the divine foreknowledge, or between our proposi- 
tions concerning them, to do with the necessary connexion 
among events f 

The question is not whether all future events will cer- 
tainly come to pass; or, in other words, whether all future 
events are future events ; for this is a truism, which no man in 
his right mind can possibly deny. But the question is, whether 
all future events will be determined by necessitating causes, or 
whether they may not be, in part, the free unnecessitated acts 
of the human mind. This is the question, and let it not be lost 
sight of in a cloud of logomachy. If all future events are 
necessitated, then all past events are necessitated. But if we 
know anything, we know that all present events are not neces- 
sitated, and hence, all future events will not be necessitated. 
We deem it always safer to reason thus from the known to the 
unknown, than to invert the process. 

But suppose that foreknowledge proves that all human voli- 
tions are under the influence of causes, in what sense does it 
leave them free ? Does it leave them free to depart from the 
influence of motives ? By no means. It would be a contra- 
diction in terms, according to this argument, to say that they 
are certainly and infallibly foreknown, and yet that they may 
possibly not come to pass. Hence, if the argument proves 
anything, it proves the absolute fatality of all human volitions. 
It leaves not a fragment nor a shadow of moral liberty on 
earth. 

If this argument prove anything to the purpose, then Luther 
was right in declaring that "the foreknowledge of God is a 
thunderbolt to dash the doctrine of free-will into atoms ;" and 



228 MORAL EVIL CONSISTENT LPart I, 

Dr. Dick is right in affirming, " that it is as impossible to avoid 
them " (onr volitions) " as it is to pluck the sun out of the 
firmament."* It either proves all the most absolute necessi- 
tarian could desire, or it proves nothing. In our humble opinion 
it proves the latter. 

On this point the testimony of Dr. Dick himself is explicit : 
" Whatever is the foundation of his foreknowledge," says he, 
" what he does foreknow will undoubtedly take place. Hence, 
then, the actions of men are as unalterably fixed from eternity, 
as if they had been the subject of an immutable decree" \ But 
to dispel this grand illusion, it should be remembered, that the 
actions of men will not come to pass because they are fore- 
known; but they are foreknown because they will come to 
pass. The free actions of men are clearly reflected back in the 
mirror of the divine omniscience — they are not projected forward 
from the engine of the divine omnipotence. 

Since the argument in question proves so much, if it proves 
anything, we need not wonder that it was employed by Cicero 
and other ancient Stoics to establish the doctrine of an abso- 
lute and unconditional fate. "If the will is free," says he, 
" then fate does not rule everything, then the order of all causes 
is not certain, and the order of things is no longer certain in 
the prescience of God ; if the order of things is not certain in 
the prescience of God, then things will not take place as he 
foresees them ; and if things do not take place as he foresees, 
there is no foreknowledge in God." Thus, by a reductio ad 
absurdum, he establishes the position that the will is not free, 
but fate rules all things. Edwards and Dick, however, would 
only apply this argument to human volitions. But are not 
the volitions of the divine mind also foreknown ? Certainly 
they are ; this will not be denied. Hence, the very men who 
set out to exalt the power of God and abase the glory of man, 
have, by this argument, raised a dominion, not only over the 
power of man, but also over the power of God himself. In 
other words, if this argument proves that we cannot act unless 
we be first acted upon, and impelled to act, it proves no less 
in relation to God ; and hence, if it show the weakness and 
dependence of men, it also shows the weakness and depend- 
ence of God. So apt are men to adopt arguments which defeat 

° Theology, vol. i, p. 358. t Ibid - 



Chapter VII.] WITH THE HOLINESS OF GOD. 22'J 

their own object, whenever they have any other object than 
the discovery of truth. 

It is frequently said, as we have seen, that it is a contradic- 
tion to affirm that a thing is foreknown, or will certainly come 
to pass, and that it may possibly not come to pass. This posi- 
tion is at least as old as Aristotle. But let it be borne in mind, 
that if this be a contradiction, then future events are placed, 
not only beyond the power of man, but also beyond the power 
of God itself ; for it is conceded on all hands, that God cannot 
work contradictions. This famous argument entirely overlooks 
the question of power. It simply declares the thing to be a 
contradiction, and as such, placed above all power. In other 
words, if it be absurd or self-contradictory to say, that a future 
event is foreknown, and, at the same time, might not come to 
pass, this proposition is true of the volitions of the divine no 
less than of the human mind ; for they are all alike foreknown. 
That is to say, if the argument from foreknowledge proves that 
the volitions of man might not have been otherwise than they 
are, it proves precisely the same thing in regard to the voli- 
tions of God. Thus, if this argument proves anything to the 
purpose, it reaches the appalling position of Sj)inoza, that noth- 
ing in the universe could possibly be otherwise than it is. And 
if this be so, then let the Calvinist decide whether he will join 
with the Pantheist and fatalist, or give some little quarter to the 
Arminian. Let him decide whether he will continue to em- 
ploy an argument which, if it proves anything, demonstrates 
the dependency of the divine will as well as of the human; 
and instead of exalting the adorable sovereignty of God, sub- 
jects him to the dominion of fate. 



PART II 



THE EXISTENCE OF NATURAL EVIL, OR SUFFERING, 
CONSISTENT WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 



The path of sorrow, and that path alone, 
Leads to the land where sorrow is unknown. 

But He, who knew what human hearts would prove, 

How slow to learn the dictates of his love, 

That, hard by nature and of stubborn will, 

A life of ease would make them harder still, 

In pity to the souls his grace design'd 

For rescue from the ruin of mankind, 

Call'd forth a cloud to darken all their years, 

And said, " Go, spend them in the vale of tears." 



PART II. 



CHAPTER I. 

GOD DESIRES AND SEEKS THE SALVATION OP ALL MEN. 

Love is the root of creation, — God's essence. 

Worlds without number 

Lie in his bosom, like children : he made them for this purpose only, — 

Only to love, and be loved again. He breathed forth his Spirit 

Into the slumbering dust, and, upright standing, it laid its 

Hand on its heart, and felt it was warm with a flame out of heaven. 

Tegneb. 

The attentive reader has perceived before this time, that one of 
the fundamental ideas, one of the great leading truths, of the 
present discourse is, that a necessary holiness is a contradiction 
in terms, — an inherent and utter impossibility. This truth has 
shown us why a Being of infinite purity does not cause virtue 
to prevail everywhere, and at all times. If virtue could be 
necessitated to exist, there seems to be no doubt that such a 
Being would cause it to shine out in all parts of his dominion, 
and the blot of sin would not be seen upon the beauty of the 
world. But although moral goodness cannot be necessitated to 
exist, yet God has attested his abhorrence of vice and his appro- 
bation of virtue, by the dispensation of natural good and evil, 
of pleasure and pain. Having marked out the path of duty for 
us, he has made such a distribution of natural good and evil as 
is adapted to keep us therein. The evident design of this ar- 
rangement is, as theologians and philosophers agree, to prevent 
the commission of evil, and secure the practice of virtue. The 
Supreme Ruler of the world adopts this method to promote 
that moral goodness which cannot be produced by the direct 
omnipotency of his power. 

Hence, it must be evident, that although God desires the 
happiness of his rational and accountable creatures, he does not 



234 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part 11, 

bestow happiness upon them without regard to their moral 
character. The great dispensation of his natural providence, as 
well as the express declaration of his word, forbids the inference 
that he desires the happiness of those who obstinately persist in 
their evil courses. If we may rely upon such testimony, he 
desires first the holiness of his intelligent creatures, and next 
their happiness. Hence, it is well said by Bishop Butler, that 
the " divine goodness, with which, if I mistake not, we make 
very free in our speculations, may not he a bare, single disposi- 
tion to produce happiness, but a disposition to make the good, 
the faithful, the honest man happy."* 

He desires the holiness of all, that all may have life. This 
great truth is so clearly and so emphatically set forth in revela- 
tion, and it so perfectly harmonizes with the most pleasing con- 
ceptions of the divine character, that one is filled with amaze- 
ment to reflect how many crude undigested notions there are in 
the minds of professing Christians, which are utterly inconsist- 
ent with it. " As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure 
in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his 
way, and live. Turn ye, turn ye, for why will ye die V This 
solemn asseveration that God desires not the death of the sinner, 
but that he should turn from his wickedness and live, one would 
suppose should satisfy every mind which reposes confidence in 
the divine origin of revelation. And yet, until the minds of 
men are purged from the films of a false philosophy and secta- 
rian prejudice, they seem afraid to look at the plain, obvious 
meaning of this and other similar passages of Scripture. They 
will have it, that God desires the ultimate holiness and happi 
ness of only a portion of mankind, and the destruction of all the 
rest; that upon some he bestows his grace, causing them to be- 
come holy and happy, and appear forever as the monuments of 
his mercy ; while from some he withholds his saving grace, that 
they may become the fearful objects of his indignation and 
wrath. Such a display of the divine character seems to be 
equally unknown to reason and to revelation. 

° Butler's Analogy, part i, chap. ii. 



Chapter L] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 235 



SECTION L 

The reason why theologians have concluded that God designs the saltation of 
only a part of mankind. 

The reason why so many theologians come to so frightful a 
conclusion is, that they imagine God could very easily cause 
virtue in the breast of every moral agent, if he would. Hence 
arises in their minds the stupendous difficulty, " How can God 
really desire the holiness and happiness of all, since he refuses 
to make all holy and happy ? Is he really in earnest, in plead- 
ing with sinners to turn from their wickedness, since he might 
so easily turn them, and yet will not do it? Is the great God 
really sincere in the offer of salvation to all, and in the grand 
preparations he hath made to secure their salvation, since he 
will not put forth his mighty, irresistible hand to save them?" 
Such is the great difficulty which has arisen from the imagina- 
tion in question, and confounded theology for ages, as well as 
cast a dark shadow upon the Christian world. It is only by 
getting rid of this unfounded imagination, this false supposition, 
that this stupendous difficulty can be solved, and the glory of 
the divine government clearly vindicated. 

We have before us Mr. Symington's able and plausible 
defence of a limited atonement, in which he says, that " the 
event is the best interpreter of the divine intention" Hence he 
infers, that as all are not actually saved, it was not the design 
of God that all should be saved, and no provision is really made 
for their salvation. This argument is plausible. It is often 
employed by the school of theologians to which the author 
belongs, and employed with great effect. But is it sound. ? !N"o 
doubt it has often been shown to be unsound indirectly • that 
is, by showing that the conclusion at which it arrives comes 
into conflict with the express declarations of Scripture, as well 
as with our notions of the perfections of God. But this is not 
to analyze the argument itself, and show it to be a sophism. 
"Not can this be done, so long as the principle from which the 
conclusion necessarily follows be admitted. If we admit, then, 
that God could very easily cause virtue or moral goodness to 
exist everywhere, we must conclude that " the event is the best 
interpreter of the divine intention ;" and that the atouement 



236 NATUEAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

and all other provisions for the salvation of men are limited in 
extent by the design of God. That is to say, if we admit the 
premiss assumed by Mr. Symington and his school, we cannot 
consistently deny their conclusion. 

Nor could we resist a great many other conclusions which are 
frightful in the extreme. For if God could easily make all men 
holy, as it is contended he can, then the event is the best evi- 
dence of his real intention and design. Hence he really did 
not design the salvation of all men. When he gave man a holy 
law, he really did not intend that he should obey and live, but 
that he should transgress and die. "When he created the world, 
he really did not intend that all should reach the abodes of 
eternal bliss, but that some should be ruined and lost forever. 
Such are some of the consequences which necessarily flow from 
the principle, that holiness may be caused to exist in the breast 
of every moral agent. This is not all. We have before us 
another book, which insists that since the world was created, 
the law of God has never been violated, because his will cannot be 
resisted. Hence, it is seriously urged, that if theft, or adultery, 
or murder, be perpetrated, it must be in accordance with the 
will of God, and consequently no sin in his sight. " The whole 
notion of sinning against God," this book says, "is perfectly 
puerile." JSTow all this vile stuff proceeds on the supposition, 
that " the event is the best interpreter of the divine intention ;" 
and it rests upon that supposition with just as great security, as 
does the argument in favour of a limited atonement. Though, 
we may well give such stuff to the winds, or trample it under 
foot with infinite scorn, as an outrage against the moral senti- 
ments of mankind ; yet we cannot meet it on the arena of logic, 
if we concede that holiness may be everywhere caused to exist, 
and universal obedience to the divine will secured. 

The only principle, it clearly seems to us, on which we can 
reconcile such glaring discrepancies between the express will 
of God and the event, is, that the event is of such a nature that 
it is not an object of power, or cannot be caused to exist by the 
Divine Omnipotence. For his " secret will," or rather his exe- 
cutive will, is always in perfect harmony with his revealed 
will. It is from an inattention to the foregoing principle, that 
theologians have not been able to see and vindicate the sincerity 
of God, in the offer of salvation to all men. We have examined 



Chapter!] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 237 

their efforts to remove this difficulty, and been constrained to 
agree with Dr. Dick, that " we may pronounce these attempts 
to reconcile the universal call of the gospel with the sincerity 
of God, to be a faint struggle to extricate ourselves from the 
profundities of theology." But on looking into those solutions 
again, in which for some years we found a sort of rest, we could 
clearly perceive why theology had struggled in vain to deliver 
itself from its profound embarrassments on this subject, as well 
as on many others, These solutions admit the very principle 
which necessarily creates the difficulty, and renders a satis- 
factory answer impossible. Discard this false principle, substi- 
tute the truth in its stead, and the sincerity of God will come 
out from every obscurity, and shine with unclouded splendour. 



SECTION I! 

The attempt of Howe to reconcile the eternal ruin of abortion of mankind 
with the sincerity of God in his endeavours to save them. 

To illustrate the justness of the remark just made, we shall 
select that solution of the difficulty in question which has been 
deemed the most profound and satisfactory. We mean the solu- 
tion of "the wonderful Howe."* This celebrated divine clearly 
saw the impossibility of reconciling the sincerity of God with the 
offer of salvation to all, on the supposition that he does anything 
to prevent the salvation, or promote the ruin of those who are 
finally lost. He rejects the scheme of necessity, or a concur- 
rence of the divine will, in relation to the sinful volitions of 
men, as aggravating the difficulty which he had undertaken to 
solve. This was one great step towards a solution. But it still 
remained to " reconcile God's prescience of the sins of men with 
the wisdom and sincerity of his counsels, exhortations, and 
whatsoever means he uses to prevent them." Let us see how 
he has succeeded in his attempt to accomplish this great object. 

He admits in this very attempt, " that the universal, continued 
rectitude of all intelligent creatures had, we may be sure, been 
willed with a peremptory, efficacious will, if it had been best." 
He expressly says, that God might have prevented sin from 

° Robert Hall, a profound admirer of Howe, has pronounced his attempt to 
reconcile the sincerity of God with the universal offer of salvation, to be one of 
his great master-pieces of thought and reasoning. 



238 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

raising its head in his dominions, if he had chosen to do so. 
" Nor was it less easy," says he, " by a mighty, irresistible hand, 
universally to expel sin, than to prevent it." ISTow, having 
made this concession, was it possible for him to vindicate the 
sincerity and wisdom of God in the use of means to prevent sin, 
which he foresaw must fail to a very great extent? 

After having made such an admission, or rather after having 
assumed such a position, we think it may be clearly shown that 
the author was doomed to fail ; and that he has deceived him- 
self by false analogies in his gigantic efforts to vindicate the 
character of God. He says, for example : " We will, for dis- 
course's sake, suppose a prince endowed with the gift or spirit 
of prophecy. This most will acknowledge a great perfection, 
added to whatsoever other of his accomplishments. And sup- 
pose this his prophetic ability to be so large as to extend to 
most events which fall out in his dominions. Is it hereby 
become unfit for him to govern his subjects by laws, or any 
way admonish them of their duty? Hath this perfection so 
much diminished him as to depose him from his government ? 
It is not, indeed, to be dissembled, that it were a difficulty to 
determine, whether such foresight were, for himself, better or 
worse. Boundless knowledge seems only in a fit conjunction 
with an unbounded power. But it is altogether unimaginable 
that it should destroy his relation to his subj ects ; as what of 
it were left, if it should despoil him of his legislative power and 
capacity of governing according to laws made by it ? And to 
bring back the matter to the Supreme Ruler : let it for the 
present be supposed only, that the blessed God hath, belonging 
to his nature, the universal prescience whereof we are discours- 
ing ; we will surely, upon that supposition, acknowledge it to 
belong to him as a perfection. And were it reasonable to affirm, 
that by a perfection he is disabled from government ? or were 
it a good consequence, ' He foreknows all things — he is therefore 
unfit to govern the world?' " 

This way of representing the matter, it must be confessed, is 
exceedingly plausible and taking at first view ; but yet, if we 
examine it closely, we shall find that it does not touch the real 
knot of the difficulty. The cases are not parallel. The prince 
is endowed with a foreknowledge of offences, which it is not in 
his power wholly to prevent. Hence it may be perfectly con- 



Chapter I.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 239 

sistent with his wisdom and sincerity, to use all the means in 
his power to prevent them, though he may see they will fail in 
some cases, while they will succeed in others. But God, accord- 
ing to the author, might prevent all sin, or exclude it all from 
his dominions by "his mighty, irresistible hand." Hence it 
may not be consistent with his wisdom and sincerity to use 
means which he foresees will have only partial success, when 
he might so easily obtain universal and perfect success. It 
seems evident, then, that this is a deceptive analogy. It over- 
looks the root, and grapples with the branches of the difficulty. 
Let it be seen, that no power can cause the universal, continued 
moral rectitude of intelligent creatures, and then the two cases 
will be parallel ; and God may well use all possible means to 
prevent sin and cause holiness, though some of his subjects 
may resist and perish. Let this principle, which we have 
laboured to establish, be seen, and then may we entirely dispel 
the cloud which has so long seemed to hang over the wisdom 
and sincerity of the Supreme Ruler of the world. We might 
offer strictures upon other passages of the solution under con- 
sideration ; but as the same error runs through all of them, the 
reader may easily unravel its remaining obscurities and embar- 
rassments for himself. 

If holiness cannot be caused by a direct application of power, 
it follows that there is no want of wisdom in the use of indirect 
means, or of sincerity in the use of the most efficacious means 
the nature of the case will admit : but if universal holiness may 
be caused to exist by a mere w T ord, then indeed it seems to be 
clearly inconsistent with wisdom to resort to means which must 
fail to secure it, and with sincerity to utter the most solemn 
and vehement asseverations that it is the will of God to secure 
it ; for how obvious is the inquiry, If he so earnestly desire it. 
and can so easily secure it, why does he not do it? 

In rejecting the principle for which we contend, Howe has paid 
the usual penalty of denying the truth ; that is, he has contra- 
dicted himself. " It were very unreasonable to imagine," says 
he, "that God cannot, in any case, extraordinarily oversway 
the inclinations and determine the will of such a creature, in a 
way agreeable enough to its nature, (though we particularly 
know not, and we are not concerned to know, or curiously to 
inquire in what way,) and highly reasonable to suppose that in 



240 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

many cases he doth." Here he affirms, that our wills may be 
overruled and determined in perfect conformity to our natures, 
in some way or other, though we know not how. Why, then, 
does not God so overrule our wills in all cases, and secure the 
existence of universal holiness ? Because, says he, " it is mani- 
fest to any sober reason, that it were very incongruous this 
should be the ordinary course of his conduct to mankind, or the 
same persons at all times ; that is, that the whole order of intel- 
ligent creatures should be moved only by inward impulses ; 
that God? s precepts, promises, and comminations, whereof their 
nature is capable, should he all made impertinences, through 
his constant overpowering those that should neglect them ; that 
the faculties, whereby men are capable of moral government, 
should be rendered to this purpose, useless and vain / and that 
they should be tempted to expect to be constantly managed 
as mere machines that Tcnow not their own %ise?' i 

What strange confusion and self-contradiction! The wills 
of men may be, and often are, swayed by the mighty, irresist- 
ible hand of God, and in a way agreeable to their nature • and 
yet this is not done in all cases, lest men should be governed 
as mere machines ! The laws, promises, and threatenings of 
Gocl, are not to be rendered vain and useless in all cases, but 
only in some cases ! Indeed, if we would escape such incon- 
sistencies and self-contradictions, we must return to the position 
that a necessary holiness is a contradiction in terms, — that no 
power can cause it. From this position we may clearly see, 
that the laws, promises, and comminations; the counsels, ex- 
hortations, and influences of God, which are employed to pre- 
vent sin, are not a system of grand impertinences, — are not a 
vast and complicated machinery to accomplish what might be 
more perfectly, easily, and directly accomplished without them. 
We may see, that God really desires the holiness and happiness 
of all men, although some may be finally lost; that he is in 
earnest in the great work of salvation ; and when he so solemnly 
declares that he has no pleasure in the death of the sinner, but 
would rather he should turn and live, he ,means precisely what 
he says, without the least equivocation or mental reservation. 
This position it is, then, which shows the goodness of God in 
unclouded glory, and reconciles his sincerity with the final 
result of his labours. 



Chapter I.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 241 

But we have not yet got rid of every shade of difficulty. For 
it may still be asked, why God uses means to save those who 
he foresees will be lost ? why he should labour when he foresees 
his labour will be in vain % To this we answer, that it does not 
follow his labour will be in vain, because some may be pleased 
to rebel and perish. This would be the case in regard to such 
j ersons, provided his only object in what he does be to save 
tnem ; but although this is one great end and aim of his agency, 
it does not follow that it is his only object. For if any perish, 
it is certainly desirable that it be from their own fault, and not 
from the neglect of God to provide them with the means of sal- 
vation. It is his object, as he tells us, to vindicate his own 
character, and to stop every mouth in regard to the lost, as well 
as to save the greatest possible number. But this object could 
not be accomplished, if some should be permitted to perish 
without even a possibility of salvation. Hence he gives to all 
the means, power, and opportunity to turn and live ; and this 
fact is nearly always alluded to in relation to the finally impeni- 
tent and lost. Thus says our Saviour, with tears of commiser- 
ation and pity : " O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I 
have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth 
her chickens under her wings, and ye would not ! Behold, your 
house is left unto you desolate." Now the tears of the Eedeemer 
thus wept over lost souls, and this eloquent vindication of his 
own and his Father's goodness and compassion, would be a 
perfect mockery, if salvation had never been placed within 
their reach, or if their obedience, their real spiritual obedience 
and submission, might have been secured. But as it is, there 
is not even the shadow of a ground for suspecting the sincerity 
of the Redeemer, or his being in earnest in the great work of 
saving souls. 

Again the impenitent are addressed in the following awful 
language: "Turn ye at my reproof: behold, I will pom- out 
my spirit upon you, I will make known my words unto you. 
Because I have called, and ye refused ; I have stretched out 
my hand and no man regarded ; but ye have set at naught all 
my counsel and would none of my reproof : I also will laugh at 
your calamity : I will mock when your fear cometh." Thus 
the proceeding of the Almighty, in the final rejection of the 
impenitent, is placed on the ground, that they had obstinately 

16 



242 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT ' [Part II, 

resisted the means employed for their salvation. This seems to 
remove every shade of difficulty. But how dark and enigmati- 
cal, nay, how self-contradictory, would all such language appear, 
if they might have been very easily rendered holy and happy ! 
Thus, by bearing in mind that a necessary holiness is a contra- 
diction, an absurd and impossible conceit, the goodness of God 
is vindicated in regard to the lost, and his sincerity is evinced 
in the offer of salvation to all. 



SECTION III. 

The views of Luther and Calvin respecting the sincerity of God in his 
endeavours to save those who will finally perish. 

On any other principle, we must forever struggle in vain to 
accomplish so desirable and so glorious an object. If we pro- 
ceed on the assumption that holiness may be very easily caused 
by an omnipotent, extraneous agency, we shall never be able to 
vindicate the sincerity of the Almighty, in the many solemn 
declarations put forth by him that he desires the salvation of 
all men. The only sound, logical inference for such premises, 
is that drawn by Luther, namely, that when God exhorts the 
sinner, who he foresees will remain impenitent, to turn from hi', 
wickedness and live, he does so merely in the way of mocker} 
and derision; just "as if a father were to say to his child, 
' Come,' while he knows that he cannot come."* 

The representation which Calvin, starting from the same 
point of view, gives of the divine character, is not more amiable 
or attractive than that of Luther. Pie maintains that "the 
most perfect harmony " exists between these two things : " God's 
having appointed from eternity on whom he will bestow his 
favour and exercise his wrath, and his proclaiming salvation 
indiscriminately to all."f But how does he maintain this posi- 
tion? How does lie show this agreement? "There is more 
apparent plausibility," says he, "to the objection [against pre- 
destination] from the declaration of Peter, that ' the Lord is not 
willing that any should perish, but that all should come to 
repentance.' But the second clause furnishes an immediate 
solution of the difficulty ; for the willingness to come to repent- 

° Hagenbach's History of Doctrines, vol. ii, p. 259. 
f Institutes, book iii, chap, xxiv, sec. xvii. 



Chapter 1.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 243 

ance must be understood in consistence with the general tenor of 
Scripture."* Now what is the general tenor of Scripture, which 
is to overrule this explicit declaration that " God is not willing 
that any should perish ?" The reader will be surprised, perhaps, 
that it is not Scripture at all, but the notion that God might 
easily convert the sinner if he would. " Conversion is certainly 
in the power of God ;" he adds, " let him be asked, whether he 
wills the conversion of all, when he promises a few individuals 
to give them ' a heart of flesh,' while he leaves them with ' a 
heart of stone.' " Thus the very clearest light of the divine 
word is extinguished by the application of a false metaphysics. 
God tells us that he " is not willing that any should perish :" 
Calvin tells us, that this declaration must, in conformity with 
the general tenor of Scripture, be so understood as to allow us 
to believe that he is not only willing that many should perish, 
but also that their destruction is preordained and forever fixed 
by an eternal and immutable decree of God. Nay, that they 
are, and were, created for the express purpose of being devoted 
to death, spiritual and eternal. Is this to interpret, or to refute 
the divine word? 

The view which Calvin, from this position, finds himself 
bound to take of the divine character, is truly horrible, and 
makes one's blood run cold. The call of the gospel, he admits, 
is universal — is directed to the reprobate as well as to the elect ; 
but to what end, or with what design, is it directed to the 
former? "He directs his voice to them," if we may believe 
Calvin, "but it is that they may become more deaf; he 
kindles a light, but it is that they may be made more blind ; he 
publishes his doctrine, but it is that they may be more besotted ; 
he applies a remedy, but it is that they may not be healed. 
John, citing this prophecy, declares that the Jews could not 
believe, because the curse of God was upon them. Nor can it be 
disputed, that to such persons as God determines not to enlighten, 
he delivers his doctrine involved in enigmatical obscurity, that 
its only effect may be to increase their stupidity."f 

In conclusion, we would add that it is this idea of a necessi- 
tated holiness which gives apparent solidity to the arguments 
of the Calvinist, and which neutralizes the attacks of their op- 
ponents. To select only one instance out of a thousand: the 

° Institutes, book iii, chap, xxiv, sec. xvi. | Id., sec. xiii. 



244 NATUKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part IT. 

Calvinist insists that if God had really intended the salvation of 
all men, then all would have been saved ; since nothing lies be- 
yond the reach of his omnipotence. To this the Arminian 
cries out with horror, that if God does not desire the salvation 
of all, but is willing that a portion should sin and be eternally 
lost, then his goodness is limited, and his glory obscured. In 
perfect conformity with these views, the one contends for a 
limited atonement, insisting that it is confined either in its origi- 
nal design, or in its application, to a certain, fixed, definite num- 
ber of mankind ; while the other maintains, with equal earnest- 
ness, that such is the goodness of God that he has sent forth 
his Son to make an atonement for the sins of the whole world. 
To design and prepare it for all, says the Calvinist, and then 
apply it only to a few, is not consistent with either the wisdom 
or goodness of God ; and that he does savingly apply it only to 
a small number of the human race is evident from the fact that 
only a small number are actually saved. However the doctrine 
of a limited atonement, or, what is the same thing in effect, the 
limited application of the atonement, may be exclaimed against 
and denounced as dishonourable to God, all must and do admit 
the fact, that it is efficaciously applied to only a select portion 
of mankind ; which is to deny and to admit one and the same 
thing in one and the same breath. 

Now, in this contest of arms, it is our humble opinion that 
each party gets the better of the other. Each overthrows the 
other; but neither perceives that he is himself overthrown. 
Hence, though each demolishes the other, neither is convinced, 
and the controversy still rages. ~Nor can there ever be an end 
of this wrangling and jangling while the arguments of the op- 
posite parties have their roots in a common error. Let the 
work of Mr. Symington, or any other which advocates a limited 
atonement, be taken up, its argument dissected, and let the 
false principle, that God could easily make all men holy if he 
would, be eliminated from them, and we venture to predict 
that they will lose all appearance of solidity, and resolve them- 
selves into thin air.* 

° We do not intend to investigate the subject of a limited atonement in the pres- 
ent work, because it is merely a metaphysical off-shoot from the doctrine of elec- 
tion and reprobation, and must stand or fall -with the parent trunk. The strength 
of this we purpose to try in a subsequent chapter. 



Chapter II.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 245 



CHAPTER H. 

NATURAL EVIL, OR SUFFERING, AND ESPECIALLY THE SUFFERING OF INFANTS 
RECONCILED WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 

Sweet Eden was the arbour of delight ; 
Yet in his lovely flowers our poison blew : 
Sad Gethsemane, the bower of baleful night, 
Where Christ a health of poison for us drew ; 
Yet all our honey in that poison grew : 
So we from sweetest flowers could suck our bane, 
And Christ, from bitter venom, could again 
Extract life out of death, and pleasure out of pain. 

Giles Fletcher. 

If, as we have endeavoured to show, a necessary holiness is a 
contradiction in terms, then the existence of natural evil may 
be easily reconciled with the divine goodness, in so far as it 
may be necessary to punish and prevent moral evil. Indeed, 
the divine goodness itself demands the punishment of moral 
evil, in order to restrain its prevalence, and shut out the dis- 
orders it tends to introduce into the moral universe. Nor is it 
any impeachment of the infinite wisdom and goodness of God, 
if the evils inflicted upon the commission of sin be sufficiently 
great to answer the purpose for which they are intended — that 
is, to stay the frightful progress and ravages of moral evil. 
Hence it was that the sin of one man brought " death into the 
world, and all our woe." Thus the good providence of God, no 
less than his word, speaks this tremendous lesson to his intelli- 
gent creatures : " Behold the awful spectacle of a world lying 
in ruins, and tremble at the very thought of sin ! A thousand 
deaths are not so terrible as one sin !" 

SECTION" I. 
All suffering not a punishment for sin. 

We should not conclude from this, however, that all suffering 
or natural evil bears the characteristic of a punishment for 
moral evil. This seems to be a great mistake of certain theo- 
logians, who pay more attention to the coherency of their system 
than to the light of nature or of revelation. Thus, says Dr. 



iJ4() NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

Dick : " If our antagonists will change the meaning of words, 
they cannot alter the nature of things. Pain and death are 
evils, and when inflicted by the hand of a just God, must oe 
punishments : for although the innocent may be harassed and 
destroyed by the arbitrary exercise of human power, none but 
the guilty suffer under his administration. To pretend that. 
although death and other temporal evils have come upon us 
through the sin of Adam, yet these are not to be regarded as a 
punishment, is neither more nor less than to say, — they must 
not be called a punishment, because this would not agree with 
our system. If we should concede that they are a punishment, 
we should be compelled to admit that the sin of the first man is 
imputed to his posterity, and that he was their federal head. 
We deny, therefore, that the labours and sorrows of the present 
life, the loss of such joys as are left to us at its close, and the 
dreadful agonies and terrors with which death is often attended, 
have the nature of a penalty. In like manner, a man may call 
black white, and bitter sweet, because it will serve his purpose ; 
but he would be the veriest simpleton who should believe 
him." 

Now, we do not deny that the agonies and terrors of death 
are sometimes a punishment for sin : this is the case in regard 
to all those who actually commit sin, and sink into the grave 
amid the horrors of a guilty conscience. But the question is, 
Do suffering and death never fall upon the innocent under the 
administration of God ? We affirm that they do ; and also that 
they may fall upon the innocent, in perfect accordance with the 
infinite goodness of God. In the first place, we reply to the 
confident assertions of Dr. Dick, and of the whole school to 
which he belongs, as follows : To pretend that death and other 
temporal evils are alw coys punishments, is neither more nor less 
than to say, "they must be called punishments, because this 
would agree with our system. If we should concede that they 
are not a punishment, we should be compelled to admit that 
the sin of the first man is not imputed to his posterity, and that 
he was not their federal head. If our antagonists," &c. Surely 
it is not very wise to use language which may be so easily 
retorted. 

Secondly, it is true, the change of a word cannot alter the 
nature of things ; but it may alter, and very materially too, our 



Chapter II.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 247 

view of tlie nature of things. Besides, if to refuse to call suf- 
fering in certain cases a punishment, be merely to chauge a 
word, why should so great an outcry be made about it ? Why 
may we not use that word which sounds the most pleasantly to 
the ear, and sits the most easily upon the heart ? 

Thirdly, we do not arbitrarily and blindly reject the term 
punishment, "because it does not agree with our system." 
We not only reject the term, but also the very idea and the 
thing for which it stands. We mean to affirm, that the inno- 
cent do sometimes suffer under the administration of God ; and 
that all suffering is not a punishment for sin. The very idea of 
punishment, according to Dr. Dick himself, is, that it is suffer- 
ing inflicted on account of sin in the person upon whom it is 
inflicted ; and hence, wherever pain or death falls under the 
administration of God, we must there find, says he, either actual 
or imputed sin. Now, in regard to certain cases, we deny both 
the name and the thing. And we make this denial, as it will 
be seen, not because it agrees with our system merely, but 
because it agrees with the universal voice and reason of man 
kind, except where that voice has been silenced, and that rea- 
son perverted, by dark and blindly-dogmatizing schemes of 
theology. 

Fourthly, there is a vast difference, in reality, between regard- 
ing some sufferings as mere calamities, and all suffering as pun- 
ishment. If we regard all suffering as punishment, then we 
need look no higher and no further in order to vindicate the 
character of God in the infliction of them. For, according to 
this view, they are the infliction of his retributive justice, 
merited by the j>erson upon whom they fall, and adapted to 
prevent sin ; and consequently here our inquiries may termin- 
ate ; just as when we see the criminal receive the penalty due 
to his crimes. On the other hand, if we may not view all suf- 
fering as punishment, then must we seek for other grounds and 
principles on which to vindicate the goodness of God; then 
must we look for other ends, or final causes, of suffering under 
the wise economy of divine providence. And this search, as 
we shall see, will lead us to behold the moral government of 
the world, not as it is darkly distorted in certain systems of 
theology, but as it is in itself, replete with light and ineffable 
beauty. 



248 NATUBAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

But before we undertake to show this by direct arguments, 
let us pause and consider the predicament to which the greatest 
divines have reduced themselves, by their advocacy of such an 
imputation of the sin of one man. Dr. Dick affirms, as we have 
seen, that every evil brought upon man under the good provi- 
dence of God, must be a punishment for sin ; and hence, as 
infants do not actually sin, they are exposed to divine wrath on 
account of the sin of Adam, which is imputed to them. But is 
not this imputation, which draws after itself pain and death, 
also an evil? How has it happened, then, that in the good 
providence of God, this tremendous evil, this frightful source of 
so many evils, has been permitted to fall on the infant world ? 
Must there not be some other sin imputed to justify the inflic- 
tion of such an evil, and so on ad infinitum? Will Dr. Dick 
carry out his principle to this consequence ? Will he require, as 
in consistency he is bound to require, that the tremendous evil of 
the imputation of sin shall not fall upon any part of God's cre- 
ation, except as a punishment for some antecedent guilt ? No, 
indeed : at the very second step his great principle, so con- 
fidently and so dogmatically asserted, completely breaks down 
under him. The imposition of this evil is justified, not by any 
antecedent guilt, but by the divine constitution, according to 
which Adam is the federal head and representative of the 
human race. Thus, after all, Dr. Dick has found some princi- 
ple or ground on which to justify the infliction of evil, beside 
the principle of guilt or ill-desert Might there not possibly be, 
then, such a divine constitution of things, as to bring suffering 
upon the offspring of Adam in consequence of his sin, without 
resorting to the dark and enigmatical fiction of the imputation 
of his transgression ? If there be a divine constitution, as Dr. 
Dick contends there is, which justifies the imputation of moral 
evil, with all its frightful consequences, both temporal and eter- 
nal death, may it not be possible, in the nature of things, to 
suppose a divine constitution to justify suffering without the 
imputation of sin ? How can the one of these things be so 
utterly repugnant to the divine character, and the other so per- 
fectly agreeable to it ? Until this question be answered, we 
may suspect the author himself of having assumed positions 
and made confident assertions, " because they agree with his 
system." 



Chapter II.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 249 

" We say, then," says Dr. Dick, " that by his sin his posterity 
became liable to the punishment denounced against himself. 
They became guilty through his guilt, which is imputed to them, 
or placed to their account ; so that they are treated as if they 
had personally broken the covenant." Thus all the posterity 
of Adam, not excepting infants, became justly obnoxious to the 
" penalty of the covenant of works, — death, temporal, spiritual, 
and eternal." JSTow, we would suppose that this scheme of 
imputation is attended with at least as great a difficulty as the 
doctrine that the innocent do sometimes suffer under the good 
providence of God. Indeed, the author does not deny that it is 
attended with difficulties, which have never been answered. 
In regard to the imputation of sin, he says : " Candour requires 
me to add, that we are not competent fully to assign the reasons 
of this dispensation. After the most mature consideration of 
the subject, it appears mysterious that God should have placed 
our first parent in such circumstances, that while he might 
insure, he might forfeit, his own happiness and that of millions 
of beings who were to spring from his loins. We cannot tell 
why he adopted this plan with us and not with angels, each of 
whom was left to stand or fall for himself."* Now, when it 
is affirmed that the innocent may suffer for wise and good pur- 
poses, why is all this candour and modesty forgotten ? Why is 
it not admitted, " It may be so ;" " We cannot tell ?" Why 
is the fact, of which these writers so often and so eloquently 
remind us, that the human intellect is a poor, blind, weak thing, 
quite unfit to pry into mysteries, then sunk in utter oblivion, 
and a tone of confident dogmatism assumed? Why not act 
consistently with the character of the sceptic or the dogmatist, 
and not put on the one or the other by turns, according to the 
exigencies of a system ? 

If we ask, why infants are exposed to death, we are told, that 
it is a punishment for Adam's sin imputed to them. We are 
told that this must be so ; since " none but the guilty ever 
suffer under the administration of God," who is not an arbi- 
trary and cruel tyrant to cause the innocent to suffer. Why 
then, we ask, does he impute sin to them ? To this it is replied, 
" We cannot tell." Eo wonder ; for if there must always be 
antecedent guilt to justify God in imposing evil upon his sub- 

?; ' = Lectures on Theology, vol. i, p. 458. 



250 NATUKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

jects, then there can be no reason for such a dispensation for 
imposing the tremendous evil of the imputation of sin. The 
advocates of it themselves have laid down a principle, which 
shows it to be without a reason. Hence they may well say, 
" We cannot tell." Thus suffering is justified by the imputation 
of guilt ; the imputation of guilt by the divine constitution ; 
and the divine constitution, by nothing ! If this is all that can 
be done, would it not have been just as well to have begun, as 
well as ended, in the divine constitution of things 1 But, no ! 
even the most humble of men must have some explanation, 
some little mitigation of their difficulties, if it be only to place 
the world upon the back of an elephant, the elephant upon the 
back of a tortoise, and the tortoise upon nothing. 

It seems to be inconceivably horrible to Dr. Dick, and others 
of his school, that the innocent should ever be made to suffer 
under the providence of God ; but yet they earnestly insist that 
the same good providence plunges the whole human race — in- 
fants and all — into unavoidable guilt, and then punishes them 
for it ! To say that the innocent may be made to suffer is mon- 
strous injustice — is horrible ; but to say that they are made sin- 
ners, and then punished, is all right and proper ! To say that 
the innocent can suffer under the administration of God, is to 
shock our sense of justice, and put out the light of the divine 
goodness ; but it is all well if we only say that the punishment 
due to Adam's sin is made, by the same good administration, to 
fall upon all his posterity in the form of moral evil, and that 
then they are justly punished for this punishment ! Alas, that 
the minds of the great and the good, born to reflect the light of 
the glorious gospel of God upon a darkened world, should be so 
sadly warped, so awfully distorted, by the inexorable necessities 
of a despotic system ! 

SECTION II. 

The imputation of sin not consistent with the goodness of God. 

This point has been already indirectly considered, but it is 
worthy of a more direct and complete examination. It is very 
remarkable that although Dr. Dick admits he cannot reconcile 
the scheme of imputation with the character of God, or remove 
its seeming hardships, not to say cruelty, lie yet positively 



Chapter IL] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 251 

affirms that " it is a proof of the goodness of God."* Surely, if 
the covenant of works, involving the imputation of sin, as ex- 
plained by Dr. Dick, be a "proof of the divine goodness," it 
cannot but appear to be too severe. But as this point, on which 
he scarcely dwells at all, is more elaborately and fully discussed 
by President Edwards, we shall direct our attention to him. 

"It is objected," says Edwards, "that appointing Adam to 
stand in this great affair as the moral head of his posterity, and 
so treating them as one with him, is injurious to them." "To 
which," says he, " I answer, it is demonstrably otherwise ; that 
such a constitution was so far from being injurious to Adam's 
posterity any more than if every one had been appointed to 
stand for himself personally, that it was, in itself considered, 
attended with a more eligible probability of a happy issue than 
the latter would have been ; and so is a constitution that truly 
expresses the goodness of its Author." Now, let us see how this 
is demonstrated. 

" There is a greater tendency to a happy issue in such an ap- 
pointment," says he, " than if every one had been appointed to 
stand for himself; especially on these accounts : (1.) That Adam 
had stronger motives to watchfulness than his posterity would 
have had ; in that, not only his own eternal welfare lay at stake, 
but also that of all his posterity. (2.) Adam was in a state of 
complete manhood when his trial began."f In the first place, 
then, the constitution for which Edwards contends is "an ex- 
pression of the divine goodness," because it presented stronger 
motives to obedience than if it had merely suspended the eternal 
destiny of Adam alone upon his conduct. The eternal welfare 
of his posterity was staked upon his obedience ; and, having 
this stupendous motive before him, he would be more likely to 
preserve his allegiance than if the motive had been less power- 
ful. The magnitude of the motive, says Edwards, is the grand 
circumstance which evinces the goodness of God in the appoint- 
ment of such a constitution. If this be true, it is very easy to 
see how the Almighty might have made a vast improvement in 
his own constitution for the government of the world. He 
might have made the motive still stronger, and thereby made 
the appointment or covenant still better : instead of suspending 
merely the eternal destiny of the human race upon the conduct 
° Lectures on Theology, p. 458. f Edwards's Works, vol. ii, p. 548. 



252 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT LPart II, 

of Adam, he might have staked the eternal fate of the universe 
upon it. According to the argument of Edwards, what a vast, 
what a wonderful improvement would this have been in the 
divine constitution for the government of the world, and how 
much more conspicuously would it have displayed the goodness 
of its Divine Author ! 

Again, the scheme of Edwards is condemned out of his own 
mouth. If this scheme be better than another, because its mo- 
tives are stronger, why did not God render it still more worthy 
of his goodness, by rendering its motives still more powerful 
and efficacious? Edwards admits, nay, he insists, that God 
might easily have rendered the motives of his moral govern- 
ment perfectly efficacious and successful. He repeatedly de- 
clares that God could have prevented all sin, " by giving such 
influences of his Spirit as would have been absolutely effectual 
to hinder it." If the goodness of a constitution, then, is to be 
determined by the strength of its motives, as the argument of 
Edwards supposes, then we are bound, according to his princi- 
ples, to pronounce that for which he contends unworthy of the 
goodness of God, as being radically unsound and defective. 
This is emphatically the case, as the Governor of the world 
might have strengthened the motives to obedience indefinitely, 
not by augmenting the danger, but by increasing the security 
of his subjects; that is to say, not by making the penalty more 
terrific, but by giving a greater disposition to obedience. 

The same thing may be clearly seen from another point of 
view. Let us suppose, for instance, that God had established 
the constitution or covenant, that if Adam had persevered in 
obedience, then all his posterity should be confirmed in holi- 
ness and happiness ; and that if he fell, he should fall for him- 
self alone. Would not such an appointment, we ask, have been 
more likely to have been attended with a happy issue than 
that for which Edwards contends ? Let us suppose again, that 
after such a constitution had been established, its Divine Author 
had really secured the obedience of Adam ; would not this 
have made a " happy issue " perfectly certain ? Why then was 
not such a constitution established ? It would most assuredly 
have been an infinitely clearer and more beautiful expression 
of the divine goodness than that of Edwards. Hence, the phi- 
losophy of Edwards easily furnishes an unspeakably better con- 



Chapter H.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 253 

stitution for the government of the world, than that which has 
been established by the wisdom of God ! Is it not evident, that 
the advocates of such a scheme should never venture before the 
tribunal of reason at all ? Is it not evident, that their only safe 
policy is to insist, as they sometimes do, that we do not know 
what is consistent, or inconsistent <, with the attributes of God, 
in his arrangements for the government of the world? Is it 
not evident, that their truest wisdom is to be found in habitually 
dwelling on the littleness, weakness, misery, and darkness of 
the human mind, and in rebuking its arrogance for presuming 
to pry into the mysteries of their system ? 

The vindication of the divine goodness by Edwards, is, we 
think it must be conceded, exceedingly weak. All it amounts 
to is this,' — that this scheme is an expression of the goodness of 
God, because, in certain respects, it is better than a scheme 
which might have been established. So far from showing it to 
be the best possible scheme, his philosophy shows it might be 
greatly improved in the very respects in which its excellency is 
supposed to consist. In other words, he contends that God has 
displayed his goodness in the appointment of such a constitu- 
tion, on the ground that he might have made a worse ; though, 
according to his own principles, it is perfectly evident that he 
might have made a better ! Is this to express, or to deny, the 
absolute, infinite goodness of God ? Is it to manifest the glory 
of that goodness to the eye of man, or to shroud it in clouds and 
darkness ? 

Edwards also says, that " the goodness of God in such a con- 
stitution with Adam appears in this : that if there had been no 
sovereign, gracious establishment at all, but God had proceeded 
on the basis of mere justice, and had gone no farther than this 
required, he might have demanded of Adam and all his pos- 
terity, that they should have performed perfect, perpetual obedi- 
ence." The italics are all his own. On this passage, we have 
to remark, that it is built upon unfounded assumptions. It is 
frequently said, we are aware, that if it had not been for the 
redemption of the world by a "sovereign, gracious" dispensation, 
the whole race of man might have been justly exposed to the 
torments of hell forever. But where is the proof? Is it found 
in the word of God ? This tells us what is, what has been, and 
what will be y but it is not given to speculate upon what might 



254 NATUKAL EVIL CONSISTENT LPart II, 

be. For aught we know, if there had been no salvation through 
Christ, as a part of the actual constitution and system of the 
world, then there would have been no other part of that system 
whatever. We are not told, and we do not know, what it would 
have been consistent with the justice of God to do in relation 
to the world, if there had been no remedy provided for its 
restoration. Perhaps it might never have been created at all. 
The work of Christ is the great sun and centre of the system as 
it is ; and if this had never been a part of the original grand 
design, we do not know that the planets would have been created 
to wander in eternal darkness. We do not know that even the 
justice of God would have created man, and permitted him to 
fall, wandering everlastingly amid the horrors of death, with- 
out hope and without remedy. We find nothing of the kind in 
the word of God ; and in our nature it meets with no response, 
except a wail of unutterable horror. We like not, we confess, 
those vindications of God's goodness, which consist in drawing 
hideous, black pictures of his justice, and then telling us that it 
is not so dark as these. We want not to know whether there 
might not be darker things in the universe than God's love ; we 
only want to know if there could be anything brighter, or 
better, or more beautiful. 

The most astounding feature of this vindication of the divine 
goodness still remains to be noticed. We are told that the con- 
stitution in question is good, because it was so likely to have 
had a " happy issue." And when this constitution was estab- 
lished by the sovereign will aud pleasure of God, the conduct 
of Adam, it is conceded, was perfectly foreseen by him. At 
the very time this constitution was established, its Divine Author 
foresaw with perfect absolute certainty what would be the issue. 
He knew that the great federal head, so appointed by him, 
would transgress the covenant, and bring down the curse of 
" death, temporal, spiritual, and eternal," upon all his posterity. 
0, wonderful goodness ! to promise eternal life to the human 
race on a condition which he certainly foreknew would not be 
performed ! Amazing grace ! to threaten eternal death to all 
mankind, on a condition which he certainly foreknew would be 
fulfilled ! 

This cannot be evaded, by asserting that the same difficulty 
attaches to the fact, that God created Adam foreseeing he 



Chapter II..] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 255 

would fall. His foreknowledge did not necessitate the fall of 
Adam. It left him free as God had created him. Life and 
death were set before him, and he had the power to stand, as 
well as the power to fall. He had no right to complain of God, 
then, if, under such circumstances, he chose to rebel, and incur 
the penalty. But if the scheme of Edwards be true, the 
descendants of Adam did not have their fate in their own 
hands. It did not depend on their own choice. It was necessi 
tated, even prior to their existence, by the divine constitution 
which had indissolubly connected their awful destiny, their 
temporal and eternal ruin, with an event already foreseen. 
And the constitution binding such awful consequences to an 
event already foreseen, is called an expression of the goodness 
of God! 

Suppose, for example, that a great prince should promise his 
subjects that on the happening of a certain event, over which 
they had no control, he would confer unspeakable favours upon 
them. Suppose also, that at the same time he should declare 
to them, that if the event should not happen, he would load 
them with irons, cast them into prison, and inflict the greatest 
imaginable punishments upon them during the remainder of 
their lives. Suppose again, that at the very time he thus made 
known his gracious intentions to them, he knew perfectly well 
that the event on which his favour was suspended would not 
happen. Then, according to his certain foreknowledge, the 
event fails, and the penalty of the covenant or appointment is 
inflicted upon his subj ects : — they are cast into prison ; they are 
bound in chains, and perpetually tormented with the greatest 
of all imaginable evils :■ — not because they had transgressed the 
appointment or sovereign constitution, but because an event 
had taken place over which they had no control. Kow, who 
would call such a ruler a good prince ? Who could conceive, 
indeed, of a more cruel or deceitful tyrant ? But we submit it 
to the candid reader, if he be not more like the prince of pre- 
destination, than the great God of heaven and earth ? 

This scheme of imputation, so far from being an expression 
of infinite goodness, were indeed an exhibition of the most 
frightful cruelty and injustice. It would be a useful, as well as 
a most curious inquiry, to examine the various contrivances of 
ingenious men, in order to bring the doctrine of imputation 



256 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

into harmony with the justice of God. We shall briefly allude 
to only two of these wonderful inventions, — those of Augustine 
and Edwards. Neither of these celebrated divines supposed 
that a foreign sin, properly so called, is ever imputed to any 
one ; but that the sin of Adam, which is imputed to his descend- 
ants, is their own sin, as well as his.* But here the question 
arises, How could they make Adam's sin to be the sin of his 
descendants, many of whom were born thousands of years after 
it was committed ? 

Augustine, as is well known, maintained the startling paradox, 
that all mankind were present in Adam, and sinned in him. 
In this way, he supposed that all men became partakers in the 
guilt of Adam's sin, and consequently justly liable to the 
penalty due to his transgression. Augustine was quite too 
good a logician not to perceive, that if all men are responsible 
for Adam's sin, because they were in him when he transgressed, 
then, it follows, that we are also responsible for the sins of all 
our ancestors, from whom we are more immediately descended. 
This follows from that maxim of jurisprudence, from that dic- 
tate of common-sense, that a rule of law is coextensive with the 
reason upon which it is based. Hence, as Wiggers remarks : 
" Augustine thought it not improbable that the sins of ancestors 
universally are imputed to their descendants, "f This conclu- 
sion is clearly set forth in the extracts made by the translator 
of Wiggers.J If this scheme be true, we know indeed that we 
are all guilty of Adam's sin ; but who, or how many of the 
human race, were the perpetrators of Cain's murder beside him- 
self, we cannot determine. Indeed, if this frightful hypothesis 
be well founded, if it form a part of the moral constitution of 
the world, no man can possibly tell how many thefts, murders, 
or treasons, he may have committed in his ancestors. One 
thing is certain, however, and that is, that the man who is born 
later in the course of time, will have the more sins to answer 
for, and the more fearful will be the accumulation of his guilt ; 
as all the transgressions of all his ancestors, from Adam down 
to his immediate parents, will be laid upon his head. 

Clearly as this consequence is involved in the fundamental prin- 

° Edwards on Original Sin, part iv, chap, iii, p. 543. 

f Encheir., c. 4G, 47. Sec also remarks by the American editor and translator. 

t See p. 284. 



Chapter IL] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 25T 

ciple of Augustine's theory, the good father could not but reel 
and stagger under it. " Respecting the sins of the other parents," 
says he, " the progenitors from Adam down to one's own imme- 
diate father, it may not improperly be debated, whether the 
child is implicated in the evil acts and multiplied original faults 
of all, so that each one is the worse in proportion as he is later ; 
or that, id respect to the sins of their parents, God threatens 
posterity to the third and fourth generation, because, by the 
moderation of his compassion, he does not further extend his 
anger in respect to the faults of progenitors, lest those on whom 
the grace of regeneration is not conferred, should be pressed 
with too heavy a burden in their own eternal damnation, if 
they were compelled to contract by way of origin {priginaliter) 
the sins of all their preceding parents from the commence- 
ment of the human race, and to suffer the punishment due to 
them* Whether, on so great a subject, anything else can or 
cannot be found, by a more diligent reading and scrutiny of the 
Scriptures, I dare not hastily affirm."! 

Thus does the sturdy logician, notwithstanding his almost in- 
domitable hardihood, seem to stand appalled before the conse- 
quences to which his principles would inevitably conduct him. 
Having followed those principles but a little way, the scene 
becomes so dark with his representations of the divine justice, 
that he feels constrained to retrace his steps, and arbitrarily in- 
troduce the divine mercy, in order to mitigate the indescribable 
horrors which continually thicken around him. Such hesitation, 
such wavering and inconsistency, is the natural result of every 
scheme which places the decisions of the head in violent con- 
flict with the indestructible feelings of the heart. 

In his attempt to reconcile the scheme of imputation with the 
justice of God, Edwards has met with as little success as Augus- 
tine. For this purpose, he supposed that God had constituted 
an identity between Adam and all his posterity, whereby the 
latter became partakers of his rebellion. " I think it would go 

e If God, out of tne abundance of his compassion, imputes the sins of parents 
only to the third or fourth generation, how has it happened that Adam's trans- 
gression is imputed to all his posterity, and punished throughout all generations ? 
Is there any consistency, or harmony, in such views respecting the government 
of the world ? 

| Wiggers's Presentation, note by translator, p. 285. 

17 



258 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

far toward directing ns to the more clear conception and right 
statement of this affair," says he, in reference to imputation, 
" were we steadily to bear this in mind, that God, in every step 
of his proceedings with Adam, in relation to the covenant or 
constitution established with him, looked on his posterity as 
being one with him. And though he dealt more immediately 
with Adam, it yet was as the head of the whole body, and the 
root of the whole tree ; and in his proceedings with him, he 
dealt with all the branches as if they had been then existing in 
their root. From which it will follow, that both guilt, or ex- 
posedness to punishment, and also depravity of heart, came 
upon Adam's posterity just as they came upon him, as much as 
if he and they had all coexisted, like a tree with many branches ; 
allowing only for the difference necessarily resulting from the 
place Adam stood in as head or root of the whole. Otherwise, 
it is as if, in every step of proceeding, every alteration in the 
root had been attended at the same instant with the same altera- 
tion throughout the whole tree, in each individual branch. I 
think this will naturally follow on the supposition of their being 
a constituted oneness ox identity of Adam and his posterity in 
this affair."* As the sap of a tree, Edwards has said, spreads 
from the root of a tree to all its branches, so the original sin of 
Adam descends from him through the generations of men. 

In the serious promulgation of such sentiments, it is only for- 
gotten that sin is not the sap of a tree, and that the whole 
human race is not really one and the same person. Such an 
idea of personal identity is as utterly unintelligible as the nature 
of the sin and the responsibility with which it is so intimately 
associated. Surely these are the dark dreams of men, not the 
bright and shining lights of eternal truth. 

Before we take leave of President Edwards, we would re- 
mark, that he proceeds on the same supposition with Calvin,f 
Bates,;): Dwight,§ Dick, and a host of others, that suffering is 
always a punishment of sin, and of "sin in them who suffer."} 
" The light of nature," says Edwards, " or tradition from ancient 
revelation, led the heathen to conceive of death as in a peculiar 
manner an evidence of divine vengeance. Thus we have an 

° Edwards on Original Sin, part iv, ch. iii. | Institutes, book ii, ch. i. 

| Divine Attributes. § Sermon on Original Sin. 

|| Original Sin, part i, ch. ii. 



Chapter II.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 259 

account, that when the barbarians saw the venomous beast 
hang on Paul's hand, they said among themselves, ' No doubt, 
this man is a murderer, whom, though he hath escaped the 
seas, jet vengeance suffereth not to live.' "* We think that 
the barbarians concluded rashly : it is certain that St. Paul was 
neither a murderer nor a god. ISTor, indeed, if the venomous 
beast had taken his life, would this have proved him to be a 
murderer, any more than its falling off into the fire proved him 
to be a god, according to the rash judgment of the barbarians. 
There is a better source of philosophy, if we mistake not, than 
the rash, hasty, foolish judgments of barbarians. 

SECTION III. 

The imputation of sin not consistent with human, much less with the divine 

goodness. 

There are few persons whose feelings will allow them to be 
consistent advocates of the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's 
sin. " To many other divines," says Bishop Burnet, " this seems 
a harsh and inconceivable opinion : it seems repugnant to the 
justice and goodness of God to reckon men guilty of sin which 
they never committed, and to punish them in their souls eter- 
nally for that which is no act of theirs."f It certainly " seems 
very hard," as the author says, " to apprehend how persons who 
have never sinned, but are only unhappily descended, should be, 
in consequence of that, under so great a misery." But how to 
escape the pressure of this stupendous difficulty is the question. 
There are many who cannot endure it ; or rather, there are very 
few who can endure it ; but, as Bishop Burnet says, they find 
no difficulty in the idea of temporal punishment on account of 
Adam's sin. "This, they think, is easily enough reconcilable 
with the notions of justice and goodness, since this is only a 
temporary punishment relating to men's persons."^: But do 
they not sacrifice their logic to their feelings ? Let us see. 

This view of a limited imputation, and a limited punishment, 
is not confined to the Church of England. It prevails to a 
greater or less extent in all denominations. But President 
Edwards has, we think, unanswerably exposed the inconsistency 

° Original Sin, part i, ch. ii. 

f Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles, article ix. J Ibid. 



260 NATUKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

of its advocates. " One of them supposes," says lie, " that this 
sin, though truly imputed to infants, so that thereby they are 
exposed to a proper punishment, yet is not imputed to them in 
such a degree, as that upon this account they should be liable 
to eternal punishment, as Adam himself was, but only to tem- 
poral death, or annihilation y Adam himself, the immediate 
actor, being made infinitely more guilty of it than his posterity. 
On which I would observe, that to suppose God imputes, not 
all the guilt of Adam, but only some little part of it, relieves 
nothing but his imagination. To think of poor little infants 
bearing such torments for Adam's sin, as they sometimes do in 
this world, and these torments ending in death and annihila- 
tion, may sit easier on the imagination, than to conceive of their 
suffering eternal misery for it ; but it does not at all relieve 
one's reason. There is no rule of reason that can be supposed 
to lie against imputing a sin in the whole of it, which was com- 
mitted by one, to another who did not personally commit it, 
but will also lie against its being so imputed and punished in 
part / for all the reasons (if there be any) lie against the impu- 
tation, not the Quality or degree of what is imputed. If there 
be any rule of reason that is strong and good, lying against a 
proper derivation or communication of guilt from one that 
acted to another that did not act, then it lies against all that 
is of that nature .... If these reasons are good, all the differ- 
ence is this : that to bring a great punishment on infants for 
Adam's sin, is a great act of injustice, and to bring a compara- 
tively smaller punishment is a smaller act of injustice ; but not, 
that this is not as truly and demonstrably an act of injustice as 
the other."* 

We hold this to be a solid and unanswerable argument ; and 
we hold also, that God can no more commit a small act of 
injustice than a great one. Hence, in the eye of reason, there 
is no medium between rejecting the whole of the imputation of 
Adam's sin, and ceasing to obj ect against the imputation of the 
whole of it, as inconsistent with the justice and goodness of God. 
We may arbitrarily wipe out a portion of it in order to relieve 
our imagination; but this brings no relief to the calm and 
passionless reason. It may still the wild tumults of emotion, 
but it cannot silence the voice of the intellect. Why not relieve 

Q Edwards on Original Sin, part iv, ch. iii. 






Chapter II.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 261 

both the imagination and the reason ? Why not wipe out the 
whole dark film of imputation, and permit the glad eye to open 
on the bright glory of God's infinite goodness ? 

The wonder is, that when Edwards had carried out his logic 
to such a conclusion, he did not regard his argument as a per- 
fect reductio ad absurdum. The wonder is, that when he had 
carried out his logic to the position, that it might well consist 
with the justice of God to impute the whole of Adam's sin to 
" poor little infants," as he calls them, and then cause them to 
endure " eternal torments for it," his whole nature did not 
recoil from such a conclusion with indescribable horror. For 
our part, highly as we value logical consistency, we should 
prefer a little incoherency in our reasoning, a little flexibility in 
our logic, rather than bear even one " poor little infant" on the 
hard, unyielding point of it into the torments of hell forever. 

St. Augustine was the great founder of the doctrine of the 
imputation of sin. But although he did more than any other 
person to give this doctrine a hold upon the mind of the Chris- 
tian world, it never had a perfect hold upon his own mind. So 
far from being able to reconcile it with the divine goodness, he 
could not reconcile it with his own goodness. For this purpose, 
he employed the theory that all the posterity of Adam were, in 
the most literal sense, already in him, and sinned in him — in 
his person ; and that Adam's sin is therefore justly imputed to 
all his posterity.* He also appeals to revelation. "St. Au- 
gustine," as Father Almeyda truly says, " and the fathers who 
follow him, take the fundamental principle of their doctrine 
(which affirms that infants without baptism will endure eternal 
pain) from the sentence which the Supreme Judge is to pro- 
nounce at the last day. We know that the Lord, dividing the 
human race into two portions, will put the elect on the right 
hand, and the reprobate on the left ; and he will say to those on 
the left, Depart into eternal fire. St. Augustine then argues, 
that infants will not be on the right, because Jesus Christ has 
positively excluded all those who shall not oe horn again of 
water and of the Holy Spirit : then they will be on the left ; 
and thus they will be comprehended in the damnation of eter- 
nal fire, which the Lord will pronounce against those who shall 

° See Knapp's Theology, vol. ii, art. ix, sec. 76 ; also Wiggers's Presentation 
of Augustinism and Pelagianism, chap, xix, p. 268. 



262 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

be on the left side : for having no more than two hands, and 
only two places and two sentences, since, then, there are infants 
which God does not favour, it follows that they will be com- 
prehended in the sentence of the reprobate, w T hich is not only 
a privation of the sight of God, but also the pain of lire."* 
Such is the ground, and such the logic, on which St. Augustine 
and his followers erected that portentous scheme, that awful 
speculation, which has so long cast a dark cloud over the glory 
of the Christian w T orld, and prevented it from reflecting the 
bright, cheering beams of the divine goodness. 

But, what ! could St. Augustine find rest in his own views, — 
in his own logic ? Did he really banish all non-elect infants 
into the region of penal fire and everlasting woe ? If he adhered 
to the literal meaning of the words of revelation, as he under- 
stood them, he was certainly bound to do so ; but did he really 
and consistently do it ? Did he really bind the " poor little " 
reprobate, because it had sinned in Adam, in chains of adamant, 
and leave it to writhe beneath the fierce inquisitorial fury of the 
everlasting flames? Did he really extract the vials of such 
exquisite and unprovoked wrath from the essence of infinite 
goodness itself ? No : this was reserved for the superior logic 
and the sterner consistency of an iron age. But since it has 
been extracted, we may devoutly thank Almighty God, that it 
is now excluded from the hearts of men calling themselves 
Christians, and kept safely bottled up in their creeds and con- 
fessions. 

St Augustine could not endure the insufferable consequences 
of his own doctrine. Hence, in writing to his great friend, St. 
Jerome, he said, " in all sincerity : when I come to treat of the 
punishment of infants, believe that I find myself in great 
embarrassment, and I absolutely know not what to reply? 
Writing against Julian, he adds: U I do not say that those ivho 
die without baptism will be punished with a torment such that 
it would be better for them if they had never been born? And 
again : " Those who, besides original sin which they have con- 
tracted, have not committed any other, will be subjected to a 
pain the most mild of all."f Thus by adopting a wrong inter- 
pretation, the principles of which were but little understood in 
his time, St. Augustine banished all unbaptized infants from the 

Harmonie de la Raison et de la Religion. f Ibid., Almeyda. 



Chapter II.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 263 

kingdom of light ; but yet he could hardly find it in his heart 
to condemn them to the outer darkness. He had too great a 
regard for the word of God, as he understood it, to permit non- 
elect infants to reign with Christ in heaven ; and, on the other 
hand, he was too severely pressed by the generous impulses of 
Ids nature, nay, by the eternal dictates of truth and goodness, 
to permit him to consign them really to the "fire prepared 
for the devil and his angels." Hence, although Christ knew 
of " but two places," he fitted up a third, to see them in which, 
was, as Edwards would say, "more agreeable to his imagin- 
ation." 

It was the sublime but unsteady genius of St. Augustine that 
caused this doctrine of the damnation of infants to be received 
into the Christian world, and find its way into the council of 
Trent. That celebrated council not only adopted the views of 
St. Augustine on this subject, but also most perfectly reflected 
all his hesitation and inconsistency. Widely as its members 
differed on other points, they all agreed that unbaptized infants 
should be excluded from the kingdom of heaven. There was 
but little unanimity however, as to the best method of disposing 
of them. The Dominicans fitted up a dark, subterraneous 
cavern for them, in which there is no fire, at least none such as 
that of the infernal regions, and in which they might be at least 
as happy as monks. This place was called Lmibo — which, we 
suppose, is to Purgatory, about what the varioloid is to the 
smallpox. The Franciscans, more humane in their doctrine, 
determined that " dear little infants," though they had never 
felt the sanctifying influences of holy water, should yet reside, 
not in dark caverns and holes of the earth, but in the sweet 
light and pure air of the upper world. Well done, noble Fran- 
ciscan! we honour thee for thy sweet fancy! Surely thou 
wert not, like other monks, made so altogether fierce by dark 
keeping, that thou couldest not delight to see in God's blessed, 
beautiful world, a smiling infant ! 

Others insisted, that unbaptized infants would be condemned 
to become philosophers, and turn out the authors of great dis- 
coveries. This may seem a terrible damnation to some persons ; 
but, for our part, if we had been of that famous council, it is 
likely we should have been in favour of this decree. As the 
most agreeable punishment we could imagine, we should have 



264 NATUKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part H, 

been for condemning them, like the fallen angels of Paradise 
Lost, to torment themselves with reasonings high, — ■ 

" Of providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate, 
Fix'd fate, free-will, foreknowledge absolute." 

And if any of them had been found to possess no very great 
aptitude for snch speculations, then, rather than they should find 
" no end in wandering mazes lost," we should have condemned 
them to turn poets and " build the lofty rhyme." 

So completely did the spirit of a blind exegesis triumph over 
the light of reason in the time of Augustine, that even Pelagius 
and his followers excluded unbaptized infants from the king- 
dom of heaven, because our Saviour had declared that a man 
could not enter therein, except he be born of water and of the 
Spirit. It is true, they did not banish them into " the fire pre- 
pared for the devil and his angels," nor into Limbo, nor into 
dark holes of the earth ; on the contrary, they admitted them 
to the joys of eternal life, but not into the kingdom of heaven.* 
Thus, the Pelagians brought "poor little infants" as near to the 
kingdom of heaven as possible, without doing too great violence 
to the universal orthodoxy of their time. 

But as we cannot, like the Church of Rome, determine the 
fate of infants by a decree, we must take some little pains to 
ascertain how it has been determined by the Supreme Ruler of 
the world. For this purpose we shall first show, that there is 
suffering in the world which is not a punishment for sin, and 
then declare the great ends, or final causes, of all natural evil. 

SECTION IV. 
The true ends, or final causes, of natural evil. 

We have often wondered that grave divines should declare 
that there could be no natural evil, or suffering, under the 
administration of God, except such as is a punishment for sin 
in the person upon whom it is inflicted. ¥e have wondered, 
that in declaring none but a tyrant could ever permit the inno- 
cent to suffer, they have entertained no fears lest they might 
strengthen the cause of atheism. For if it be impossible to 
justify the character of God, except on the principle that all 

° Wiggers's Presentation of Augustinisra and Telagianism, chap. iv. 



Chapter II] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 265 

suffering is merited on account of sin in the object of it, then 
it is easy to see, that the atheistical argument against the good- 
ness of God is unanswerable. The atheist might well say : " Do 
we not see and know that the whole animal creation suffers? 
Now for what sin are they punished ? The inferior animals, 
you will admit, are not capable of committing actual sin, any 
more than infants are ; and Adam was not their federal head 
and representative. Hence, unless you can show for what sin 
they are punished, you must admit that, according to your own 
principles, God is a tyrant." How Dr. Dick, or Dr. Dwight, or 
President Edwards, or Calvin, would have answered such an 
argument, we cannot determine. For although they all assume 
that there can be no suffering under the good providence of 
God, except it be a punishment for sin in the object of it, yet, 
so far as we know, they have not made the most distant allu- 
sion to the suffering of the inferior animals. Indeed, they seem 
to be so intently bent on maintaining the doctrine of the impu- 
tation of sin to infants, that they pay no attention, in the assump- 
tion of the above position, either to the word of God, or to the 
great volume of nature spread out before them. 

But we find the difficulty noticed in a prize essay of three 
hundred pages, on the subject of native depravity, by Dr. Woods. 
The author assumes the same ground with Edwards, that all 
suffering must be justified on the ground of justice ; and hence 
he finds a real and proper sin in infants, in order to reconcile 
their sufferings with the character of God. This is the only 
ground, according to Dr. Woods, on which suffering can be 
vindicated under the administration of a perfect God. Where, 
then, is the real and proper sin in the inferior animals to justify 
their sufferings? This difficulty occurs to the distinguished 
author, and he endeavours to meet it. Let us see his reply. It 
is a reply which we have long been solicitous to see, and we 
now have it from one of the most celebrated theologians of the 
present day. 

" Some suppose," says he, " that infants suffer as irrational 
animals do, without reference to a moral law or the principles 
of a moral government. A strange supposition indeed, that 
human beings should for a time be ranked with beings which 
are not human, that is, mere animals." He is evidently shocked 
at such an insult offered to poor little infants. He will not 



266 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

allow us, for one moment, to take the whole race of man, 
"during the interesting period of infancy, cnt them off from 
their relation to Adam, degrade them from the dignity of hu- 
man beings, and put them in the rank of brute animals, — and 

then say, they suffer as the drutes do This would be the 

worst of all theories, — the farthest off from Scripture and rea- 
son, and the most revolting to all the noble sensibilities of 
man." 

E"ow, it is really refreshing to find these allusions to " the 
dignity of human beings" in a writer of this school; and 
especially in Dr. "Woods, who has so often rebuked others for 
their pride, when they have imagined that they were only en- 
gaged in the laudable enterprise of asserting this very dignity, 
by raising men from the rank of mere machines. It is so refresh- 
ing, indeed, to find such allusions in Dr. Woods, that we could 
almost forgive a little special pleading and bad logic in his at- 
tempt to vindicate the " dignity of human beings," which should 
have been an attempt to vindicate the goodness of God. 

"We do not place human beings and brutes in the same rank, 
except in so far as both are sensitive creatures, and consequently 
susceptible of pleasure and pain. In this particular, the Crea- 
tor himself has, to a certain extent, placed them in the same 
rank, and it is useless to cry out against his appointment. He 
will not listen to our talk about " the dignity of human beings." 
He will still leave us, in so far as bodily pain and death are 
concerned, in the same rank with mere animals. This single 
point of resemblance between animals and human beings is all 
that our argument requires ; and the fact that animals do suffer 
pain and death cannot be denied, or swept away by declama- 
tion. Let this fact be fairly and openly met, and not merely 
evaded. Let it be shown how the suffering of mere animals 
may be reconciled with the infinite goodness of God, and we 
will undertake to show how the suffering of guiltless " human 
beings " may be reconciled with it. Nay, we will undertake to 
show that the suffering of infants may be reconciled with the 
divine goodness, on the same, and also on still higher, grounds. 
We will place their sufferings on a more solid and a more defi- 
nite foundation, than upon such vague and misty assertions as 
that they " suffer with reference to a moral law." 

We do not cut off infants from their relation to Adam ; nor 



Chapter IL] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 267 

could we, if we desired to do so, cut them off from their relation 
to the animal nature which God has given them. It may be a 
very humiliating thought, it is true, that humcm ~beings should 
ever eat like mere animals, or sleep like mere animals, or suffer 
like mere animals ; but yet we cannot see how any rebellion 
against so humiliating a thought can possibly alter the fact. 
We do not deny, indeed, that a theologian may eat, and sleep, 
and suffer on higher principles than mere animals do ; but we 
seriously doubt if infants ever eat, or sleep, or suffer on any 
higher principles. It may shock the "noble sensibilities" of 
man that dear little infants should suffer as brutes do, especially 
when the term brutes is so strongly emphasized; but how it 
can relieve the case to have the poor little creatures arraigned 
at the bar of divine justice, and condemned to suffer as male- 
factors and criminals do, is more than we can possibly compre- 
hend. To have them thus arraigned, condemned, and punished 
as criminals, may dignify their sufferings, and render them 
more worthy of the rank of human beings ; but this is a dignity 
to which, we trust, they will never aspire. 

If we are not mistaken, then, the theory for which we con- 
tend is "not the worst of all theories," nor "the most revolting 
to the noblest sensibilities of man." It is a worse theory to sup- 
pose, with Edwards, that they may be arraigned and banished 
into "eternal misery" for a sin they have not committed, or 
the possession of a nature they could not possibly have avoided 
possessing. It is better, we say, to rank the human race "for 
a time," " during the interesting period of infancy," even with 
mere animals, than to rank them with the devil and his angels. 
But, in truth, we rank them with neither ; we simply leave them 
where God hath placed them, as a connecting link between the 
animal and the angelic natures. 

But we may produce many instances of suffering among hu- 
man beings, which are not a punishment for sin. We might 
refer to the feeling of compassion, which is always painful, and 
sometimes wrings the heart with the most exquisite agony ; and 
yet this was not planted in our bosom as a punishment for sin, 
but, as Bishop Butler has shown,* it was ordained by a God of 
mercy, to teach us a lesson of mercy, and lead us to mitigate 
the manifold miseries of man's estate. We might also refer to 

c= Sermon on Compassion. 



268 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II. 

an indignation against crime, which, as the same profound 
thinker has shown in his sermon on resentment, was planted in 
our natures, not to punish the subject of it, but to insure the 
punishment of others, that is, of criminals ; and thereby to pre- 
serve the good order and well-being of the world. This sense 
of wrong, of injustice, of outrage, by which the soul is so often 
tortured, is not designed to punish the subject of it, but to pro- 
mote the happiness and virtue of mankind. We might refer to 
these, and many other things of the same kind, but it is not 
necessary to dwell upon particular instances ; for the principle 
against which we contend may be more directly refuted by an 
appeal to reason, and to the very authors by whom it is advo- 
cated ; for, although it is adopted by them, and seems plausible 
at first view, it is often lost sight of when they lose sight of 
their system, and they give utterance to another principle more 
in accordance with the voice of nature. 

It is evident, that if the government of God requires that no 
suffering should be inflicted, except as a punishment for sin, 
then his perfect moral government requires that the punish- 
ment should, in all cases, be exactly proportioned to the demerit 
of those upon whom it falls. 

For, as Butler truly says, "Moral government consists in 
rewarding the righteous and punishing the wicked ; in rendering 
to men according to their actions, considered as good or evil. 
And the perfection of moral government consists in doing this, 
with regard to all intelligent creatures, in exact proportion to 
their personal merits and demerits."* This will not be denied. 
Hence, if suffering is distributed by God as a punishment for 
sin in all cases, as Calvin and his followers assert, then it must, 
on the same principle, be distributed according to the demerit 
of men. But is this the case ? Does this necessary consequence 
of this principle agree with fact ? If so, then every vile deed, 
every wicked outrage, committed by man, should be regarded 
as an instrument of divine justice, and deserved by those upon 
whom they fall. The inquisition itself, with all its unuttered 
and unutterable horrors, should be regarded, not merely as an 
exhibition of human wickedness and wrath, but also as an 
engine of divine justice, to crush the martyr on its wheels, 
because he refuses to lie to his own soul and to his God ! !Na- 

Butler's Analog}', part i, chap. iii. 



Chapter II."! WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 269 

ture itself recoils from such a conclusion. Not one of the 
writers in question would adopt it. Hence, they should not 
advocate a principle from which it necessarily flows. 

Indeed, they all argue the necessity of a future state of retri- 
bution, from the unequal distribution of natural good and evil 
in this life. But Lord Bolingbroke has refuted this argument 
by reasoning from their own principles. He insists that such is 
the justice of Gocl, that there can be no suffering or natural evil 
in this life, except such as is proportioned to the demerits of 
men ; and hence he rejects the argument from the apparent 
unequal distribution of pleasure and pain in this world in favour 
of the reality of a future judgment. He resents the imputation 
that God could ever permit any suffering which is not deserved, 
as warmly as it is resented by Dr. Dick himself, and proclaims 
it to be dishonourable to God. All rewards and punishments, 
says he, are equal and just in this life ; and to say otherwise, is 
to take an atheistical view of the divine character. Learned 
divines proceed on the same princijDle, as we have seen, when 
they contend for the imputation of sin ; but they forget and 
overlook it, when they come to prove the future judgment to 
the infidel. Thus, in their zeal to establish their own peculiar 
dogmas, they place themselves and their cause in the power of 
the infidel. 

But if suffering be not always inflicted, under the admin- 
istration of God, as a punishment for sin, for what other end is 
it inflicted ? We answer, it is inflicted for these ends : 1. Even 
when it is inflicted as a punishment for sin, this is not the only 
end, or final cause of its infliction. It is also intended to deter 
others from the commission of evil, and preserve the order of 
the world. 2. In some instances, nay, in very many instances, 
it is intended to discipline and form the mind to virtue. As 
Bishop Butler well says, even while vindicating the moral 
government of the world : " It is not pretended but that, in 
the natural course of things, happiness and misery appear to 
be distributed by other rules, than only the personal merit and 
demerit of character. They may sometimes be distributed by 
way of mere discipline. And in his profound chapter on a 
" State of probation, as intended for moral discipline and im- 
provement," he shows that they are actually distributed for this 
purpose. 3. The unavoidable evils of this life, which are not 



270 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Tart II, 

brought upon us by our faults, are intended to serve as a foil to 
set off the blessedness of eternity. Our present light afflictions 
are intended, not merely to work out for us an exceeding and 
eternal weight of glory, but also to heighten our sense and 
enj oyment of it by a recollection of the miseries experienced in 
this life. They are intended to form but a short and discordant 
prelude to an everlasting harmony. If they should not prove 
so in fact, the fault will be our own, without the least impeach- 
ment of the beneficent design of the great Author and Ruler 
of the universe. 

On these grounds, especially on the first two, we must justify 
all the natural evil in the world. In regard to the second, 
Bishop Butler says : " Allurements to what is wrong ; difficulties 
in the discharge of our duties ; our not being able to act a uni- 
form right part without some thought and care ; and the oppor- 
tunities we have, or imagine we have, of avoiding what we 
dislike, or obtaining what we desire, by unlawful means, when 
w T e either cannot do it at all, or at least not so easily, by lawful 
ones ; these things, that is, the snares and temptations of vice, 
are what render the present world peculiarly fit to he a state of 
discipline to those who will preserve their integrity / because 
they render being upon our guard, resolution, and the denial 
of our passions, necessary to that end." Thus, the temptations 
by which we are surrounded, the allurements of those passions 
by which vice is rendered so bewitching, are the appointed 
means of moral discipline and improvement in virtue. 

The habit of virtue thus formed, he truly observes, will be 
firm and fixed in proportion to the amount of temptation we 
have gradually overcome in its formation. "Though actions 
materially virtuous," says he, " which have no sort of difficulty, 
but are perfectly agreeable to our particular inclinations, may 
possibly be done only from those particular inclinations, and so 
may not be any exercise of the principle of virtue, i. e., not be 
virtuous actions at all; yet, on the contrary, they may be an 
exercise of that principle, and, when they are, they have a ten- 
dency to form and fix the habit of virtue. But when the exer- 
cise of the virtuous principle is more continued, oftener repeated, 
and more intense, as it must be in circumstances of danger, 
temptation, and difficulty of any kind, and in any degree, this 
tendency is increased proportion ably, and a more confirmed 



Chapter IL] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 271 

habit is the consequence."* The greater the temptation, then, 
the more fixed will be the habit of virtue, by which it is gradu- 
ally overcome and subdued. 

This habit may become so fixed, by a struggle with tempta- 
tions and difficulties, as to raise the soul above the dangers to 
which moral agents are exposed. "Virtuous self-government 
is not only right in itself, but also improves the inward consti- 
tution or character ; and may improve it to such a degree, that 
though we should suppose it impossible for particular affections 
to be absolutely co-incident with the moral principle, and con- 
sequently should allow, that such creatures as have been above 
supposed icould forever remain def edible ; yet their danger of 
actually deviating from right may be almost infinitely lessened, 
and they fully fortified against what remains of it ; if that 
may be called danger, against which there is cm adequate effec- 
tual security r ."f 

" These several observations," says he, " concerning the active 
principle of virtue and obedience to God's commands are appli- 
cable to passive submission or resignation to his will, which is 
another essential part of a right character, connected with the 
former, and very much in our power to form ourselves to." 
This, then, is the view which we think should be entertained 
with respect to the natural evils of this life : they are intended 
by the infinitely wise and good Ruler of the world to detach 
us from the fleeting things of time and sense, by the gradual 
formation of a habit of moral goodness, arising from a resist- 
ance against the influence of such things and firm adherence to 
the will of God, and to form our character for a state of fixed 
eternal blessedness. Such is the beneficent design of God in 
relation to the human race itself. His design in relation to the 
more magnificent scheme of the moral universe, in thus plant- 
ing the human race and striving to train it up to virtue and 
happiness, we have already considered.^: 

We say, then, that it is a principle of the divine government 
of the world to impose natural evil or suffering as a means of 
good. It is obj ected against this principle, that it is to do evil 
that good may come. "To say that Christ was subjected to 
sufferings" says Dr. Dick, " for the benevolent purpose of con- 
ferring important benefits upon mankind, is to give the highest 

° Analogy, chap. v. f Id., chap, v, p. 178. | Part i, chap. vi. 



272 NATUKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

sanction to the principle which is so strongly reprobated in the 
Scriptures, that evil may be done that good may come." The 
theology of Dr. Dick, and of his school, does not sufficiently 
distinguish between natural and moral evil. We are nowhere 
told in Scripture, that it is wrong to do natural evil, or inflict 
suffering, that good may come. Every good man acts upon 
this principle every day of his life. Every act of self-denial, 
and every infliction of parental discipline, are proofs of the just- 
ness of this remark. The surgeon who amputates a limb, in 
order to save the life of his patient, acts upon the same principle. 
But who ever thought of condemning such conduct ? Who ever 
reminded him that he should not do evil that good may come ? 
It is plain, that neither " the sufferings " of Christ, nor any other 
sufferings imposed for the real good of the world, are liable to any 
such objection, or come under the condemnation of any such 
maxim. This objection lies, as we have seen,* against the doc- 
trine of Edwards and his followers, that moral evil, that sin, 
may be chosen as the means of good. The high and holy God 
never commits, or causes others to commit, moral evil that good 
may come ; but he not only may, but actually does, inflict 
natural evil in order to promote the good of his creatures. 
Thus, by applying the language of Scripture to natural evil 
instead of to moral, Dr. Dick has just exactly inverted the order 
of things as they actually exist in the constitution and govern- 
ment of the moral world. 



SECTION V. 
The importance of harmonizing reason and revelation. 

For these reasons, we refuse to justify the sufferings of infants, 
on the ground that the sin of Adam was imputed to them. A 
sentiment so dark and appalling but ill accords with the sublime 
and beautiful spirit of the gospel. It partakes more of the 
weakness and infirmity of human nature than of the divine 
nature of Him who "spake as never man spake." The best 
account which Plato could give of the sufferings of infants was 
that they had sinned in some former state of existence, for which 
they are punished in this. St. Augustine and his followers, 
rejecting such a view, and relying on the literal sense of the 

Part i, chap. ii. 



Chapter II] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 273 

words of reveiation, advanced the hypothesis that infants sinned, 
not in a preexistent state, bnt in Adam ; for which they are 
justly exposed to pain and death. Others again, not being 
able to conceive how infants could be really and personally in 
Adam many thousand years before they were born, so as to sin 
with him, adopted the hypothesis, that if they had heen in his 
place they would have sinned, and are therefore justly exposed 
to the penalty due to his transgression ; according to which 
theory each soul might be made liable to the guilt of infinitely 
more sin than any finite being could possibly commit. Another 
age, rising above such dark notions respecting the nature of sin 
and the justice of God, maintained the hypothesis that Adam's 
sin was imputed to all his posterity, by which the fearful 
penalty due to his sin might be justly inflicted upon them. 
According to a fifth theory, it is clear that " nothing under the 
empire of Jehovah " can be sin, except a known transgression 
of the law ; and infants are punished, because, as soon as they 
come into the world, they knowingly transgress the law of God. 
They cannot knowingly sin, says a sixth theory ; but still they 
really transgress the law of God by those little bubbling emo- 
tions of anger, and so forth, as soon as they come into exist- 
ence; and hence, the penalty of sin is inflicted upon them. 
Such are some of the hypotheses which have been adopted by 
Christian theologians to reconcile the suffering of infants with 
the justice and goodness of God. The more we look into them, 
the more we are amazed that the great lights of the world 
should have indulged in reveries so wild and so wonderful ; 
and the more are we convinced, that the speculations of men on 
these subjects, and the whole theological literature of the world 
in relation to it, form one of the darkest chapters in the history 
of the human mind. 

How unlike are such views respecting the origin and exist- 
ence of natural evil to the divine simplicity and beauty of the 
gospel ! " Who did sin, this man or his parents," said the dis- 
ciples to our Saviour, " that he was born blind ?" They made 
no doubt but that the great evil of natural blindness must have 
been the punishment of some sin ; and merely wished to know 
whether it were his own sin, committed in some former state 
of existence, or the sin of his parents. Their minds seem to 
have hung in a state of vacillation between the theory of Plato 

18 



274 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

and that of imputation. But our Saviour replied : " Neither 
did this man sin, nor his parents," that he was born blind ; but 
" that the work of God might be made manifest in him." We 
thank thee, O blessed Master, for that sweet word ! How 
delightful is it, after passing through the dark labyrinths of 
human folly to sit at thy feet and drink in the lessons of heav- 
enly wisdom ! How pleasant to the soul — how inexpressibly 
cheering is it — to turn from the harsh and revolting systems 
of men, and listen to the sweet accents of mercy as they fall 
from thy lips ! 

The great law of suffering, then, is that it is intended for the 
benefit of intelligent creatures. This is the case, even when it 
assumes the character of punishment ; for then it is designee 1 
to prevent moral evil. Such a view of natural evil, or suffering, 
does not give that horrid picture of the world which arises 
from the sentiment that all pain and death must be a punish- 
ment for sin. This causes us to see the black scourge of retri- 
butive justice everywhere, and the hand of fatherly correction 
nowhere. It places us, not in a school or state of probation, to 
train us up for a better and brighter world, but in the midst of 
inquisitorial fires and penal woe. It teaches that all mankind 
became guilty by the act of one man ; and that for one deed, 
millions upon millions of human beings are justly obnoxious, 
not only to temporal and spiritual, but also to eternal death. 

"We are perfectly aware of all the arguments which have 
been drawn from Scripture in support of such a doctrine ; and 
we are also perfectly satisfied that they may be most easily and 
triumphantly refuted. But at present we do not mean to touch 
this argument ; we shall reserve it for another work. In the 
mean time, we must be permitted to express the sentiment, that 
a system of theology, so profoundly unphilosophical, so utterly 
repugnant to the moral sentiments of mankind, can never fulfil 
the sublime mission of true religion on earth. It may possess 
the principle of life within, but it is destitute of the form of life 
without. It may convert the individual soul, and lead it up to 
heaven ; but it has not the radiant form and power of truth, to 
command the admiration and conquer the intellect of the world. 
It may elevate and purify the affections, even while it depresses 
and confounds the understanding ; but it cannot transfigure 
the whole mind, and change it into its own divine image. Noth- 



Chapter II] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 2*75 

ing but the most fixed and rooted faith, or the most blind and 
unquestioning submission, can withstand the fearful blasts and 
dark impulses of such a system. 

!No wonder, then, that under a system so deplorably deficient 
in some of the most sublime features of Christianity, infidelity 
and Pelagianism should so often have sprung up. If we write 
libels on the divine government, we must expect rebellions and 
insurrections. This is the natural consequence of the great 
fundamental heresy which places reason and revelation in 
opposition to each other. Orthodoxy, as she proudly* styles 
herself, may denounce such rebellions ; but she herself is partly 
responsible for the fatal consequences of them. Reason and 
revelation can never be dissevered, can never be placed in 
violent conflict, without a frightful injury to both, and to the 
best interests of mankind. Reason must find its own internal 
power and life in revelation, and revelation must find its own 
external form and beauty in reason. The perfection and glory 
of each consists in the living union and consentaneous develop- 
ment of both. 

If we teach absurdity, it is worse than idle to enforce sub- 
mission by arrogant and lordly denunciations of human pride, 
or of " carnal reason." And we shall always find, indeed, that 
when a theologian or a philosopher begins by abusing and vili- 
fying human reason, he either has some absurdity which he 
wishes us to swallow, or he wishes to be excused from believing 
anything in particular. Thus, the dogmatism of the one and 
the scepticism of the other unite in trampling human reason 
under foot ; the one, to erect an empire of absurdity, and the 
other, to erect an empire of darkness upon its ruins. It should 
be the great object of all our labours to effect a reunion and 
harmony between revelation and reason, whose " inauspicious 
repudiations and divorces " have so long " disturbed everything 
in the great family of mankind."* 

° This language of Bacon is applied by him to the empirical and rational 
faculties of the human mind. 



276 NATUKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 



CHAPTEE IE. 

THE SUFFERINGS OF CHRIST RECONCILED WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 

blessed Well of Love ! Flower of Grace ! 

glorious Morning Starre ! Lampe of Light ! 

Most lively Image of thy Father's face, 

Eternal King of Glorie, Lord of Might, 

Meeke Lambe of God, before all worlds behight, 

How can we thee requite for all this good ? 

Or who can prize that thy most precious blood ? — Spenser. 

In the preceding chapter we have endeavoured to show that 
natural evil or suffering is not inconsistent with the goodness 
of God. "We were there led to see that God, although he never 
chooses moral evil, often imposes natural evil, or suffering, in 
order to secure the well-being of the world. Of this general 
principle, the sufferings and death of Christ are a particular 
instance ; they are not anomalous, but a striking manifestation 
of a great principle which pervades the whole economy of 
divine providence. These sufferings, so far from being incon- 
sistent with the goodness of God, are a stupendous display of 
that sublime mercy which is over all his works. To illustrate 
this position, and clear it of sceptical cavils and objections, is 
the main object of the present chapter. 

SECTION I. 
The sufferings of Christ not unnecessary. 

Because the necessity of Christ's death and sufferings is not 
manifest at first view, or because the utility of them is not seen, 
it is concluded by some that they were wholly useless, and con- 
sequently inconsistent with the infinite goodness ascribed to the 
Ruler of the world. We shall content ourselves with disposing 
of this objection in the words of Bishop Butler. "To object 
against the expediency or usefulness of particular things revealed 
to have been done or suffered by him," says he, " because we 
do not see how they were conducive to those ends, is highly 
absurd. Yet nothing is more common to be met with than this 



Chapter m.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 277 

absurdity. But if it be acknowledged beforehand, that we are 
not judges in this case, it is evident that no objection can, with 
any shadow of reason, be urged against any particular part of 
Christ's mediatorial office revealed in Scripture, till it can be 
shown positively, not to be requisite, or conducive, to the ends 
proposed to be accomplished ; or that it is in itself unreason- 
able."* 

Again : " It is indeed," says he, " a matter of great patience to 
reasonable men to find people arguing in this manner ; objecting 
against the credibility of such particular things revealed in 
Scripture, that they do not see the necessity or expediency of 
them. For, though it is highly right, and the most pious exer- 
cise of our understanding, to inquire with due reverence into the 
ends and reasons of God's dispensations ; yet, when those reasons 
are concealed, to argue from our ignorance, that such dispensa- 
tions cannot be from God, is infinitely absurd. The presumption 
of this kind of obj ection seems almost lost in the folly of them. 
And the folly of them is yet greater, when they are urged, as 
usually they are, against things in Christianity analogous, or 
like to those natural dispensations of Providence which are 
matters of experience. Let reason be kept to, and if any part 
of the Scripture account of the redemption of the world by 
Christ can be shown to be really contrary to it, let the Scrip- 
ture, in the name of God, be given up : but let not such poor 
creatures as we go on objecting against an infinite scheme, 
that we do not see the necessity or usefulness of all its parts, 
and call this reasoning ; and what heightens the absurdity in 
the present case, parts which we are not actively concerned in."f 

This reply is amply sufficient for such an objection. But 
although the concession is made, for the sake of argument, it is 
not true, that we do not see the necessity or usefulness of the 
sufferings of Christ. For, as the author well says : " "What has 
been often alleged in justification of this doctrine, even from 
the apparent natural tendency of this method of our redemp- 
tion — its tendency to vindicate the authority of God's laws, and 
deter his creatures from sin : this has never been answered, and 
is, I think, plainly unanswerable ; though I am far from think- 
ing it an account of the whole of the case." J 

It is true, we believe, that the position that the great work 

* Butler's Analogy, part ii, chap. v. f Analogy. J Ibid. 



278 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

of Christ was necessary to maintain the authority of God's law, 
and to deter his creatures from sin, never has been, and never 
can be refuted. Yet nearly all of the commonly received sys- 
tems of theology furnish a principle, a false principle, on which 
this position may be overthrown, and the sufferings of Christ 
shown to be unnecessary. For if a necessary holiness be not a 
contradiction in terms, if God can, as is usually asserted, cause 
holiness universally to prevail by the mere word of his power, 
then the work and sufferings of Christ are not necessary to 
maintain the authority of his law, and deter his creatures from 
sin. In other words, the sufferings of Christ were " not requi- 
site to the ends proposed to be accomplished," because, on such 
a supposition, they might have been far more easily and com- 
pletely accomplished without them. 

Those who maintain, then, as most theologians clo, that God 
could easily cause virtue to exist everywhere if he would, really 
set forth a principle which, if true, would demonstrate the suf- 
ferings of Christ to be unnecessary, and consequently inconsist- 
ent with the goodness of God. We must strike at this false 
principle, and restore the truth that a necessary holiness is a 
contradiction in terms, an inherent and impossible conceit, if 
we would behold the sublime significancy and beauty of the 
stupendous sacrifice of the cross. We shall then behold the 
necessity of that sacrifice, and see the omnipotent yearnings of 
the divine love in its efforts to overcome an obstacle, which 
could not be otherwise surmounted. 

It is often said, we are well aware, that God might have 
saved us by a mere word ; but he chose not to do so, preferring 
to give up his Son to death in order to show his love. But 
how can such a position be maintained ? If God could save us 
by a word, how can it display his love to require such immense 
sufferings in order to save us? If he could accomplish the 
salvation of all men by a mere word, how does it show his love 
to make such wonderful preparations for their salvation ; and, 
after all, permit so large a portion of them to be eternally lost ? 
If we could save the life of a fellow-being by merely putting 
forth a hand, would it display our love for him if we should 
choose to travel all around the earth, and incur incredible hard- 
ships and sufferings in order to save him ? Would this display 
our love, we ask, or our folly ? Is it not evident, then, that the 



Chapter ni] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 279 

principle that virtue or holiness might be easily caused to exist 
everywhere, is utterly repugnant to the glory of revelation ? Is 
it not evident that it causes the transcendent glory of the cross 
to disappear, and reduces the whole complicated system of 
means and appliances for the salvation of the world to a mere 
idle mockery of the miseries of man's estate ? Does it not 
show the whole plan of salvation, as conceived and executed by 
the infinite wisdom of God, to be an awkward and bungling 
attempt to accomplish an end, which might have been far more 
easily and perfectly accomplished ? And if so, does it not be- 
come all Christian theologians to expunge this false principle 
from their systems, and eradicate it from their thoughts ? 

SECTION II. 
The sufferings of Christ a bright manifestation of the goodness of God. 

The reason why the love of God does not appear to all men in 
the sacrifice of his Son is, that it is often viewed, not as it is in 
itself, but through the distorting medium of false analogies, or 
of a vague and ill-defined phraseology. Hence it is that the 
melancholy spectacle is everywhere presented of men, of rational 
and immortal beings, living and dying in a determined opposi- 
tion to a doctrine which they have not taken the pains to under- 
stand, and of whose intrinsic grandeur and glory they have not 
enjoyed the most remote glimpse. So far from beholding the 
love of God, which shines forth so conspicuously in the cross of 
Christ, they see in it only an act of injustice and cruelty on the 
part of God. 

One source of this error, we have no doubt, is to be found in 
the use, or rather in the abuse, of the term punishment. In the 
strict sense of the word, it is not only unjust, but impossible, for 
God to punish the innocent. The very idea of punishment, ac- 
cording to the strict sense of the word, implies the notion of 
guilt or ill-desert in the person upon whom it is inflicted. It is 
suffering inflicted on an offender, on account of his real or sup- 
posed personal guilt. Hence, as God regards all things just as 
they are in themselves, he cannot possibly look upon the inno- 
cent as guilty; and consequently he cannot, in the strict sense 
of the word, inflict punishment upon them. And when we 
speak of the punishment of Christ, we merely mean, or should 



280 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

merely mean, to convey the idea that he suffered, in order to 
release us from the punishment due to our sins. It would be 
well, perhaps, if this could always be borne in mind ; for most 
men are more under the influence and power of words than 
they are apt to see, or willing to acknowledge. The mere ex- 
pression, the punishment of the innocent, is apt to awaken 
associations in the mind which are inconsistent with the dictates 
of justice ; but which the idea of the atonement would never 
have suggested, if clearly and distinctly viewed in its own clear 
light, and not through the dark medium of an ill-defined 
phraseology. 

Another source of the error in question is to be found in the 
ambiguity of the term justice. It is frequently said that the 
atonement is a satisfaction to divine justice ; to which it is 
replied, that justice requires the punishment of the very indi- 
vidual who offends, and not of another person in his place. Let 
us consider this subject. 

The term justice has two distinct significations, which I 
shall designate by the epithets retributive and administrative. 
By retributive justice, I mean that attribute which inclines 
Him to punish an offender merely on account of the intrinsic 
demerit and hatefulness of his offence ; and which animadverts 
upon the evil conduct of a moral agent, considered as an indi- 
vidual, and not as a member of the great family of intelligent 
beings. This attribute seeks to punish sin merely because it 
deserves punishment, and not because its punishment is neces- 
sary to secure the ends of government; and, supposing sin to 
exist, it would have its object, even if there were only one ac- 
countable creature in the universe. 

The object of public or administrative justice is quite differ- 
ent. It inflicts punishment, not because it is deserved, but in 
order to prevent transgression, and to secure the general good, 
by securing the ends of wise and good government. In the 
moral government of God, one of the highest objects of this 
kind of justice, or, if you please, of this phase or manifestation 
of the divine justice, is to secure in the hearts of its subjects a 
cordial approbation of the principles according to which they 
are governed. This is indispensable to the very existence of 
moral government. The dominion of force, or of power, may 
be maintained, in many cases, notwithstanding the aversion of 



Chapter III.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 281 

those who are subject to it; but it is impossible to govern the 
heart by love while it disapproves and hates the principles to 
which it is required to submit, or the character of the ruler by 
whom those principles are enforced. 

Now, it is very true, that Christ has made a satisfaction to 
divine justice. This is frequently asserted; but it is seldom 
considered, we apprehend, with any very great degree of dis- 
tinctness, in what sense the term justice should always be 
understood in this proposition. It cannot properly refer to the 
retributive justice of God. This requires the punishment of 
the offender, and of no one else. It accepts of no substitute. 
And hence, it is impossible to conceive that it can be satisfied, 
except by the punishment of the offender himself. The obj ect 
of this sort of justice, as I have said, is personal guilt ; and 
hence, as our Saviour did not become personally guilty, when 
he assumed our place and consented to die for us, so it is impos- 
sible to conceive that he became liable to the infliction of the 
retributive justice of God. And we suppose it is this idea, at 
which the Socinian vaguely and obscurely aims, when he says, 
that the justice of God requires the punishment of the trans- 
gressor alone ; and that it is absurd to suppose it can be satisfied 
by the substitution of the innocent in his stead. He denies the 
whole doctrine of satisfaction, because he sees and feels that it 
is not true according to one meaning of the terms in which it is 
expressed. 

In truth and in deed, the sinner is just as guilty after the 
atonement as he was before ; and he is just as obnoxious to the 
inflictions of the retributive justice of God. He may be most 
justly punished ; for as the claims of retributive justice have 
not been satisfied, so they may be demanded of him without 
being a second time exacted. He really deserves the wrath of 
God on account of his sins, although administrative justice has 
been satisfied ; and hence, when he truly repents and believes, 
all his sins are freely and graciously remitted. ]STo satisfaction 
is made to retributive justice. 

It is the administrative justice of God that has been satisfied 
by the atonement. This merely enforces the punishment of the 
sinner, as I have said, in order to secure the ends of good 
government ; and hence, it is capable of yielding and giving 
place to any expedient by which those ends may be secured. 



282 NATUEAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part H, 

In other words, it is capable of being satisfied by whatever 
method God may be pleased to adopt in order to secure the 
ends of good government, and to accomplish his own glorious 
designs, without the punishment of the sinner. All this, as we 
shall see hereafter, has been most gloriously accomplished by 
the death and sufferings of Christ. God can now be just, and 
yet the justifier of him that believes. The great obstacles which 
the administrative justice of God interposes to the forgiveness 
of sin, having been taken out of the way and nailed to the 
cross, that unbounded mercy from which the provision of such 
a Saviour proceeded, can now flow down upon a lost and 
ruined world in all the fulness and plenitude of its pardoning 
and sanctifying power. 

As a general thing, those who undertake to vindicate the 
sufferings of Christ against objections, rest their defence on the 
ground that they are a satisfaction to the administrative justice 
of Gocl. This is seen, not from their express declarations, but 
from the nature of their arguments and defence ; as if they 
unconsciously turned to this position as to their stronghold. 
On the other hand, those who assail the sacrifice of Christ, 
almost invariably treat it as if it were a satisfaction to the 
retributive justice of God. Both sides seem to be right, and 
both wrong. The whole idea of satisfaction to divine justice 
by a substitute is not Absurd, because the idea of satisfaction 
to retributive justice is so ; nor is the whole justice of God, or 
the justice of God in every sense of the word, to be conceived 
of as satisfied by the atonement, because his administrative 
justice is thus satisfied. When it is thus asserted, then, that 
the justice of God is satisfied by the atonement ; we should be 
careful, we think, to observe in what precise sense this propo- 
sition is true, and in what sense it is false ; in order that we 
may pursue the clear and shining light of truth, neither dis- 
tracted by the clamour of words nor enveloped in clouds of 
logomachy. 

There is a class of theologians, we are aware, and a very 
large class, who regard the sufferings of Christ as a satisfaction 
to the retributive justice of God. But this forms no part of the 
doctrine which we have undertaken to defend ; and, indeed, 
we think the defence of such a view of the atonement clearly 
impossible. It is placed on the ground, that the sins of the 



Chapter III.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 283 

world, or of those for whom Christ died, have been imputed to 
him ; and hence he really suffers the inflictions of the retri- 
butive justice of God. The objections to this scheme, which 
seek to remove the apparent hardships and injustice of the 
sufferings of the innocent, by the fiction of the imputation of 
the sins of the guilty, we shall not dwell upon here ; as we so 
fully considered them in the preceding chapter. To our mind 
they are plainly unanswerable. We would vindicate the suf- 
ferings of Christ no more than those of infants, on the ground 
that sin was imputed to him, so as to render them just. On 
the contrary, we hold them to have been wholly undeserved; 
and instead of vindicating them on the ground of stern justice, 
we vindicate them on the ground of the infinite, unbounded, 
and overflowing goodness of God. 

It is easy to see that such a view of the atonement does not 
in the least degree conflict with the justice of God. It merely 
teaches, that God has provided for the salvation of the world by 
the sufferings of Jesus Christ, who was without spot or blemish. 
Surely we cannot find it in our hearts to object, that the suffer- 
ings of Christ for such a purpose are not consistent with the 
justice of God, if we will only read a single page in the great 
volume of nature and of providence. It has been said by 
Bishop Butler, that such an objection " concludes altogether as 
much against God's whole original constitution of nature, and 
the whole daily course of divine providence, in the government 
of the world, i. e., against the whole scheme of theism and the 
whole notion of religion, as against Christianity. For the world 
is a constitution, or system, whose parts have a mutual refer- 
ence to each other ; and there is a scheme of things gradually 
carrying on, called the course of nature, to the carrying on of 
which God has appointed us, in various ways, to contribute. 
And when, in the daily course of natural providence, it is 
appointed that innocent people should suffer for the faults of 
the guilty, this is liable to the very same objection as the 
instance we are considering. The infinitely greater importance 
of that appointment of Christianity which is objected against, 
does not hinder but that it may be, as it plainly is, an appoint- 
ment of the very same kind with what the world affords us 
daily examples of. Nay, if there were any force at all in the 
objection, it would be stronger, in one respect, against natural 



284 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT LPart II, 

providence, tlian against Christianity ; because, under the 
former, we are in many cases commanded, and even necessi- 
tated, whether we will or no, to suffer for the faults of others, 
whereas the sufferings of Christ were voluntary." 

Now, how very unreasonable is it in the theist, to object 
against Christianity, that it represents God as having acted upon 
a particular principle, i. e., as having appointed the innocent to 
suffer for the good of the guilty, when we see that he has 
everywhere recognised and adopted the very same principle in 
the government of the world ? However remote this principle 
may appear from the conceptions of man, it is not only found 
in the volume of inspiration ; it is deeply engraven by the 
finger of God himself upon every page of the volume of natu- 
ral providence. And to question the divine original of revela- 
tion, because it contains such a principle or appointment, while 
we admit that God created and governs the world, is about as 
unreasonable as it would be to deny that a letter came from a 
particular person, because it was clearly written in his hand- 
writing, and bore evident traces of his peculiarities of style and 
thought. 

Let us view this general principle in a particular instance. 
This will set it in a clear and striking light, and seem to vindi- 
cate the constitution of the world, as well as the doctrine of the 
atonement. The principle of compassion has been planted in 
our bosom by the finger of God. And thus the necessity is laid 
upon us, by a law of our nature, to suffer on account of the 
distresses which our fellow-men bring upon themselves by their 
own crimes and vices ; and we are impelled in various ways to 
undergo inconvenience and loss, and self-denial and suffering, 
in order to avert from them the consequences of their own mis- 
conduct. But have we any reason to complain of this appoint- 
ment of God ? Certainly not : for if we obey the indications 
of his will, as seen in this part of the constitution of our nature, 
by doing all in our power to relieve the distresses of our fellow- 
men, we shall be infinitely more than repaid for all that we 
may undergo and suffer. However painful may be the feeling 
of compassion, we only have to obey its dictates by relieving 
the distressed to the utmost of our ability, and we shall be more 
than repaid by the satisfaction and delight which never fail to 
result from such a course of life ; to say nothing of those infinite 



Chapter III.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 285 

rewards which God has prepared for those who sincerely love 
and serve him. 

Just so it is in relation to the sufferings of Christ. He was 
led by his boundless compassion to avert from ns the awful 
consequences of sin, by the agony, and the sufferings, and the 
death, which he endured upon the cross. And, according to 
the doctrine of atonement, he is infinitely more than repaid for 
all this. Though he suffered in the flesh, and was made a spec- 
tacle to men and angels, yet he despised the shame, seeing the 
joy that was set before him. We do confess that we can see 
no insufferable hardship in all this, nor the least shadow of 
injustice. One thing is certain, if injustice is exhibited here, 
it is exhibited everywhere in the providence of God ; and if the 
doctrine of the atonement were stricken from the scheme of 
Christianity, the injustice which is supposed to attend it would 
still continue to overhang and cloud the moral government of 
God. And hence, if the deist or the Socinian would escape 
from this frightful spectre of his own imagination, he must bury 
himself in the most profound depths and most cheerless gloom 
of atheism. 

The doctrine in question is frequently misrepresented, and 
made to appear inconsistent with the justice of God, by means 
of false analogies. The Socinian frequently speaks of it, as if it 
were parallel with the proceeding of a human government that 
should doom the innocent to suffer in place of the guilty. Thus 
the feeling of indignation that is aroused in the human bosom 
at the idea of a virtuous man's being sentenced to suffer the 
punishment due to the criminal is sought to be directed against 
the doctrine of the atonement. But in vain will such rhetoric 
be employed to excite indignation and horror against the doc- 
trine of the cross, in the mind of any person by whom it is at 
all understood. 

The cases are not at all parallel. In the first place, no human 
government has a right to doom a virtuous man to bear the 
punishment due to the criminal ; and if he were willing to suf- 
fer in the place of the culprit, no government on earth has a 
right to accept of such a substitute. The life of the virtuous 
citizen is the gift of God, and no earthly power has the author- 
ity to take it for any such purpose. It would be a violation of 
the will of God for any human government to admit of such a 



286 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

substitution. On the contrary, Christ had the power to lay 
down his life ; and he did so, in perfect accordance with 
the appointment of God. In submitting to the death of the 
cross, he did not subvert, he fulfilled the end of his earthly 
existence. 

Secondly, it would overthrow the ends of public justice for 
any human government to permit a good man, the ornament 
and blessing of society, to die in the room of the criminal, its 
scourge and plague. The sufferings of the good citizen in such 
a case would be pure and unmitigated evil. While they would 
deprive society of his services, they would throw back upon it 
the burden of one who deserved to die. They would tend to 
render the punishment of crime uncertain ; they would shock 
the moral sentiments of mankind, and cover with odium and 
disgrace the government that could tolerate such a proceeding. 
But not so in relation to the sufferings of Christ. He assumed, 
his human nature for the express purpose of dying upon the 
cross. He died, not to deliver an individual and turn him loose 
to commit further depredations upon society, but to effect the 
salvation of the world itself, and to deliver it from all the evils 
under which it groans and travails in pain. He died for sin- 
ners, not that they might continue in their sins, but in order to 
redeem unto himself a peculiar people zealous of good works. 

In the third and last place, the death of a good man is the 
end of his existence, the entire extinction of his being, in so 
far as all human government is concerned ; whereas the death 
of Christ, in relation to the government of God, was but the 
beginning of his exaltation and glory. He endured the cross, 
despising the shame, in view of the unbounded joy that was 
set before him. The temporal evils which he endured, unut- 
terably great as they were, if viewed merely in relation to 
himself, were infinitely more than counterbalanced by the eter- 
nal satisfaction and delight that resulted from them. 

< 

SECTION III. 

The objections of Dr. Channing, and other Unitarians, against the doctrine 
of the atonement. 

It is likewise objected against the doctrine of the atonement, 
that it obscures the freeness and glory of the divine mercy. It 



Chapter m.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 28*7 

is supposed to interfere with the freeness of the favour of God, 
inasmuch as it requires a sacrifice to procure the remission of 
sin. This point, no less than the former, the Socinian endeavours 
to establish by means of analogies drawn from the ordinary- 
transactions of life. " I know it is said," says Dr. Channing, 
"that Trinitarianism magnifies God's mercy, because it teaches 
that he himself provided the substitute for the guilty. But I 
reply, that the work here ascribed to mercy is not the most 
appropriate, nor the most fitted to manifest it and impress it on 
the heart. This may be made apparent by familiar illustration. 
Suppose that a creditor, through compassion to certain debtors, 
should persuade a benevolent and opulent man to pay him in 
their stead; would not the debtors see a greater mercy, and 
feel a weightier obligation, if they were to receive a free, 
gratuitous release ? And will not their chief gratitude stray 
beyond the creditor to their benevolent substitute ? Or sup- 
pose that a parent, unwilling to inflict a penalty on a disobedient 
but feeble child, should persuade a stronger child to bear it ; 
would not the offender see a more touching mercy in a free 
forgiveness, springing immediately from a parent's heart, than 
in this circuitous remission ?" 

If there were any force in such analogies, they would con- 
clude quite as much against the scheme of Dr. Channing as 
against ours. For he maintains that the sinner can obtain for- 
giveness only by a sincere repentance of his sins. He teaches 
that God requires the sinner to humble himself, and take up his 
cross and follow Christ. Now to return to the case of the 
debtor. Would he not see a greater kindness, "and feel a 
weightier obligation," if he were to receive a free release, with- 
out any conditions being imposed upon him, than if it was 
accompanied by any terms or conditions ? 

But the analogy is false. However well it might serve some 
purposes, it is misapplied by Dr. Channing. If a creditor is 
known to love money, as most men are, and he should never- 
theless release his debtors ; this would undoubtedly be an 
exhibition of his kindness. And we might measure the extent 
of his kindness by the amount of the indebtedness which he had 
forgiven. But although the creditor, who is the most easily 
moved by the necessities of his debtor, may be the most com- 
passionate man, it does not follow that the governor, who under 



288 NATUKAL EVIL CONSISTENT LPart H, 

all circumstances, makes the most free and unrestrained use of 
the pardoning power, is the best ruler. The creditor has a 
perfect right to release his debtor ; and in so doing, he affects 
the interest of no one but himself: whereas, by the pardon of 
offences against public law, the most sacred rights of the com- 
munity may be disregarded, the protection of law may be 
removed, and the general good invaded. The penalty of the 
law does not belong to the supreme executive, as a debt belongs 
to the creditor to whom it is due ; and hence it cannot always 
be abandoned at his pleasure. It is ordained, not merely for 
the ruler, but for the benefit and protection of all who are sub- 
ject to its control. And hence, although a creditor may show 
his mercy by releasing his necessitous debtors ; yet the ruler 
who undertakes to display his mercy by a free use of the par- 
doning power, may only betray a weak and yielding compassion 
for the individual, instead of manifesting that calm and enlight- 
ened benevolence which labours to secure the foundations of 
wise and good government, and thereby to promote the order 
and haj>piness of the governed. 

This leads me to remark, that the hope and the theology of 
the Socinian is built upon the most inadequate conceptions of 
the divine mercy. This is not a weak and yielding thing, as 
men are so fondly prone to imagine ; it is a universal and 
inflexible law. The most perfect harmony exists among all the 
attributes of God ; and as his justice demands the punishment 
of the sinner, so also doth his mercy. The bosom of God is not, 
like that of frail mortals, torn and distracted by conflicting 
principles. Even to the maintenance of his law, that bright 
transcript of his eternal justice, his mercy is inviolably pledged. 
Heaven and earth shall sooner pass away, than his mercy shall 
withdraw from the support of one jot or one tittle of it. It is 
not only just and holy, and therefore will be maintained with 
almighty power ; but it is also good, and therefore its immutable 
foundations are laid in the everlasting and unchanging mercy 
of God. 

For the universal good, it will be inexorably enforced against 
the individual transgressor. God is not slack concerning his 
promises. He is free from all human weakness. His mind is 
not limited, like that of man, to be more affected by partial 
suffering than by that universal disorder and ruin which must 



Chapter III/] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 289 

inevitably result from the unrequited violation of his law. The 
mind of man is unduly affected by the present and the proxi- 
mate : but to God there is neither remote nor future. And 
when, in wisdom and in goodness, he first established and or- 
dained the law unto life, he saw the end from the beginning ; 
and he can never sacrifice the universal good by setting aside 
that law in order to avoid partial evil. His mercy to the whole 
creation makes the same demand as his justice. The execution 
of divine justice is, indeed, but a manifestation of that mercy 
which is over all his works ; and which labours, with omnipo- 
tent energy, to secure the good of all, by vindicating the maj esty 
and glory of that law, upon the preservation of which inviolate 
the good of all depends. The fire that is not quenched is 
kindled by the boundless love of God no less than by his j ustice ; 
and the very fierceness of its burning is, that it is the " wrath 
of the Lamb." Let us not be deceived by the vain fancies and 
the idle dreams which our fond wishes and narrow-minded in- 
firmities are so apt to beget in us. Let us remember that the 
mercy of God is united with omniscience ; and that it is to be 
found only in the bosom of Him whose empire extends to the 
utmost bounds of the universe, as well as throughout the end- 
less ages of eternity. 

Li the genuine spirit of Socinian theology, Dr. Channing, in 
his illustration, has set before us the mercy of God alone ; and 
that, too, merely in relation to the sinner, and not in relation to 
his law and government. He entirely overlooks the fact, that 
it is impossible to exhibit either the justice or the mercy of 
God in the most affecting manner, except in union with each 
other. It is frequently said, we are aware, that if God had 
pardoned the sinner without enforcing the demands of the law, 
he would have displayed his mercy alone, and not his justice; 
but in fact this would have been a very equivocal display of 
mercy. It would have shown only one of two things : either 
that God regarded the sinner with an eye of compassion, or that 
he did not regard his sin : either that he was merciful, or that 
he had no great abhorrence of sin : either that he loved the 
transgressor, or that he did not hate the transgression. 

To illustrate this point, let us take the case of Zaleucus, the 
king of the Locrians. He passed a certain law, with the penalty 
that every transgressor of it should lose both his eyes. It so 

19 



290 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT |_Part II, 

happened that his own son was the first by whom it was vio- 
lated. Now, any one can see, that although Zalencus had 
been a hard-hearted and unfeeling tyrant, he might have par- 
doned his son, just because he had no regard to the demands 
of public justice ; or, on the other hand, that he might have 
inflicted the penalty of the law upon his son to the uttermost, 
not out of a supreme regard to the law, but because he was 
destitute of mercy and natural affection. Neither by remitting 
the whole punishment, nor by inflicting it with rigour, could he 
have made such a display of his justice and mercy as to make 
a deep moral impression upon his subjects. In other words, if 
either of these attributes had been left out in the manifestation, 
the display of the other must have been exceedingly feeble and 
equivocal. Both must be seen in union, or neither can be seen 
in the fulness of its glory. 

How, then, could Zaleucus have displayed both of these at- 
tributes in the most perfect and affecting manner? By doing 
precisely that which he is said to have done. He directed that 
one of his own eyes should be put out, and one of his son's. 
Whose heart is not touched by this most affecting display of the 
tender pity of the father, in union with the stern justice of the 
xaw-giver ? His pity would not allow him to inflict the whole 
penalty upon his beloved son ; and his high regard for the de- 
mands of public justice would not permit him to set at naught 
the authority of the law : and but for the possession and mani- 
festation of this last trait of character, the mighty stragglings 
and yearnings of the first could not have burst forth and ap- 
peared with such overwhelming power and transcendent lustre. 
Hence, every system of redemption which, like that of the 
Socinian, leaves out of view the administrative justice of God, 
does not admit of any very impressive display of his goodness 
and his mercy. 

All such illustrations must be imperfect, in some respects ; 
but the one above given conveys a far more adequate view of 
the atonement than that presented by Dr. Channing. The 
application of it is easy. Such was the mercy of God, that he 
could not leave his poor fallen creatures to endure the awful 
penalty of the law ; and such was his regard for the purity and 
happiness of the universe, that he could not permit his law to 
be violated with impunity. If his administrative justice had 



Chapter III.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 291 

not stood in the way, the offer of pardon to the sinner would 
have cost him merely a word. And hence the length, the 
breadth, and the depth of his love conld not have been mani- 
fested. But he was the Ruler of the universe, and as such his 
law stood in the way. He owed it to himself not to permit this 
to be trampled under foot with impunity, nor its violation to be 
forgiven, until he had provided some way in order to secure 
the high and holy ends for which it had been established. 
Hence, as it was not possible for God to deny himself, he sent 
forth his beloved Son, who had been the companion of his 
bosom and his blessedness from all eternity, to take upon him- 
self the form of a servant, and by his teaching, and obedience, 
and sufferings, and death, to vindicate the majesty of the law, 
and to render it honourable in the sight of the universe. And 
it is this wonderful union of the goodness and the severity, of 
the mercy and the justice of God, which constitutes the grand 
moral tendency and glory of the cross. 

The course pursued by the king of the Locrians, in relation 
to the crime of his son, secured the ends of the law in a much 
greater degree than they could have been secured by a rigor- 
ous execution of its penalty upon the person of his son. It 
evinced a deep and settled abhorrence of crime, and an inflexi- 
ble determination to punish it. It cut off all hope from his 
subjects that crime would be permitted to escape with impunity. 
And hence, after such a manifestation of his character as a 
king, he could permit his son to enjoy the unspeakable blessings 
of sight, without holding out the least encouragement to the 
commission of crime. 

So, likewise, in relation to the sufferings of Christ. These 
were not, in strictness, the penalty of the law. This was eternal 
death ; whereas the sufferings of Christ, inconceivably great as 
they were, were but temporal ; and there can be no proportion 
between sufferings which know a period, and those which are 
without end. Hence, as we have already said, he did not 
satisfy the punitive justice of God. But the sacrifice of Christ 
answered all the purposes that could have been answered by 
the rigorous execution of the law ; and it answered them in an 
infinitely greater degree, than if the human race had been per- 
mitted to endure it without remedy. 

God's love to his Son was inconceivably greater than that 



292 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part U, 

which any creature ever bore to himself or to any other ; and, 
consequently, by offering him np as a substitute for guilty 
mortals, in order that he might save them without doing 
violence to his administrative justice, he manifested the infinite 
energy of his determination to destroy sin. No account of the 
indescribable odiousness and deformity of evil, nor of the incon- 
ceivable holiness of God, could have made so deep an impres- 
sion of his implacable abhorrence of sin, as is made by the cross 
upon which his Son was permitted to expire amid the scorn and 
contempt of his enemies. The human imagination has no power 
to conceive of a more impressive and appalling enforcement of 
the great lesson, " Stand in awe, and sin not," than that which is 
presented to an astonished universe in the cross and passion of 
the Son of God. 

And besides, it possesses this other unspeakable advantage, 
that while it manifests an infinite abhorrence of sin, it displays 
the most heart-subduing love of the sinner. If Zaleucus had 
exhausted the penalty of the law upon his son, this would have 
had little or no tendency to reform his heart, or to induce him 
to acquiesce in the justness of the law. It would have been 
more apt to lead him to regard the king as an unfeeling father. 
But when he was made to see, by the manner in which the 
king had dispensed the law, that he cherished the warmest 
feelings of affection for him, there was no cause left for a mur- 
mur on the part of any, but for the highest admiration on the 
part of all. 

Just so in relation to the sufferings and death of Christ. If 
God had exhausted the fearful penalty of the law upon poor, 
suffering, and degraded humanity, this would have been well 
calculated to inspire his creatures with a servile and trembling 
awe of him. From their limited and imperfect views of the 
evil of sin, and of the reasons why it should be punished, they 
would not have been prepared to acquiesce in such tremendous 
severity. Thus, one of the great ends of God's moral govern- 
ment would have been subverted : the affections of his creatures 
would have been estranged from him, through a distrust of his 
goodness and a dread of his power, instead of having been 
drawn to him by the sweet and sacred ties of confidence and 
love. But how different is the case now ! Having given for 
us his beloved Son, who is greater than all things, while we 



Chapter HI.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 293 

were yet enemies, now that we are reconciled to him, we are 
most firmly persuaded that he will freely give us all things that 
can possibly conduce to our good. Surely, after such a display 
of his love, it were highly criminal in us, to permit the least 
shadow of suspicion or distrust to intercept the sweet, and 
cheering, and purifying beams of his reconciled countenance. 
Whatever may be his severity against sin, and whatever terror 
it may strike into the conscience of evil-doers, we can most 
cordially acquiesce in its justness : for we most clearly perceive, 
that the penalty of the law was not established to gratify any 
private appetite for revenge, but to uphold and secure the highest 
happiness of the moral universe. 



294 NATUKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 



CHAPTEK IV. 

THE ETERNAL PUNISHMENT OE THE WICKED RECONCILED WITH THE 
GOODNESS OF GOD. 

And thus, 
Transfigured, with a meek and dreadless awe, 
A solemn hush of spirit, he beholds 
All things of terrible seeming : yea, unmoved 
Views e'en the immitigable ministers, 
That shower down vengeance on these latter days. 
For even these on wings of healing come, 
Yea, kindling with intenser Deity; 
From the celestial mercy-seat they speed, 
And at the renovating wells of love, 
Have fill'd their vials with salutary wrath. — Coleridge. 

Having considered the sufferings of the innocent, it now 
becomes necessary to contemplate the punishment of the guilty, 
in connexion with the infinite goodness of God. This conducts 
us to the consideration of the most awful subject that ever 
engaged the attention of a rational being, — the never-ending 
torments of the wicked in another world. Though plausible 
arguments and objections have been urged against this doctrine, 
we are perfectly satisfied they will not bear the test of a close 
examination. They have derived all their apparent force and 
conclusiveness, it seems to us, from two distinct sources, namely : 
from the circumstance that this appalling doctrine has been too 
often placed, by its advocates, upon insecure and untenable 
grounds ; and from the fact, that the supporters of this doctrine 
have too often maintained principles from which its fallacy may 
be clearly inferred. In the defence of this doctrine, then, we 
shall endeavour to point out, first, the false grounds upon which 
it has been placed ; secondly, the unsound principles from 
which its fallacy may be inferred ; and, thirdly, we shall en- 
deavour to show the means by which it may be clearly and 
satisfactorily reconciled with the goodness of the Supreme 
Ruler of the world. 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 295 



SECTION I. 

The false grounds upon wliich the doctrine of the eternity of future punish- 
ment has deen placed. 

Nothing could be more untenable, it seems to us, than the 
usual argument in favour of future punishments, which seeks 
to justify their eternity on the ground that every sinful act, 
because it is committed against an infinite being, is infinite, and 
therefore deserves to be visited with endless torments. This 
argument, which seems but little better than a play on the 
term infinite, is perhaps calculated to make no impression upon 
any mind, which is not already fully persuaded of the truth of 
the doctrine in question. On the other hand, it may be so 
easily refuted by a multitude of considerations, that it exposes 
the doctrine, in one of its defences, to the triumphant attacks of 
its adversaries. We shall not exhaust the patience of the reader 
by dwelling upon the refutation which may be given of such 
an argument. We shall dismiss it with a single reply, and that 
we shall give in the language of John Foster. 

" A common argument has been that sin is an infinite evil, 
that is, of infinite demerit, as an offence against an infinite 
being ; and that, since a finite creature cannot suffer infinitely 
in measure, he must in duration. But, surely in all reason, the 
limited, and in the present instance, diminutive nature of the 
criminal, must be an essential part of the case for judgment. 
Every act must, for one of its proportions, be measured by the 
nature and condition of the agent : and it would seem that 
one principle in that rule of proportion should be, that the 
offending agent should be capable of being aware of the magni- 
tude (the amount, if we might use such a word,) of the offence 
he commits, by being capable of something like an adequate 
conception of the being against whom it is committed. A per- 
verse child, committing an offence against a great monarch, of 
whose dignity it had some, but a vastly inadequate apprehen- 
sion, would not be punished in the same manner as an offender 
of high endowments and responsibility, and fully aware of the 
dignity of the personage offended. The one would justly be 
sharply chastised ; the other might as justly be condemned to 
death. In the present case, the offender does or may know that 



296 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT |Part II, 

the Being offended against is of awful majesty, and therefore 
the offence is one of great aggravation, and he will justly be 
punished with great severity ; but by his extremely contracted 
and feeble faculties, as the lowest in the scale of strictly rational 
and accountable creatures in the whole creation, he is infinitely 
incapable of any adequate conception of the greatness of the 
Being offended against. He is then, according to the argument, 
obnoxious to a punishment not in any proportion to his own 
nature, but alone to that infinity of the supreme nature, which 
is to him infinitely inconceivable and unknown."* 

This answer alone, though perhaps not the best which might 
be made, we deem amply sufficient. Indeed, does not the posi- 
tion, that a man, a poor, weak, fallible creature, deserves an 
infinite punishment, an eternity of torments, for each evil 
thought or word, carry its own refutation along with it ? And 
if not, what are we to think of that attribute of justice, which 
demands an eternity to inflict the infinite pangs due to a single 
sin ? Is it a quality to inspire the soul with a rational worship, 
or to fill it with a horror which casteth out love ? 

Another argument to show the infinite ill-desert of some men, 
is drawn from the scientia media Dei. It is said, that if God 
foresaw that if they had been placed in various other circum- 
stances, and surrounded by other temptations, their dispositions 
and character would have induced them to commit other sins ; 
for which they are, therefore, as really responsible as if they 
had actually committed them. If this be a correct principle, it 
is easy, we must admit, to render each individual of the human 
race responsible for a greater number of sins than have ever 
been committed, or than could ever have been committed by 
all the actual dwellers upon the face of the earth. ISTay, by 
such a process of multiplication, it would be easy to spread the 
guilt of a single soul over every point of infinite space, and 
every moment of eternal duration. But such a principle is 
more than questionable. To say nothing of its intrinsic deform- 
ity, it is refuted by the consequences to which it leads. We 
want arguments on this subject, that will give the mind, not 
horrid caricatures of the divine justice, but such views of that 
sublime attribute as will inspire us with sentiments of admira- 
tion and love, as well as with a godly fear and wholesome awe. 

Letter on the Duration of Future Punishment, pp. 19, 20. 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 297 



SECTION II. 

The unsound principles from which, if true, the fallacy of the eternity of 
future 'punishments may he clearly inferred. 

It is a doctrine maintained by Augustine, Calvin, and Luther, 
as well as by many of their followers, that, in his fallen state, 
man " is free to evil only." He can do nothing good without 
the aid of divine grace ; and this, in point of fact, is given to 
but a very small number of the human race ; at least, efficacious 
grace is given to but few, so that the greater part of mankind 
cannot acquire or possess that holiness without which no man 
shall see the Lord. Now, if we take our stand upon this plat- 
form of doctrine, it will be found utterly impossible, we think, 
to defend the eternity of future punishments. 

It was upon this platform that John Foster erected his tre- 
mendous battery against the doctrine in question; and it is 
believed, that the more closely the argument is examined, the 
more clearly it will be seen, that he has either demolished the 
doctrine which was so obnoxious to his feelings, or else the 
platform which constituted so essential a part of his own creed. 
In our humble opinion, " the moral argument," as he calls it, 
" pressed irresistibly upon his mind ;" because it was drawn 
from false premises, of whose correctness he seems not to have 
entertained the shadow of a doubt. He clung to the conclu- 
sion, when he should have abandoned the premises. But we 
shall give his own words, and permit the reader to judge for 
himself. 

After having endeavoured to impress our feeble powers with 
" the stupendous idea of eternity," he adds : " Now think of an 
infliction of misery protracted through such a period, and at the 
end of it being only commenced, — not one smallest step nearer a 
conclusion, — the case just the same if that sum of figures were 
multiplied by itself ; and then think of mm, — his nature, his 
situation, the circumstances of his brief sojourn and trial on 
earth. Far be it from us to make light of the demerit of sin, 
and to remonstrate with the Supreme Judge against a severe 
chastisement, of whatever moral nature we may regard the 
infliction to be. But still, what is man ? He comes into the 
world with a nature fatally corrupt, and powerfully tending to 



298 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

actual evil. He comes among a crowd of temptations adapted 
to his innate evil propensities. He grows up (incomparably 
the greater portion of the race) in great ignorance, his judg- 
ment weak, and under numberless beguilements into error; 
while his passions and appetites are strong, his conscience 
unequally matched against their power, — in the majority of 
men, but feebly and rudely constituted. The influence of what- 
ever good instructions he may receive, is counteracted by a 
combination of opposite influences almost constantly acting on 
him. He is essentially and inevitably unapt to be powerfully 
acted on by wdiat is invisible and future. In addition to all 
which, there is the intervention and activity of the great tempter 
and destroyer. In short, his condition is such that there is no 
hope of him, but from a direct, special operation on him, of 
what we denominate grace. Is it not so ? Are we not con- 
vinced ? Is it not the plain doctrine of Scripture ? Is there 
not irresistible evidence, from a view of the actual condition 
of the human world, that no man can become good in the 
Christian sense, — can become fit for a holy and happy place 
hereafter, — but by this operation ab extra? But this is arbi- 
trary and discriminative on the part of the sovereign Agent, 
and independent of the will of man. And how awfully evident 
is it, that this • indispensable operation takes place only on a 
comparatively small proportion of the collective race ! 

" Now this creature, thus constituted and circumstanced, 
passes a few fleeting years on earth, a short, sinful course, in 
which he does often what, notwithstanding his ignorance and 
ill-disciplined judgment and conscience, he knows to be wrong, 
and neglects what he knows to be his duty ; and, consequently, 
for a greater or less measure of guilt, widely different in dif- 
ferent offenders, deserves punishment. But endless punish- 
ment ! hopeless misery, through a duration to which the 
enormous terms above imagined will be absolutely nothing ! 
I acknowledge my inability (I would say it reverently) to admit 
this belief, together with a belief in the divine goodness, — the 
belief that ' God is love,' that his tender mercies are over all 
his works. Goodness, benevolence, charity, as ascribed in 
supreme perfection to him, cannot mean a quality foreign to all 
human conceptions of goodness : it must be something analo- 
gous in principle to what himself has defined and required as 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 299 

goodness in his moral creatures ; that, in adoring the divine 
goodness, we may not be worshipping an c unknown God.' 
But, if so, how would all our ideas be confounded, while con- 
templating him bringing, of his own sovereign will, a race of 
creatures into existence, in such a condition that they certainly 
will and must — must by their nature and circumstances — go 
wrong, and be miserable, unless prevented by especial grace, 
which is the privilege of 'only a small proportion of them, and 
at the same time affixing on their delinquency a doom of which 
it is infinitely beyond the highest archangeVs faculty to appre- 
hend a thousandth part of the horror /"* 

Now, granting the premises, we hold this argument to be un- 
answerable and conclusive. But is it not wonderful that it did 
not occur to so acute a mind as Foster's, that the same premises 
would furnish a valid argument against the justice of all pun- 
ishment, as well as against the justice of eternal punishments? 
Surely, if the utter inability of man to do good without divine 
grace is any extenuation, when such grace is not given, it is an 
entire and perfect exoneration. It is either this, or it is nothing. 
Such are the inevitable inconsistencies of the best thinkers, 
when the feelings of the heart are at war with the notions of the 
head. Instead of analyzing this awful subject, and tracing it 
down to its fundamental principles, upon which his reason 
might have reposed with a calm and immovable satisfaction, 
Foster seems to have permitted his great mind to take root in 
a creed of man's devising, and then to be swayed by the gusts 
and counter-blasts of passion. Believing that man "must go 
wrong," that nature and circumstances impose this dire neces- 
sity upon him, his benevolence could not contemplate an eter- 
nity of torments as due to such inevitable sin. It was repelled 
by " the infinite horror of the tenet." On the other hand, his 
abhorrence of evil, and sense of justice, shrank with equal vio- 
lence from the idea that all punishment is unjust; and hence he 
could say, " Far be it from us to make light of the demerit of 
sin, and to remonstrate with the Supreme Judge against a 
severe chastisement" Thus did his great mind, instead of rest- 
ing upon truth, perpetually hang in a state of suspense and 
vacillation between the noblest feelings of his heart and the 
darkest errors of his creed. 

° Letter, &c, pp. 15-18. 



300 NATUKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part H, 

Others, who have adopted the same creed, have endeavoured 
to extricate themselves from the dilemma in which Foster found 
himself, not by denying the eternity of future punishments, but 
by inventing a very nice distinction between the natural and 
moral inability of man. " He can obey the law," say they, 
"if he will f* all that " he wants is the will." All his natural 
faculties are complete ; only let him will aright, and he is safe. 
But, after all, the question still remains, How is he to get the 
will, — the good will, — in order to render him acceptable to 
God ? Does he get it from nature — is it a part of his birth- 
right? No: from this he derives a depraved will, "free to 
evil only." Is it vouchsafed to him from above? Is it a gift 
from God ? Alas ! to those who are lost, and perish eternally 
in their sins, the grace of God is never given ! What does it 
signify thus to tell them, or to tell the world, that they have the 
natural ability to obey ; that none of their natural faculties are 
lost; that they still have understandings, and affections, and 
wills ? What can all these avail them ? Is it not the merest 
mockery to assure them that they really have hearts, and wills, 
and feelings, if they " must go wrong," if they must put forth 
the volitions for which they shall be tormented forever ? 

Upon this distinction we shall not dwell, as we have fully 
considered it in our " Examination of Edwards on the Will." 
We shall merely add, that it is not an invention of modern 
times.* It is at least as old as the age of Augustine. " The 
Pelagians think," says he, " they know some great thing, when 
they say, ' God would not command what he knew could not he 
done hy man.'' Who does not know this? But he commands 
what we cannot do, whereby we know what we ought to ask of 
him. For it is faith which obtains by prayer what the law 
commands. For true it is that we keep the commandments if 
we will, (si volumus •) but as the will is prepared of the Lord, 
we must seek of him that we may will as much as is sufficient, 
in order to our doing by volition, (ut volendofaciamus") Truly, 
we can keep the commandments if we will to do so ; for, as 
Augustine immediately says, " certain it is, that we will when 
we will."t But no man can put forth a volition in conformity 

° Kobert Hall supposes that Edwards must have found it in Owen. He might 
have found it in a hundred earlier writers. 

f Wiggers's Presentation, p. 210 — Note by Translator. 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 301 

with the commandments, unless it be given him of God, who 
" causes us to will good f* and this is never given to the repro- 
bate. How, then, can they be justly consigned to eternal tor- 
ments? How can they be eternally punished for that which 
they could not possibly avoid ? It is no wonder that a Foster 
should have shrunk from " the infinite horrors of such a tenet," 
as seen from this point of view ; the only wonder is, that any 
one can be found who can possibly endure them. 

The same distinction, as we have already said, is relied upon 
by Edwards in order to show that man has an ability to obey 
the law of God.f 

Thus we are gravely taught that we are able to obey the 
law of God ; because if we will to do so, the external act will 
follow ; and because it is certain that if we will we do really 
will. But how to will is the question. Can we put forth the 
requisite volitions \ ]STo one doubts that if we put forth the 
volition which the. law of God requires, we then obey him, 
whether the external act follow or not; nor that if we will, 
then we do really will. But all this leaves the great question 
untouched, Can we put forth the requisite volitions without 
divine aid? And after this question has been answered in the 
negative, and we have been told that such aid is not given to 
the reprobate, all this talk about a natural ability, which must 
forever prove unavailing, is the merest mockery that ever en- 
tered 'into the imagination or the metaphysics of man. How- 
ever the fact may be disguised by verbal niceties, it as really 
places eternal life beyond the reach of the reprobate, as is the 
very sun in the firmament of heaven, and makes eternal death 
as inevitable to them as is the rising and the setting thereof. 

SECTION" III 
The eternity of future punishments an expression of the divine goodness. 

We have seen in the first chapter of this part of the present 
work, that God really and sincerely intended the salvation of 
all men ; and that if any are lost, it is because it is impossible 
in the nature of things to necessitate holiness; and that the 
impenitent, in spite of all the means employed by infinite 
wisdom and goodness for their salvation, do obstinately work 

• Wiggers's Presentation, p. 210— Note by Trans, f Freedom of the Will, p. 38. 



302 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT LPart II, 

out their own ruin and destruction. Omnipotence cannot con- 
fer holiness upon them ; they do not choose to acquire it ; and 
hence, they are compelled to endure the awful wages of sin. 
To those who reject this view of the nature of holiness, the 
world in which we live must forever remain an inexplicable 
enigma ; and that to which we are hastening must present still 
more terrific subjects of contemplation. To their minds the 
eternal agonies of the lost can never be made to harmonize with 
the infinite perfections of Gocl, by whom the second death is 
appointed. "How self-evident the proposition," says Foster, 
"that if the Sovereign Arbiter had intended the salvation of 
the race, it must have been accomplished." Having so sum- 
marily settled this position, that God did not intend the salva- 
tion of the race, the question which admits of no answer, Why 
did he not intend it f might well spread a mysterious darkness 
over the whole economy of divine providence. It was that 
darkness, that perplexing and confounding darkness, by which 
the mighty soul of Foster was oppressed with so many gloomy 
thoughts, and filled with so many frightful imaginations. 

For our part, if we could believe that God could easily work 
holiness in the heart of every creature, and that he does not do 
so simply because he does not intend their salvation, we should 
not have attempted to vindicate his perfections. We should 
have believed in them, it is true ; but we should have been con- 
strained to confess, that they are veiled in impenetrable clouds 
and darkness. Hence, if we had not confessed ignorance and 
inability for all minds and all ages, as so many others have 
done, we should, at least, have confessed these things for our- 
selves, and supinely waited for the light of eternity to dispel 
the awful and perplexing enigmas of time. But we hold no 
such doctrine ; we entertain no such sentiment. We believe 
that God, in his infinite, overflowing goodness desires, and from 
all eternity has desired, the salvation of all men. We believe 
that salvation is impossible to some, because a necessary holi- 
ness is impossible, and they do not choose to work out for 
themselves what cannot be worked out for them, even by 
omnipotence. It was the bright and cheering light which this 
truth seemed to cast upon the dark places of the universe, that 
first inspired us with the thought and determination to produce 
a theodicy. And it is in the light of this truth, if we mistake 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 303 

not, that the infinite love of God may be seen beaming from 
the eye of hell, as well as from the bright regions of eternal 
blessedness. This conclusion we shall endeavour methodically 
to unfold, and to set in a clear light. 

In the first place, then, to begin with our fundamental posi- 
tion, the Creator could not necessitate the holiness of the crea- 
ture. Hence this holiness, after all the means and the ability 
were given to him, must be left to the will of the creature him- 
self. All that could be done in such a case was, for God to set 
life and death before us, accompanied by the greatest of all con- 
ceivable motives to pursue the one, and to fly from the other ; 
and then say, " choose ye :" and all this has God actually 
done for the salvation of all men. Hence, though some should 
be finally lost, his infinite goodness will be clear. Let us see 
what objections may be urged against this conclusion. 

Supposing it granted, that a necessitated virtue is a contra- 
diction in terms, and that it is indispensably requisite to ordain 
rewards and punishments in order to prevent sin and secure 
holiness ; it may still be said that the penalty of eternal death 
is too severe for that purpose, and is therefore inconsistent with 
the goodness of God. Indeed, after such a concession, this is 
the only position which can be taken in opposition to the doc- 
trine in question. Let us then look at it, and examine the 
assumption upon which it rests for support. 

If such punishments be too severe, it must be for one of these 
two reasons: either because no object can justify the infliction 
of them, or because the end proposed by the Supreme Ruler is 
not sufficiently great for that purpose. 

► Let us suppose, then, in the first place, the position to be 
assumed, that no object can possibly justify the infliction of 
such awful punishments. Such would be the case, we admit, 
if such punishments were unjust — were not deserved by the per- 
son upon whom they are inflicted. Hence, it becomes indis- 
pensable, in order to vindicate the divine benevolence, to show 
that eternal sufferings are deserved by those upon whom they 
fall. Otherwise they would be unjust, and consequently un- 
justifiable ; as the end could never justify the means. 

We say, then, that eternal sufferings are deserved by the 
finally impenitent, not because every sinful act carries along 
with it an infinite guilt, nor because every sinner may be 



304 NATUKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

imagined to have committed an infinite number of sins, but 
because they will continue to sin forever. It will be conceded, 
that if punishment be admissible at all, it is right and proper 
that so long as acts of rebellion are persisted in, the rewards of 
iniquity should attend them. It will be conceded, that if the 
finally impenitent should continue to sin forever, then they for- 
ever deserve to reap the rewards of sin. But this is one part 
of the Scripture doctrine of future punishments, that those who 
endure them will never cease to sin and rebel against the 
authority of God's law. 

Foster has attempted a reply to this defence of the doctrine 
in question, but without success. " It is usually alleged," says 
he, " that there will be an endless continuance of sinning .... 
and therefore the punishment must be endless." But " the 
allegation," he replies, "is of no avail in vindication of the 
doctrine, because the first consignment to this dreadful state 
necessitates a continuance of the criminality / the doctrine 
teaching that it is of the essence, and is an awful aggravation 
of the original consignment, that it dooms the condemned to 
maintain the criminal spirit unchanged forever. The doom to 
sin as well as to suffer, and, according to the argument, to sin 
in order to suffer, is inflicted as the punishment of the sin 
committed in the mortal state. Virtually, therefore, the eter- 
nal punishment is the punishment of the sins of time."* 

Even according to the principles of Foster himself, the argu- 
ment is wholly untenable. For he admits, that such is the evil 
nature of man, such the circumstances around him, and such 
the influences of the great tempter, he must inevitably go 
wrong; and yet he holds that he may be justly punished for 
such transgressions. JSTow, if every man who comes into the 
world be doomed to sin, as this author insists he is, and may 
be justly punished for sins committed in this life, why should 
he be excused for the sins committed in another state, because 
he is doomed to commit them? But this argumentum ad 
hominem is merely by the way, and has more to do with the 
consistency of the author, than with the validity of his position. 
We shall proceed to subject this to a more searching and a 
more satisfactory test. 

His argument assumes, that " it is of the essence of the 
° Letter, pp. 21, 22. 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 305 

original consignment, that it dooms the condemned to maintain 
the criminal spirit unchanged forever." This is an unwarrant- 
able assumption. We nowhere learn, and we are nowhere 
required to believe, that the guilty are doomed to sin forever, 
because they have voluntarily sinned in this life ; much less 
that they are necessitated to sin in order to suffer ! The doc- 
trine of the eternity of future punishments is not necessarily 
encumbered with any such ridiculous appendage ; and if any 
one can be found to entertain so absurd a view of the doctrine, 
we must leave him to vindicate the creation of his own 
imagination. 

We do not suppose that the soul of the guilty will continue 
to sin forever, because it will be consigned to the regions of the 
lost ; but we suppose it will be consigned to the regions of the 
lost, because, by its own repeated acts of transgression, it has 
made sure of its eternal continuance in sinning. God dooms 
no man to sin — neither by his power nor by his providence. 
But it is a fact, against which there will be no dispute, that if 
a man commit a sin once, he will be still more apt to commit 
the same sin again, under the same or similar circumstances. 
The same thing will be true of each and every succeeding repe- 
tition of the offence ; until the habit of sinning may be so 
completely wrought into the soul, and so firmly fixed there, 
that nothing can check it in its career of guilt. Neither the 
glories of heaven, nor the terrors of hell, may be sufficient to 
change its course. No amount of influence brought to bear 
upon its feelings, may be sufficient to transform its will. " There 
is a certain bound to imprudence and misbehaviour," says But- 
ler, "which being transgressed, there remains no place for 
repentance in the natural course of things." And may we not 
also add, nor in the supernatural course of things either ; and 
there only remains a certain fearful looking-for of judgment? 
As this may be the case, for aught we know, nay, as it seems so 
probable that this is the case, no one is authorized to pronounce 
endless sufferings unjust, unless he can first show that the object 
of them has not brought upon himself an eternal continuance 
in the practice of sin. In other words, unless he can first show 
that the sinner does not doom himself to an eternity of sinning, 
he cannot reasonably complain that his Creator and Judge 
dooms him to an eternity of suffering. 

20 



306 NATUKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

But it may be said, that although the sinner may deserve to 
suffer forever, because he continues to sin forever ; yet it were 
more worthy the infinite goodness of God, to release him from 
so awful a calamity. If the sinner deserves such punishment, 
it is not only just to inflict it upon him, it is a demand of infinite 
goodness itself that it should be inflicted upon him, provided 
a sufficiently great good may be attained by such a manifesta- 
tion of justice. This brings us to the consideration of our 
second point, namely: Is the object proposed to be accom- 
plished by the infliction of eternal misery sufficiently great to 
justify the infliction of so severe a penalty? In other words, 
Is such a penalty disproportioned to the exigencies of the case ? 

In his attempt to show, that the infliction of eternal misery 
is too severe to consist with the goodness of God, Mr. Foster 
does not at all consider the great ends, or final causes, of penal 
enactments. He merely dwells upon the terrors of the punish- 
ment, and brings these into vivid contrast with the weakness 
and impotency of man in his mortal state. This, it must be con- 
fessed, is a most one-sided and partial view of so profound a sub- 
ject ; much better adapted to work upon the feelings than to 
enlighten the judgment. All that he seems to have seen in the 
case, is a poor, weak creature, utterly unable to do any good, 
subjected to eternal torments for the sins of "a few fleeting 
years on earth." Hence it was, that " the moral argument," 
which " pressed so irresistibly on his mind," came in " the stu- 
pendous idea of eternity." 

Indeed, according to his theology, there could be no object 
sufficiently vast, no necessity sufficiently imperious, to justify 
eternal punishments. The prevention of sin, and the promotion 
of universal holiness, could not form such an object or constitute 
such a necessity ; for, according to his creed, all this might have 
been most perfectly attained by a word. Hence, he was puz- 
zled and confounded in the contemplation of what appeared to 
him so much unnecessary evil. " I acknowledge my inability" 
said he, " to admit the belief, (the belief in endless punishment,) 
together with the belief in the divine goodness — the belief that 
' God is love,' that ' his tender mercies are over all his works.' " 

As we have already seen from another point of view, we must 
come out from his theology if we would see the harmony and 
agreement between these beliefs. We must take our stand on 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 307 

the position, that Omnipotence cannot necessitate holiness, and 
must have recourse to rewards and punishments to secure it. 
Otherwise all evil and all suffering will remain an inexplicable 
enigma; all rewards and punishments awkward and clumsy 
contrivances to attain an end, wdiich might be much better at- 
tained without them. 

On this high and impregnable ground the moral argument 
of Foster loses all its irresistible force, and "the stupendous 
idea of eternity " presses with all its weight in favour of endless 
punishment. If temporal punishments are justified on the 
ground that they are necessary to meet the exigencies and up- 
hold the interests of temporal governments, surely eternal pun- 
ishments may be justified on the same ground in relation to an 
eternal government. The "stupendous idea of eternity" at- 
taches to the whole, as well as to the part ; and hence nothing 
can be gained to the cause of Universalism by the introduction 
of this idea, except in the minds of those who take only a one- 
sided and partial view of the subject. 

The spectacle of punishment for a single day, it will be ad- 
mitted, would be justified on the ground that it was necessary 
to support for a single day a government ; especially if that 
government were vast in extent and involved stupendous in- 
terests. But if suffering for a single day may be justified on 
such a ground, then the exigencies of such a government for 
two days would justify a punishment for two days ; and so on 
ad infinitum. Hence, the doctrine of eternal punishments in 
common with the eternal moral government of God, is not 
a greater anomaly than temporal punishments in relation to 
temporal governments. If we reject the one, we must also 
reject the other. Indeed, when we consider not only the eter- 
nal duration, hut also the universal extent, of the divine govern- 
ment, the argument in question, if good for anything, presses 
with greater force against the little, insignificant governments 
of men, than against the moral government of God. One 
reason why Foster was "repelled into doubt by the infinite 
horrors of the tenet " is, that he merely contemplated the suffer- 
ings of the guilty, and saw not how those sufferings were con- 
nected with the majesty and glory of God's universal and eternal 
empire. It is as if an insect should undertake to set bounds to 
the punishments which human beings have found necessary 



308 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

to meet the exigencies and uphold the interests of human 
society. 

"We are told by writers on jurisprudence, that penalties should 
be proportioned to offences ; but, as has been truly said, how 
this proportion is to be ascertained, or on what principles it is 
to be adjusted, we are seldom informed. We are usually left 
to vague generalities, which convey no definite information, and 
furnish no satisfactory guidance to our minds. If we can ascer- 
tain the precise conditions according to which this principle 
should be adjusted, even by goodness itself, we shall then be 
the better able to determine whether the eternal suffering of the 
guilty and impenitent is not a manifestation of the love of God, 
— of that tender mercy which is over all his works. 

It is a maxim that punishment should be sufficient to accom- 
plish the great end for which it is imposed, namely, the preven- 
tion of offences. Otherwise, if it failed to accomplish this obj ect, 
"it would be so much suffering in waste."* Now, who can 
say that the penalty of eternal death is not necessary to this end 
in the moral government of the universe, or that it is greater 
than is necessary for its accomplishment ? Who can say that a 
punishment for a limited period would have answered that end 
in a greater or more desirable degree ? Who can say that there 
would have been more holiness and happiness, with less sin and 
misery, in the universe, if the punishment of those whom nothing 
could reclaim had not been eternal ? Who can say that it would 
be better for the universe, on the whole, if the punishment of 
sin were limited than if it were eternal ? Until this question, 
which so evidently lies beyond the range of our narrow facul- 
ties, be answered, it is presumption to object that eternal pun- 
ishment is inconsistent with the goodness of Gocl. For aught 
the objector knows, this very penalty is demanded by infinite 
goodness itself, in order to stay the universal ravages of sin, and 
preserve the glory of the moral empire of Jehovah. For aught 
he knows, the very sufferings of the lost forever may be, not 
only a manifestation of the justice of God, but also a profound 
expression of that tender mercy which is over all his works. 
For aught he knows, this very appointment, at which he takes 
so great offence, may be one of the main pillars in the structure 
of the intellectual system of the universe ; without which its in- 

° Jeremy Bentham. 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 309 

ternal constitution would be radically defective, and its moral 
government impossible. In short, for aught he knows, his ob- 
jection may arise, not from any undue or unnecessary severity 
of the punishment in question, but from his own utter inca- 
pacity to decide such a point in relation to the universal and 
eternal government of God. 

It may be said that this is an appeal to human ignorance, 
rather than a reply to the argument of the Universalist. Surely, 
it is good to be reminded of our ignorance, when we undertake 
to base objections against the doctrines of religion upon assump- 
tions about the truth of which we know, and, from the nature of 
the case, must know T , absolutely nothing. If the doctrine in 
question involved any inherent contradictions, or were it clearly 
at war with the dictates of justice, or mercy, or truth, there 
might be some reason in our opposition ; but to oppose it be- 
cause we cannot see how it subserves the highest interests of the 
universe, seems to be an exceedingly rash and hasty decision ; 
especially as we see that such a penalty must powerfully tend 
to restrain the wickedness of men, as w^ell as to preserve un- 
fallen creatures in their obedience. 

It is not at all strange that beings with such faculties as we 
possess, limited on all sides, and far more influenced by feeling 
than by reason, should be oppressed by the stupendous idea of 
eternal torments. It absolutely overwhelms the imagination 
of poor, short-sighted creatures like ourselves. But God, in his 
plans for the universe and for eternity, takes no counsel of hu- 
man weakness ; and that which seems so terrible to our feeble 
intellects may, to his all-seeing eye, appear no more than a dark 
speck in a boundless realm of light. Surely, if there ever was, 
or ever could be, a question wdiich should be reduced to the 
simple inquiry, " What saith the Scripture?" it is that respecting 
the future condition of the wicked. 

It is truly amazing that a mind like Foster's should have put 
this inquiry so easily aside, and relied with so much confidence 
upon what he was pleased to call " the moral argument." This 
argument, as we have seen, is altogether unsound and sophisti- 
cal. It bases itself upon the prejudices of a creed, and termi- 
nates in dark conjectures merely. He hopes, or rather he 
" would wish to indulge the hope, founded upon the divine at- 
tribute of infinite benevolence, that there will be a period some- 



310 NATUKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

where in the endless futurity, when all God's sinning creatures 
will be restored by him to rectitude and happiness." Yain 
hope ! delusive wish ! How can they be made holy without 
their own consent and cooperation? And if they could be 
restored to rectitude and happiness, how can we hope that God 
would restore them, since he has not been pleased to preserve 
them in their original state of rectitude and happiness ? 

But perhaps, says he, there will be, not a restoration of all 
God's sinning creatures to rectitude and happiness, but an anni- 
hilation of their existence. Even this conj ecture, if true, " would 
be a prodigious relief;" for "the grand object of interest is a 
negation of the perpetuity of misery." Suppose, then, that the 
universe had been planned according to this benevolent wish of 
Mr. Foster, and that those who could not be reclaimed should, 
after a very protracted period of suffering, be forever anni- 
hilated ; would this promote the order and well-being of the 
whole creation? How did Mr. Foster know but that such a 
provision in the government of the universe would oppose so 
feeble a barrier to the progress of sin, that scenes of mutability, 
and change, and ruin, would be introduced into the empire of 
God, from which his benevolence would shrink with infinite 
abhorrence ? How did Mr. Foster know but that the Divine 
Benevolence itself would prefer a hell in one part of his domin- 
ions, to the universal disorder, confusion, and moral desolation 
which such a provision might introduce into the government of 
God? Such a conjecture might, it is true, bring a "prodigious 
relief" to our imagination; but the government of God is in- 
tended for the relief of the universe, and not for the relief of 
our imagination. 

Others besides the author in question have sought relief for 
their minds on this subject, by indulging in vague conjectures 
respecting the real design of the Supreme Ruler and Judge. 
Archbishop Tillotson, for example, supposes that although God 
actually threatened to punish the wicked eternally, he does not 
intend, and is not bound, to carry this threat into execution. 
This penalty, he supposes, is merely set forth as a terror to evil- 
doers, in order to promote the good order and well-being of the 
world ; and after it has subserved this purpose, the Lawgiver 
will graciously remit a portion of the threatened 2)enalty, and 
restore all his sinning creatures to purity and bliss. In reply to 



Chapter IV.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 311 

this extraordinary position, we shall only say that if the Al- 
mighty really undertook to deceive the world for its own good, 
it is a pity he did not take the precaution to prevent the arch- 
bishop from detecting the cheat. It is a pity, we say, that he 
did not deceive the archbishop as well as the rest of men ; and 
not suffer his secret to get into the possession of one who has so 
indiscreetly published it to the whole world. 

Nothing seems more amazing to us than the haste and pre- 
cipitancy with which most men dispose of subjects so awful as 
that of the eternity of future punishments. One would suppose 
that if any subj ect in the whole range of human thought should 
engage our most serious attention, and call forth the utmost 
exertion of our power of investigation, it would be the dura- 
tion of punishment in a future life. If that punishment be 
eternal, it is certainly the most momentous question which ever 
engaged the attention of man, and is to be lightly disposed of 
only by madmen." 

* On one point we fully concur with Mr. Foster, (see Letter, p. 27 :) " As to 
religious teachers, if this tremendous doctrine be true, surely it ought to he almost 
continually proclaimed as with the blast of a trumpet, inculcated and reiterated, 
with ardent passion, in every possible form of terrible illustration ; no remission 
of the alarm to thoughtless spirits." 

But if it be so incumbent on religious teachers, who believe this awful tenet, 
thus to proclaim it to a perishing world, is it not equally incumbent on them not 
to speak on such a subject at all until they have taken the utmost pains to form 
a correct opinion concerning it ? If the man who merely proclaims this doctrine 
in the usual quiet way of preachers, while he sees his fellow-men perishing around, 
is guilty of criminal neglect, what shall we say of the religious teacher who, 
without having devoted much time to the investigation of the subject, exerts his 
powers and his influence to persuade his fellow-men that it is all a delusion, and 
that the idea of endless misery is utterly inconsistent with the goodness of God ? 
How many feeble outcries and warnings of those who are so terribly rebuked by 
Mr. Foster, may be silenced and forever laid to rest by his eloquent declamation 
against the doctrine in question, and how many souls may be thereby betrayed 
and led on to their own eternal ruin I Yet, wonderful as it may seem, Mr. Fos- 
ter tells us that his opinion on this awful subject has not been the result of " a 
protracted inquiry." In the very letter from which we have so frequently quoted, 
he says : " I have perhaps been too content to let an opinion (or impression) ad- 
mitted in early life dispense with protracted inquiry and various reading." Now, 
is this the way in which a question of this kind should be decided, — a question 
which involves the eternal destiny of millions of human beings ? Is it to be de- 
cided, not by protracted inquiry, but under the influence of an " impression ad- 
mitted in early life ?" 



312 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 



CHAPTER Y. 

THE DISPENSATION OE THE DIVINE FAVOURS HECONCILED WITH THE GOODNESS 

OF GOD. 

God, whose thunder shakes the sky, 

Whose eye this atom globe surveys, 
To thee, my only rock, I fly ; 

Thy mercy in thy justice praise. 



Then why, my soul, dost thou complain ? 

Why drooping seek the dark recess ? 
Shake off the melancholy chain, 

For God created all to bless. — Chatterton. 

In the preceding part, we considered the doctrine of predesti- 
nation, under the name of necessity, in its relation to the origin 
of evil. We there encleavonred to show that it denies the re- 
sponsibility of man, and makes God the author of sin. In the 
present part, it remains for us to examine the same doctrine in 
relation to the equality of the divine goodness. If we mistake 
not, the scheme of predestination, or rather the doctrine of 
election, which lies at its foundation, is, when rightly under- 
stood, perfectly consistent with the impartiality and glory of 
the goodness of God. On this subj ect we shall now proceed to 
unfold our views in as orderly and perspicuous a manner as 
possible. 

SECTION I. 

The unequal distribution of favours, which obtains in the economy of natural 
providence, consistent with the goodness of God. 

It has been thought that if the goodness of God were un- 
limited and impartial, the light and blessings of revelation 
would be universal. But before we should attach any weight 
to such an objection, we should first consider and determine 
two things. 



First, we should consider and determine how far the unequal 
diffusion of the light of revelation has resulted from the agency 
of man, and how far from the agency of God. For, if this in- 



Chapter V.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 313 

equality in the spread of a divine blessing has sprung in any 
degree from the abuse which free, subordinate agents have made 
of their powers, either by active opposition, or passive neglect, 
it is in so far no more imputable to a want of goodness in the 
Divine Being than is any other evil or disorder which the crea- 
ture has introduced into the world. In so far, the glory of God 
is clear, and man alone is to blame. It is incumbent upon 
those, then, who urge this objection against the goodness of 
God to show that the evil in question has not resulted from 
the agency of man. This position, we imagine, the objector 
will not find it very easy to establish ; and yet, until he does 
so, his objection very clearly rests upon a mere unsupported 
hypothesis. 

Secondly, before we can fairly rely upon the objection in 
question, we should be able to show, that the agency of God 
might have been so exerted as to spread the light of revelation 
further than it now extends, without on the whole causing 
greater evil than good. Light or knowledge, it should be 
remembered, is not in itself a blessing. It may be so, or it 
may not ; and whether it be a blessing or a curse depends, not 
upon the beneficence of the giver, but upon the disposition and 
character of the recipient. Before we should presume to 
indulge the least complaint, then, against the goodness of divine 
providence, we should be able to produce the nation, whose 
character for moral goodness and virtue would, on the whole, 
and in relation to its circumstances, have been improved by the 
interposition of God in causing the light of truth to shine in 
the midst of its corruptions. But we are manifestly incompe- 
tent to deal with a question of such a nature. Its infinite com- 
plication, as well as its stupendous magnitude, places it entirely 
beyond the reach of the human mind. So manifold and so 
multiform are the hidden causes upon which its solution de- 
pends, that general principles cannot be brought to bear upon 
it ; and its infinite variety and complication of detail must for- 
ever baine the intellect of man. Hence, an objection which 
proceeds on the supposition that this question has been solved 
and determined, is worth nothing. 

But, for the sake of argument, let us suppose that the unequal 
diffusion of religious knowledge has proceeded directly from 
the agency of God. Still the objection against his goodness, in 



314 NATUKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

regard to the dispensation of light, would be no greater than 
in relation to all the* dispensations of his favonr. All the gifts 
of Heaven — health, riches, honour, intelligence, and whatever 
else comes down from above — are scattered among the children 
of men with the most promiscuous variety. Hence, the unequal 
distribution of the blessings of the gospel, or rather of its exter- 
nal advantages, is so far from being inconsistent with the charac- 
ter of God, that it is of a piece with all his other dispensations : 
it is so far from standing out as an anomaly in the proceedings 
of the Divine Being, that it falls in with the whole analogy of 
nature and of providence. Hence, there is no resting-place 
between the abandonment of this objection, and downright 
atheism. 

Let us see, then, what force there is in this objection, when 
urged, as it is by the atheist, against the whole constitution and 
management of the world. It proceeds on the supposition, that 
if light and knowledge, or any other natural advantage, were 
bestowed upon one person, it would be bestowed upon all 
others, and upon all in precisely the same degree. According 
to his view, there should be no such thing as degrees in knowl- 
edge, and consequently no such thing as self-development and 
progress. To select only one instance out of many : the atheist 
objects, that it is not worthy of infinite wisdom and goodness 
to provide us with so complicated an instrument as the eye, as 
a means of obtaining light and knowlege. Why could not this 
end be attained by a more simple and direct method ? Why 
leave us, for so great a portion of earthly existence, in com- 
parative ignorance, to grope out our way into regions of light ? 

In the eye of reason, there is no end to this kind of object- 
ing ; and it only stops where the shallow conceit, or wayward 
fancy, of the objector is pleased to terminate. It is very easy 
to ask, Why a Being of infinite goodness did not confer light 
and knowledge upon us directly and at once, without leaving 
us to acquire them by the tedious use of the complicated means 
provided by his natural providence. But the inquiry does not 
stop here. He might just as well ask, Why such a Being was 
pleased to confer so small an amount of light upon us, and leave 
us to acquire more for ourselves ? Why not confer it upon us 
without measure and without exertion on our part ? The same 
interrogation, it is evident, may be applied to every other bless- 



Chapter V.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 315 

ing, as well as to knowledge ; and hence the obj ection of the 
atheist, when carried out, terminates in the great difficulty, 
why God did not make all creatures alike, and each equal to 
himself. On the principle of this objection, the insect should 
complain that it is not a man ; the man that he is not an angel ; 
and the angel' that he is not a god. Hence, such a principle 
would exclude from the system of the world everything like a 
diversity and subordination of parts; and would reduce the 
whole universe, as a system, to as inconceivable a nonentity as 
would be a watch, all of whose parts should be made of exactly 
the same materials, and possessing precisely the same force 
and properties. 

In every system, whether of nature or of art, there must be 
a variety and subordination of parts. Hence, to object that 
each part is not perfect in itself, without considering its rela- 
tions and adaptation to the whole, is little short of madness. 
And what heightens the absurdity in the present case is, that 
the parts which fall under observation may, for aught we know, 
possess the greatest perfection which is consistent with the 
highest good and beauty of the whole. 

If God has endowed man with the attributes of reason and 
speech ; if he has scattered around him, with a liberal hand, 
the multiplied blessings of life ; if, above all, he has made him 
capable of eternal blessedness, and of an endless progress in 
glory ; this should warm his heart with the most glowing grati- 
tude, and tune his tongue to the most exalted praise. And the 
man, the rational and immortal being, whose high endowments 
should lead him to murmur and repine at the unequal dispen- 
sations of the divine bounty, because God has created beings 
of a higher order than himself, and placed them in a world 
where no cloud is ever seen, and where no sigh is ever heard, 
would certainly, to say the very least, be guilty of the most 
criminal ingratitude. Reason and conscience might well cry 
out, Shall the thing formed say to Him who formed it, "Why 
hast thou made me thus ? And God himself might well demand, 
Is thine eye evil, because I am good % 

The case is not altered, if we suppose that the divine favour 
is unequally bestowed upon different individuals of the same 
species, instead of the different orders of created beings. The 
same principle of wisdom and goodness, as Butler remarks, 



316 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

whatever it may be, which led God to make a difference 
between men and angels, may be the same which induces him 
to make a difference between one portion of the human family 
and another — to leave one portion for a season to the dim twi- 
light of nature, while upon another he pours out the light of 
revelation. The same principle, it may also be, which gives 
rise to the endless diversity of natural gifts among the different 
individuals of the same community, as well as to the different 
situations of the same individual, in regard to his temporal and 
eternal interests, during the various stages of his earthly exist- 
ence. And if this be so, we should either cease to obj ect against 
the goodness of God, because the same powers and advantages 
are not bestowed upon all, or we should adopt the atheistical 
principle, in its fullest extent, which has now been shown to be 
so full of absurdity. 

But although we cannot see the particular reasons of such a 
diversity of gifts, or how each is subservient to the good of the 
whole ; yet every shadow of injustice will disappear, if we con- 
sider that God deals with every one, to use the language of 
Scripture, " according to what he hath, and not according to 
what he hath not." His bounty overflows, in various degrees, 
upon his creatures; but his justice equalizes all, by requiring 
every one to give an account of just exactly as many talents as 
have been committed to his charge, and no more. 

In this respect, all the dispensations of divine providence are 
clearly and broadly distinguished from the Calvinistic scheme 
of election and reprobation. According to this scheme, the 
reprobate, or those who are not objects of the divine mercy, 
have not, and never had, the ability to obey the law of God ; 
and yet they are condemned to eternal death for their failure to 
obey it. This is to deal with them, not according to what they 
have, but according to what they have not, and what they 
could not possibly have. Hence, to reason from one of these 
cases to the other, from the inequality of gifts and talents 
ordained by God to a scheme of election and reprobation, as 
Calvinists uniformly do, is to confound all our notions of just 
dealing, and to convert the rightful sovereignty of God into 
frightful tyranny. The perfect justice of this remark will, we 
trust, be made to appear the more clearly and fully in the 
course of the following section of the present work. 



Chapter V.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 317 



SECTION II. 

The Scripture doctrine of election consistent with the impartiality of the 
divine goodness. 

We have seen that the election of a nation to the enjoyment 
of certain external advantages, or the bestowment of superior 
gifts upon some individuals, is not inconsistent with the perfec- 
tion of the divine goodness. Beyond the distinctions thus indi- 
cated, and which so clearly obtain in the natural providence of 
God, it is believed that the Scriptural scheme of election does 
not go ; and that the more rigid features of the Calvinistic 
scheme of election and reprobation can be deduced from revela- 
tion only by a violent wresting and straining of the clear word 
of God. Let us see if this assertion may not be fully estab- 
lished. 

The ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, it is well 
known, is the portion of Scripture upon which the advocates of 
that scheme have chiefly relied, from Augustine down to Cal- 
vin, and from Calvin down to the present day. But, to any 
impartial mind, we believe, this chapter will not be found to 
lend the least shadow of support to any such scheme of doctrine. 
We assume this position advisedly, and shall proceed to give 
the reasons on which it is based. 

Now, in the interpretation of any instrument of writing, it is 
a universally admitted rule, that it should be construed with 
reference to the subject of which it treats. What, then, is the 
subject of which the apostle treats in the ninth chapter of Ro- 
mans ? In regard to this point there is no dispute ; and, to 
avoid all appearance of controversy in relation to it, we shall 
state the design of the apostle, in this part of his discourse, in 
the words of one by whom the Calvinistic scheme of election 
is maintained. " With the eighth chapter," says Professor 
Hodge, in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, " the 
discussion of the plan of salvation, and its immediate conse- 
quences, was brought to a close. The consideration of the 
calling of the Gentiles, and the rejection of the Jews, com- 
mences with the ninth, and extends to the end of the eleventh." 
Thus, according to the author, "the subject which the apostle 
had in view," in the ninth chapter, is "the rejection of the 



318 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II 

Jews, and the calling of the Gentiles." Now, if tins be his 
subject, and if the discussion of the plan of salvation was 
brought to a close in the eighth chapter, how can the doctrine 
of election and reprobation, which lies at the very foundation 
of, and gives both shape and colouring to, the whole scheme of 
salvation, as maintained by Calvinists, be found in the ninth, 
chapter? How has it happened that such important lights 
have been thrown upon the plan of salvation, and such funda- 
mental positions established in relation to it, after its discussion 
has been brought to a close ? But this only by the way ; we 
shall hereafter see how these important lights have been ex- 
tracted from the chapter in question. 

The precise passage upon which the greatest stress is laid 
seems to be the following: "The children being not yet born, 
neither having done any good or evil, that the purpose of God, 
according to election, might stand, not of works, but of him that 
calleth ; it was said unto her, The elder shall serve the younger. 
As it is written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated." 
ISTow, the question is, Does this refer to the election of Jacob to 
eternal life, and the eternal reprobation of Esau ; or, Does it 
refer to the selection of the descendants of the former to consti- 
tute the visible people of God on earth ? This is the question ; 
and it is one which, we think, is by no means difficult of 
solution. 

The apostle was in the habit of quoting only a few words of a 
passage of the Old Testament, to which he had occasion to refer ; 
and in the present instance he merely cites the words of the 
prophecy, " The elder shall serve the younger." But, according 
to the prophecy to which he refers, it was said to Kebecca, 
" Two nations are in thy womb, and two manner of people shall 
be separated from thy bowels; and the one people shall be 
stronger than the other people, and the elder shall serve the 
younger." Nothing can be plainer, we think, than that this 
prophecy relates to the descendants of Jacob and Esau, and 
not to the individuals themselves. 

This view of the above passage, if it needed further confirma- 
tion, is corroborated by the fact that Esau did not serve Jacob, 
and that this part of the prophecy is true only in relation to his 
descendants. Thus the prophecy, when interpreted by its own 
express words, as well as by the event, shows that it related to 



Chapter V.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 319 

" two nations," to " two manner of people," and not to two 
individuals. 

The argument of St. Paul demands this interpretation. He 
is not discussing the plan of salvation. The question before 
him is not whether some are elected to eternal life on account 
of their works or not ; and hence, if he had quoted a prophecy* 
from the Old Testament to establish that position, he would 
have been guilty of a gross solecism, a non sequitur, as plain as 
could well be conceived. 

For these reasons, we think there can be but little doubt with 
respect to the true meaning of the passage in question. And 
besides, this construction not only brings the language of the 
apostle into perfect conformity with the providence which God 
is actually seen to exercise over the world, but also reconciles it 
with the glory of the divine character. 

In regard to the meaning of the terms loved and hated, used 
in the prophecy under consideration, there can be no doubt 
that the interpretation, of Professor Hodge is perfectly just. 
" The meaning is," says he, " that God preferred one to the 
other, or chose one instead of the other. As this is the idea 
meant to be expressed, it is evident that in this case the word 
hate means to love less, to regard and treat with less favour. 
Thus in Gen. xxix, 33, Leah says, she was hated by her hus- 
band ; while, in the thirtieth verse, the same idea is expressed 
by saying, Jacob ' loved Eachel more than Leah.' Matt, x, 37. 
Luke xiv, 26 : 4 If any man come to me, and hate not his 
father and mother,' &c. John xii, 25." 

No one will object to this explanation. But how will the 
language, thus understood, apply to the case of individual elec- 
tion and reprobation, as maintained by Calvinists ? We can 
see, indeed, how it applies to the descendants of Esau, who were 
in many respects placed in less advantageous circumstances 
than the posterity of Jacob ; but how can God be said to love 
the elect more than the reprobate ? Can he be said to love the 
reprobate at all ? If, from all eternity, they have been eter- 
nally damned for not rendering an impossible obedience, should 
we call this a lesser degree of love than that which is bestowed 
upon the elect, or should we call it hate ? It seems, that the 
commentator feels some repugnance at the idea of setting apart 

Surely a very singular doctrine to be found in a prophecy. 



320 NATUKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part IT, 

the individual, before he has " done either good or evil," as an 
object of hate ; but not at all at the idea of setting him apart 
as an object of eternal and remediless woe ! 

" It is no doubt true," says Professor Hodge, " that the pre- 
diction contained in this passage has reference not only to the 
relative standing of Jacob and Esau, as individuals, but also to 
that of their descendants. It may even be allowed that the 
latter was principally intended in the communication to Re- 
becca. But it is clear : 1. That this distinction between the 
two races presupposed and included a distinction between the 
individuals. Jacob, made the special heir to his father Isaac, 
obtained as an individual the birthright and the blessing ; and 
Esau, as an individual, was cut oif." 

This may all be perfectly true ; it is certainly nothing to the 
purpose. It is true, that Jacob was made the special heir to 
his father ; but did he thereby inherit eternal life ? The dis- 
tinction between him and Esau was undoubtedly a personal 
favour ; the very fact that his descendants would be so highly 
blessed, must have been a source of personal satisfaction and 
joy, which his less favoured brother did not possess. But was 
this birthright and this blessing the fixed and irreversible boon 
of eternal life ? There is not the least shadow of any such thing 
in the whole record. The only blessings, of a personal or indi- 
vidual nature, of which the account gives us the least intima- 
tion, either by express words or by implication, are like those 
with which God, in his providence, still continues to distinguish 
some individuals from others. They are not the gift of eternal 
life, but of certain external and temporal advantages. Hence 
they throw no light upon the Calvinistic scheme of election 
and reprobation. To make out this scheme, or anything in 
support of it, something more must be done than to show that 
God distinguishes one nation, or one individual, from another, 
in the distribution of his favours. This is conceded on all sides ; 
and has nothing to do with the point in dispute. It must also 
be shown, that the particular favour which he brings home to 
one by his infinite power, and which he withholds from an- 
other, is neither more nor less than the salvation of the soul. 
It must be shown, that the mere will and pleasure of God makes 
such a distinction among the souls of men, that while some are 
invincibly made the heirs of glory, others are stamped with 



Chapter V.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 321 

the seal of eternal death. The inheritance of Jacob, and the 
casting off of Esau, were, so far as we can see, very different 
from the awful proceeding which is ascribed to God according 
to the Calvinistic scheme of election and reprobation. 

The same remark is applicable to other attempts to show, 
that God's favour was bestowed upon Jacob, as an individual, 
in preference to Esau. " As to the objection," says Professor 
Hodge, " that Esau never personally served Jacob, it is founded 
on the mere literal sense of the words. Esau did acknowledge 
his inferiority to Jacob, and was postponed to him on various 
occasions. This is the real spirit of the passage. This prophecy, 
as is the case with all similar predictions, has various stages of 
fulfilment. The relation between the two brothers during life ; 
the loss of the birthright blessing and promises on the part of 
Esau ; the temporary subjugation of his descendants to the 
Hebrews under David ; their final and complete subjugation 
under the Maccabees ; and especially their exclusion from the 
peculiar privileges of the people of God, through all the periods 
of their history, are included." Suppose all this to be true, 
what relation has it to the election of some individuals to eter- 
nal life, and the reprobation of others ? 

We shall not dwell upon other portions of the chapter in 
question ; for, if the foregoing remarks be just, it will be easy 
to dispose of every text which may, at first view, appear to sup- 
port the Calvinistic doctrine of election. "We shall dismiss the 
consideration of the ninth chapter of Romans with an extract 
from Dr. Macknigkt, who, although a firm believer in the Cal- 
vinistic view of election and reprobation, does not find any sup- 
port -for his doctrine in this portion of Scripture. " Although 
some passages in this chapter," says he, " which pious and 
learned men have understood of the election and reprobation 
of individuals, are in the foregoing illustration interpreted of 
the election of nations to be the people of God, and to enjoy the 
advantage of an external revelation, and of their losing these 
honourable distinctions, the reader must not, on that account, 
suppose the author rej ects the doctrines of the decree and fore- 
knowledge of God. These doctrines are taught in other pas- 
sages of Scripture : see Rom. viii, 29." Thus this enlightened 
critic candidly abandons the ninth chapter of Romans, and seeks 
support for his Calvinistic view of the divine decrees elsewhere. 

21 



322 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

Let us, then, proceed to examine the eighth chapter of Ro- 
mans, upon which he relies. The words are as follow : " For 
whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be con- 
formed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born 
among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, 
them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justi- 
fied : and whom he justified, them he also glorified." We need 
have no dispute with the Calvinists respecting the interpretation 
of these words. If we mistake not, we may adopt their own 
construction of them, and yet clearly show that they lend not the 
least support to their views of election and reprobation. " As 
to know" says Professor Hodge, " is often to approve and love, 
it may express the idea of peculiar affection in the case ; or it 
may mean to select or determine upon." These two interpreta- 
tions, as he truly says, " do not essentially differ. The one is 
but a modification of the other." " The idea, therefore, obvi- 
ously is, that those whom God peculiarly loved, and by thus 
loving, distinguished or selected from the rest of mankind ; or, 
to express both ideas in one word, those whom he elected he 
predestinated, &c." Thus, according to this commentator, those 
whom God elected, he also predestinated, called, justified, and, 
finally, glorified. 

!Now, suppose all this to be admitted, let us consider whether 
it gives any support to the Calvinistic creed of election. It 
teaches that all those whom God elects shall be ultimately 
saved ; but not one word or one syllable does it say with respect 
to the principle or ground of his election. It tells us that God, in 
his infinite wisdom, selects one portion of mankind as the objects 
of his saving mercy, — the heirs of eternal glory ; but it does not 
say that this selection, this approbation, this peculiar love, is 
wholly without foundation in the character or condition of the 
elect. It tells us that God has numbered the elect, and written 
their names in the book of life ; but it does not tell us that, in 
any case, he has taken precisely such as he has left, or left pre- 
cisely such as he has taken. The bare fact of the election is 
all that is here disclosed. The reason, or the ground, or the 
principle, of that election is not even alluded to ; and we are 
left to gather it either from other portions of Scripture, or from 
the eternal dictates of justice and mercy. Hence, as this pas- 
sage makes no allusion to the ground or reason of the divine 



Chapter V.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 323 

election, it does not begin to touch the controversy we have 
with theologians of the Calvinistic school. Every link in the 
chain here presented is perfect, except that which connects its 
first link, the election to eternal life, with the unconditional 
decree of God ; and that link, the only one in controversy, is 
absolutely wanting. We have no occasion to break the chain; 
for it is only to the imagination that it seems to be uncondition- 
ally bound to the throne of the Omnipotent. 

As this passage, then, determines nothing with respect to the 
ground or reason of election, so we have as much right to affirm, 
even in the presence of such language, that God did really fore- 
see a difference where he has made so great a distinction, as the 
Galvinists have to suppose that so great a distinction has been 
made by a mere arbitrary and capricious exercise of power. 
That we have a better reason for this position than our opponents 
can produce for theirs, we shall endeavour to show in the en- 
suing section. 

SECTION III. 

The Calvinistic scheme of election inconsistent with the impartiality and, 
glory of the divine goodness. 

Having seen that the unequal distribution of favours, which 
obtains in the wise economy of Providence, distinguishing na- 
tion from nation, as well as individual from individual, is not 
inconsistent with the perfection of the divine goodness ; and 
having also seen that the Scripture doctrine of election makes 
no other distinctions than those which take place in the provi- 
dence of God, and is equally reconcilable with the glory of his 
character, we come now to consider the Calvinistic scheme of 
election and reprobation. "We have shown on what principles 
the providence of God, which makes so many distinctions among 
men, may be vindicated ; let us now see on what principles the 
Calvinistic scheme of election and reprobation seeks to justify 
itself. If we mistake not, this scheme of predestination is as 
unlike the providence of God in its principles as it is in the ap- 
palling distinctions which it makes among the subjects of the 
moral government of the world. 

" Predestination," says Calvin, " we call the eternal decree 
of God, by which he has determined in himself, what he would 



324 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT |Part II, 

liave to become of every individual of mankind. For they are 
not all created with a similar destiny ; but eternal life is fore- 
ordained for some, and eternal damnation for others. Every 
man, therefore, being created for one or the other of these 
ends, we say, he is predestinated either to life or to death."* 
Again : "In conformity, therefore, to the clear doctrine of 
Scripture, we assert, that by an eternal and immutable counsel, 
God has once for all determined, both whom he would admit 
to salvation and whom he would condemn to destruction."! 

The doctrine of predestination is set forth in the Westminster 
Confession of Faith, in the following terms: " By the decree of 
God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels 
are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordain^, 
to everlasting death." 

" These men and angels, thus predestinated and foreordained, 
are particularly and unchangeably designed ; and their number 
is so certain and definite, that it cannot be either increased or 
diminished." 

" Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, 
before the foundation of the world was laid, according to his 
eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and 
good pleasure of his will, hath chosen in Christ unto everlasting 
glory, out of his mere free grace and love, without any fore- 
sight of faith or good works, or perseverance in either of them, 
or any other thing in the creature, as conditions or causes moving 
him thereunto ; and all to the praise of his glorious grace." 

" As God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so hath he, 
by the eternal and most free purpose of his will, foreordained 
all the means thereunto. "Wherefore, they who are elected, 
being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by Christ, are effectually 
called unto faith in Christ by his Spirit working in due season ; 
are justified, adopted, sanctified, and kept by his power through 
faith unto salvation. Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, 
effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified, and saved, but 
the elect only." 

"The rest of mankind, God was pleased, according to the 
unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth 
or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth, for the glory of his sov- 
ereign power over his creatures, to pass by, and to ordain to 

Institutes, book iii, ch. xxi. f Ibid. 



Chapter V.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 325 

dishonour and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious 
justice." 

The defenders of this system assume the position, that as 
" by Adam's sin the whole human race became a corrupt mass, 
and justly subject to eternal damnation ; so that no one can 
blame God's righteous decision, if none are saved from per- 
dition."* Augustine expressly says : " But why faith is not 
given to all, need not move the faithful, who believe that by 
one all came into condemnation, doubtless the most just ; so 
that there would he no just complaining of God, though no one 
should be freed." And again : "The dominion of death has so 
far prevailed over men, that the deserved punishment would 
drive all headlong into a second death likewise, of which there 
is no end, if the undeserved grace of God did not deliver them 
from it."f Such is the picture of the divine justice, which the 
advocates of predestination have presented, from the time of 
Augustine, the great founder of the doctrine, down to the 
present day. It surely furnishes a sufficiently dark back- 
ground on which to display the divine mercy to advantage. 

We are told, however, that we should not judge of the pro- 
ceeding of God, according to our notions of justice. This is 
certainly true, if the divine justice is fairly represented in the 
scheme of predestination ; for that is clearly unlike all that is 
called justice among men. If God can create countless myriads 
of beings, who, because they come into the world with a 
depraved nature, and " can do nothing but sin," he regards 
with such displeasure, as to leave them without hope and with- 
out remedy ; and not only so, but dooms them to eternal misery 
on 'account of an unavoidable continuance in sin ; it must be 
confessed, that we should not presume to apply our notions of 
justice to his dealings with the world. They would more 
exactly accord with our notions of injustice, cruelty, and 
oppression, than with any others of which we are capable of 
forming any conception. 

But, if we are not to decide according to our notions of jus- 
tice, how shall we judge, or form any opinion respecting the 
equity of the divine proceeding ? Shall we judge according to 
some notion which we do not possess, or shall we not judge 
at all ? This last would seem to be the wiser course ; but it is 

a Wiggers, ch. xvi. f Wiggers's Presentation, ch xvi. 



326 NATUKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

one which the Calvinists themselves will not permit us to adopt. 
They tell us, that the predestination of the greater part of 
mankind to eternal death is "to the praise of God's glorious 
justice." But how are we to behold this glorious manifestation 
of the divine justice, if we may not view it through any medium 
known to us, or contemplate it in any light which may have 
dawned upon our minds ? 

Indeed, although the defenders of this doctrine often declare 
that the predestination of so many men and angels to eternal 
misery, displays the justice of God in all its glory ; yet their 
own writings furnish the most abundant and conclusive evi- 
dence, that they themselves can see no appearance of justice 
in such a proceeding. On various occasions they do not hesi- 
tate to tell us, that although they cannot recognise the justice 
of such a proceeding, yet they believe it to be just, because it 
is the proceeding of God. But how can that be a display of 
justice to us, which, according to all our notions, wears the 
appearance of the most frightful injustice? Calvin himself 
admits, that the justice of God, which is supposed to be so 
brightly displayed in the predestination of so many immortal 
beings to endless woe, is, in reality, therein involved in clouds 
and darkness. Yet he does not fail to deduce an argument 
in its favour from " the very obscurity which excites such 
dread."* 

It seems clear, that if the divine justice is really displayed 
in the punishment of the reprobate, it would have been exhibited 
on a still more magnificent scale by the condemnation of the 
whole human race. For, according to Calvinism, all were 
equally deserving of the divine displeasure, and the saved are 
distinguished from the lost only by the election of God. Hence, 
this scheme shows the justice of God to be limited, or not dis- 
played on so grand and imposing a scale as it might have been ; 
that is to say, it shows the justice of God to be less than infinite. 
But if such be the justice of God, we certainly should not com- 
plain that it has been limited by his mercy ; we should rather 
rejoice, indeed, to believe that it had been thereby entirely 
extinguished. 

Notwithstanding the claims of divine justice, all were not 
reprobated and doomed to eternal death. A certain portion of 

° Institutes, book iii, ch. xxi. 



Chapter V.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 32*7 

mankind are elected and saved, " to the praise of his glorious 
grace." Now, it is conceded by Calvinists, that " all the cir- 
cumstances which distinguish the elect from others are the 
fruit of their election."* This proposition is deduced by a Cal- 
vinistic divine from the "Westminster Confession of Faith." 
It is also conceded, that if the same grace which is given to 
the elect, should be bestowed upon the reprobate, they also 
would be saved. f Why, then, is it not bestowed ? Why this 
fearful limitation of the divine mercy ? Can the justice of God 
be manifested only at the expense of his mercy, and his mercy 
only at the expense of his justice 1 Or, is the everlasting mercy 
of God, that sublime attribute which constitutes the excellency 
and glory of his moral nature, so limited and straitened on 
all sides, that it merely selects here and there an object of its 
favour, while it leaves thousands and millions, equally within 
its reach, exposed to the eternal ravages of the spoiler ? If so, 
then are we bound to conclude, that the mercy of God is not 
infinite ; that it is not only limited, but also partial and arbi- 
trary in its operation. But such is not the mercy of God. This 
is not a capricious fondness, nor yet an arbitrary dictate of feel- 
ing ; it is a uniform and universal rule of goodness. 

To select one here and there out of the mass of mankind, 
while others, precisely like them in all respects, are left to 
perish, is not mercy ; it is favouritism. The tyrant may have 
his favourites as well as others. But God is not a respecter of 
persons. If he selects one, as the object of his saving mercy, 
he will select all who stand in the like condition ; otherwise, 
his mercy were no more mercy, but a certain capricious fondness 
of feeling, unworthy of an earthly monarch, and much more of 
the august Head and Ruler of the moral universe. 

These views and feelings are not peculiar to the opponents 
of Calvinism. They exist in the bosom of Calvinists themselves ; 
only they are so crushed beneath a system, that they cannot 
find that freedom of development, nor that fulness of utterance, 
which so rightfully belongs to them, and which is so essential 
to their entire healthfulness and beauty. 

We shall give only one illustration of the justness of this 
remark, although we might produce a hundred. After having 
endeavouredto vindicate the mercy of God, as displayed in the 

° Hill's Divinity, p. 525. t !<*•> P- 526 « 



328 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 

scheme of predestination, Dr. Hill candidly declares : " Still, 
however, a cloud hangs over the subject / and there is a difficulty 
in reconciling the mind to a system, which, after laying this 
foundation, that special grace is necessary to the production of 
human virtue, adopts as its distinguishing tenet this position, 
that that grace is denied to many."* Notwithstanding his 
most elaborate defence of predestination, he may well say, 
that "a cloud still hangs over the subject," and darkens the 
mercy of God. 

Some of the stereotyped attempts of Calvinists to escape from 
the cloud which hangs over their doctrine are too weak to 
deserve a serious refutation. "We are often asked, for example, 
if God may not do what he pleases with his own? Most 
assuredly he may ; but does it please him, according to the 
high supralapsarian notion of Calvin, to create myriads of men 
and angels, to the end that they may be eternally damned ? 
Does it please him, according even to the sublapsarian scheme, to 
leave the great mass of mankind in the helpless and forlorn 
condition in which they were born, without assistance, and 
then subject them to eternal misery, because they would not 
render an obedience beyond their power ? Truly, the sovereign 
Creator and Ruler of the world may do what he pleases with 
his own ; but yet we insist, that it is his supremest pleasure to 
deal with his creatures according to the eternal principles of 
justice and mercy. 

His power is infinite, we admit, nay, we joyfully believe ; 
but yet it is not a power which works according to the lawless 
pleasure of an unmitigated despot. It moves within a sphere 
of light and love. God's infinite wisdom and goodness super- 
intend and surround all its workings ; otherwise its omnipotent 
actings would soon carry the goodly frame of the world, to- 
gether with, all the blessed inhabitants thereof, into a state of 
utter confusion and chaotic night ; leaving occasion for none, 
save the blind idolaters of power, to exclaim, " May he not do 
what he pleases with his own ?" 

We are also told, that " God is under no obligation to his 
creatures." Supposing this to be true, (though true most cer- 
tainly it is not,) yet does he not owe it to himself — does he not 
owe it to the eternal principles of truth and goodness — does he 

Hill's Divinity, p. 562. 



Chapter V.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 329 

not owe it to the glory of his own empire over the world — to 
deal with his rational and immortal creatures, otherwise than 
according to the dark scheme of Calvinistic predestination? 
]STay, is it not due to the creature himself, that he should have 
some little chance or opportunity to embrace the life which 
God has set before him ? Or, in default of such opportunity, is 
it not due to him that he should be exempt from the wages of 
the second death ? 

Confessing the wisdom and justice of predestination, as main- 
tained by themselves, to be above our comprehension, the 
Calvinists are accustomed to remind us of the littleness, the 
weakness, and the blindness of the human mind, and how 
dangerous it is for beings like ourselves to pry into mysteries. 
We are aware, indeed, that our faculties are limited on all sides, 
and that we are exceedingly prone to assume more than belongs 
to us. We are not sure that the human mind, so little and so 
assuming, appears to any very great advantage in its advocacy 
of the Calvinistic scheme of predestination. This scheme is not 
only found in the ninth chapter of Komans, by a strange mis- 
apprehension of the whole scope and design of the apostle's 
argument, but, after having based it upon this misinterpretation 
of the divine word, its advocates persist in regarding all opposi- 
tion to it as an opposition against God. As often as we dispute 
the doctrine, they cry out, "Nay, but, O man, who art thou 
that repliest against God ?" 

This rebuke was well administered by St. Paul. He applied 
it to those who, understanding his doctrine, did not hesitate to 
arraign the equity of the divine proceeding in the election of 
one nation in preference to another to constitute the visible 
Church on earth. This was not only to reply against God's 
word, but also against the manifest arrangements and dispensa- 
tions of his providence. But it is not well applied by Calvin- 
ists, unless they possess an infallibility which authorizes them 
to identify their interpretation of the word of God with the 
word itself. It is not well applied by them, unless they are 
authorized to put themselves in the place of God. If they have 
no right to do this, we must insist upon it that it is one thing to 
reply against God, and quite another to reply against Calvin 
and his followers. 



330 NATUKAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part II, 



SECTION IV. 

The true ground and reason of election to eternal life shows it to oe consistent 
with the infinite goodness of God. 

We agree witli both Calvinistic and Arminian writers in the 
position, that no man is elected to eternal life on account of his 
merits. Indeed, the idea that a human being can merit any- 
thing, much less eternal life, of God, is preposterous in the 
extreme. All his gifts are of pure grace. The creation of the 
soul with glorious and immortal powers was an act of pure, un- 
mixed favour. The duty of loving and serving him, which we 
are permitted to enjoy, is an exalted privilege, and should in- 
spire us with gratitude, instead of begetting the miserable 
conceit that our service, even when most perfect, could deserve 
anything further from God, or establish any claims upon his 
justice. This view, which we take to be the true one, as com- 
pletely shuts out all occasion of boasting as does the scheme of 
election maintained by the Calvinists. 

It is objected, that God did not elect individuals to eternal 
life, because he foresaw that they would repent and believe ; 
since repentance and faith themselves are the fruits of election. 
If this objection have any force, we are persuaded that it arises 
from an improper wording, or presentation, of the truth against 
which it is directed. "We cannot suppose that God elected any 
one because he foresaw his good works, so as to make election 
to depend upon them, instead of making them to depend upon 
election. This does not prevent an individual, however, from 
having been elected, because God foresaw from all eternity that 
the influences attending upon his election would, by his own 
voluntary cooperation therewith, be rendered effectual to his 
salvation. This is the ground on which we believe the election 
of individuals to eternal life to proceed. Accordingly, we sup- 
pose that God never selected, or determined to save, any one 
who he foresaw would not yield to the influences of his grace, 
provided they should be given. And we also suppose that such 
is the overflowing goodness of God, that all were elected by 
him, and had their names written in the book of life, who he 
foresaw would yield to the influences of his grace, and, by the 
cooperation therewith, " make their calling and election sure." 



Chapter V.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 331 

This scheme appears to possess the following very great ad- 
vantages : — ■ 

1. It does not give such a pervading energy to the operations 
of divine grace as to exclude all subordinate moral agency from 
the world, and destroy the very foundation of man's account- 
ability. 
* 2. It does not weaken the motives to the practice of a virtu- 
ous and decent life, by assuring the worst part of mankind that 
they are just as likely to be made the objects of the saving 
grace of God as any others. On the contrary, it holds out this 
terrible warning, that by an obstinate continuance in evil-doing, 
the wicked may place themselves beyond the effectual influ- 
ences of divine grace, and set the seal of eternal death to their 
own souls. 

3. It shows the mercy of God to be infinite. "No one, except 
those who place themselves beyond the possibility of salvation 
by their own evil deeds, is ever lost. Hence, the mercy of 
God, which takes in all whose salvation is within the range of 
possibility, appears in full-orbed and unclouded splendour. It 
could not possibly appear greater, or more beautiful, than as it 
presents itself to our view in this scheme. 

4. It shows the justice of God to be infinite. This, according 
to the above view, is neither limited by, nor does it limit, the 
mercy of God. It acts merely upon those who were not, and 
never could be made, the obj ects of mercy ; and it acts upon 
these according to the full measure of their ill-desert, as well as 
according to the exigencies of the moral empire of God. It has 
no limits, except those which circumscribe and bound the ob- 
jects of infinite justice. 

5. It not only shows the mercy and justice of God to be as 
great as can possibly be conceived, but it also shows the per- 
fect harmony and agreement which subsists between these 
sublime attributes of the Divine Being. It marks out and 
defines the orbit, in which each revolves in all the perfection 
and plenitude of its glory, without the least clashing or inter- 
ference with the other. 

In conclusion, we would simply ask the candid and impartial 
reader, Does any dark or perplexing " cloud still hang over the 
subject?" Is "there a difficulty in reconciling the mind to a 
system," which exhibits the character of God, and his govern- 



332 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT [Part H, 

ment of the world, in so pleasing and so advantageous a light ? 
Does not a system, which gives so glad and joyous a response 
to the demand of God, " Are not my ways equal ?" recommend 
itself to the affections of the pious mind ? 

It very clearly seems to us, that, strong as are the convictions 
of Dr. Chalmers in favour of " a rigid and absolute predes- 
tination,"* his affections cannot always be restrained within 
the narrow confines of so dark a scheme. His language, in 
pleading for the universality of the gospel offer, contains, it seems 
to us, as direct, and pointed, and powerful condemnation of 
his own scheme as can well be found in the whole range of 
theological literature. " There must be," says he, " a sad mis- 
understanding somewhere. The commission put into our hands 
is to go and preach the gospel to every creature under heaven ; 
and the announcement sounded forth in the world from heaven's 
vault was, Peace on earth, good-will to men. There is no 
freezing limitation here, but a largeness and munificence of 
mercy boundless as space, free and open as the expanse of the 
firmament. We hope, therefore, the gospel, the real gospel, 
is as unlike the mews of some of its interpreters ; as creation, in 
all its boundless extent and beauty, is unlike the paltry scheme of 
some wretched scholastic in the middle ages. The middle age 
of science and civilization is now terminated ; but Christianity 
also had its middle age, and this, perhaps, is not yet fully 
terminated. There is still a remainder of the old spell, even 
the spell of human authority, and by which a certain cramp 
or confinement has been laid on the genius of Christianity. We 
cannot doubt that the time of its complete emancipation is 
coming, when it shall break loose from the imprisonment in 
which it is held ; but meanwhile there is, as it were, a stricture 
upon it, not yet wholly removed, and in virtue of ivhieh the 
largeness and liberality of Heaven's own purposes have been 
made to descend in partial and scanty droppings through the 
strainers of an artificial theology, instead of falling, as they 
ought, in a universal shower upon the world. "f 

Is it possible, that this is the language of a man who believes 
that Heaven's purposes of mercy descend, not upon all men, but 
only upon the elect ? It is even so. Boundless and beautiful 
as the goodness of God is in itself; yet, through the strainers of 

° Institutes of Theology. | Institutes of Theology, vol. ii, ch. vii. 



Chapter V.] WITH THE GOODNESS OF GOD. 333 

his theology, is it made to descend in partial and scanty drop- 
pings merely, and not in one universal shower. It is good- will, 
not to men, but to the elect. Such is the " chilling limitation," 
and such the frightful "stricture," on the genius of Chris- 
tianity, from which, in the fervour of his imagination, the great 
heart of Chalmers burst into a higher and a more genial ele- 
ment of light and love. 

Alas ! how sad and how sudden the descent, when in the 
very next paragraph he says : " The names and number of the 
saved may have been in the view, nay, even in the design and 
destination of God from all eternity / and still the distinction 
is carried into effect, not by means of a gospel addressed par- 
tially and exclusively to them, but by means of a gospel ad- 
dressed generally to all. A partial gospel, in fact, coidd not 
have achieved the conversion of the elect:" that is to say, though 
it was the design and destination of God from all eternity to 
save only a small portion of those whom he migh* have saved ; 
yet he made the offer of salvation to all, in order to save the 
chosen few ! And if he had not proclaimed this universal offer, 
by which " the largeness and munificence " of his mercy are 
made to appear as " boundless as space," the elect could not 
have been saved ! If so, is it the real goodness of God, then, or 
merely the appearance of universal goodness, that leadeth men 
to repentance ? 

" Any charm," says he, " which there is in Christianity to 
recall or to regenerate some, lies in those of its overtures which 
are so framed as to hold out the offered friendship of God to 
all :"* that is, that although God intends and seeks to save only 
a few, he offers the same salvation to all, to give an efficacious 
charm to the scheme of redemption ! Indeed, if the Calvin- 
istic scheme of an absolute predestination be true, then we 
admit that there is a charm and a glory in the magnificent 
delusion, arising from God's offer of friendship to all, which is 
not to be found in the truth. But that scheme, as we have 
seen, is not true ; and also, that the goodness of God is as 
boundless and beautiful in reality, as it could possibly be in 
appearance. 

We agree with Dr. Chalmers, that the goodness of God should 
be viewed, not through the medium of predestination, but as it 

s Institutes of Theology, vol. ii, ch. vii. 



334 NATURAL EVIL CONSISTENT, ETC. [.Part IL 

shines forth in the light of the glorious gospel. "We agree with 
him, that " we ought to proceed on the obvious representations 
which Scripture gives of the Deity ; and these "beheld in their 
own immediate light, untinged by the dogma of predestination. 
God waiting to be gracious — God not willing that any should 
perish, but that all should come to repentance — God swearing 
by himself that he has no pleasure in the death of a sinner, but 
rather that all should come unto him and live — God beseeching 
men to enter into reconciliation, and this not as elect, but simply 
and generally as men and sinners ; — these are the attitudes in 
which the Father of the human family sets himself forth unto 
the world — these the terms in which he speaks to us from 
heaven." It is precisely in this sublime attitude, and in this 
transporting light, that we rejoice to contemplate the Father of 
mercies ; and this view, it must be confessed, is wholly " un- 
tinged with the dogma of predestination." 



CONCLUSION 



A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES AND ADVANTAGES 
OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 



There is a lamp within the lofty dome 

Of the dim world, whose radiance clear doth show 

Its awful beauty ; and, through the wide gloom, 
Make all its obscure mystic symbols glow 

With pleasing light, — that we may see and know 
The glorious world, and all its wondrous scheme ; 

Not as distorted in the mind below, 
Nor in philosopher's, nor poet's dream, 
But as it was, and is, high in the Mind Supreme. 

Anon. 



CONCLUSION. 



SUMMARY OE THE EIRST PART OE THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 

The commonly received systems of theology are, it is confessed 
by their advocates, attended with manifold inconveniences and 
difficulties. The habit of mind by which, notwithstanding such 
difficulties, it clings to the great truths of those systems, is wor- 
thy of all admiration, and forms one of the best guarantees of 
the stability and progress of human knowledge. For in every 
department of science the great truths which dawn upon the 
mind are usually attended with a cloud of difficulties, and, but 
for the habit in question, they would soon be permitted to fade 
away, and be lost in their original obscurity. Copernicus has, 
therefore, been justly applauded,* not only for conceiving, but 
for firmly grasping the heliocentric theory of the world, not- 
withstanding the many formidable objections which it had to 
encounter in his own mind. Even the sublime law of the ma- 
terial universe, before it finally established itself in the mind of 
Newton, more than once fell, in its struggles for acceptance, 
beneath the apparently insuperable objections by which it was 
attended; and, after all, the overpowering evidence which 
caused it to be embraced, still left it surrounded by an immense 
penumbra of difficulties. These, together with the sublime 
truth, he bequeathed to his successors. They have retained the 
truth, and removed the difficulties. In like manner, admirable 
though the habit of clinging to every sufficiently accredited 
truth may be, yet, whether in the physical or in the moral 
sciences, the effort to disencumber the truth of the difficulties 
by which its progress is embarrassed should never be remitted 

* WhewelUs History of the Inductive Sciences, vol. i. 



338 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 

The scientific impulse, by which a great truth is grasped, and 
established upon its own appropriate evidence, should ever be 
followed by the subordinate movement, which strives to remove 
every obstacle out of the way, and cause it to secure a wider 
and a brighter dominion in the human mind. And in propor- 
tion as any scheme, whether in relation to natural or to divine 
things, shall, without a sacrifice or mutilation of the truth, divest 
itself of the darkness which must ever accompany all one-sided 
and partial views, will it possess a decided advantage and 
superiority over other systems. Since this general principle 
will not be denied, let us proceed, in conclusion, to take a brief 
survey of the foregoing scheme of doctrine, and determine, if 
we can, whether to any truth it has given any such advantage. 
It clearly seems free from the stupendous cloud of difficulties 
that overhang that view of the moral universe which supposes 
its entire constitution and government to be in accordance with 
the scheme of necessity. These difficulties pertain, first, to the 
responsibility of man ; secondly, to the purity of God ; and, 
thirdly, to the reality of moral distinctions. These three several 
branches of the difficulty in question have been respectively 
considered in the first three chapters of the first part of the 
present work ; and we shall now briefly recapitulate the views 
therein presented, in the three following sections. 

SECTION I. 
The scheme of necessity denies that man is the responsible author of sin. 

If, according to this scheme, all things in heaven and earth, 
the volitions of the human mind not excepted, be under the 
dominion of necessitating causes, then may we well ask, How 
can man be a free and responsible agent ? To this inquiry the 
most illustrious advocates of the scheme in question have not 
been able to return a coherent or satisfactory reply. After the 
search of ages, and the joint labour of all their gigantic intel- 
lects, they have found no position in their system on which the 
freedom of the human mind may be securely planted. The 
position set up for this purpose by one is pulled down by an- 
other, who, in his turn, indicates some other position only to be 
demolished by some other advocate of his own scheme. The 
more we look into their writings on this subject, the more 



SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 339 

irreconcilable seems the conflict of opinion in which they are 
among themselves involved. The more closely we contemplate 
the labour of their hands, the more clearly we perceive that all 
their attempts, in opposition to the voice of heaven and earth, 
to rear the great metaphysical tower of necessity, have only 
ended in an utter confusion of tongues. So far, indeed, are 
they from having found and presented any such view of the 
freedom and responsibility of man, as shall, by the intrinsic and 
overpowering lustre of its evidence, stand some chance to dis- 
arm the enemies of God, that they have not even found one in 
which they themselves can rest. The school of the necessitarian 
is, in reality, a house divided against itself; and that, too, in 
regard to the most vital and fundamental point of its philos- 
ophy. 

There seems to be one exception to the truth of this general 
remark : for there is one scheme or definition of liberty, in 
which many, if not most, of the advocates of necessity have 
concurred ; that is, the definition of Hobbes. As the current 
of a river, says he, is free to flow down its channel, provided 
there be no obstruction in the way ; so the human will, though 
compelled to act by causes over which it has no control, is free, 
provided there be no external impediment to prevent its voli- 
tion from passing into effect. This idea of the freedom of the 
will, though much older than Hobbes, is primarily indebted to 
his influence for its prevalence in modern times ; for it de- 
scended from Hobbes to Locke, from Locke to Edwards, and 
from Edwards to the modern school of Calvinistic divines. 

~No matter how we come by our volitions, says Edwards, yet 
are we perfectly free when there is no external impediment to 
hinder our volitions from passing into effect : that is to say, 
though our volitions be absolutely produced by the divine 
omnipotence itself, or in any other way ; yet is the will free, 
provided no external cause interpose to prevent its volition from 
moving the body. According to this definition of the liberty 
of the will, it is not a property of the soul at all, but only an 
accidental circumstance or condition of the body. In the sig- 
nificant language of Leibnitz, it is not the freedom of the mind ; 
it is merely " elbow-room." It consists not in an attribute, or 
property, or power of the soul, but only in the external oppor- 
tunity which its necessitated volitions may have to necessitate 



340 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 

an effect. We ask, How can the mind be free ? and they tell 
us, When the body may be so ! We inquire about an attribute 
of the spiritual principle within, and they turn us off with an 
answer respecting an accident of the material principle without ! 
An ignoratio elenchi more flagrant — a mistaking of the question 
more palpable — it is surely not possible to conceive. Yet this 
definition of the freedom of the will, though so superficially 
false, is precisely that which has found the most general accept- 
ance among necessitarians. Though vehemently condemned 
by Calvin himself, unanswerably refuted by Leibnitz, sneered 
at by Edwards the younger, and pronounced utterly inadequate 
by Dr. John Dick ; yet, as we have seen, is it now held up as 
" the Calvinistic idea of the freedom of the will." 

We do not wonder that such a definition of free-will should 
have been adopted by atheizing philosophers, such as Hume 
and Hobbes, for example ; because we cannot suppose them to 
have been penetrated with any very profound design to uphold 
the cause of human responsibility, or to vindicate the immaculate 
purity of the divine glory. But that it should have been 
accepted with such unquestioning simplicity by a large body 
of Christian divines, having the great interests of the moral 
world at heart, is, we cannot but think, a sufficient ground for 
the most profound astonishment and regret ; for, surely, to plant 
the great cause of human responsibility on a foundation so slen- 
der, on a fallacy so palpable, on a position so utterly untenable, 
is to expose it to the victorious assaults of its weakest enemy 
and invader. 

SECTION" II. 
The scheme of necessity makes God the author of sin. 

The necessitarian, in his attempts to vindicate the purity of 
God, has not been more successful than in his endeavours to 
establish the freedom and accountability of man. If, according 
to his scheme, the Supreme Euler of the world be the primal 
cause of all things, the volitions of men included ; it certainly 
seems exceedingly difficult to conceive, that he is not impli- 
cated in the sin of the world. And this difficulty, so appalling 
at first view, remains just as great after all that the most enlight- 
ened advocates of that scheme have advanced as it was before. 



SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 341 

We have witnessed the efforts of a Leibnitz, an Edwards, and 
a Chalmers, to repel this objection to the scheme of necessity ; 
and if we mistake not, we have seen how utterly ineffectual 
they have proved to break its force, or resist its influence. The 
sum and substance of that defence is, as we have seen, that God 
may do evil that good may come ; a defence which, instead of 
vindicating the purity of the divine proceeding, represents it as 
having been governed by the most corrupt maxim of the most 
corrupt system of casuistry the world has ever seen. It darkens, 
rather than illuminates, that profound and portentous obscurity 
of the system of the world, arising from the origin and ex- 
istence of moral evil. So far from removing the difficulty 
from their scheme, they have only illustrated its force by the 
ineffable weakness of the means and methods which that scheme 
has necessitated them to employ for its destruction. 

SECTION III 
The scheme of necessity denies the reality of moral distinctions. 

For, if all things in the world, the acts of the will not 
excepted, be produced by an extraneous agency, it seems clear 
that it is absurd to attach praise or blame to men on account 
of their volitions. Nothing appears more self-evident than the 
position, that whatever is thus produced in us can neither be 
our virtue nor our vice. The advocates of necessity, at least 
those of them who do not admit the inference in question, 
invoke the aid of logic to extinguish the light of the principle 
on which it is based. But where have they found, or where 
can. they find, a principle more clear, more simple, or more 
unquestionable on which to ground their arguments ? "Where, 
in the whole armory of logic, can be found a principle more 
unquestionable than this, that no man can be to praise or to 
blame for that which is produced in him, by causes over which 
he had no control? 

We have examined those arguments in detail, and exhibited 
the principles on which they proceed. Those principles, instead 
of being of such a nature as to subserve the purposes of valid 
argument, are either insignificant truisms which prove nothing, 
or else they reach the point in dispute only by means of an 
ambiguity of words. Of the first description is the celebrated 



342 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 

maxim of Edwards, that the essence of virtue and vice consists 
in their nature, and not in their cause. By which he means, 
that no matter how we come by our virtue and vice, though 
they be produced in us according to the scheme of necessity, 
yet are they our virtue and vice. If a horse should fall from 
the moon, it would be a horse : for no matter where it comes 
from, a horse is a horse / or, more scientifically expressed, the 
essence of a horse consists in the nature of a horse, and not in 
its origin or cause. All this is very true. But then, we no 
more believe that horses fall from the moon, than we do that vir- 
tue and vice are produced according to the scheme of necessity. 

Of the last description is that other maxim of Edwards, that 
men are adjudged virtuous or vicious on account of actions pro- 
ceeding from the will, without considering how they came by 
their volition. True, we may judge of external actions accord- 
ing as their origin is in the will or otherwise, without consider- 
ing how its volitions come to pass ; but then this is because we 
proceed on the tacit assumption that the will is free, and not 
under the dominion of necessitating causes. But the question 
relates, not to external actions or movements of the body, but 
to the volitions of the mind itself. And this being the case, it 
does make a vast difference in our estimate, whether we con- 
sider those volitions as coming to pass freely; or whether, 
according to the scheme of necessity, we regard them as being 
produced by the operation of causes over which we have no 
control. In this case, it is impossible for the human mind to 
attach praise or blame to them, or view them as constituting 
either virtue or vice. For nothing can be plainer than the 
position, that if anything in us be produced by the mighty and 
irresistible operation of an extraneous agency, it can neither be 
our virtue nor vice. This principle is so clear, that logic can 
neither add to nor detract from the intrinsic lustre of its evi- 
dence. And all the cloudy sophistications of an Edwards, in- 
genious as they are, can obscure it only to the minds of those 
who have not sufficient penetration to see through the nature of 
his arguments. 

At this point, then, as well as at others, the scheme of neces- 
sity, instead of clearing up the old, has introduced new difficul- 
ties into the system of the world. Instead of diffusing light, it 
has actually extended the empire of darkness, by investing in 



SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 343 

the clouds and mists of its own raising, some of the brightest 
elements which enter into its organization. By scholastic re- 
finements and sophistical devices, it has sought to overturn and 
destroy, not the elements of error and confusion, but some of 
the clearest and most indestructible intuitional convictions of 
the human head and heart. 

But great as these difficulties are, we may still be asked to 
embrace the scheme from which they flow, on the ground that 
it is true. Indeed, this is the course pursued by some of the 
most enlightened Calvinistic necessitarians of the present day. 
Freely admitting that all the attempts of Leibnitz, of Edwards, 
and others, to bring the scheme of necessity into an agreement 
with the dictates of reason, have left its stupendous difficultly 
pretty much where they found them — 'Wrapped in impenetrable 
gloom ; they nevertheless maintain this scheme, and propose it 
to our acceptance, on the sole and sufficient ground of its evi- 
dence. If we may judge from those of their writings which we 
have seen, this course of proceeding is getting to be very much 
the fashion among the Calvinists of the present day ; and they 
have a great deal to say in praise of simply adhering to the 
truth, without being over-solicitous about its difficulties, or pay- 
ing too much attention to them. That man, say they, is in 
imminent danger of heresy who, instead of receiving the truth 
with the simplicity of a little child, goes about to worry himself 
with its difficulties. He walks in dark and slippery places. 
"We agree with them in this, and commend their wisdom : for 
it presents the only chance which their system has of retaining 
its hold on the human mind. But before accepting this scheme 
on the ground of its evidence, we have deemed it prudent to 
look into the very interior of the scheme itself, and weigh the 
evidence on which it is so confidently recommended. 

SECTION" IV. 
The moral world not constituted according to the scheme of necessity. 

In the prosecution of this inquiry, we have appeared to our- 
selves to find, that this boasted scheme of necessity is neither 
more nor less than one grand tissue of sophisms. We have 
found, we believe, that this huge imposition on the reason of 
man is a vile congregation of pestilential errors, through which, 



344 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 

if the glory of God and his marvellous ways be contemplated, 
they must appear most horribly distorted. We have found that 
this scheme is as weak and crazy in the mechanism of its inter- 
nal structure as it is frightful in its consequences. Instead of 
that closely articulated body of thought, which we were led to 
expect therein, we have found little more than a jumble of in- 
coherences, a semi-chaotic mass of plausible blunders. We 
have seen and shown, we trust, that this grand and imposing 
scheme of necessity is, in reality, based on a false psychology, 
• — directed against a false issue, — supported by false logic, — 
fortified by false conceptions, — recommended by false analogies, 
— and rendered plausible by a false phraseology. And, besides, 
we have ascertained that it originates in a false method, and 
terminates in a false religion. As such, we deem it far better 
adapted to represent the little, narrow, dark, crooked, and per- 
verted world within, than the great and all-glorious world of 
God without. So have we not spared its deformities. 

SECTION V. 
The relation letween the human agency and the divine. 

Having got rid of the scheme of necessity, which opposed so 
many obstacles to the prosecution of our design, we were then 
prepared to investigate the great problem of evil : but, before 
entering on this subject, we paused to consider the difficulty 
which, in all ages, the human mind has found in attempting to 
reconcile the influence of the Divine Spirit with the freedom of 
the will. In regard to this difficulty, it has been made to ap- 
pear, we trust, that we need not understand how the Spirit of 
God acts, in order to reconcile his influence with the free- 
agency of mam We need to know, not how the one Spirit acts 
on the other, but only what is done by each, in order to see a 
perfect agreement and harmony in their cooperation. The in- 
quiry relates, then, to the precise thing done by each, and not 
to the modus operandi. Having, in opposition to the commonly 
received notion, ascertained this to be the difficulty, we lave 
found it comparatively easy of solution. 

For the improved psychology of the present day, which gives 
so clear and steady a view of the simple facts of consciousness, 
has enabled us to see what may, and what may not, be pro- 



SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 345 

duced by an extraneous agency. This again has enabled us to 
make out and define the sphere of the divine power, as well as that 
of the human ; and to determine the point at which they come 
into contact, without interfering with or intersecting each other. 

The same means have also shown us, that the opposite errors 
of Pelagianism and Augustinism have a common root in a false 
psychology. The psychology of the past, which identifies the 
passive states of the sensibility with the active states of the will, 
is common to both of these schemes. From this common root 
the two doctrines branch out in opposite directions ; the one on 
the side of the mind's activity, and the other on that of its 
passivity. Each perceives only one phase of the complex 
whole, and denies the reality of the other. With one, the 
active phase is the whole ; with the other, the passive impression 
is the whole. Hence the one recognises the human power alone ; 
while the other causes this power entirely to disappear beneath 
the overshadowing influence of the divine. 

Now the foregoing system, by availing itself of the psychology 
of the present day, not only does not cause the one of these 
great facts to exclude the other, but, by showing their logical 
coherency and agreement, it removes the temptation that the 
speculative reason has ever felt to do such violence to the cause 
of truth. It embraces the half views of both schemes, and 
moulds them into one great and full-orbed truth. In the great 
theandric work of regeneration, in particular, it neither causes 
the human element to exclude the divine, nor the divine to 
swallow up the human ; but preserves each in its integrity, and 
both in their harmonious union and cooperation. The mutual 
inter-dependency, and the undisturbed inter-working, of these 
all-important elements of the moral world, it aims to place on 
a firm basis, and exhibit in a clear light. If this object has 
been accomplished, though but in part, or by way of a first 
approximation only, it will be conceded to be no small gain, or 
advantage, to the cause of truth. 

SECTION" VI. 
The existence of moral evil consistent with the infinite purity of God. 

The relation of the foregoing treatise to the great problem 
of the spiritual world, concerning the origin and existence of 



346 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 

evil, may be easily indicated, and the solution it proposes dis- 
tinguished from that of others. This may be best done, per- 
haps, with the aid of logical forms. 

The world, created by an infinitely perfect Being, says the 
sceptic, must needs be the best of all possible worlds : but the 
actual world is not the best of all possible worlds : therefore it 
was not created by an infinitely perfect Being. Now in reply- 
ing to this argument, no theist denies the major premiss. All 
have conceded, that the idea of an infinitely perfect Being 
necessarily implies the existence and preservation of the great- 
est possible perfection in the created universe. In the two 
celebrated works of M. Leibnitz and Archbishop King, both 
put forth in reply to Bayle, this admission is repeatedly and 
distinctly made. This seems to have been rightly done ; for, in 
the language of Cudworth, " To believe a God, is to believe the 
existence of all possible good and perfection in the universe."* 

In this, says Leibnitz, is embosomed all possible good. But 
how is this point established? "We judge from the event 
itself," says he ; " since God has made it, it was not possible to 
have made a better '."f But this is the language of faith, and 
not of reason. As an argument addressed to the sceptic, it is 
radically unsound ; for as a medium of proof, it employs the 
very thing in dispute, namely, that God is infinitely perfect. 
Hence this is a petitio principii, a begging of the question. If 
this were all that M. Leibnitz had to offer, he might as well 
have believed, and remained silent. 

But this was not all. He endeavours to show, that the world 
is absolutely perfect, without inferring its perfection from the 
assumed infinite perfection of its Author. At first view, this 
does not appear to be so ; for the sin and misery which over- 
flow this lower part of the world seem to detract from the 
perfection and beauty of the whole. !N~ot so, says. Leibnitz: 
" there are some disorders in the parts, which marvellously 
heighten the beauty of the whole ; as certain discords, skilfully 
employed, render the harmony more exquisite. "J Considered 
as an argument, this is likewise quite unsatisfactory. It is, in 
fact, merely the light of the imagination, playing over the 
bosom of the cloud ; not the concentrated blaze of the intelli- 

• Intellectual System, vol. ii, p. 349. f Theodicee, Abrege de la Controversy 

t Ibid. 



SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 347 

gence, dispelling its gloom. And besides, this analogy proceeds 
on a false principle ; inasmuch as it supposes that God has him- 
self introduced sin into the world, with a view to its happy 
effects. We could sooner believe, indeed, that the principle 
of evil had introduced harmony into the world in order to 
heighten the frightful effects of its discord, than that the prin- 
ciple of all good had produced the frightful discord of the 
world, in order to enhance the effects of its harmony. But we 
shall let all such fine sayings pass. Perhaps they were intended 
as the ornaments of faith, rather than as the radiant armour and 
the invincible weapons of reason. 

Though Leibnitz frequently insists, that " the permission of 
evil tends to the good of the universe,"* he does not always 
seem to mean that evil would be better than holiness in its 
stead ; but that the permission of sin is not so great an incon- 
venience as would be its universal prevention. " We ought to 
say," says he, " that God permits sin, because otherwise he 
would himself do a worse action (une action pire) than all the 
sin of his creatures."f But what is this worse, this more unrea- 
sonable action of which God would be guilty, if he should pre- 
vent all sin ? One bad feature thereof would be, according to 
Leibnitz, that it would interfere with the freedom of the will. 
In his " Abrege de la Controverse," he says : " We have added, 
after many good authors, that it is in conformity with the gen- 
eral order and good, for God to leave to certain creatures an occa- 
sion for the exercise of their liberty." This argument comes 
with a bad grace from one who has already denied the liberty 
of the will ; and, indeed, from the very form of his expression, 
Leibnitz seems to have adopted it from authority, rather than 
from a perception of any support it derives from his own prin- 
ciples. He asserts the freedom of the will, it is true, but he 
does this, as we have seen, only in opposition to the " absolute 
necessity" of Hobbes and Spinoza ; according to whom nothing 
in the universe could possibly have been otherwise than it is. 
In his "Reflexions sur le Livre de Hobbes," he says, that 
although the will is determined in all cases by the divine omnipo- 
tence, yet is it free from an absolute or mathematical necessity, 
" because the contrary volition might happen without implying 
a contradiction" True, the contrary volition might happen 

Abrege de la Controverse. \ Reflexions sur le Livre de Hobbes. 



348 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 

without implying a contradiction ; for God himself might cause it 
to exist. And if, by his almighty and irresistible power, he should 
cause it to exist, the will would still be free in Leibnitz's sense 
of the word ; since its contrary might have happened. Hence, 
according to this definition of liberty, if God should, in all cases, 
determine the will to good, it would nevertheless be free ; since 
the contrary determination might have been produced by his 
power. In other words, if such be the liberty of the will, no 
operation of the Almighty could possibly interfere therewith ; 
as no volition produced by him would have rendered it impos- 
sible for him to have caused the opposite volition, if he had so 
chosen and exerted his omnipotence for that purpose. This 
defence of the divine procedure, then, has no foundation in the 
scheme of Leibnitz ; and the only thing he can say in its favour 
is, that after the authority " of many good authors," we have 
added it to our own views. 

Archbishop King, too, as is well known, assumes the ground 
that God permits sin, on account of the greater inconvenience 
that would result to the world from an interference with the 
freedom of the will. But so extravagant are his views respect- 
ing this freedom, that the position in question is one of the 
weakest parts of his system. The mind chooses objects, says 
he, not because they please it; but they are agreeable and 
pleasant to the mind, because it chooses them. Surely, such 
a liberty as this, consisting in a mere arbitrary or capricious 
movement of the soul, that owns not the guidance of reason, or 
wisdom, or anything apparently good, cannot possess so great a 
value that the moral good of the universe should be permitted to 
suffer, rather than that it should be interfered with or restrained. 

But these are merely argumenta ad hominem. There are 
" many good authors " who, although they maintain neither of 
the above views of liberty, insist that it is better for God 
to permit sin, than to interfere with the freedom of his crea- 
tures. But is it clear, that greater inconveniences would have 
arisen from such an interference, than from the frightful reign 
of all the sin and misery that have afflicted the world ? If God 
can so easily prevent all sin, and secure all holiness, by restrain- 
ing the liberty of Ms creatures, is it clear, that in preferring 
their unrestrained freedom to the highest moral ffood of the 
universe, he makes a choice worthy of his infinite wisdom ? In 



SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 349 

other words, is it not more desirable that moral evil should 
everywhere disappear, and the beauty of holiness everywhere 
shine forth, than that the creature should be left to abuse his 
liberty by the introduction of sin and death into the world % 
Besides, it is admitted by all the authors in question, that God 
sometimes interposes the arm of his omnipotence, in order to 
the production of holiness. ISTow, in such an exertion of his 
power, he either interferes with the freedom of the creature, or 
he does not. If he does not interfere with that freedom, why 
may he not produce holiness in other cases also, without any 
such interference? And if, in some cases, he does interfere 
therewith, in order to secure the holiness of his creatures, why 
should he not, in all cases, prefer their highest moral good to 
so fatal an abuse of their prerogatives % Is his proceeding 
therein merely arbitrary and capricious, or is it governed by 
the best of reasons ? Undoubtedly by the best of reasons, say 
all the authors in question : but then, when we come to this 
point of the inquiry, they always tell us, that those reasons are 
profoundly concealed in the unsearchable depths of the divine 
wisdom ; that is to say, they believe them to be the best, not 
because they have seen and considered them, but because they 
are the reasons of an infinitely perfect mind. Now, all this is 
very well ; but it is not to the purpose. It is to retire from the 
arena of logic, and fall back on the very point in dispute for 
support. It is not to argue ; it is simply to drop the weapons 
of our warfare, and oppose the shield of faith to the shafts of 
the adversary. 

It is also contended by Leibnitz and King, as well as many 
other good authors, that there is an established order, or system 
of laws, in the government of the world ; into which so great a 
confusion would be introduced by the interposition of divine 
power to prevent all sin, that some had better be permitted. 
This, which Leibnitz so positively asserts, is thrown out as a 
conjecture by Bishop Butler.* But in the present controversy, 
it is not to the point. For here the question is concerning the 
order and government of the moral world itself. And this 
being the question, it is not admissible for one of the parties 
to say, that the proposed plan for the government of the world 
is not the best, because it would Interfere with and disturb the 

° Analogy, part i, chap. vii. 



350 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 

arrangements of that which is established. This is clearly to 
beg the question. It is to assume that the established method 
is the best, and therefore should not have been superseded by 
another ; but this is the very point in dispute. 

The truth is, that the theist has assailed the sceptic in his 
strong and impregnable point, and left the vulnerable part of 
his system untouched. This may be easily seen. The objection 
of the sceptic is thus stated by Leibnitz : Whoever can prevent 
the sin of another, and does not, but rather contributes to it by 
his concourse and by the occasions he gives rise to, though he 
possesses a perfect knowledge, is an accomplice. God can 
prevent the sin of his intelligent creatures : but he does it not, 
though his knowledge be perfect, and contributes to it by his 
concourse and the occasions to which he gives rise : therefore 
he is an accomplice. Now Leibnitz admits the minor, and 
denies the major, premiss of this argument. He should have 
done the contrary. For, admitting that God might easily pre- 
vent sin, and cause holiness to reign universally, what had he 
left to oppose to the attacks of the sceptic but the shield of 
faith % He might say, indeed, as he often does, that God volun- 
tarily permits sin, because it is a part and parcel of the best 
possible universe. But how easy for the sceptic to demand, 
What good purpose does it answer ? Can it add to the holiness 
or happiness of the universe ? Cannot these high ends, these 
glorious purposes of the Divine Being, be as well attained by 
the universal rectitude and purity of his creatures, as by any 
other means ? Cannot the Supreme Ruler of the world, in the 
resources of his infinite mind, bring as much good out of holi- 
ness as can be brought out of sin ? And if so, why permit sin 
in order to the good of the creation ? Are not the perfect holi- 
ness and happiness of each and every part of the moral world 
better for each and every part thereof than are their contraries \ 
And if so, are they not better for the whole ? By this reply, 
the theist is, in our o}3inion, disarmed, and the sceptic victorious. 
Hence we say, that the former should have conceded the major, 
and denied the minor, premiss of the above argument ; that is, 
he should have admitted, that whoever can prevent the sin of 
another, but, instead of so doing, contributes to it by his con- 
course, is an accomplice : and he should have denied that 
God, being able to produce holiness in the place of sin, both 



SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 351 

permits and contributes to the reign of the latter in his domin- 
ions. The theist should have denied this, we say, if he would 
have raised the ever-blessed God above all contact with sin, 
and placed his cause upon high and impregnable ground, far 
above the attacks of the sceptic. But as it is, he has placed 
that cause upon false grounds, and thereby exposed it to the 
successful shafts of the adversary. 

Another reason assigned by Leibnitz* and Kingf for the per- 
mission of moral evil is, that if God should interpose to prevent 
it, this would be to work a constant and universal miracle. But 
if such a thing were possible, why should he not work such a 
miracle ? By these authors themselves it is conceded, that the 
Almighty often works a miracle for the production of moral 
good ; and, this being the case, why should he not exhibit this 
miracle on the most grand and magnificent scale of which it is 
possible to conceive ? In other words, why should he not ren- 
der it worthy of his infinite wisdom, and power, and goodness ? 
Is it not by a like miracle, by a like universal interposition of 
his power, that the majestic fabric of the material globe is up- 
held, and the sublime movement of all its countless orbs con- 
tinually carried on ? And if so, are not the order and harmony 
of the moral universe as worthy such an exercise of his omnipo- 
tence as are the regularity and beauty of the material? We 
defend the Divine Author and Preserver of all things on no 
such grounds. We say that a universal holiness is not produced 
by the omnipresent energy of his power, not because this would 
be to work a miracle, but because it would be to work a con- 
tradiction. 

But we are becoming weary of such replies. The very ques- 
tion is, Why is there not a universal interposition of the divine 
power ? and the reply, Because this would be a universal inter- 
position of the divine power ! What is all this but a grand at- 
tempt to solve the awful mystery of the world, which ends in 
the assurance that God does not universally interpose to prevent 
sin, because he does not universally interpose to prevent it? 
Or, in fewer words, that he does not, because he does not ? 

Since sin exists, says the sceptic, it follows that God is either 
unable or unwilling to prevent it. " Able, but unwilling" re- 

3 Remarques sur Le Livre cle M. King, sec. xvi. 
J Origin of Evil, vol. ii, ch. y, sec. v. 



352 SUMMAEY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM, 

plies the tlieist. Such is the answer which has come down to 
ns from the earliest times ; from a Lactantius to a Leibnitz, and 
from a Leibnitz to a M'Cosh. No wonder that in all this time 
they have not been able to find the reason why God is unwilling 
to prevent sin ; since, in truth and reality, he is infinitely more 
than willing to do so. 

But, saying that he is willing, shall we concede that he is un- 
able ? By no means : for such language implies that the power 
of God is limited, and he is omnipotent. We choose to impale 
ourselves upon neither horn of the dilemma. We are content 
to leave M. Bayle upon the one, and M. Voltaire upon the other, 
while we bestow our company elsewhere. In plain English, we 
neither reply unwilling nor unable. 

We do say, however, that although God is infinitely willing 
to secure the existence of universal holiness, to the exclusion of 
all sin, yet such a thing is not an object of power, and there- 
fore cannot be produced by omnipotence itself. The produc- 
tion of holiness by the application of power is, as we have seen, 
an absurd and impossible conceit, which may exist in the brain 
of man, but which can never be embodied in the fair and 
orderly creation of God. It can no more be realized by the 
Divine Omnipotence than a mathematical absurdity can be 
caused to be true. 

Hence, we no longer ask why God permits sin. This were 
to seek a ground and reason of that which has no existence, ex- 
cept in the imagination of man. God does not permit sin. He 
chooses it not, and he permits it not, as an essential part of the 
best possible universe. Sin is that which his soul abhors, and 
which all the perfections of his nature, his infinite power and 
wisdom, no less than his holiness, are pledged to wipe out from 
the face of his creation. He does not cause, he does not toler- 
ate sin, on account of its happy effects, or on account of the 
uses to which it may be turned. The only word he has for 
such a thing is woe ; and the only attitude he bears toward it 
is one of eternal and inexorable vengeance. All the schemes 
of men make light of sin ; but God is in earnest, infinitely and 
immutably in earnest, in the purpose to root out and destroy 
the odious thing, that it may have no place amid the glory of 
his dominions. 

As sin did not originate by his permission, so it does not con- 



SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 353 

tinue by his sufferance. He permits it, indeed, in that he per- 
mits the existence of beings capable of sinning ; and he permits 
the existence of such beings in the very act of permitting the 
existence of those who are capable of knowing, and loving, and 
serving him. An infinitely good Being, says M. Bayle, would 
not have conferred on his creature the fatal power to do evil. 
But he did not reflect that a power to do good is, ex necessitate 
rei, a power to do evil. Surely, a good Being would bestow on 
his creature the power to do good— the power to become like 
himself, and to partake of the incommunicable blessedness of a 
holy will. But if he would bestow this, he would certainly con- 
fer power to do evil ; for the one is identical with the other. 
And sin has arisen, not from any power conferred for that pur- 
pose, but from that which constitutes the brightest element in 
the sublime structure and glory of the moral world. It arises, 
not from any imperfection in the work of God, but from that 
without which it would have been infinitely less than perfect. 

" All divines admit," says Bayle, " that God can infallibly 
produce a good act of the will in a human soul without depriv- 
ing it of the use of liberty."* This is no longer admitted. "We 
call it in question. We deny that such an act can be produced, 
either with or without depriving the soul of liberty. We deny 
that it can be produced at all : for whatever God may produce 
in the human soul, this is not, this cannot be, the moral good- 
ness or virtue of the soul in which it is produced. In other 
words, it is not, and it cannot be, an object of praise or of moral 
approbation in him in whom it is thus caused to exist. His 
virtue or moral goodness can exist only by reason, and in case 
of an exercise of his own will. It can no more be the effect of 
an extraneous force than two and two can be made equal to 
five. 

In conclusion, the plain truth is, that the actual universe is 
not in the best of all possible conditions ; for we might con- 
ceive it to be better than it is. If there were no sin and no 
suffering, but everywhere a purity and bliss as great as it is 
possible to conceive, this would be a vast improvement in the 
actual state of the universe. Such is the magnificent dream of 
the sceptic ; and, as we have seen, it is not without truth and 
justice that he thus dreams. But with this dream of his, mag- 

° Dictionary, Article Paulicians. 
23 



•S54 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 

nificent as it is, there is connected another which is infinitely 
false : for he imagines that the sublime spectacle of a world 
without sin, that the beatific vision of a universe robed in stain- 
less splendour might have been realized by the Divine Omnipo- 
tence ; whereas, this could have been realized only by the uni- 
versal and continued cooperation of the whole intelligent crea- 
tion with the grand design of God. On the other hand, the 
theist, by conceding the error and contesting the truth of the 
sceptic, has inextricably entangled himself in the toils of the 
adversary. 

The only remaining question which the sceptic has to ask is, 
that since God might have prevented moral evil by the crea- 
tion of no beings who he foresaw would sin, why did he 
create such beings ? Why did he not leave all such uncreated, 
and call into existence only such as he foreknew would obey 
his law, and become like himself in purity and bliss? This 
question has been fully answered both from reason and revela- 
tion. We have shown that the highest good of the universe 
required the creation of such beings. We have shown that it 
is by his dealings with the sinner that the foundation of his 
spiritual empire is secured, and its boundaries enlarged. In 
particular, we have shown, from revelation, that it is by the 
redemption of a fallen world that all nnfallen worlds are pre- 
served in their allegiance to his throne, and kept warm in the 
bosom of his blessedness. 

If the sceptic should complain that this is to meet him, not 
with weapons drawn from the armory of reason, but from that 
of revelation, our reply is at hand : he has no longer anything 
left to be met. His argument, which assumes that a Being of 
infinite power could easily cause holiness to exist, has been 
shown to be false. This very assumption, this major premiss, 
which has been so long conceded to him, has been taken out of 
his hands, and demolished. Hence, we do not oppose the shield 
of faith to his argument ; we hold it in triumph over his ex- 
ploded sophism. We merely recall our faith, and exult in the 
divine glory which it so magnificently brings to view, and 
against which his once blind and blundering reason has now no 
more to say. 



SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 355 



II. 

SUMMARY OF THE SECOND PART OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 

Having reconciled the existence of sin with the purity of God, 
and refuted the objections against the principles on which that 
reconciliation is based, we next proceeded to the second part of 
the work, in which the natural evil, or suffering, that afflicts 
humanity, is shown to be consistent with his goodness. This 
part consists of five chapters, of whose leading principles and 
position we shall now proceed to take a rapid survey in the re- 
maining sections of the present chapter. 

SECTION I 

God desires the salvation of all men. 

The fact that all men are not saved, at first view, seems in- 
consistent with the goodness of the Divine Being, and the 
sincerity of his endeavours for their conversion. We naturally 
ask, that if God could so easily cause all men to turn and live, 
why should he in vain call upon them to do so ? Is he really 
sincere in the use of means for the salvation of all, since lie 
permits so many to hold out in their rebellion and perish ? In 
other words, if he really and sincerely seeks the salvation of all, 
why are not all saved? This is confessedly one of the most 
perplexing and confounding difficulties which attach to the 
commonly received systems of theology. It constitutes one of 
those profound obscurities from which, it is admitted, theology 
lias not been able to extricate itself, and come out into the clear 
light of the divine glory. 

By many theologians this difficulty, instead of being solved, 
is most fearfully aggravated. Luther, for example, finds it so 
great, that he denies the sincerity of God in calling upon sin- 
ners to forsake their evil ways and live ; and that, as addressed 
to the finally impenitent, his language is that of mockery and 
scorn. And Calvin imagines that such exhortations, as well as 
the other means of grace offered to all, are designed, not for the 



356 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 

real conversion of those who shall finally perish, but to enhance 
their guilt, and overwhelm them in the more fearful condemna- 
tion. If it were possible to go even one step beyond such doc- 
trines, that step is taken by President Edwards : for he is so 
far from supposing that God really intends to lead all men into 
a conformity with his revealed will, that he contends that God 
possesses another and a secret will by which, for some good 
purpose, he chooses their sin, and infallibly brings it to pass. 
If any mind be not appalled by such doctrines, and chilled with 
horror, surely nothing can be too monstrous for its credulity, 
provided only it relate to the divine sovereignty. 

The Arminian with indignation rejects such views of the 
divine glory. But does he escape the great difficulty in ques- 
tion ? If God forms the design, says he, not to save all men, he 
is not infinitely good ; but yet he admits that God actually re- 
fuses to save some. Now, what difference can it make whether 
God's intention not to save all be evidenced by a preexisting 
design, or by a present reality ? Is not everything that is done 
by him, or left undone, in pursuance of his eternal purpose and 
design? What, then, in reference to the point in question, is 
the difference between the Arminian and the Calvinist ? Both 
admit that God could easily save all men if he would / that is, 
render all men holy and happy. But the one says that he did 
not design to save all, while the other affirms that he actually 
refuses to save some. Surely, if we may assume what is con- 
ceded by both parties, the infinite goodness of God is no more 
disproved by a scheme of salvation limited in its design, than 
by a scheme of salvation limited in its execution. Hence, it is 
admitted by many Arminians themselves, that their own scheme 
merely mitigates and softens down, without removing, the ap- 
palling difficulty in question. 

There are many exceptions to this remark. One of the most 
memorable of these is the judgment which Robert Hall* pro- 
nounces concerning the solution of this difficulty by th6 u Won- 
derful Howe." This solution, as we have seen, labours under 
the same defect with those of its predecessors, in that it rejects 

° It is not exactly just to rank Hall among the Arminians. His scheme of 
doctrine, if scheme it may be called, is, like that of so many others, a hetero- 
geneous mixture of Calvinism and Arminianism— a mixture, and not an organic 
compound, of the conflicting elements of the two systems 



SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 357 

the truth that a necessary holiness is a contradiction in terms. 
Instead of following the guidance of this truth, he wanders 
amid the obscurities of the subject, becomes involved in nu- 
merous self-contradictions, and is misled by the deceitful light 
of false analogies. 

We shall not here reproduce his inconsistencies and self- 
contradictions. We shall simply add, that although he, too, 
attempts to show why it is for the best that all should not be 
saved, he frequently betrays the feeble and unsatisfactory nature 
of the impression which his own reasons made upon his mind. 
For the light of these reasons soon fades from his recollection ; 
and, like all who have gone before him, when he comes to con- 
template the subject from another point of view, he declares 
that the reasons of the thing he has endeavoured to explain^ 
are hid from the human mind in the profound depths of the 
divine wisdom. 

If we would realize, then, that God sincerely desires the sal- 
vation of all men, we must plant ourselves on the truth, that 
holiness, which is of the very essence of salvation, cannot be 
wrought in us by an extraneous force. It is under the guidance 
of this principle, and of this principle alone, that we can find 
our way out from the dark labyrinth of error and self-contra- 
diction, in which others are involved, into the clear and beau- 
tiful light of the gospel, that God " will have all men to be 
saved, and come unto a knowledge of the truth." It is with 
the aid of this principle, and of this alone, that we may hear 
the sublime teachings of the divine wisdom, unmingled with 
the discordant sounds of human foil v. 



SECTION II. 

The sufferings of the innocent, and especially of infants, consistent with the 
goodness of God. 

By the Calvinistic school of divines it is most positively and 
peremptorily pronounced that the innocent can never suffer 
under the administration of a Being of infinite goodness. They 
cannot possibly allow that such a Being would permit one of 
his innocent creatures to suffer ; but they can very well believe 
that he can permit them both to sin and to suffer. Is not this 
to strain at a gnat, and swallow a camel ? 



358 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM, 

Having predetermined that the innocent never suffer, they 
have felt the necessity of finding some sin in infants, by which 
their sufferings might be shown to be deserved, and thereby 
reconciled with the divine goodness. This has proved a hard 
task. From the time of Augustine down to the present day, it 
has been diligently prosecuted ; and with what success, we have 
endeavoured to show, The series of hypotheses to which this 
effort has given rise, are, perhaps, as wild and wonderful as any 
to be found in the history of the human mind. We need not 
again recount those dark dreams and inventions in the past 
history of Calvinism* Perhaps the hypothesis of the present 
day, by which it endeavours to vindicate the suffering of infants, 
will seem scarcely less astonishing to posterity, than those ex- 
ploded fictions of the past appear to this generation. 

According to this hypothesis, the infant world deserves 
to suffer, because the sin of Adam, their federal head and 
representative, is imputed to them. It is even contended that 
this constitution, by which the guilt or innocence of the world 
was suspended on the conduct of the first man, is a bright 
display of the divine goodness, since it was so likely to be 
attended with a happy issue to the human race. Likely to be 
attended with a happy issue ! And did not the Almighty fore- 
see and know, that if the guilt of the world were made to 
depend on the conduct of Adam, it would infallibly be attended 
with a fatal result? 

"We have examined, at length, the arguments of an Edwards 
to show that such a divine scheme and constitution of things 
is a display or manifestation of goodness. Those arguments 
are, perhaps, as ingenious and plausible as it is possible for the 
human intellect to invent in the defence of such a cause. 
'When closely examined and searched to the bottom, they cer- 
tainly appear as puerile and weak as it is possible for the human 
imagination to conceive. 

Indeed, no coherent hypothesis can be invented on this sub- 
ject, so long as the mind of the inventor fails to recognise the 
impossibility of excluding all sin. from the moral system of the 
universe : for if all sin, then all suffering, likewise, may be 
excluded ; and we can never understand why either should be 
permitted ; much less can we comprehend why the innocent 
should be allowed to suffer. But having recognised this impos- 



SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 359 

sibility, we have been conducted to three grounds, on which, 
it is believed, the sufferings of the innocent may be reconciled 
with the goodness of God. 

First, the sufferings of the innocent, in so far as they are the 
consequences Of sin, serve to show its terrific nature, and tend 
to prevent its introduction into the world. If this end could 
have been accomplished by the divine power, such a provision 
would have been unnecessary, and all the misery of the world 
only so much " suffering in waste." Secondly, the sufferings 
of the innocent serve as a foil to set off and enhance the bless- 
edness of eternity. They are but a short and discordant prelude 
to an everlasting harmony. Thirdly, difficulties and trials, 
temptations and wants, are indispensable to the rise of moral 
good in the soul of the innocent ; for if there were no tempta- 
tion to wrong, there could be no merit in obedience, and no 
virtue in the world. Suffering is, then, essential to the moral 
discipline and improvement of mankind. On the one or the 
other of these grounds, it is believed that every instance in 
which suffering falls upon the innocent, or falls not as a pun- 
ishment of sin, may be vindicated and reconciled with the 
goodness of God. 

SECTION III. 

The sufferings of Christ consistent with the divine goodness. 

The usual defences of the atonement are good, so far as they 
go, but not complete. The vicarious sufferings of Christ are 
well vindicated on the ground, that they are necessary to cause 
the majesty and honour of the divine law to be respected ; but 
this defence, though sound, has been left on an insecure founda- 
tion ; for it has been admitted that God, by the word of his 
power, might easily have caused his laws to be universally 
respected and obeyed. Hence, according to this admission, 
the sufferings of Christ might have been easily dispensed with, 
and were not necessary in 6rder to maintain the honour and 
glory of the divine government. According to this admission, 
they were not necessary, and consequently not consistent with 
the goodness of God. 

Again : by distinguishing between the administrative and 
the retributive justice of God, and showing that the vica* 



360 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM; 

rious sufferings of Christ were a satisfaction to the first, and not 
to the last, we annihilate the objections of the Socinian. By 
means of this view of the satisfaction rendered to the divine 
justice, we think we have placed the great doctrine of the 
atonement in a clearer and more satisfactory light than usual. 
We have shown that the vicarious sufferings of the tnnocent 
are so far from being inconsistent with the divine justice, that 
they are, in fact, free from the least shadow or appearance of 
hardship either to him or to the world, Nay, that they are a 
bright manifestation of the divine goodness both to himself 
and to those for whom he suffered ; the brightest manifestation 
thereof, indeed, which the universe has ever beheld. 



SECTION IV. 
The eternity of future punishment consistent with the goodness of God. 

The genuine Calvinist, if he reason consecutively from some 
of the principles of his system, can never escape the conclusion 
that all men will be saved : for so long as he denies the ability 
of men to obey without the efficacious grace of Gocl, and affirms 
that this grace is not given to such as shall finally perish, it 
must follow that their punishment is unjust, and that their 
eternal punishment were an act of cruelty and oppression 
greater than it is possible for the imagination of man to con- 
ceive. 

It was precisely from such premises, as we have seen, that 
John Foster denied the eternal duration of future punishment. 
His logic is good ; but even an illogical escape from such a 
conclusion were better than the rejection of one of the great 
fundamental doctrines of revealed religion. By having shown 
his premises to be false, we demolished the very foundation of 
his arguments. But, not satisfied with this, we pursued those 
arguments into all their branches and ramifications, and exposed 
their futility. By these means we have removed the objec- 
tions and solved the difficulties pertaining to this doctrine of 
revealed religion. In one word, we have shown that it is not 
inconsistent with the dictates of reason^ or with the principle 
of the divine goodness. 

We have shown that the eternal punishment of the wicked 



SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 361 

is deserved, and therefore demanded by the divine justice ; 
that they serve to promote the highest moral interests of the 
universe, and are consequently imposed by the divine goodness 
itself. We have shown, that in the administration of his eter- 
nal government, the infliction of an endless punishment is even 
more consistent with goodness than the use of temporal pun- 
ishment in the management of a temporal government ; for the 
first, besides being eternal in duration, is unbounded in extent. 
Thus reason itself, when disenchanted of its strong Calvmistic 
prejudices and its weak Socinian sentimentalities, utters no 
other voice than that which proceeds from revelation ; and 
this it echoes rather than utters. In plainer words, though 
reason does not prove or establish the eternity of future pun- 
ishment, it has not one syllable to say against its wisdom, its 
justice, or its goodness. 

SECTION" V. 

The t/rue doctrine of election and predestination consistent with the goodness 

of God. 

The Calvinists endeavour to support their scheme of elec- 
tion and predestination by means of analogies drawn from the 
unequal distribution of the divine favours, which is observable 
in the natural economy and government of the world. But 
the two cases are not parallel. According to the one, though 
the divine favours are unequally distributed, no man is ever 
required to render an account of more than he receives. 
Whereas, according to the other, countless millions of human 
beings are doomed to eternal misery for the non-observance of 
a law which they never had it in their power to obey. This 
is to judge them, not according to what they receive, but 
according to what they receive not, and cannot obtain. It is 
to call them to give an account of talents never committed to 
their charge. The difference between the two cases is, indeed, 
precisely that between the conduct of a munificent prince who 
bestows his favours unequally, but without making unreason- 
able demands, and the proceeding of a capricious tyrant who, 
while he confers the most exalted privileges and honours on 
one portion of his subjects, consigns all the rest, not more unde- 
serving than they, to hopeless and remediless destruction ; and 



362 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM.- 

that, too, for the non-performance of an impossible condition/ 
Is it not wonderful that two cases so widely and so glaringly 
different, should have been so long and so obstinately com 
founded by serious inquirers after truth ? 

The Calvinistic scheme of predestination, it is pretended, 
derives support from revelation. The ninth chapter of Romans 
which, from the time of Augustine down to the present day, 
has been so confidently appealed to in its support, has, as we 
have seen, no relation to the subject. It relates, not to the 
election of individuals to eternal life, but of a nation to the 
enjoyment of external privileges and advantages. This is so 
plain, that Dr. Macknight, though an advocate of the Calvin- 
istic dogma of predestination, refuses to employ that portion of 
Scripture in support of his doctrine. 

Nor does the celebrated passage of the eighth chapter of the 
same epistle touch the point in controversy. We might well 
call in question the Calvinistic interpretation of that passage, 
if this were necessary ; but we take it in their own sense, and 
show that it lends no support to their views. The Calvinists 
themselves being the interpreters, that passage teaches that 
God, according to his eternal purpose, chose or selected a cer- 
tain portion out of the great mass of mankind as the heirs of 
eternal life. Granted, then, that a certain portion of the human 
race were thus made the obj ects of a peculiar favour, and pros- 
pectively endowed with the greatest of all conceivable blessings. 
But who were thus chosen, or selected? and on what principle 
was the election made ? In regard to this point, it is not pre- 
tended by them that the passage in question utters a single 
syllable. They themselves being the judges, this Scripture 
merely affirms that a certain portion of mankind are chosen or 
elected to eternal life ; while in regard to the ground, or the 
reason, of their election, it is most perfectly and profoundly 
silent. 

Hence it leaves us free to assume the position, that those per* 
sons were elected or chosen who God foresaw would,- by a 
cooperation with his Spirit, make their calling and election 
sure. And being thus left free, this is precisely the position 
in which we choose to plant ourselves, in order to vindicate 
the divine glory against the awful misrepresentations of Calvin- 
ism : for, in the first placej this view harmonizes the passage 



SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM* 363 

in question with other portions of the divine record, and allows 
us, without the least feeling of self-contradiction, to embrace 
the sublime word, that God " will have all men to be saved ;" 
and that if any are not made the heirs of his great salvation, 
it is because his grace would have proved unavailing to 
them. 

Secondly, this view not only harmonizes two classes of seem- 
ingly opposed texts of Scripture, but it also serves to vindicate 
the unbounded glory of the divine goodness. It shows that the 
goodness of God is not partial in its operation ; neither taking 
such as it leaves, nor leaving such as it takes ; but embracing 
all of the same class, and that class consisting of all who, by 
wicked works, do not place themselves beyond the possibility 
of being saved. Unlike Calvinism, it presents us, not with the 
spectacle of a mercy which might easily save all, but which, 
nevertheless, contenting itself with a few only, abandons the 
rest to the ravages of the never-dying worm. 

Thirdly, at the same time that it vindicates the glory of the 
divine mercy, it rectifies the frightful distortion of the divine 
justice, which is exhibited in the scheme of Calvinism. Accord- 
ing to this scheme, all those who are not elected to eternal life 
are set apart as the objects on which the Almighty intends to 
manifest the glory of his justice. But how is this glory, or his 
justice, manifested? Displayed, we are told, by dooming its 
helpless objects to eternal misery for the non-performance of 
an impossible condition ! A display of justice this, which, to 
the human mind, bears every mark of the most appalling 
cruelty and oppression. A display of justice stamped uith the 
most terrific features of its opposite ; so that no human mind 
can see the glory of the one, for the inevitable manifestation of 
the other ! No wonder that Calvinists themselves so often fly 
from the defence of such a display of the divine justice, and 
hide themselves in the unsearchable clouds and darkness of the 
divine wisdom. This being of course a display for eternity, 
and not for time, they may there await the light of another 
world to clear away these clouds, and reveal to them the great 
mystery of such a manifestation of the divine justice. But 
whether that light will bring to view the great mystery of the 
divine wisdom therein displayed, or the great secret of human 
folly therein concealed, we can hardly say remains to be seen. 



364 SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 

The view we take presents a glorious display of the divine 
justice for time as well as for eternity. 

Fourthly, this view not only shows the justice and the mercy 
of God, separately considered, in the most advantageous light) 
but it exhibits the sublime harmony which subsists between 
them. It presents not, like Calvinism, a mercy limited by jus- 
tice^ and a justice limited by mercy ; but it exhibits each in its 
absolute perfection, and in its agreement with the other : for, 
according to this view, the claim of mercy extends to all who 
may be saved, and that of justice to those who may choose to 
remain incorrigibly wicked. Hence, the claim of the one does 
not interfere with that of the other ; nor can we conceive how 
either could be more gloriously displayed* We behold the 
infinite amplitude, as well as the ineffable, unclouded splendour 
of each divine perfection, without the least disturbance or col- 
lision between them. In the very act of punishment, the tender 
mercy of God, which is over all his works, concurs, and inflicts 
that suffering which is demanded by the good of the uni- 
verse. The torment of the lost, is " the wrath of the Lamb." 
The glory of the redeemed, is the pity of the Judge. Hence, 
instead of that frightful conflict which the scheme of Calvinism 
presents, we behold a reconciliation and agreement among the 
divine attributes, worthy the great principle of order, and har- 
mony, and beauty in the universe. 

SECTION VI. 

The question submitted. 

We must now take leave of the reader. "We have honestly 
endeavoured to construct a Theodicy, or to vindicate the divine 
glory as manifested in the constitution and government of the 
moral world. We have endeavoured to reconcile the great 
fundamental doctrines of God and man with each other, as well 
as with the eternal principles of truth. It has likewise been 
our earnest aim, to evince the harmony of the divine attributes 
among themselves, as well as their agreement with the condition 
of the universe. In one word, we have aimed to repel the 
objections, and solve the difficulties which have been permitted 
to obscure the glory of the Divine Being ; whether those diffi- 
culties and objections have seemed to proceed from the false 



SUMMARY OF THE FOREGOING SYSTEM. 365 

philosophy of his enemies, or the mistaken views and misguided 
zeal of his friends. How far we have succeeded in this attempt, 
no less arduous than laudable, it is not for us to determine. 
We shall, therefore, respectfully submit the determination of 
this point to the calm and impartial judgment of those who 
may possess both the desire and the capacity to think for 
themselves. 



NOTE. 



In this work, beginning at page seventy, Dr. M'Cosh is accused of being on 
both sides of the great question respecting the freedom of the will, which has 
been so long debated between Arminians and Calvinists. In the fourth edition 
of his " Divine Government " he replies, in an appendix, that " it is much 
easier to assert than to prove this." I have not laboured to show his self-con- 
tradiction. I have simply exhibited his statements on both sides of the ques- 
tion, and left the reader to determine whether the contradiction does not show 
itself. 

Dr. M'Cosh says, " Mr. B. has made his use of some unguarded expressions 
used in the first edition of this work, but which had disappeared from the later 
British editions before the Theodicy was published;* we do not think the 
statements now made are inconsistent," &c. Now does not this indirectly 
admit that the statements as before made by him were inconsistent ? 

But what are these " unguarded expressions ?" Only two of the expres- 
sions noticed by me have disappeared from the work of Dr. M. The one is 
the extract, on page seventy, concluding with the words of Coleridge : " It is 
the man that makes the motive, and not the motive the man." Now here, 
let it be remembered, the whole controversy is concerning the relation between 
motive and the will. Dr. M. says that Necessitarians have erred because they 
have been " afraid of making admissions to their opponents." He entertains 
no such fear. He boldly proceeds to adopt the pointed and well-known 
expression of one of the most distinguished of these opponents ; an expression 
relating to the very point in controversy, and, if true, decisive of the whole 
question. Now who could, for one moment, have imagined that in adopting 
such language Dr. M. was merely putting forth "an unguarded expression?" 
If it were not his mature and deliberate opinion, I make bold to affirm that it 
ought to have been so ere it was given to the world. 

The other position of the author, considered as an unguarded expression, 
will appear still more wonderful. It relates to the nature of liberty. In the 
first edition of his work Dr. M. adopted that notion of the freedom of the will 
which is maintained by President Edwards and other Calvinistic divines. It 
has been, indeed, called, by a distinguished Calvinist, the Calvinistic idea of 
moral liberty. (See page G9.) It is discussed at length in the first chapter 
° Mv strictures were on the onlv American edition. 



NOTE. 367 

of this work, and in section fourteen of my " Examination of Edwards on the 
Will." 

When I saw the same idea put forth by Dr. M'Cosh, I supposed that as he 
was a Calvinistic divine so he had adopted the Calvinistic idea and definition 
of free-will. I certainly did not imagine for an instant that such a position 
was merely " an unguarded expression " on his part. I should, indeed, just as 
soon have supposed that his whole work, from beginning to end, was made up 
of " unguarded expressions." Nay, I should as soon have supposed that the 
same position in President Edwards, though so elaborately wrought out and 
explicitly laid down by him, was merely an " unguarded expression." Indeed, 
if we would write on these great themes at all, we should take care how we 
speak of moral liberty, the very thing in dispute. It will not do to speak in 
unguarded expressions ; and if we adopt the stereotyped definition or idea of 
any particular school, we should not complain that it is supposed to be our 
real opinion. 

It is a little remarkable, I think, that, although it is in this work that Dr. M, 
is accused of self-contradiction, he notices only certain passages in the ex- 
amination aforesaid, and attempts no reply to my strictures upon his work. I 
still think he contradicts himself. Let the reader judge. 

" Mr. B." says he, " deals much more in the criticism of others than in the 
exposition of his own system." This is true, and especially in regard to his 
M Examination." For all that is necessary to establish " his own system " of 
free-will is to show that the scheme of his opponents is false. In other words, 
if it be shown that there is no power over the will by which its volitions are 
determined, then are we free. Hence, to batter down the scheme of necessity 
is to establish the doctrine of free-will. 

" In such a subject as the freedom of the will," says Dr. M., " it is easy to 
start objections, but not so easy to evolve a doctrine free from all difficulties." 
Hence, even if Mr. B. has not evolved any system of his own, it is to be hoped 
he has committed no very great sin. It will be time, he thinks, to evolve a 
system when he can find one which shall be free from contradiction. 

But I have, according to Dr. M., been singularly unfortunate in having 
landed myself in many difficulties, although I have evolved no doctrine of my 
own. Here is one of these many difficulties : " In order to support his theory, 
he is obliged to strip causation of its very peculiarities to make effect mean 
simply what is effected," &c. Now, if an effect does not mean what is 
effected, I should like to know what it does mean. Does it mean something 
that is not effected ? If so, what becomes of Dr. M.'s great principle, that 
every effect must have a cause? " See this defective view noticed," says Dr. 
M., " in Art, HI, p. 523." On turning to that article we find him saying: 
" There is something new implied in the very conception of effect — it is some- 
thing effected, something which did not exist before, or put in a new state." 
What! is it possible, after all, that an effect is something effected? in its very 
conception, something effected? 

According to my scheme, says Dr. M., "there can be no guarantee, even in 
the power of God, against the very saints in glory falling away, or even — we 
ase tne lannaiaoe reluctantlv — in the continuance of the Divine Excellence.'' 



368 NOTE. 

This objection has been a thousand times urged against the scheme of Armin^ 
ians. It is repeatedly noticed in this volume. (See Part I, chap, vii, sec. 3 ; 
also Part I, chap, vi, sec. 7 ; and also Part II, chap, ii, sec. 4.) The bare 
restatement of this objection by Dr. M., who makes no allusion to my answers, 
does not entitle it to further notice. 

According to Dr. M., Mr. B. says : " We are conscious of action, and a 
thing which acts cannot be caused." Now here, Dr. M. has not only made 
his use of this unguarded expression ; he has made the unguarded expression 
itself. It is not mine. It can nowhere be found in my works ; for I have 
taken the utmost pains to guard against any and every such blundering 
expression of my views. It is true, and I admit, that " a thing which acts 
can be caused." The mind, for example, acts ; and yet the mind is caused, 
yea, it is created by the power of the Almighty. 

I have never doubted that " a thing which acts can be caused." But that is 
not the question ; for that is, on all sides, conceded. " The question is," as I 
have said in my examination, (p. 121,) " can the mind he efficiently caused to 
act ? Or, in other words, has an act of the will — not has the mind — not has 
the will itself — but has an act of the will an efficient cause ? Is each act 
produced by a preceding act ? TJiat is the question which I have put, and 
put with emphasis, in order that my position might not be misunderstood. I 
have not only clearly, distinctly, and most emphatically put this precise ques- 
tion, but I have also accompanied its terms with an elaborate explanation of 
the precise sense in which they are used by me. But all this is overlooked, 
and other words are substituted in their place. All my arguments and illus- 
trations are passed by, and I am made to father a proposition which I have not 
put forth, and which I utterly repudiate and reject as false. 

Having done this, Dr. M. may well add, " There is an obvious mistake 
here, and indeed in his whole view of action and passion. Surely that which 
is acted on may itself have power of action." Surely, I repeat, it may. The 
mind, though acted on, not only may have, but it has, a power of action in 
itself. I know not what mistakes Dr. M. may have discovered in my " whole 
view of action and passion ;" but I do know that the only mistake therein 
which he attempts to point out is one of his own creation. He convicts me 
of a gross blunder, not by quoting my own expressions, but simply by invent- 
ing an expression for me. He should be more guarded. 

Note.— Some of my quotations from Dr. M'Cosh's work will be found in the fourth 
edition, in Article VII. of the Appendix. 



THE END. 



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